TELOS

Number 53 Fall 1982

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Articles:

HELLER, FEHER: *The Antinomies of Peace*
CASTORIADIS: *The Crisis of Western Society*
CASANOVA: *The Modernization of Spain*
NAÏR: *Algeria (1954 - 1982)*
DENITCH: *Social Movements in the Reagan Era*
GRANSOW, OFFE: *Political Culture in the SPD*
KALLSCHEUER: *Philosophy and Politics in the SPD*
KARNOOUH: *National Unity in Central Europe*
RITTERSPORN: *The 1930's in Soviet History*

Poland and the Continuing Eastern European Crisis:

The End of Nomenclature? Interview with Szlajfer
THIBAUD: *The Extent of the Defeat*
TOURAINE et. al.: *A Social Movement: Solidarity*
SWIDLICKI: *"Experience and the Future"*
A.M.: *Our Goal Must Not Be Revenge*
TÖRÖCSIK: *Hungary 1956 — 25 Years Later*
DONATH: *1956 and Self-Management*
HEGEDÜS: *Hungary in 1956*

Notes and Commentary:

CAVALCANTI: *The Left in the Mallands*
WOLIN: *The Benjamin Congress: (July 13, 1982)*
Discussions by Arato, Breines, Castoriadis, Cohen, Graham, Piccone and Zaslavsky

Reviews:

SHORT JOURNAL REVIEWS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TELOS
a quarterly journal of radical thought

Editor: *Paul Piccone*

Managing Editors: *Janet McMurtry, Joan Toeniskoetter*

Book Review Editor: *Paul Breines*

Journal Review Editor: *John Fekete*

Editorial Associates: *Frank Adler, Andrew Arato, Seyla Benhabib, Russell Berman, José Casanova, Pedro C.U. Cavalcanti, Jean Cohen, Robert D'Amico, David Gross, Joan Landes, Axel Honneth, Russell Jacoby, Testuo Kogawa, Joel Kovel, Orville Lee III, Tim Luke, Eleni Mahaira-Odoni, David Parent, Mark Poster, Adolph Reed Jr., Gabor Rittersporn, Ivan Szelenyi, Joel Whitebook, Victor Zaslavsky, Sharon Zukin*

Carbondale *Telos* Group: *Harry Hoffman, Raymond Lau, Nan-Nan Lee, David Johnson, Mark Wichlin*

****

Subscription Rates

One year individual	$20.00	One year institutional	$38.00
Two year individual	$40.00	Two year institutional	$76.00

Foreign subscribers, including those in Canada, must pay an additional 10 percent to cover handling and postage charges.

****

Available back issues: Nos. 13, 17-52. Cost to individuals is $4.50 per copy for each issue prior to No. 40; $5.00 each for No. 40 onward. Institutions pay $10.00 each for all back issues. Foreign orders add 10 percent. Payment must be in U.S. funds (no checks drawn on Canadian banks can be accepted). Out-of-print issues may be obtained in microform or facsimile editions through University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106 USA.

****

Telos is published in the Spring, Summer, Fall and Winter. *Telos* No. 52 corresponds to Vol. 15, No. 3. Second class postage paid at St. Louis, Missouri. Address all correspondence to:

TELOS
Box 3111
St. Louis, MO 63130 USA.

Copyright 1982, Telos Press Ltd.

ISSN 0090-6514

****

Unsolicited manuscripts will be considered if the author provides at least three copies. Please allow three months minimum for editorial consideration. Rejected manuscripts will not be returned.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TELOS

a quarterly journal of radical thought

Number 53 Fall 1982

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 3

ARTICLES:

The Antinomies of Peace 5
Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller

The Crisis of Western Societies 17
Cornelius Castoriadis

The Modernization of Spain 29
José Casanova

Algeria 1954-1982: Social Forces and Blocs in Power 45
Kuider Sami Naïr

Social Movements in the Reagan Era 57
Bogdan Denitch

Political Culture and the Politics of the Social Democratic Government 67
Volker Gransow and Claus Offe

Philosophy and Politics in the SPD 81
Otto Kallscheuer

National Unity in Central Europe:
The State, Peasant Folklore, and Mono-Ethnism 95
Claude Karnoouh

The 1930s in the Longue Durée of Soviet History 107
Gabor Rittersporn

SPECIAL SECTION: CRISES IN EASTERN EUROPE

The End of Nomenclature? A Conversation with Henryk Szlajfer 117

The Extent of the Defeat 121
Paul Thibaud

A Social Movement: Solidarity 128
F. Dubet, A. Touraine, M. Wieviorka

"Experience and the Future" and the Polish Crisis 137
Andrzej Swidlicki

Our Goal Must Not Be Revenge 150
A.M.

Hungary 1956 — 25 Years Later 157
Mihaly Töröcsik

1956 and Self-Management 160
Ferenc Donath

Hungary in '56 163
Andras Hegedüs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NOTES AND COMMENTARY:
The Left in the Mallands 173
Pedro C.U. Cavalcanti
The Benjamin-Congress: Frankfurt (July 13, 1982) 178
Richard Wolin
More on *Telos* and Social Movements 185
Paul Breines
Reply to Our Non-critics 188
Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen
"Facing the War" and "The Socio-Economic Roots of Re-Armament":
A Rejoinder 192
Cornelius Castoriadis
Reply to Castoriadis 198
Victor Zaslavsky
On Social Movements, Non-Liberals, and Castoriadis 201
Paul Piccone
Reviews as Politics: Reply to Bookchin 208
Daniel Neal Graham

REVIEWS:
Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, *The Ethiopian Revolution* 211
Tom Good
Peter Fuller, *Seeing Berger: A Revaluation of Ways of Seeing* 217
Peter Fuller, *Beyond the Crisis in Art*
Casey Blake
Nikolai-Klaus von Kreitor, *Kansankodin Kuokkavieras* 224
Martha Flogell
Katrin Lederer, ed., *Human Needs: A Contribution to the Current Debate* 227
Patricia Springborg
Short Journal Reviews 231
Carbondale Telos *Group*

SCREEN

22/4
Television:
Art Television: TV series and soaps: Documentary Producers and the US Networks

Macte — interview with Pat Murphy: Eisenstein and Reich on the orgasm:
Cumulative Index 1971-1981

22/3
UK Film Legislation — interview with Sir Harold Wilson

MARY KELLY Modernist Criticism: PAUL WILLEMEN Inner Speech: Michael Snow's *Presents*: Equality in the ACTT

Single copies £2.50 (US $7) plus 50p ($1) p&p from SEFT Ltd, 29 Old Compton St, London W1

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INTRODUCTION

Far from being exhausted in the previous two issues, the question of new social movements is receiving more attention than ever. Moving on a broader theoretical level than most previous contributors, Heller and Feher carefully examine the antinomies of anti-nuclear and peace movements. In doing so, they dispel a number of simplistic assumptions about these movements by placing their concerns within a wider ethical and historical framework. In the way of a preview of his new book — the second volume of *Devant la Guerre* — Castoriadis discusses aspects of the general crisis of Western societies, especially the United States. It is precisely this series of problems that constitutes the backdrop against which the new social movements thrive, and not *just* those on the Left. As Denitch shows, in fact, a lot of these new movements tend to exhibit a right-wing orientation and can be understood primarily in terms of the disintegration of party politics.

Focusing specifically on West Germany and the SPD, both the Kallscheuer and the Offe-Gransow articles extend this analysis of the impasse in party politics. Both try to indicate how a more positive SPD orientation toard the alternative movements might revitalize such hitherto statist approaches to politics. Although both articles were written well before the fall of the Schmidt government, their analyses accurately identify some of the more glaring shortcomings that precipitated such a failure. Although limited to the West German SPD, these analyses can be readily extended to include most other Western political parties and, as such, point to the much broader crisis which Castoriadis has begun to outline.

While martial law did checkmate any possibility of major social change in Poland, it has clearly failed to resolve any of the underlying problems. In a special section on "Poland and the Continuing Eastern European Crisis," we reprint an interview, now more than a year old, with Henryk Szlajfer of the Warsaw branch of Solidarity to reiterate the moderation and fundamental soundness of the union's demands. The same can be said of the role of Polish intellectuals. Swidlicki recounts the history of the group "Experience and Future," and critically evaluates the various reports it issued, even after the imposition of martial law. Thibaud and Touraine *et al.* begin to provide overall evaluations of the impact of Solidarity, while A.M., still imprisoned in Poland, attempts to indicate possible options for the movement under and after martial law.

A lot has been written about and much speculation given to "the Kadarist alternative" for Poland, on the assumption that it is a lasting solution to the problems of Eastern European societies under Soviet domination. Tőrőcsik indicates that the compromise between the regime and the intellectuals may be coming to an end. A quarter of a century after the Hungarian revolution, Donath and Hegedüs re-examine the significance of self-management and the unfolding of events at that time. This is particularly relevant in the case of Hegedüs who happened to be in the midst of the turmoil and can thus not only draw from his own experience, but also do so *from the viewpoint of the other side.*

Still in Eastern Europe — but a little further south — Karnoouh describes how cultural traditions are instrumentalized by the state apparatus; and Rittersporn attempts to evaluate the meaning of the 1930s in Soviet history.

In the past, *Telos* has been often criticized for paying far too much attention to Eastern and Western Europe, while hardly ever mentioning the Third World. This is no accident. Given the journal's general theoretical perspective, it has always been easier to identify with movements and events in those parts of the world than with Third World movements. The latter have always had strong Marxist-Leninist leanings and have tended to result in authoritarian regimes impossible to identify with. In this issue,

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

however, some of these problems of underdevelopment-industrialization-imperialism-militarism are concretely confronted. The section starts, somehow indirectly, with a European Mediterranean society.

Casanova's article on Spain is particularly interesting in that he shows that foreign capital may develop economies, and imperialist exploitation does, in some cases, improve people's economic and social conditions. It thus runs counter to much Marxist-Leninist rhetoric to the effect that only a break with the capitalist world can bring about meaningful development. It also suggests the need for empirical studies to overcome outdated simplistic schemes and old Marxist formulas, to concretely understand the exact role of economic imperialism today. This is precisely what Naïr does: he addresses the same problem of development on the other side of the Mediterranean. The focus is on the political system built since Algeria's independence and the interaction of classes and social groups in the last two decades of Algerian history. As usual, the military clearly emerge as the preponderant force. Naïr's article is remarkable in that it competently analyzes the formation and evolution of a *typical* Third World political system with all its authoritarian, inefficient and internally contradictory features. Cavalcanti's account of the Left response to the Malvinas-Falkland war points to the Left's illusion of giving unconditional support to Third World movements of whatever kind. Because of frustrations with its own social impotence and the impossibility of revolution in the West, there is a tendency in the Left to displace its "guilty conscience" by jumping on the bandwagon of *any* "revolution" in Asia, Africa or Latin America. Cavalcanti shows this *third-worldism* to be a bad disguise for a Marxism-Leninism no longer able to present itself as such after Poland, Afghanistan and other revelations about "really existing socialism." The same lesson can be learned by reading Good's review of Halliday's and Molyneux's apologetic book on Ethiopia. With exceeding moderation, Good exposes it as another attempt by a certain authoritarian Left, to justify events that no one would dream to try to "understand" if they took place under capitalism.

To the extent that *Telos* has editors and contributors dispersed throughout the world, and its politics are, within the context of a democratic Left, fairly pluralistic, it is understandable that a great deal of diversity and controversy thrives within it. Differences and misunderstandings, of course, are normally dealt with in a democratic and generally friendly way. Occasionally, however, the political and theoretical dimensions of these differences are too important to keep *inter familia* and it becomes necessary to articulate them in print. In this issue, Arato, Breines, Castoriadis, Cohen, Zaslavsky and Piccone tackle a few of these crucial issues and indicate how, among ourselves, we are even more severe than with opponents.

The issue closes with a detailed report by Wolin of the Benjamin Congress in Frankfurt and additional reviews by Blake, Flogell and Springborg.

Pedro C. U. Cavalcanti and Paul Piccone

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE ANTINOMIES OF PEACE

by Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller

The new peace movements present a number of dilemmas. On the one hand, there are some accumulated experience and principles which can still serve as standards to criticize not the illusions but the (often-deliberate) self-delusions of peace movements. On the other hand, these movements have obviously raised a number of questions which had not been part of Left theoretical discourse and political strategy, and which have to be confronted in order to formulate new answers.

Normally, movements do not take off with rational argumentation, but rather, with *gesture*. They start with protest, disobedience, rebellion. They express and indicate needs and desires rather than interpret them. The first characteristic of movements growing out of such needs and desires is that, as a rule, they focus on *single-issues*. The second, and complementary feature, is that by promoting this single issue, *they contribute to a more general cause*. In the case of peace movements, the more general cause has been so comprehensively described by Arato and Cohen that there is little to add.[1] The general cause is the fight against the expropriation by institutions and a "system logic" of the universal possibility of decision-making in vital democratic issues as well as, ultimately, global human survival. A third feature is that movements are only *minimally organized*. There are, of course, always trends within them, typified by activists from one party or another which aim at providing the movement with a more solid and circumscribed organizational framework. But as long as they preserve their initial momentum, movements can resist attempts of this kind. This, however, does not exclude stimulating dialogues between movements and political organizations. Fourthly, and precisely for the above reasons, they are generally indifferent, and sometimes outrightly hostile, to doctrinaire tenets. However, this is not to say that they are hostile to ideologies, rather their "ideology-intake" operates in such subterranean way that it radically differs from that of ideologically-centered political parties. A further structural feature is that, more often than not, movements are short-lived. Thus, their demise is experienced as *horror vacui* by those who are most involved — although, like the phoenix, they spring to life once again around new issues, usually with a partly changed constituency. And, finally, in the majority of cases, movements are *cross-class phenomena*.

All of these features explain the increasing importance attributed to movements in Western European politics. Not being organized along traditional European party lines, the American political scene has always displayed a much greater resiliance towards them. The movements of the 60s, both in their anti-war as well as more general objectives, have left an indelible mark on the political consciousness of even those who did not fully participate in

1. Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen, "The Peace Movement and Western European Sovereignty," *Telos*, 51 (Spring 1982), pp. 158-171.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

them. It is therefore relevant to inquire into the potential role of movements in general, and of peace movements in particular, in regard to the defence and radicalization of democracy. This is possible because, by promoting a general cause through their single issues, *movements have a democratic potential and substance*. To realize this potential, two conditions have to be met. First, the particular issues advocated by the movements should have an affinity with democratic values, ideas or tenets. Secondly, these issues should be open to rational discussion.

The second condition (readiness to dialogue) is at least as important as the first for the realization of the democratic substance. The reason is simple. For the duration of the movement, the people involved share one single objective. Yet, they live the rest of their lives with various other needs and interests. This, in turn, means a differentiated approach to the single issue in common. If these different interpretations of the shared cause cannot be actively formulated (and their active formulation is what openness to rational discourse means), the movement will inevitably have its newly created public sphere organized around the shared single issue turned against individual members as a coercive force preventing them from expressing objections, doubts and personal views. It will be expropriated by "opinion-makers." In this way, movements which originally aimed at the reformation of the alienated public sphere, can be degraded into manifestations of a *sham public sphere* similar to the alienated official institutions criticized by them.

The result is uneven. Peace movements promote a single issue which has an undeniably radical and democratic potential in terms of its further contribution to the more general cause (the re-appropriation of the public sphere of crucial decision-making). While they have an affinity to democratic values to the extent that the undeniable presence of manipulative 'opinion-makers' in them does not make the participants deaf to counterarguments, they also contain a romantic attitude betraying an inclination towards self-closure. In this double capacity, they may become the springboard for a radical, if not doctrinaire, struggle for the re-democratization of the West. But because of the romantic elements (which, of course, have a most important critical potential), they can degenerate into an intolerant and destructive force as well.

Peace as a 'Single Issue' and as an Empirical Universal

That movements are concerned with single issues seems straightforward and simple. In fact, this has two entirely different constituents. The first is the *supreme value* (or *ultimate end*), the second is the *concrete objective*. One's self-definition as the member of a movement only means one's unqualified acceptance of the supreme value as valid. In this sense, the supreme value is accepted with a *gesture*. It is tautological to state that joining the peace movement implies the acceptance of *peace as an ultimate end or supreme value*. In reality, there is quite a complex historical constellation behind this simple and tautological statememt.

A good deal of the agressiveness of peace militants stems from an almost

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deliberate distortion. They behave as if peace were an empirical human universal since time immemorial, whereas in fact this empirical human universal has a fairly short career. It has become accepted as such in the wake of the terrible casualties of WWII and Hiroshima. Before the war, Fascist or semi-Fascist cultures promoted a martial anthropology supporting Napoleon's dictum: "What the hell does a million dead mean to me?" Similarly, what was then accepted as socialism lived in perfect and open contempt of peace. As far as intentions are concerned, the pushy intolerance of many peace activists serves a good cause: the bolstering of the newly born empirical universal. This does not mean, however, that one should compromise with substantive exaggerations. When, in an otherwise interesting and original article, one finds a reiteration of the criminal charge against the so-called allies' terror bombardments against Germany,[2] it becomes necessary to point out that the prisoners of concentration camps, who prayed daily for the return of Anglo-American planes, were also human beings. So were the soldiers of the Western armies who would have been massacred in additional thousands had the bombardments not undermined German and Japanese resistance.[3] Falk's argument and similar positions are instances of an exaggerated advocacy of peace as an empirical universal. The advocates unwittingly place themselves in the position of superhuman arbiters: they pit human lives against other human lives and decide which are 'more valuable.' Allied commanders followed a more pragmatic principle: national interest. In so doing, they remained more humane.[4]

A different situation obtains with the peace movement's *concrete objective*. Here a gesture does not suffice. Interpretation becomes inevitable and it can only be carried out under the aegis of values other than the movement's supreme value. Arato and Cohen have pointed out how a rift emerges in the peace movement and around it between those for whom peace is only conceivable in conjunction with freedom (as the "good life") and those who advocate life — be it no more than sheer slavery (as mere life). Whatever level the pertinent debates have reached so far, mere gestures are no longer enough. Tactical alternatives and programmatic options will have to be defined through seemingly sterile debates around the *concrete objective*.

Peace Movement or Anti-Nuclear Movement?

The two movements, one seeking peace and the other the abolition of nuclear weapons, are usually merged into one. But they are not identical. The false impression is created by the gestures and failure to discuss analytically

2. Richard Falk, "Nuclear Weapons and the End of Democracy," *Praxis International*, 2:1 (April 1982).

3. A key witness testifies that they had done so: in his *Diaries*, Goebbels repeatedly described with despair how the population of the Western parts of Germany, terrorized by endless bombardments, hampered the *Wehrmacht*'s resistance. See "Final Entries, 1945," *The Diaries of Joseph Goebbels*, ed. with introduction by H. Trevor-Roper (New York, 1979), in particular pp. 16, 22, 85-86.

4. Of course, the destruction of Dresden cannot be justified with pragmatic reasons, and Hiroshima was more than the destruction of a city.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the content of these gestures. What ends up obscured is that a)peace movements and anti-nuclear movements are not identical, and b) that anti-nuclear movements serve as vehicles for several different social aspirations.

As to the first, consider the Falkland war. Irrespective of any assessments of Thatcher's policy, Great Britain which, along with West Germany, was the noisiest battle-field of the seemingly identical peace and anti-nuclear movements, was gripped by a bellicose patriotism. The English anti-nuclear movement, with the exception of the small and principled minority around Tony Benn, offered no resistance to Thatcher's war policy. In this sense, it was no peace movement at all.

What is, then, the anti-nuclear movement if and when it is not a peace movement? First, it is *romantic environmentalist action*. This can best be seen in the case of the West German version which, way before the problem of the missiles was raised, had already moved against nuclear power stations through *Bürgerinitiative*. The romantic character of these aspirations is ambivalent. On the one hand, they engage in a good deal of uncritical rhetoric in the name of "life" or the "organic" which is being now contaminated by the "artificial" or the "synthetic" polluting the air and poisoning rivers. This trend is uncritical in that it also accepts modern industrial civilization and its system of needs, ignoring that, should the artificial be eliminated, present needs could not be satisfied. On the other hand, this romantic trend may instigate the first major technological revolution to break out under conscious social guidance. The ecologists' romantic movement might erupt into the most powerful of such radical technological revolutions.

There are also other non-pacifist uses of the anti-nuclear movements. The best-known of the non-pacifist anti-nuclear movements is the one which rejects the stationing of nuclear weapons in its country either as long as the population of that given country has to contribute considerably to their costs, or when the nuclear weapons are stationed on a nation's territory without this nation's right to overrule decisions regarding their deployment. Both cases conceal nationalist tendencies in anti-nuclear disguise — and the term "nationalist" is just as contradictory as "romantic."

This makes it possible to analyze peace movements *in relative separation* from anti-nuclear movements. Any peace movement which lives up to its name has to reject wars of *all* types. There are tendencies which self-consciously profess pacifism as an empirical universal.[5] In a pacifist movement of a religious extraction the moral grounds are clear: killing is a sin, so is self-defence. However, apart from the fact that even the most orthodox religious institutions could not dispense entirely with tacitly supporting violence and killing (e.g., the Polish Church during the resistance under German occupa-

5. A manifest trend of this kind within the East German Evangelical Church has been described in detail by the interesting collection of documents, *Friedensbewegung in der DDR. Texte 1978-1982*, herausgegeben von Wolfgang Büscher, Peter Wensierski und Klaus Wolschner, unter Mitarbeit von Reinhard Henkys (Hattingen, 1982).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion), what can non-religious movements do with the principle of *absolute* non-violence? Here, very ancient and old-fashioned questions emerge. Is tyrannicide allowed? How should one behave towards the danger of a genocidal regime being extended to them (Cambodia)? Is merely watching events unfold not a sin of forebearance? Can one doom nations and human groups to the rejection of armed self-defence on moral grounds? Was the war against Nazi Germany a sin? Should one accept living in slavery in order to prevent a war? Not only are these questions more than rhetorical, they are also tragically topical; they are tacitally answered on behalf of emancipatory violence by a considerable part of the most ardent present-day pacifists. This "tacitly" cannot be documented here by large-scale surveys. Yet, it exists. Clearly, many participants of present-day peace movements earlier joined the anti-Vietnam war movement. The participation in this movement not only sought to protest against a particular war (the American) but also and at the same time to provide vigorous support to another war (that of the Vietnamese against the Americans). Once again, this is not the sign of inconsistency, but another symptom of the antinomic character of these movements.

There are only two straightforward answers to the above questions: what Castoriadis calls "*zoological*" and the "*radically democratic*" answers; neither one free of antinomic elements. The zoological position has been most dramatically formulated by a young American who made history in an anti-draft demonstration during the Carter presidency carrying a poster proclaiming: "Nothing is worth dying for." Besides eliminating one of the best Leftist traditions, allegedly in the name of the Left, i.e., the preference for dying upright in human dignity instead of surviving in constant genuflection, the human zoologists face a logical contradiction. If nothing is worth dying for, in other words, if bare, value-free subsistence, and not peace, is the supreme value, then nothing is worth living for in that there is no transcendence, no "beyond" to mere living (and already "*anything* worth living for" is more than mere living). This is the ethics of the slave. This is what Jorge Semprum called "Jewish death" with just contempt, having in mind the endless lines of human raw material marching to their death while hoping for mere survival. This is Cambodia with somewhat improved food conditions. However, given that it belongs to the socio-zoological character of all Cambodias that the slave can never guarantee the subsistence level of "mere living," this position can hardly keep the minimal promise in the name of which it sacrifices everything: vegetative survival.

The democratic answer to the questions raised by the peace movements starts with the refusal to separate peace issues from political issues in general. But in so doing, the radically democratic attitude runs counter to the fundamental life-feeling of peace and anti-nuclear movements alike: *fear*. A democratic management of issues raised by the peace movements and a manipulative emphasis on fear, simply cannot coexist long without the second irreparably crippling the first. The question is not whether there is good reason for fear: there has never been so good a reason in human history.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The crux of the matter is that, if they want to be democratic, the movements have to return to the neo-Stoic ethic of Spinoza and Goethe: they must not organize their lives on the principles of fear and hope — in particular not on fear alone. The new-Stoic argument emphasized that a life based on the constant interplay of fear and hope would loose the capacity of rational deliberation, an absolute hallmark of the free individual, and this is even more characteristic of a life led in constant fear, in organized hysteria. In the case of peace movements, this suggests the integration of peace demands as such with political demands and the categorical rejection of the ethics of 'nothing is worth dying for'. Global peace and the realization of a radicalized democracy, itself a global concern, cannot be confronted separately.

Thus, no peace movement which transcends the level of the zoological position can be absolutely pacifist. In other words, the ultimate end of the peace value must mean more than bare subsistence, as it already encompasses a certain type of demand for a 'good life' — not just for a 'mere life.' And, despite the fact that peace has indeed become an empirical universal, no one can deny that there is still a contradiction between a good life and a mere life, that violence and wars cannot be entirely eliminated from our actions if we seek something more than survival. There are tyrannical governments in the world, and when speaking of them, it would be insincere to deny that this refers, first of all, to the types of government which call themselves socialist but which are in fact the perversion of everything socialism has traditionally stood for. And this is not because they are the only tyrannical systems, but because they are the only *generalizable* tyrannies while the Latin-American Juntas or the lunactic despotisms of the Idi Amin type are not. Undoubtedly, the hegemony of *any* political system, including the one we seek to transform, i.e., liberal capitalism, would inevitably result in unfreedom in many places, and would thus deny "the good life" there. Thus, the radically democratic answer to the questions raised by the peace movements will not regard peace as an absolute and unquestionable value, only a relative one: relative to self-defence, to the defence of democracy and human dignity.

Here we have reached the point where the radical democratic attitude is also fraught with antinomies. Precisely because it starts from the premise of freedom, this position runs counter to the major value which has recently become an empirical human universal: peace. This is not to say, however, that peace, as an empirical human universal, has ever been simply identical with the postulate of the human zoologists; far from being so, it has always been associated with 'the good life'. But every empirical human universal tends to be absolute, and the democratic position necessarily relativizes the absolute character of peace. What is more, this happens in a world in which no one can foretell when a local conflict will lead to global collision; when an originally non-nuclear clash may bring about the employment of nuclear weapons, or, in a milder version, when the idea of building nuclear weapons against all non-proliferation treaties emerges in a community fighting for its existence or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

democratic order.[6] This conflict between an abolutist peace and democratic attempts at its relativization, implies all of the contradictions of present-day humanism. This is forcefully indicated in Falk's previously mentioned article. While nuclear weapons as *deterrents* can serve democracy (it is very hard to believe, after what one knows of the reality of "real socialism", that what has been left of democracy under liberal oligarchy could have existed, or can exist, without the Bomb), the very existence of nuclear weapons endanger democracy. First, an inevitably authoritarian atmosphere surrounds their technological secrets, their warehousing, their constant strategic preparedness, and their eventual use. Secondly, all matters related to them, and thereby global survival, are, and have to be, in the discretion and under the prerogative of a power which in its very structure is incompatible with even restricted liberalism.

Anti-Nuclear Movements Proper

Anti-nuclear movements as such are for the virtual elimination of nuclear weapons from our civilization (here, we exclude from consideration anti-nuclear movements as ecological initiatives). Here "virtual" as a qualification means exactly what it stands for in the dictionary: "not such in fact but capable of being considered as such for some purpose." This simple semantic detour leads to one of the cardinal antinomies of peace in modern times. Anti-nuclear movements cannot demand *less* than the total destruction of all nuclear weapons — at least not as their final goal. In principle, such a demand can be achieved, and when that will be the case, there will be "purposes for which" the elimation of nuclear weapons "can be regarded as a fact." On the other hand, it will not be an ultimate reality, only regarded as such, because there is no possibility (without a complete genetic change which is a more dreadful nightmare than a nuclear holocaust) to eradicate the knowledge of building nuclear weapons now eternally and indelibly engraved on the membrane of collective human consciousness. All those who approach the problem only in terms of the existence of nuclear weapons have to face the unpleasant perspective that their success can at best be virtual, not total and factual.

But, in at least one respect, the anti-nuclear movements are theoretically in a far more advantageous position than the peace movements: they do not have to bother with the problems of combining the interests of mere life and those of the good life. If it comes to an all-out nuclear clash, the minimal conditions of the good life will certainly disappear once and for all, and those of mere life will probably disappear as well. Since freedom, human dignity, rationality and the like can only be applied within the present system, any investment of moral energies in their defense no longer makes sense should the whole system perish. Of course, fanatics could argue that no moral act looks

6. In the 1970s, there were repeated public statements by military experts in the Yugoslav press to the effect that pressure by a 'certain' power might lead Yugoslavia to purchase or construct nuclear weapons. There are constant — unconfirmed, but not officially refuted — rumors regarding Israel's having nuclear weapons.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

beyond itself, for moral quality resides in the very act. A similar argument is that there have constantly been human communities which chose collective death (think of Masada at the time of the Jewish war against Rome, and of many Indian tribes escaping together into suicide *vis-à-vis* white oppression) rather than living an undignified life. But in the case of a nuclear holocaust even this kind of argument will not apply. All those, presidents and first secretaries, who are in a position to decide on behalf of a collective suicide of their own community, will opt, by the same act, for the suicide of all existing communities. This is the end of any moral choice.

Here one could argue that the contrast of mere life and good life, and with it, all genuinely moral questions, disappear totally and tracelessly. What remains is a moral graveyard with only two alternatives, both beyond morality: collective voluntary self-enslavement, and collective-heroic suicide of the whole human frame of reference. This would be indeed the end of morality, for the latter is aimed at human life, not at its spiritual or physical self-extinction. All attempts at combining peace with freedom become impossible in the context of a nuclear holocaust. We can neither choose our death in the face of loosing everything which is worth living for, because we then choose the death of all living beings; nor can we choose the good life any longer, just a short and tense existence in between.

As a matter of fact, the Bomb was caught in this doomsday atmosphere at the moment of its invention as the outcome of the unlikeliest coincidence of the most heterogenous factors. It had been built by the most liberal of scientists, the greatest among them being an instinctive and committed pacifist, in order to save freedom. The moment it demonstrated its "efficiency," its very builders started to curse it as the greatest threat humankind had ever been exposed to. It was the proudest result of human intellect, but no invention of the symbolic Mephistopheles brought us closer to the brink of destruction. Solzhenytsin gave a mythological name to this monster child of calculative intellect. He called it, and the road leading to it, "the second Fall," and Einstein regarded the creation of the Bomb as his (and his fellow-scientists') personal sin. So emphatic was the infernal emanation of the invention that the brunt, perhaps the whole responsibility, was put on the shoulders of a science which knew no limits. But people who blame science tend to forget that it takes Hitlers for natural sciences to follow this option. The Bomb then became the sensuous symbol of the self-destructivity and the underlying inferno of our civilization which could not thereby give birth to any new human order.

But if this is the case, then the historical merit is conceived in terms of an ironic historical dialectic, for it militates against the innermost heart of anti-nuclear movements which also regard themselves as peace movements. *The historical merit consists of the possibility that, should the anti-nuclear movements achieve their aim, total virtual nuclear disarmament, which is highly unlikely under unchanged global sociological conditions, they would return thereby the possibility of choice between war and peace to us — a choice which is no longer ours in the nuclear age, or only to a limited*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

degree. Of course, this merit may also appear, cynically, in the following formulation: in forcing the elimination of the "deterrant factor" between the expansionist systems, the anti-nuclear movements usher in a new epoch of conventional world-wars of unheard-of dimensions. While such an alternative cannot be summarily dismissed, this is meant as a compliment. Yet, it is being said in despair. *A world of tragic choices* is full of bloodshed, but infinitely better than a world of no choices, or a world in which self-abandonment to "Cambodia" or to collective and all-encompassing self-destruction is the only antidote. And make no mistake: a world of tragic choices is the only possible result of the unlikely event that movements addressing the problem of the Bomb should achieve their goal.

Alternatives

But given that people would like to survive and live a good life, instead of enslaving themselves or committing collective suicide, even if the theorists present the movement with *antinomies* which must be faced, they are also morally bound to devise at least certain alternative versions of a solution. But before entering the questions of "what is to be done," there is at least one issue in regard of which there ought to be consensus; this is the *proliferation issue.* Undoubtedly, there can be arguments in favor of proliferation as well because this question also belongs to the antinomies of peace. It is super-power chauvinism alone, many would say, that advocates a nuclear monopoly. Yet, super-power military and civilian bureaucracies, much too well-informed about each other's capability of destruction, would honor the deterrent character of the Bomb whereas there is no such relative guarantee on the part of the Idi Amins of the world. Therefore, no proliferation implies a lesser injustice than the risk inherent in a world in which every lunatic has his fingers on a nuclear trigger.

When turning towards the most important alternatives, there are two which can be rejected without reservation. The first is the escalation of the armament race, in whatever ideological disguise it might present itself. The general justification of the escalated armament race in the West is the defense of the free world, the re-establishment of a balance upset on behalf of the Soviets which may or may not be true. In the Soviet Union the situation is simple: the leaders do not provide any justification, they either simply deny the obvious facts, or guarantee peace. Often, though, the reference to self-defense is authentic if it comes from those outside Western state circles who accept with heavy heart that, despite everything, the West is still the more habitable part of the world. More often than not, however, the Western reference is just a fig-leaf for the disgusting reality behind it which is either military Keynesianism — as Piccone and Zaslavsky assume in the case of Reaganomics[7] — or the secret intention of pushing an anyhow crippled Soviet economy into an allegedly suicidal cycle of new expenditures. But, in either case, the conclusion is misleading

7. See Paul Piccone and Victor Zaslavsky, "The Socio-Economic Roots of Re-Armament," in *Telos,* 50 (Winter 1981-82), pp. 5-18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and dangerous. First, the armament race is an endless spiral in which either party could never claim victory or that their goals have been achieved. But while this spiral is endless, human social resources are finite. Secondly, each consecutive phase, each "next step" in this escalation is made with the legitimation that in the next phase "we" are going to be in a state of superiority over "them." But if this is true, to the extent that "we" could, if we "would," launch a preemptive strike unpunished, (and only such an extent would legitimate the enormous expenditures in terms of a Machiavellian "instrumental rationality"), then the whole ideology of having a deterrant falls apart. In fact, the only negative outcome of the constant escalation was that people have lost their trust in deterrants. Finally, it cannot be excluded (even if manipulation of collective human fantasy with scenes of an "accidental war" is mostly an irresponsible means to trigger mass hysteria) that the more sophisticated and more complex the armament systems become, the more susceptible they are to mechanical-electronic failures. It is very unlikely, but theoretically not eliminable, that humankind could checkmate itself. These are reasons enough for rejecting the alternatie of an armament escalation "up to victory," as a *non-solution* — as a social alternative viable only for the purposes of a self-reproducing governmental bureaucracy.

The second alternative which we also reject unconditionally is *unilateral disarmament*. Should the West disarm unilaterally, freedom would be exposed to irreparable damages.[8] The demand of unilateral disarmament is exactly the kind of thinking Castoriadis has called the zoological approach to human problems: the ethics of the slave. In fact, Western anti-nuclear movements are far too unilateral even now, without some of its contingents' irresponsible propaganda about "peaceful Soviet intentions." The reason is simple: whatever is on the posters, the actual target can only be NATO, while its Soviet counterpart remains unaffected. This is why E.P. Thompson's suggestion of "voluntary peace-tours" by anti-nuclear militants in the Soviet Union is morally respectable, even if it does not seem feasible. Irrespective of intentions, unilateral demands only promote the Finlandization of Europe which, rather than preempting nuclear war, is probably the real goal of Soviet strategy.

Of course, one cannot rule out what Sakharov called the "Moscow-scenario" — an option probably often discussed by the Soviet leadership — i.e., giving up the practical goal of defending all of the Soviet Union. This strategy entails concentrating all defensive weapons in the Moscow area — the heart of Soviet industry and political life — and launching a preemptive strike at the U.S. This would annihilate major American cities and main military targets while sacrificing all Soviet cities but the protected Moscow area to the inevitable counter-attack. Thus the USSR would win the war. While there are equally lunatic and criminal considerations in American circles, we believe

8. It is also unreasonable and unjust to expect unilateral disarmament by Eastern countries. But given the nature of the ruling apparatus, the *only* decision-maker in those countries, there is no imminent danger of it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that in the superpowers' civilian and military bureaucracies the sober wish to survive and the realistic knowledge of what is at stake will ultimately prevail. Therefore, if they want to win in this global competition, as they obviously both do, they have to prefigure different options. The Soviets have both the intentions and the conventional means to make Western Europe dependent on them — if not part of their Empire — should Western Europe loose its nuclear deterrant. This is precisely what would be encouraged by the eventual victory of unilateralism.

The soberness with which military and political bureaucracies regard the first (second, third, etc.) strike capability of their opponent presents a strange contradiction. While the deterrent character of nuclear weapons has remained an unassailable doctrine and an unalterable fact for these bureaucracies, the specific character of deterrant has been undermined in the eyes of public opinion. Unilateral movements are expressions of this phenomenon. Up until now, it has always been a minority which has lost faith in deterrence. There are three main reasons for this weakened status of deterrence. First, the Reagan administration has made a number of dangerous tactical mistakes. The irresponsible, as well as strategically untenable, advertisement of a limited nuclear war made people understandably worried.[9] But earlier similar mistakes went unnoticed. Thus, Reagan's well-known public statement cannot be the ultimate reason. The second, more important, cause is the newly escalated armament cycle with the fears that the military and political elites could feel to be in the state of unpunishable superiority over the other, and launch a preemptive strike. In reality, there is no evidence that the U.S. has any more aggressive versions of its strategic plans than it had earlier.

Undoubtedly, American policy-makers would extend the "free world," consisting of both liberal as well as conservative tyrannical systems, to the whole globe, if they could. But they do not have the necessary self-confidence. And this brings up the third factor for the waning fortunes of deterrance in public opinion: *general defeatism* in the Western world view. A growing number of people believe that the "West" has already lost the game, and that it would be foolish, even criminal, to add suicide to defeat.[10] Irrespective of whether one regards the "West" as a possible future theater of democratic socialist experiments or the seat *par excellence* of the free market society, preaching defeatism and the ideology of surrender to the Other concludes inevitably in

9. It is hard to tell which is in fact the American mistake: the belief in the possibility of a limited nuclear war or the public advertisement of such a possibility without actual belief. Alan Roberts, in his "Preparing to Fight a Nuclear War," *Arena*, 57 (1981), pp. 45-93, argues that if need be, launching a war planned to be nuclear and limited, is part of American strategical thinking. He quotes Kissinger from 1957 on, who advocated it publicly. But this is not sufficient evidence to accept that the option is indeed part of American strategy. On the other hand, Desmond Ball's *Can Nuclear War be Controlled?* (Adelphi Papers, No. 169, London, 1981) proves that the military value of all ideas regarding a *limited* nuclear war is zero.

10. It was interesting, in this respect, that in *Le Monde*, December 1981, a leading French physicist argued against the bomb as a deterrent in the following way: If the protective ring of American and German armor were pierced by Soviet tanks, he wrote, which French president would launch an obviously suicidal attack against Kiev, only in order to have Paris destroyed in retaliation?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the "zoological" position.

A further option to be rejected, not because it would be dangerous, but because it is irrelevant, is the so-called *zonal solution*: the postulates of "nuclear free zones." Of course, nations have a right to remain neutral, especially if they do so openly, and they leave alliances the burdens of which they are not ready to carry proportionately. But neutrality has always been related to a "rational egoism" whose motto could be: "The world is mad and I will stay away from it." Whatever the merits of such a maxim, and especially its feasibility in a nuclear cosmos, it is not a universalizable one, and the self-hypnosis that if I do so, in due time, others will follow suit, is not even a pious lie.

What, then, can one recommend to the movements? The same moral and political postulate formulated with regard to the peace movements: combine the principle of peace with that of democracy. Democraticization and denuclearization have to go hand in hand. Otherwise, either no practical result will follow or the zoological principle will prevail. In tactical terms, this means, first a switch from either unilateral demands or demands for an immediate and total nuclear disarmament, to the demand for an *armament freeze* followed by *gradual* and *controlled* disarmament. Secondly, the peace and anti-nuclear movements should confront their antinomies and thereby become "more theoretical." Thirdly, movements should couple their anti-nuclear goals with democratic ideals. This will obviously follow totally different patterns in East and West, and will also run against different social obstacles. At any rate, only the *end* of the road can be, in a very distant future, a world free of the means of self-destruction.

Is this too utopian? It may well be. But when the world faces the self-created possibility of self-destruction, utopia alone can rescue a very limited reality.

ANTIPODE
Radical Articles on Space and Environment

Vol. 13, No. 3, 1981

- Harvey – "The Spatial Fix—Hegel, von Thünen, and Marx"—the need for an external solution to internal contradiction.
- Peet – "Historical Forms of the Property Relation"—Marx on the relation to nature in pre-capitalist modes of production.
- Bruneau – "Landscapes, Social Relations of Production and Eco-Geography"—satellite remote sensing and the mode of production.

1982's ISSUES

Radical Cultural Geography; Agriculture, Peasantry and Food; General Issue.

PRICES: Single issues – $4.00 each; Subscriptions – $12.00 per year.

Antipode, P.O. Box 339, West Side Station, Worcester, MA 01602.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIETIES*

by Cornelius Castoriadis

Clearly, stratocratic Russia's aim is the expansion of it empire and, ultimately, world domination. At an even deeper level, the entire impersonal dynamics and inertia of the Russian regime is oriented in this direction. External expansion is not an "idea" in the mind of Kremlin leaders: it is inscribed in the very structure of the regime, materialized in the state of productive forces, of the economy, of society, in their division between the efficacious military and the scanty non-military sectors. It is also inscribed negatively in all that is lacking: the regime's domestic impasse, the demise of Communist ideology, the collapse of every Party project.

Translated into political and strategic terms, this dynamics obtains on two levels. Almost all Third World countries display a fundamental continuing instability. For Russia, this is an invitation to penetrate them and to establish governments favorable and subservient to its interests. Using the many opportunities they provide for such penetration, Russia is not always successful, but its setbacks are never definite. When pro-Russian governments are established in distant countries, it cannot guarantee the irreversibility of this in the same manner as for adjacent countries, but the net balance, in the last twenty years, has been positive.

This penetration and, more generally, Russia's international posture, are backed by excessive armaments — brute force represented by the Russian army which is incessantly accumulating all categories of weaponry and military resources. The undisguised policy of over-arming coincides with the blind dynamics of a militaristic society and production (the "military-industrial complex"). But it also presents a dual strategic relation. The Russian Army has become not the *ultima ratio*, but the *only* support, direct or indirect, of the regimes established outside and far away (hence, the development of the fleet). Moreover, the whole of Russian military resources has already become an instrument of deterrence for moments of crisis: an increasingly persuasive and convincing deterrent. As time passes and the balance of forces tilts more in Russia's favor, the repetition of a scenario such as Cuba in 1962 becomes less and less probable. Thus, we are witnessing the total failure of the "deterrence" strategy invented by Americans. Indeed, the situation is reversed, the ex-"deterrers" are themselves increasingly being deterred. (One of the symptoms of this, is the rise of pacifist and neutralist movements in Europe.)

To consider the reactions of the "Western camp" to this development is a healthy exercise against every functionalist and rationalist view of history. Here are governments, dominant strata, and finally entire societies which are mortally threatened and show themselves incapable of reacting effectively to the threat. The important thing here is not a mere "degree of inferiority." To all appearances, the imbalance is limited or minor, a question of quantities. In

*Translated by David J. Parent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reality, it is *essential*. The reactions of the "Western camp" are not just "insufficient" — they are drastically inadequate, *they are beside the point*. This can easily be seen in the two above-mentioned areas.

The main field of the confrontation is the Third World. Russian penetration into this zone is not based on the beauty of the Russian language or on Mr. Brezhnev's photogenic charm, but on the misery of the populations and the nature of their governments (simultaneously oppressive and weak). For the last thirty years "the West" has professed to be incapable of having, toward these countries, any other policy than to support their regimes: obviously, this just increases the chances for social, political and national explosions which the Russians can exploit.

In the armament field, the absence of any strategic conception is flagrant. The massive increase of military credits cannot take the place of a strategic policy, it merely marks its absence. The cases of the B-1 Bomber (30 billion dollars will have been spent to produce a piece of equipment that will be obsolete almost from the time of its deployment), the MX, concerning which we have recently witnessed the *n*th change of decision: abandoning the reinforced silos (see *International Herald Tribune* 12.2.82), the recommissioning of battleships built in 1943 (while there is inadequate funding for spare-parts, maintenance and training of the existing forces) need no comment.

Like the explanation of Russia's relative strength, the understanding of the relative weakness of Western governments is due to social and historical causes. Behind the facts described are factors which everyone can see: the inconsistency, blindness and inability of the dominant Western classes and their political personnel. But these factors, in turn, are not ultimate; they require analysis. How and why are the ruling classes of countries which have dominated the planet for five centuries suddenly showing themselves to be in this state of decrepitude which makes them inferior to the Russian stratocracy? How and why are the richest, most productive societies the world has ever seen mortally threatened by a government that cannot even feed and decently clothe its population? What causes this weird persistent voluntary blindness of Western societies to the monstrous possibilities the present situation obviously poses?

Behind the phenomena, Western societies are undergoing a process of decomposition that is gripping *all classes*. Despite the ongoing dicussions in the last three quarters of a century — the decline of the West, the crisis of civilization, the crisis of society — this decomposition has yet to be analyzed and understood beyond a mere determination of fact. The following pages aim to provide a few elementary fragments of this analysis.

The Decomposition of Management Mechanisms.

The symptoms of this decomposition can readily be seen in the continual failure of policies followed in all essential areas and, even more drastically, in the absence of any policy. If Western societies continue to function, it is certainly not the fault of their leaders but the result of the extraordinary pliancy and adaptability (*resilience*) of capitalist and liberal institutions (which critics

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and adversaries of the regime fail totally to recognize) and their enormous margins and reserves of every kind — not just of pre-accumulated wealth.

I have already alluded to the absence and/or radical inadequacy of Western policies toward the Third World and in the matter of armaments. Two other decisive areas where the same situation is evident can be mentioned.

The first is the economy. Capitalism has been able to survive as a social system essentially because of its "economic" success: nearly full employment, and the expansion of production and consumption. This development was not "inevitable" (any more, conversely, than was a "collapse"). The expansion of domestic markets (indispensible on a global scale, for the system as a whole) by the long-term increase of real remunerations was imposed on it by the workers' struggles. It took a century and a half before the government "understood"' that one of the conditions for its dynamic equilibrium was the approximate equality of the rhythms of increased consumption and heightened productivity, and that it did not incorporate this condition in its current functioning. This condition by itself is not enough, given the almost inevitable fluctuations of investment and the expansion/contraction they cause. In the long run, the deliberate management of overall demand to maintain approximately full employment has been imposed on governments since WW II. This has produced a long wave of expansion (1945 to 1974), during which the capitalist economy underwent only minor fluctuations.

No great scholarship was needed to foresee that an uninterrupted phase of full employment would create other problems for the capitalist economy.[1] Manifested (and intensified by other factors) in Great Britain since the 1950s, they became general in all industrial countries during the second half of the 1960s, leading to a continual acceleration of inflation. Successive "accidents," the Viet-Nam war and its mode of (non)-financing in the United States, the international monetary crisis of 1970, and finally the Yom Kippur war and the oil embargo, caused prices to explode.

For eight years now, Western countries have shown their inability to deal with this situation. On the whole, the only result obtained by the remedial policies has been to break expansion and to cause a serious continual rise in unemployment, without noticably reducing inflation. To self-sustained inflation was added self-sustained stagnation — each reinforcing the other. The absolute mental bankruptcy of the ruling circles can be seen in the proclamations of the failure of Keynesianism (which is like saying that our failure to prevent cancer disproves Pasteur), the fashionableness of monetarism (sweetened by the old quantitative theory of money — a tautology whose transformation into an "explanatory" theory has long been known to be false), or new demonological inventions such as *supply-side economics*.

How long will the system be able to last with a continuous rise in unemploy-

1. Kalecki had foreseen it in his famous 1943 article. For my part I had analyzed the problem by the example of Great Britain in "Le mouvement revolutionnaire sous le capitalisme moderne," *Socialisme ou Barbarie*, No. 33, (Dec. 1961), now reprinted in *Capitalisme moderne et révolution* (Paris, 1979), pp. 149-151; for the problem in general and inflation in the years 1960-1970, cf. *ibid.* preface to the English edition, 1974, pp. 234-258.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment and stagnation of the workers' standards of living? The pockets of poverty and relative (sometimes absolute) misery in industrial countries, whose gravity was hitherto mitigated by the general expansion and the concomitant expectations (Roosevelt's "submerged third" had been successively transformed into a "quarter," then a "fifth"), are becoming permanent and expanding enclaves filled with people without resources and without hope. Amid the dislocation of values and motivations, what somehow or other cemented society together is in the process of disappearing: namely, expectations of higher standards of living and some possibilities of "promotion" (a rise on the scale of qualifications and income). Finally, in the non-expanding capitalist economies, unemployment must continue to rise by some percentage points of the active population (natural population growth, plus the effects of labor-saving investments).

The second area which I can only mention is what is designated by "energy," "non-renewable resources," "environment," "ecology." Partly masked at present by economic stagnation, they are becoming increasingly serious with the passage of time. Here, again, policies are non-existent or totally incommensurate with the potential seriousness of the questions.

Superficiality and incoherence, sterility of ideas and versatility of attitudes, such are evidently the typical characteristics of Western political leadership. Why have they seemingly become general and permanent?

Certainly, the mechanisms for recruiting and selecting political personnel play an important part in this. Even more than the bureaucratic apparatuses dominating other social activities, the cleft between the ability to climb and the ability to work effectively towards certain goals reaches a maximum in political parties. "Politics," in the current sense of the term, has always been a bizarre profession, requiring the combination of the talents and abilities specifically needed to "obtain power" under the respective type of government, and the talents and abilities needed to do something with that power. As such, oratorical skill, a memory for faces, an ability to win friends and followers, to divide and weaken opponents, have nothing to do with legislative genius, administrative talent, managing a war or foreign policy — any more than under absolutist government, the art of pleasing the monarch has anything to do with the art of governing.

But, obviously, no government whatsoever can survive in the long run unless, in one way or another, its mechanism and methods for selecting its political personnel succeed in combining, more or less well, these two requirements. Our task here is not to examine how Western parliamentary (or "republican") governments had solved the problem. The fact is that, if for a hundred or a hundred and fifty years "capable" and "incapable" leaders alternated in power, the cases are rare when government incapability was a decisive factor of developments.

The opposite is true of the contemporary period. General sociological factors can be cited: general depoliticization and privatization, the disintegration of the control and correction mechanisms which worked under classical

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

parliamentary governments, fragmentation of power between all kind of *lobbies*. More on this later. Here, two factors peculiar to modern "political" organizations must be stressed. The first is linked with the bureaucratization of political (party) apparatuses. What is absolutely true for the totalitarian bureaucratic party in its contemporary phase applies more or less to all parties: the ability to advance in the apparatus has, in principle, no relation to the ability to manage the affairs the apparatus is in charge of.[2] The selection of the most capable personnel is the selection of those most skilled in having themselves selected.

The second is peculiar to liberal countries. The selection of the main leaders, as is known, is the selection of the most "saleable" personalities.[3] In the contemporary totalitarian bureaucratic apparatus, the type of authority is neither rational, nor traditional, nor charismatic, to cite Max Weber's distinctions. It is hard, for example, to see Mr. Brezhnev's charisma. This type of authority is new, a name must be found for it; let us call it *inertial* authority. But in the liberal (or soft) bureaucratic apparatuses, such as Western political parties are, there is a return to a "charismatic" type of authority: the charisma is here simply the particular talent of a kind of actor who plays the role of "head," or of "statesman." (This was evident long before the election of Mr. Reagan, who in this regard is a caricature of the platitude.) Of course, this development was sustained by the fantastic expansion of the power of the media and the servitudes they impose. As for the consequences, Kafka had already described them admirably in *Josephine the Songstress*. From the moment the tribe has publicly agreed that Mr. X is a "great leader," she feels vaguely compelled to continue her own role: to applaud.

These accidental and inevitable leaders find themselves at the head of the immense bureaucratic apparatus that is the modern state, the bearer and organic producer of a proliferating irrationality, and among whose agents the old bureaucratic *ethos* (of the high official and the conscientious small functionary) has become diluted. And they find themselves facing a society which is becoming less and less interested in "politics" — i.e., less interested in its fate as a society.

The Disappearance of Social and Political conflict

What has characterized Western countries for centuries was the very existence (practically unknown everywhere else in history) of a dynamic sociopolitical conflict, i.e., the continual emergence of currents and movements that sought to take over society, proposing both essential changes of its institutions and definite orientations of social activities — movements stemming from or linked with systems of beliefs (or "ideologies," etc.) and, of course, opposing contrary tendencies and currents.

The general picture for some thirty years now has been the disappearance of such movements. On the narrow "political" plane, the parties, completely

2. Cf. *Devant la guerre*, vol. I (Fayard: Paris, 1981) pp. 242-247 and the texts quoted there, p. 245.

3. Cf. "Le mouvement revolutionnaire sous le capitalisme moderne," pp. 138-140.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

transformed into bureaucratic machines, no longer get more than purely electoral support from the citizens whom they have become unable to "mobilize" in any sense of the term. These same parties are dying of ideological starvation, resuscitating litanies (in Western Europe, socialist and Communist litanies) no one believes anymore, or camouflaging superannuated superstitions as "new theories" and "new policies" (Thatcher, Reagan, etc.).

The contemporary unions are just *lobbies* defending the sectoral and corporative interests of their own members. This is something over and above what I, and others, have been analyzing for a long time as the bureaucratization of unions. On the one hand, we can no longer even truly speak of a somehow or other "unified" union bureaucracy pursuing objectives (no matter which ones) proper to it: all this bureaucracy pursues is its own self-preservation. On the other hand, it is not enough to say that the unions "betray" the interests of their members or "negotiate" them away by trying mainly to avoid conflicts with the capitalists and the managerial bureaucracy. If all else fails, they do engage in conflict, but to defend corporate interests according to a definition of those who transform the different categories of workers into just so many *lobbies*.

The great new movements which have shaken Western societies in the last twenty years — of youth, women ethnic and cultural minorities, ecologists — certainly had (and potentially retain) considerable importance from all viewpoints and it would be frivolous to believe that their role has ended. But, currently, their ebb leaves them in the state not just of minority movements but of fragmented and sectoral ones, incapable of articulating their aims and their means in universal terms that would be objectively relevant and capable or mobilizing forces or at least arousing some reverberations.

These movements have shaken the Western world, they have even changed it — but at the same time they have made it even less viable. A striking phenomenon, but one that really is not so suprising. To the extent that these movements were able to challenge the established order, but neither could nor would adopt a positive political design, the provisory net result which follows their ebb has been the marked dislocation of the social regimes, without the emergence of new holistic objectives nor of support for such objectives. The extreme illustration for this is provided by the actions and gesture of the opposition-movement in Germany: 300,000 demonstrating against Pershing rockets; dozens of thousands demonstrating in Frankfurt against the extension of the airport; but not a single demonstrator against the establishment of military terror in Poland. There is a desire to demonstrate against the biological dangers of war or against the destruction of a forest; but there is absolutely no interest in the political and human stakes connected with the contemporary world situation.

Contemporary "political" society is becoming more and more fragmented, dominated by *lobbies* of every kind, which create a general blockage of the system. Each of these *lobbies* is capable of effectively thwarting any policy contrary to its real or imaginary interests: none has a general policy, nor, if it had, the ability to impose it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Education, Culture, Values

The question is posed to what extent Western societies remain able to create the type of individual necessary for their continued functioning. The first and main factory for forging conformist individuals is the family. The crisis of the modern family does not consist so much in its statistical frailty. At issue is the erosion and disintegration of the traditional roles —man, woman, parents, children — and its consequence: the *formless disorientation* of the new generations. What has already been said on the movements of the last twenty years also applies here (although, in the case of the family, the process goes much further back and is even three quarters of a century older in the most "advanced" countries). The disintegration of traditional roles expresses the pushing of individuals toward autonomy and contains the seeds of emancipation. But it has long been clear that the effects are ambiguous.[4] The more time passes, the more it can rightly be asked whether the process is transmitted more by the opening of the seeds of new ways of life than by disorientation and alienation.

A social system in which the family's role is diminished while that of other institutions of training and education is increased is perfectly conceivable. In fact, many ancient tribes, for instance Sparta, have realized such systems. In the West itself, beginning at a certain time, this role has been increasingly filled by the educational system and by the cultural milieu — both the general culture and the culture of particular communities (local or work communities: village, factory, etc.).

But the Western educational system has, in the last twenty years, entered a phase of accelerated disintegration.[5] It is undergoing a crisis of contents: what is being transmitted and what *ought* to be transmitted, and according to what criteria? That is: the crisis of "programs" — and the crisis of *aims by which* the programs are defined. It is also undergoing a crisis of the educative relation: the traditional type of undisputed authority has crumbled and new types — the teacher as "pal," for example — fail to be defined, affirmed and propagated. But all this would still remain abstract, if it were not associated with the most flagrant and blinding manifestation of the crisis of the educational system, which no one even dare mention. Neither students, nor teachers are still interested in what goes on in school as such; education is no longer valued as education by the participants. It has become a bread-winning drudgery for the educators and a boring constraint for the pupils — for whom it has ceased to be the opening outside the family and who have neither the age nor the psychological structure required to have an instrumental stake in it (hence its profitableness is becoming increasingly problematic). Generally, it is a matter of obtaining a "diploma" to practice a trade (if one can find a trade).

Someone will say that it has never really been otherwise. That is not the question. Formerly — not so long ago — all the dimensions of the educational

4. Cf. "La crise de la société moderne" (1965) in *Capitalisme moderne et révolution* vol. 2, *op. cit.* pp. pp. 293-316.

5. Cf. "La Jeunesse étudiante" (1963), in *Capitalisme moderne et révolution*, vol. 2, *op.cit.*,pp.259-286

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

system (and the values underlying them) were incontestable: they have ceased to be so.

Coming from a weak family, frequenting — or not — a school lived as a drudgery and otherwise anything but a school in the traditional sense, the young individual is confronted with a society in which all "values" and "norms" are practically replaced by the "standard of living," material prosperity, comfort, and consumption. He has neither religion, nor "political" ideas, nor social solidarity with a local or work community — with "classmates." If he does not become marginalized (drugs, delinquency, "character" instability), he is left with the royal path of privatization, which he may enrich with one or several personal manias. We are living in a society of *lobbies* and *hobbies*.

The classical educational system was nourished "from above," by the living culture of its epoch. Unfortunately, contemporary culture is becoming more and more a mixture of "modernist" imposture and museumism. And "modernism" has long since become an archaism cultivated for its own sake and often based on mere plagiarism tolerated only because of the public's neo-illiteracy (hence, the admiration professed by the Parisian "cultured" public in recent years for productions which merely repeat, with some dilution, the inventions of 1920). Past culture is no longer alive in a tradition, but object of museum-knowledge and of mundane and tourist curiosities regulated by fashions. On this plane, banal as it is, the label of "Alexandrinism" is applied (and is even beginning to be insulting for Alexandria); all the more so, since in the domain of reflexion itself, history, commentary and interpretation are progressively replacing creative thinking.[6]

The Collapse of Society's Self-representation

No society can exist that *is* not something for itself: that does not *picture itself as being* something — which is consequence, part and dimension of what it ought to pose itself as "something."

This "something" is neither a mere ordinary "attribute," nor "assimilation" to any object whatsoever — natural or otherwise. Society poses itself as being something, a singular and unique self, named (identifiable), but otherwise "undefinable" (physically or logically); in fact, it poses itself as a supernatural substance, but one which is sufficiently identified, detailed, re-presented by "attributes," which are the currency of imaginary significations that hold society, *this* society, together. "To itself" society is never a collection of perishable and substitutable individuals living in a particular territory, speaking a particular language, "externally" practicing certain customs. On the contrary, these individuals "belong" to this society *because* they participate in its social imaginary significations — in its "norms," "values," "myths," "ideas," "projects," "traditions," etc. — and *because* (whether they know it or not) they share the will to belong to this society and to make it continue to exist.

6. Cf. "Tranformation sociale et création culturelle," *Sociologie et sociétés*, (Montreal, 19790 reprinted now in *Le contenu du socialisme* (Paris, 1979) pp. 413-439.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

All this is obviously part of the institution of society in general. The only "real" and "concrete" carriers of this institution are the individuals as they have been fashioned and formed by institutions — i.e., by other individuals, themselves carriers of these institutions and of the correlative significations.

That is to say: individuals must be respectively carriers of this *self-representation* of society, "sufficiently as to need and use." This is a vital condition of the *psychic* existence of the singular individual. But, much more important in the present context, this is also a vital condition for the existence of society itself. The individual's "sense of being something"; — an Athenian citizen, a Florentine merchant, or whatever else, — which conceals for him the psychic abyss over which he is living, is not possible and, above all, does not take on meaning and context other than in reference to imaginary significations and to the (natural and social) constitution of the world created by society. The individual's effort to become *x* or to stay *x* is, *ipso facto*, an effort to support and enliven the institution of society. Through individuals, society is realized and reflected by complementary parts which cannot be realized and reflected other than by realizing and reflecting it. The crisis of contemporary Western societies (in fact, of all contemporary societies — but we are speaking here of Western societies) may best be grasped by reference to the following dimension: the collapse of society's self-image, the fact that these societies can no longer pose themselves *as* "something" (except extrinsically and descriptively) — or that what they pose themselves as is crumbling, becoming shallow, empty and self-contradictory.

Another way to say that there is a crisis of the social imaginary significations is that these no longer provide individuals with the norms, values, identities, motivations, etc., enabling them both to make society function and to maintain themselves, more or less, in a livable "equilibrium" (the "banal ailment" which Freud opposed to "neurotic misery").

To avoid misunderstanding and sophisms (which cannot be avoided anyway): I am not saying that ancient societies offered to humans "happiness" or "truth," nor that their illusions were better than the illusions, or the absence of illusions, of contemporary society. I am speaking from a *factual* viewpoint: I am referring to the conditions for an adequate socialization of human beings, the conditions for creating social individuals to allow the functioning and reproduction of the society that created them. From this viewpoint the valuing (*Gelten*) of social imaginary significations is a *conditio sine qua non* for the existence of a society. Nor could it be said that the crisis of social imaginary conditions in the contemporary world implies, purely and simply, a disalienation, a disengagement, an "opening" of society to its own questioning. For there to be an opening of society to its own question, there must be a society other than as a mere collection of externally uniform and homogenized individuals. Society cannot open itself to its own question other than, in and by this question, it reaffirms itself as society; in itself as society; in other words, if *society as such* (and moreover historicity as such) is positively affirmed and posited as what is not questioned in its *fact of being* (*Da-sein*), though it is questioned in its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

determinate being (*Was-sein*).

But what is precisely in crisis today is *sociality* as such for contemporary man.[7] Paradoxically, we are witnessing, along with a hyper- or over-socialization (factual or external) of life and human activities, a "rejection" of social life, of others, of the necessity for the institution, etc. The war-cry of liberalism at the beginning of the 19th century: "the state is evil," has become today: "society is evil." I am not speaking here of the confused pseudo-philosophers of the epoch (who anyway, without knowing it, are in this regard the expression of a historical movement that goes far beyond them) but primarily of the "experienced subjectivity" more and more typical of contemporary man. This is the extreme point of what I have been analyzing for twenty years as privatization in modern societies, and of which certain recent analyses have illustrated other aspects under the heading of "narcissism." Overlooking this aspect, let us brutally pose this question: does contemporary man *want* the society he lives in, does he *want* another one, does he *want* a society in general? The answer can be read from his actions, or absence of actions. Modern man acts as if existence in society were an odious drudgery, which only an unfortunate fate prevents him from avoiding. (That this is the most monstrous of illusions obviously does not change the facts.) The typical modern man acts as if he were *submitting* to society, to which he otherwise, under the form of the state or of other persons always is ready to both impute all his evils and to present his requests for assistance for the "solution of his problems." He no longer cherishes any desire for his society, neither a plan to transform it, nor even that of conserving or reproducing it; he no longer wants social relations, in which he feels trapped, and which he reproduced only insofar as he cannot do otherwise. The Athenians or the Romans *wanted to be* something other than what the regime forced them to be — and this other thing was for them a collective design. Who could similarly say *what* contemporary man wants to be? Let us go from the individuals to the whole: present society does not want itself as society, it endures itself. And the reason why it does not want itself is because it can neither make nor maintain a self-image which it could approve and value — nor create a project of social change it could adhere to and for which it would want to struggle.

An analagous collapse is affecting the other dimension of society's self-representation: the dimension of historicity, society's placing of its reference to its own temporality, its relation to its own past and its future.

As for the past, I will restrict myself to pointing out the paradox under which contemporary society lives its relation to "tradition," and by means of which it in fact tends to abolish this tradition. It is a matter of the co-existence of hyper-information with essential ignorance and indifference. The gathering of information and objects, never before practiced to this degree, goes hand in hand with the neutralization of the past: an object of knowledge for some, of tourist curiosity or a *hobby* for others, the past is a source and root for

7. As for the Soviet Union, cf. *Devant la guerre*, vol I. *op.cit.* Ch. IV., particularly pp. 251-264.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

no one. As if it were impossible to stand up to the past, as if there were no escape from the absurd dilemma: servile imitation, or negation for negation's sake. Neither "traditionalist," nor creative and revolutionary (despite the stories it tells on this subject), the epoch lives its relation to the past in a manner which does, as such, represent a historical innovation: of the most perfect exteriority.

For a long time it — and we — could think that this strange abolition of the relation to the past stemmed from a new and intense relation instituted with the advent of society. Marx, as the voice of the bourgeois epoch, would converge here with the reality (a certain reality) of American society. The intense preoccupation with the future, the concentration on projects of change, the changes which the modern age was so full of, would have meant (and justified) a radical break with the past. "History is junk," said Henry Ford. The Model-T, apparently, was not.

This was true for a time (and remains to be explored, which cannot be done here). It no longer is. As far as substantive culture is concerned, the great modern creativity came to an end towards 1930.

How, then, had this society seen its future? Others before it had seen theirs as unending repetition or as an effort to realize a mythical promise. It lived its own myth in the ideology of "progress" — either gradual (liberalism) or leading by abrupt leaps to a qualitative transformation (Marxism/anarchism).

In fact, the two variants (banal progressivism and "revolutionary" progressivism) are inscribed in the same global interpretation of history. This interpretation regarded progress as "inevitable" (this was also Marx's explicit position, as well as an implicit requirement for what he says on any subject to make sense). A deeper tenet of this interpretation was also that history must "make sense" (the Judaeo-Christian heritage played a decisive role in this regard, but this standpoint is also consubstantial with the dominant Graeco-Occidental philosophical position, that of the centrality of the *logos*, which became reason, Divine Reason). That this :"sense" was translated into "progress" (and no longer, for example, of "proof"), and finally minted into "hard cash," the accumulation of productive forces and the "raising of the standards of living," is of little importance for what concerns us here.[8]

This idea (which has had its critics, as is well-known, since the 19th century) was severely shaken by WWI, then by Fascism, Nazism, and WWII. The elimination of Nazism, the phase of expansion of the capitalist economy, and decolonization prolonged its life by a quarter of a century. It had still another support: it also allowed Westerners to remain blind to the fact that the "victory over Nazism" had been accompanied by the considerable consolidation and expansion of Communist totalitarianism. The inevitability of progress made it possible to treat Communism or its most disagreeable traits as "transitory" and to await the inevitable "liberalization"of the Communist regime, which we were financing and still remain ready to finance.

8. Cf. "Reflexions sur le 'developpement' et la 'rationalité,'" in C. Mendes (ed.) *Le mythe du développement* (Le Seuil: Paris, 1977) pp. 205-240.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The final awakening was a long time in coming — but it was brutal. The recently decolonized countries did not rush for the delights of parliamentarism. *Homo oeconomicus* delayed his appearance: when he did appear, as in many Latin American countries, it was to condemn the great majority of his brothers to the most atrocious misery under the protection of the military and of torturers educated *ad hoc* by the "greatest democracy in the world." The environmental crisis and the "zero-growth" perspective came from the outside to undermine the idea of the future as an indefinitely exponential belief — before the petroleum shocks and an inflation resistent to all remedies did so domestically. Western man had for a long time been able to regard savages as ethnographic curiosities, the preceding phases of history as stages, sometimes of course very difficult ones, in the march toward modern happiness, ignoring the fact that, without anything compelling them, six hundred million Hindus continue to live under a rigid caste system (at the same time as they practice "parliamentarism" and construct a nuclear bomb). Idi Amin's and Bokassa's exploits in Africa; the Islamic explosion in Iran; the tribulations of the Chinese government; the Cambodian massacres and the fate of the boat-people of Viet-Nam did finally crush modern man's certainty that he represented the realization of the innate destiny of all humanity. If he had understood at all what is happening in Russia and in the countries it has enslaved, the invasion of Afghanistan, the establishment of a military dictatorship in "socialist" and "People's" Poland, he ought to have realized that the society in which he lives is a very improbable exception in the history of mankind and in its contemporary geography.

This collapse of the apparent "universalism" of Western culture necessarily affected this culture's self-regeneration and its view of its future retroactively. The nature of this effect was not determined *a priori*. The West could have found motives to hold more firmly the values it still claims to adhere to. But its crisis, on the contrary, seems to show that it has lost the confirmation of itself which it was seeking abroad. It is as if, by a curious phenomenon of negative resonance, Western societies' discovery of their historical specificity ends in shattering their adherence to what they wanted to be and succeeded in being, and even more their will to know what they want to be in the future.

Studies in Soviet Thought

Some Recent Articles

Robert E. Kiernan: The Marriage of Heaven and Hell: An Integrative Study of the Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre. Sigmund Krancberg: The *Science of Logic* in Soviet Philosophy and a Reading in Hegelian Dialectics. Lewis Brownstein: The Concept of Counterrevolution in Marxian Theory. Alex Kozulin: The Influence of the Personality of the Scientist on His Theorizing: I. P. Pavlov and the Concept of Human Signal Systems. K. M. Jensen: Red Star: Bogdanov Builds a Utopia. Helmut Dahm: Ideological Ideals.

D. Reidel Publishing Company

190 Old Derby St., Hingham, MA 02043, U.S.A.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE MODERNIZATION OF SPAIN

by José Casanova

The story of Spanish modernization has been told numerous times and from many different perspectives. The first information came from governmental and business sources, both Spanish and foreign, relating to the favorable prospects for Spanish economic development and the new business opportunities that Spain offered as an "investment paradise" and as Europe's new industrial frontier. Most of the early studies by Spanish economists were both critical of the path of economic development chosen by the Franco regime as well as skeptical of the prospects for real development unless "true" structural changes were introduced. By the early 1970s, however, the evidence was clear enough to silence if not the critics at least the skeptics and the regime felt confident that its economic performance and its record of economic growth could stand comparison with the performance of any other member country of the OECD, with the exception of Japan. This optimistic attitude was clearly reflected in the triumphalist language of the III Plan.[1] Having accumulated a GNP annual growth rate of over 7 percent throughout the 1960s, Spain ranked first among Western countries in the race for development. The "case of Spain" was even studied as a possible model of export-oriented industrialization for underdeveloped countries.[2]

Following Linz, political scientists studied the Spanish authoritarian system and its effects upon economic policy-making and economic development. Most Spanish analysts, positing a necessary relation between economic and political modernization, saw Franco's authoritarian regime as "dysfunctional" and as an impediment to authentic development. This was basically the position taken by the Spanish left opposition to the Franco regime. Others, like Anderson, used the case of Spain to show that in an age of managed economies, whatever the differences between authoritarian and liberal democratic political systems may be in terms of political structure, these differences become insignificant when it comes to the formulation and execution of macroeconomic policy. "It seems evident," says Anderson, "that Spain's distinctive political system was quite compatible with the practice of neo-Keynesian economics."[3]

1. Comisaria del Plan, *III Plan de Desarrollo Economico y Social* (Madrid, 1971).

2. Jürgen B. Donges, "From an Autarchic Towards a Cautiously Outward-Looking Industrialization Policy: The Case of Spain," *Weltwirtschaftsliches Archiv* 107 (1971), and *La Industrializacion en Espana* (Barcelona, 1976); Emilio Fontela Montes, *Commerce Exterieur et Developpement Economique: L'Espagne, Cas Particulier* (Geneva, 1962).

3. Charles W. Anderson, *The Political Economy of Modern Spain* (Madison, 1970), p. 244. Such evidence can, of course, be used differently according to one's value system. It may be used to legitimize authoritarian regimes as conducive to economic development or to criticize the authoritarian and technocratic tendencies of advanced capitalism. In any case, it puts into question the widespread ideological simple view of modernity and progress. This nuance was often overlooked by critics of the Spanish model of economic modernization. For the most systematic attempt to characterize the ideal-type of Spanish political system in a comparative differential perspective, see Klaus von Beyme, *Vom Faschismus zur Entwicklungsdiktatur* (Munich, 1971). Also see Frederick Pike and Thomas Stritch, eds., *The New Corporatism. Social-Political Structures in the Iberian World* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1974), for an attempt to develop a conceptual model of "corporatism" to analyze Iberian political structures.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is, however, in the works of a new generation of empirically oriented Spanish sociologists that the best documentation of the Spanish transformation can be found. These sociologists described the process of Spanish modernization, determining exactly the place of Spain alongside other industrial and non-industrial countries in scales of development designed to measure all possible socio-economic indicators. Some of the studies claimed to be so precise as to allegedly be able to determine exactly how many years separated Spain from Italy and France, and then predict how long it would take Spain to catch up with them by projecting existing rates of growth into the future. Spain had stopped being "different." It was only a little "backward," a difference of degree, not of kind, as easily quantifiable as it would be easy to surmount by appropriate social planning.[4]

All these studies describe in different vocabularies the story of Spanish modernization. However, there is a noticeable absence of any attempt to offer a historical interpretation as to why the modernization of Spain took place "so and now" and not otherwise. If one subscribes to the structural-functionalist, developmental-evolutionist and ethnocentric model of modernization which dominated the social sciences literature, no such interpretation is necessary.[5] Apparently, sooner or later all societies are to undergo the natural process of development known as modernization. The mechanics of the process and the stages of growth are well known. The only thing we may need to know is the phenomenon which in each case triggers the "take off" by shattering the equilibrium of traditional society and by propelling the now "transitional" society towards self-sustained growth, the form of equilibrium typical of modern societies.

Factors in the Spanish case often adduced to explain the transformation can be classified into two main categories; i.e., "exogenous" or external factors and "endogenous" or internal factors. American aid, foreign capital investment, tourism and the general economic boom of the West are the most frequently mentioned exogenous factors. These factors, together or separately, are credited — quite correctly — with having made Spanish economic development possible. Without taking these external factors into account, the extraordinary Spanish performance remains indeed incomprehensible. But when considered in the context of the political and economic system created by the Cold War and the extraordinary economic expansion of the Western capitalist economies after World War II, the Spanish performance is no longer so miraculous. From such a perspective, Spanish development can be explained as a spillover, or a regional effect of Western economic development. In a more systematic form, it can be seen as a

4. Amando de Miguel, *Manual de Estructura Social de Espana* (Madrid, 1974); Fundacion Foessa, *Informe Sociologico sobre la Situacion Social en Espana 1970* (Madrid, 1971); Miguel Martinez Cuadrado, ed., *Cambio Social y Modernizacion Politica* (Madrid, 1970); Salustiano del Campo Urbano, Manuel Fraga, Juan Velarde, *La Espana de los Anos 70*, Vol. I (Madrid, 1972); Salvador Giner, "The Structure of Spanish Society and the Process of Modernization," *Iberian Studies*, 1:2 (1972).

5. José Casanova, "Legitimacy and the Sociology of Modernization," in Arthur J. Vidich and Ronald Glassman, eds., *Conflict and Control* (Beverly Hills, 1979).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consequence of the integration of the Spanish economy into the imperialist capitalist chain.[6]

The Modernization of Capital in Spain

The thesis of Spanish modernization as an exogenous phenomenon is developed most radically by Edward Hansen, who argues that the Spanish transformation was not a Spanish development but rather the modernization of capital in Spain, a process imposed from without and determined by relations of imperialist dependency. The following points can be discerned in Hansen's analysis: (1) A theoretical classificatory distinction between development (i.e., endogenous or autonomous economic process) and modernization (i.e., exogenous or dependent economic process); (2) A general proposition concerning the empirical nature of the world system: "contemporary economic and political relations between 'advanced' and 'backward' regions are asymmetrical;" (3) A general proposition which is logically derived from the assumed empirical nature of the world system: "a contemporary underdeveloped region cannot attempt to industrialize, or even transform, its agricultural technology, without withdrawing from the influence of established centers of dominance:" (4) An empirical statement about the historical nature of the Spanish case: a "process imposed from without by already fully developed industrial centers;" (5) An historical-theoretical conclusion derived from points 2 and 4: "in modernizing societies, the nation and the region, and their respective elites, are no longer the prime movers, the national pivot is no longer the key unit for determining national evolution in a modernizing context."[7]

Before going into a more detailed analysis, it should be pointed out that: (1) The meaning and validity of such ideal-typical constructions depends solely on their value as an interpretative tool in the understanding of empirical social reality. There is a need to develop such ideal-typical constructions of different types of modernization. The one proposed by Hansen, however, is of minor interpretative value.

(2) The empirical nature of the world system is indeed highly asymmetrical, constituting a very complex system of economic, political and cultural relations of domination between "advanced" and "backward" regions. I disagree, however, with the implied "closed" inner-systematic or structural-functional nature of the system as well as with the consequences of dependence.

(3) The case of Spain shows precisely that a country may be able to

6. José Maria Vidal Villa, "Spain and Imperialism," *Monthly Review*, 29:6 (November 1977); Nicos Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships* (London, 1976); José Acosta Sanchez, *Crisis del Franquismo y Crisis del Imperialismo* (Barcelona, 1976).

7. Edward Hansen, Jane Schneider, Peter Schneider, "From Autonomous Development to Dependent Modernization: The Catalan Case Revisited; A Reply to Pi-Sunyer," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 17:2 (1975), p. 239, and Peter Schneider, Jane Schneider, Edward Hansen, "Modernization and Development: The Role of Regional Elites and Non-corporate Groups in the European Mediterranean," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 14:3 (1972), p. 340. These writings exemplify in the clearest form the ambivalence, shortcomings and inconsistencies of the Marxist theory of "Imperialism and Dependency."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

industrialize successfully by ending its long isolation from the outside world and by entering a relation of dependence within the capitalist world market. Such an integration indeed implies a radical change in economic policy from national development to dependent modernization. But in the case of Spain it worked.

(4) That the modernization of Spain was "imposed from without" is only partially valid and highly misleading if it is taken without further qualifications. It cannot mean that the modernization of Spain was forced on or unwillingly accepted by Spaniards. There was indeed a great deal of pressure, both external and primarily internal, on the regime to change economic policy. But the decision to modernize the Spanish economy by integrating it into the capitalist world system was a political decision — one which was planned by the Opus Dei ministers. This decision, which signified a radical break with Spanish tradition, is in need of sociological explanation. Once the fateful decision was taken and the Spanish economy was successfully integrated into the capitalist world system, Spain lost its relative autonomy and became highly dependent on foreign developments.

(5) Without entering into the metaphysical discussion about prime movers or last instance determinations, the Spanish national context and the nature of the Spanish modernizing elite offers one of the most important clues for understanding Spanish modernization.

Spanish industrialization can be characterized as dependent, uneven and distorted, but it cannot be denied that the industrialization of Spain did take place and that it was successful at least insofar as it radically altered the Spanish economy and the social structure of Spain as a whole. This is even implied by Hansen, who suggests that the industrialization of Spain should be seen as a typical case of what Froebel and others have called export-oriented industrialization, i.e., "free-trade zones" or "world-market factories" in which transnationally organized manufacture is integrated vertically into the world market but actually separated from the national economy.[8] This type of production would rule out from the start the goals of national industrialization.[9]

The Socio-Economic Transformation

The Spanish case cannot be considered in such a light. It would be more justified, although equally erroneous, to see it, as Donges does, as a successful 'model' of export-oriented national industrialization.[10] Some figures of the Spanish case should suffice as illustration.[11]

8. Edward Jansen, Jane Schneider, Peter Schneider, "Autonomous Development," *op.cit.*, p. 239.

9. Folker Frobel, Jürgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, "Export-Oriented Industrialization of Underdeveloped Countries," *Monthly Review*, 30:6 (November 1978), pp. 24-25.

10. Donges, "The Case of Spain," *op.cit.*

11. The information and the figures are taken almost literally from the following sources: Baklanoff, *Economic Transformation, op.cit.*, pp. 45-70; Wright, *Spanish Economy, op.cit.*, pp. 138-142; Tamames, *Republica, op.cit.*, p. 382; Gonzales, *Economia Politica, op.cit.*, pp. 300-309. From 1950 to 1975, while the active working population of Spain remained basically the same, roughly 37 to 38 percent of the total population, its sectorial distribution changed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Impressive as they may seem, these facts acquire their right proportion when considered in the perspective of what Veblen called the "advantages of backwardness."[12] But the figures defy any attempt to deny the industrialization of Spain. Furthermore, from a purely sociological perspective, the question whether capital was 'Spanish' or 'foreign' is irrelevant as long as it produced similar results in terms of transformation of the social structure, division of labor, transformation of economic sectors, urbanization, transformation of the class structure, rise in the standard of living, changes in consumption patterns, and changes in public opinion. In each and all of these factors, Spain began to resemble any other capitalist industrial society.

The import of foreign capital was surely a very important factor in Spanish industrialization. But it should not be given the absolute relevance implied by Hansen. American economic "aid" may have been important for Spanish economic growth in the 1950s. Yet, the amount of American aid received by Spain was significantly smaller than that received by many other European economies under the Marshall Plan.[13] Similarly, the extent to which the

drastically. The population active in the agrarian-primary sector changed from 47.5 percent in 1950 to 21.5 percent in 1975. During the same period the labor force active in the industrial sector grew from 26.5 percent to 38.2 percent, while the population in the service sector jumped from 25.8 percent to 40.3 percent. In absolute terms, 1.8 million people left the land between 1960 and 1973 and of the remaining active agrarian population in 1976, 55 percent were over 45 years old, which means that the relative weight of agriculture in the Spanish economy is likely to continue to decline. In 1973, agriculture already contributed less than 13 percent to Spain's GNP.

With the help of inflation, the GNP per capita income jumped from roughly $300 in the 1950s to over $2,500 in 1975 at an annual growth rate of 6.45 percent in real terms. In absolute terms, there was a radical improvement in the standard of living of the average Spaniard. From 1960 to 1974, Spain's GNP grew at an annual average rate of over 7 percent.

Equally significant data are provided by an analysis of the trends in Spanish exports. Through the 1960s, Spanish exports grew at an annual rate of 15.7 percent, compared with 0.8 percent annual growth rate in the 1950s. In 1959, Mediterranean agricultural products and mineral raw materials accounted for 67 percent of Spanish exports — a typical figure for a peripheral country. By 1973 the share of traditional exports had fallen to 33 percent, while manufactured products had risen to 67 percent of total export value. Significantly, consumer manufacturers (shoes, automobiles, apparel and books) had increased their share from 9 percent to 21 percent. But the increase of finished manufactured goods from 3 percent to 23 percent was even more dramatic and significant; heading the list in this case were ships, machine tools, electrical equipment and machinery. Spain's share of the world market for manufactured products rose at an annual average rate of 9 percent in the period from 1962 to 1973. Most economic analysts tended to agree that the Spanish economy, despite all its imbalances, had become a highly diversified, internationally competitive economy.

12. Thorstein Veblen, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution* (Ann Arbor, 1966); Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962). Some of the advantages were: a low-start base which offered a large room for over-the-board substantial improvement in productivity and rationalization; the possibility of rapid and wholesale import of the most modern foreign technology and know-how which was the key to the rise in the productivity of labor; large reserves of cheap and repressed labor; and the sheer advantage of being a late-comer, which gives the possibility of choosing from well-tested techniques, of avoiding past mistakes and of looking for substitutes.

13. For comparative figures see Manuel Vazquez Montalban, *La Penetracion Americana en Espana* (Madrid, 1974), pp. 206ff. The testimony of Vazquez Montalban, a member of the Central Committee of the Spanish Communist Party, is important because it is unlikely that he might have underestimated the extent of imperialist economic expansion in a book trying to document the "penetration" of the Spanish economy by American capital. Ironically, the Spanish Left, which admits the fact of the industrialization of Spain, tries to minimize the importance of American

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Spanish economy suffered penetration by private foreign capital was not significantly different from the pattern in other Western European economies.[14]

In short, a better case can be made from studying Spain for the thesis of the internationalization of capital, the growth of a global economy and the end of economic sovereignties than for arguing the failure of Spanish industrialization.[15] Looking at the Spanish economic record, two facts seem evident. First, the successful industrialization of Spain. Second, the growing integration of the Spanish economy in the world market and in the capitalist division of labor. Moreover, both facts are so closely related that one can argue that capitalist dependency led to the industrialization of Spain and that the industrialization of Spain led to ever increasing international dependency. When one contrasts the Spanish evidence with many other equally evident cases in which capitalist dependency has reproduced underdevelopment or has at least precluded industrialization, it seems fair to conclude that capitalist dependency sometimes leads to industrialization while sometimes it hinders such industrialization.[16]

Capitalist Dependency

Since the same cause alone cannot produce opposite effects, it seems reasonable to infer that we are dealing here with two different types of capitalist dependency.[17] That is to say, it is not in the nature of abstract capital but rather in the nature of concrete capitalist relations to produce one or the other result. In other words, the relation of dependency is not a logical one which can be deduced from the nature of capital, but rather a historical one which has to be studied empirically. It is thus imperative to study when and why certain forms of capitalist relations, while intrinsically unequal, may be beneficial to both partners, while certain forms of capitalist relations, in addition to being unequal, are so exploitative that they may

---

imperialist "aid" in Spain's economic development, since to do so would imply admitting the possibility that imperialist dependency may lead to industrialization. Foreign observers, whose point of departure is the fact of imperialist dependency, try to deny the industrialization of Spain for the very same reasons.

14. For figures of foreign capital imports see Baklanoff, *Economic Transformation, op.cit.*, pp. 42-68; Samuel Charkin, Jack Sangster and Will Susman, eds., *Spain: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy* (Stanford, Conn., 1976); James W. Cortada, *Two Nations Over Time: Spain and the U.S. 1776-1976* (Westport, Conn., 1978); A.P. Whitaker, *Spain and the Defense of the West* (New York, 1961). On general European developments see Raymond Aron, *The Imperial Republic* (Englewood Cliffs, 1974); J.J. Servan-Schreiber, *The American Challenge* (New York, 1968).

15. Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Müller, *Global Reach* (New York, 1974), Aron, *Imperial Republic.*

16. James D. Cockroft, André Gunder Frank and Dale L. Johnson, *Dependence and Underdevelopment* (Garden City, 1972); André Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York, 1969); and *Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment* (New York, 1979); Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *Ideologias de la Burguesia Industrial en Sociedades Dependientes* (Mexico, 1971).

17. For an analysis of the two different types of capitalist dependency, see Aron, *Imperial Republic, op.cit.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

preclude development.[18]

Of course, one of the advantages of the Marxist theory of capitalist accumulation and imperialism is that it is not one but actually two theories. Thus, it is able to derive two completely different historical results from the same general theoretical principle. There is first the theory of capitalist imperialism as a fresh source of profit to counter the declining rate of profit at home due to monopolistic stagnation. This form of imperialism amounts to a mode of economic exploitation geared to keep the periphery 'underdeveloped' within the capitalist system, a sort of *Lebensraum* theory of capitalist expansion. There is further the theory of imperialism as a mode of surplus utilization due to the internal oversupply caused by the oversuccess of capitalist accumulation at home. This form of imperialism amounts to a mode of capitalist exploitation which would actually help to industrialize the periphery, creating in this way new sources of profit and new possibilities of capitalist accumulation. Both analyses of imperialism can be found in most Marxist analyses. They are not, however, successfully integrated into a general theory of capitalist imperialism.[19]

Granted that capitalist relations intrinsically imply unequal exchange and therefore a distorted relation and a form of domination, the history of the capitalist system, however, shows numerous concrete cases in which the relation of capital and labor, while remaining unequal, contributed nonetheless to the welfare of both, namely, to the accumulation of capital and to a substantial rise in the standard of living of labor. There are reasons other than the imperialist exploitation of the peripheries by the metropolis or the expropriation of the world surplus to explain these mutually beneficial effects. These mutually beneficial effects, of course, do not make the relation less unequal or less distorted. It only implies that it does not lead to absolute pauperization, even though the relative distribution of benefits between capital and labor may remain the same or may even grow in favor of capital.

The same analysis can be applied to capitalist relations at the international level. Marx himself was implying such an analysis when he wrote that "two nations may exchange according to the law of profit in such a way that both gain, but one is always defrauded."[20] Sometimes, as in the case of Spain in the 1960s, capitalist dependency may have been beneficial to both members of the relation. At other times, however, as in the case of Spain in the 1860s, capitalist dependency may have been highly detrimental to national industrialization.[21] One would wish that Marxist analysis would go beyond

18. The need for comparative differential studies of historical types of dependence as well as the need to study the internal structure of dependent societies, along with the structure of international capitalist relations have also been stressed by some theorists of "imperialism and dependency." See, for example, Cardoso, *Ideologias, op.cit.*, pp. 72-73.

19. See, for example, James O'Connor, *The Corporations and the State* (New York, 1974); The first theory of capitalist imperialism goes back to V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism,* in *Selected Works* (Moscow, 1967); the second to Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital* (New York, 1964).

20. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse* (New York, 1973), p. 872.

21. Jordi Nadal, *El Francaso de la Revolucion en Espana, 1814-1913* (Barcelona, 1975); Gabriel Tortella Cesares, *Los Origenes del Capitalismo en Espana* (Madrid, 1975); Nicolas

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

scholastic discussion into historical analysis. An example of this confusion is the following: "Another outcome is that the popular masses have experienced a considerable increased exploitation both by their own dominant classes and by those of the imperialist metropolises from the very fact of this industrialization."[22] This makes sense from the perspective of a Marxist theoretical laboratory model that could be expressed in the following formula: Industrialization equals increased productivity of labor equals increased expropriation of surplus value equals increased accumulation of capital equals increased exploitation. But historically and phenomenologically, at least in the case of Spain, this makes no sense. The Spanish popular masses were certainly no better off when they were being exploited only by their own inefficient dominant classes, which were unable or unwilling to rationalize the Spanish economy, than later, when they were exploited twice, by their own and by foreign imperialist classes.

It would, however, be as fallacious to draw general laws of capitalist development or a general model of industrialization from the Spanish case as it is fallacious to draw general laws of imperialist dependency or a general model of underdevelopment from, e.g., Latin American societies. But Hansen or any Marxist-Leninist may easily grant the success of Spanish industrialization and yet argue that it confirms their theory. Namely, Spanish industrialization would be a typical case of dependent modernization and not of autonomous development. That would be the reason why Spanish industrialization was uneven, distorted, and full of contradictions. Although Spanish industrialization was all these things, the distinction between modernization and development is sheer casuistry if what is implied is basically endogenous vs. exogenous development.

At a time when even China with its enormous natural, cultural and human resources has, at least temporarily, given up the ideal of true development in order to follow the path of "four modernizations," it seems ludicrous to offer autonomous development as a model of industrialization. To be fair, Hansen warns: "It should be noted that withdrawal may involve heavy sacrifice and, when compared with modernization, result in a slower rise in such indices of growth as standard of living and percentage of population in non-agricultural pursuits."[23]

Moreover, in a strict sense, the pure ideal-typical model of autonomous development that Hansen has in mind happened only once — in the case of England. Afterward, all transformations have been in a certain sense follow-up "modernizations," defined by Hansen as "the process by which an underdeveloped region changes in response to inputs (ideologies, behavioral codes, commodities and institutional models) from already established industrial centers." But, more important, even if autonomous development were viable today, it is unclear why endogenous development should be intrinsically better than exogenous development other than from a

Sanchez Albornoz, *Espana hace un Siglo: una Economia Dual* (Barcelona, 1968).

22. Poulantzas, *Crisis, op.cit.*, p. 19.

23. Peter Schneider *et al.*, *Modernization and Development*, *op.cit.*, p. 340.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perspective of nationalist power politics from which national independence is the highest absolute value which should not be compromised even for the sake of raising the welfare of the nation's citizens.[24]

Hansen is right in distinguishing between different types of development and in stressing the need to construct normative standards with which to evaluate different types of modernization, so long as the related value systems are explicitly stated. It is unclear, however, how such a nationalist-particularist value as "autonomous" could alone serve as the normative standard. After all, the meaning of each type of modernization would be derived from the intrinsic nature of the process (i.e., the structure of the social formation in question and its formative principle) and from its net results (its socio-historical consequences), rather than from its exogenous or endogenous character. Most observers, at least most Spaniards, would agree that the Spanish autonomous development of the first phase of the Franco regime, that of the Autarquia (1939-1951) was more uneven, distorted and full of contradictions than the dependent development of the modernization phase (1957-1973).[25]

Yet, a Marxist-Leninist may still insist that the negative character of modernization is not derived from its being exogenous, but rather from the intrinsic logic of capitalist dependency, which, by its own nature, causes modernization to be necessarily uneven, distorted and full of contradictions. Thus, Villa argues that the integration of Spanish capital into the imperialist chain created commercial, technological, financial, ideological and cultural dependence from "outside" forces and those forces consequently came to control the Spanish production process.[26]

24. Hansen's model of autonomous development seems to be indistinguishable from the Soviet model of socialism in one country — a typical case of historical necessity sublimated to the category of ideological-theoretical model. The Soviet model was to find further systematic elaboration in the fascist model of "autarkic development," which was officially incorporated by the Franco regime in 1939. According to Mussolini, the formulator of the model, "a country's self-determination is meaningless unless it is upheld by the independence of its economy from external markets." Quoted in Antonio Robert, *Un problema nacional* (Madrid, 1943), p. 126. Antonio Robert was director general of industry and an official economist of the Franco regime during the autarky period. Robert stresses that the rationale and ultimate goal of industrialization and economic development should be the strengthening of the nation. Such a goal, however, is in contradiction with dependent industrialization since the latter, even if successful, would by definition compromise the very end of industrialization, namely, national independence.

25. Hansen himself hints at the sometimes irreconcilable conflict between those two ultimate values when he states that "in many societies the two alternatives coexist and are represented by conflicting social forces, further evidence of the extent to which they may be antithetical." Peter Schneider, *et al., Modernization and Development, op.cit.*, p. 340. Indeed the ultimate value conflict between national independence and rationalization of the economy was central to the power conflict between the Opus Dei technocrats who stood for economic development through international capitalist integration and the Falange Bureaucrats who preferred a "free" Spain to a "developed" one. The same antithetical conflict appears in socialist countries in the form of a political struggle between technocrats and political ideologists or bureaucrats — a conflict which in Chinese literature is usually referred to as between "red and expert." See, e.g., Serge Mallet, "Bureaucracy and Technocracy in the Socialist Countries," *Socialist Revolution* (May-June 1970); Immanuel Wallerstein, "Semi-peripheral Countries and the Contemporary World-Crisis," in *The Capitalist World Economy* (Cambridge, 1979).

26. Vidal Villa, "Spain and Imperialism," *op.cit.*, pp. 51-52.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Development of the Capitalist World System

At this point, the inner systemic logic of Marxist theory comes to its full conclusion in Wallerstein's model of the world system. There is only one world system, the capitalist one, from which it is illusory to escape. There is, furthermore, only one logic determining all relations within the system: the logic of capitalist reproduction. Indeed, there is neither national development nor modernization. There are only changes of location or of roles within the capitalist division of labor between the core and the periphery.

"It is not states," Wallerstein writes, "but the capitalist world economy that 'develops' over time.... Within this framework, particular states may come to change their economic and political roles and place in the hierarchy, but this is quite different from 'developing.' " "This is not development, but successful expropriation of world surplus."[27]

Neither Wallerstein nor anybody else has tried to apply this model for an interpretation of the Spanish case.[28] A Wallersteinian interpretation of the Spanish case can be outlined as follows: The logic of capitalist development with its inevitable long-term tendency to oversupply causes ever-recurring upward and downturn cycles. These periodic changes in capitalist trends are usually accompanied by internal transformations within the structure of the capitalist system. These transformations offer special opportunities to those capitalist agents — firms, classes or states — who are ready to take advantage of the conjunctural opportunities and are therefore able to turn the situation into their own advantage at the expense of somebody else. "At each succeeding moment of crisis in the history of the capitalist world-economy," writes Wallerstein, "a similar shift of 'bargaining power' has taken place... intermediate elements in the surplus extraction chain gain at the expense of those at the core of the system. In present-day terms this means, among other things, a relative profit advantage to the semi-peripheral nations.... In moments of world economic downturn, semi-peripheral countries can usually expand control of their home market at the expense of core producers and expand their access to neighboring peripheral market, again at the expense of core producers."

Now, the Spanish case does not exactly fit Wallerstein's analysis since Spain, a member of the semi-periphery, took advantage of the unusual opportunities offered by the world capitalist system not at a world-economic downturn but rather at an extraordinary world economic expansion, the post-World War II economic boom. But the model used for downturns could as well be applied to upward turns. Wallerstein himself provides the clue for such an application when in another context he writes: "It is worth distinguishing between the effect of world economic downturn on the

27. Immanuel Wallerstein, "Alternative Development Strategies," manuscript at the Raymond Folgeman Library of the New School for Social Research, page 1, and "Semi-peripheral Countries and the Contemporary World Crisis," *op.cit.*, p. 101.

28. For an attempt in this direction see Edward Hansen, "Economic Internalization and the Expansion of State Power: A Discussion of Two Major Problems in the Ethnography of Spain," in Joseph B. Aceves, Edward Hansen and Gloria Levitas, *Steady State-Values, op.cit.*, pp. 78-82.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

structure of national economic enterprise in semi-peripheral countries and the ability of *some* countries to take advantage of what is defined as an acute commodity shortage during such crisis: for example, oil today, gold today and in previous downturns, and other commodities yet to be so defined. For such commodity exports show high relative price rises, and in and of themselves may catapult some countries into the semi-peripheral category (Saudi Arabian and Iranian oil today, but also South African gold in the 1930s)." But commodity shortages need not only happen during crises, they may also occur during extraordinary booms. That is precisely what happened in the 1960s. For several reasons, such as an extraordinary economic boom, the rise of the service sector and the coming into being of what has been called the post-industrial society, European societies suffered an acute shortage of "sun, fun, and labor" — all commodities that Spain possessed in large supply. There is a saying in Spain, "El milagro espanol consistio en exportar sol y pobres" (All the Spanish miracle amounted to was the export of sun and the poor), implying that tourism and the migrant workers' remittances were the two main sources of capital that financed the industrialization of Spain.

At this point, one could even do without Marxist analysis and the logic of cyclical reproduction to understand what happened in Spain. Spaniards, for centuries, had been sitting on a "gold mine." However, they did not know what to do with it other than constantly complain about the unbearable heat and invent the *siesta* to protect themselves from it. In fact, Spaniards had often attributed their poverty to the harsh Spanish climate. Until one day millions of fair sun worshippers and fun lovers descended on Spain searching for their idols. The eyes of the Spaniards opened up and at once they realized the unique opportunity destiny or geography had bestowed on them. They took advantage of it — the result being the Spanish miracle: a spillover from the European economic boom, a windfall profit from the new vacation craze.

Among Spaniards, this was a commonly held view — so common, in fact, that even well-informed economists took it for granted. This would explain the constant criticism of the government's economic policies for having built the house of Spanish prosperity on a foundation of sand: on windfall profits which might *disappear* as unexpectedly as they appeared with the first European economic recession.[29] But Marxist analysis could help in uncovering serious lacunae in such a seemingly convincing narrative account. It could, first, help to explain why sun and fun, which heretofore had only had use value, suddenly acquired also exchange value, i.e., had been converted into commodities susceptible of being packaged and commercialized. Even more important, Marxist analysis could point out that windfall profits are only windfall profits, which have to be transformed into capitalist accumulation in order to be translated into economic growth. Now such a conversion of wealth into capital is by no means automatic. Even less automatic is the transformation of capital into the sustained rationalized type

29. Manuel Funes Robert was one of the few Spanish economists who saw the structural and not just the conjunctural importance of tourism and the service sector in post-industrial societies. See his *Valor Politico de la Balanza de Pagos en Espana* (Madrid, 1969).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of accumulation needed for successful industrialization. After all, Spanish history is filled with such "missed opportunities" in which windfall profits went away, leaving behind beautiful churches, palaces and precious records of Spanish grandeur and creativity, but no sign of economic growth. Moreover, it is not that capitalism had not triumphed before in Spain. There were many periods of capitalist accumulation, many beginnings of industrialization, yet sustained industrialization constantly failed.[30]

It is interesting in this context that André Gunder Frank, trying to prove Weber's thesis wrong, presents the same misplaced argument of many economic historians by stating, "As Smith and Marx already observed, capitalism was born in Catholic Italy, Spain and Portugal."[31] Such an argument basically restates the critiques of Robertson, Hyman, Fanfani and others, implying that modern capitalism came into being before the Reformation and therefore the Reformation could not have anything to do with capitalist development — at least not with its origins. To such an argument one can only answer that obviously Weber and his critics are talking of two different types of capitalism. As to the argument that capitalism was born in Catholic Italy, Spain and Portugal, Weber would probably answer that this precisely confirms his point, i.e., that in Catholic countries capitalism was not able to transform itself in the direction of what he called modern rational capitalism. Notwithstanding its triumph in Spain, capitalism was unable to industrialize the country. In other words, Spanish capitalism was unable to rationalize the Spanish economy. To attribute such a failure to the lack of sufficient capital, as many economic historians tend to do, seems tautological. One would then have to ask why Spaniards failed to accumulate sufficient capital in the direction of industrial investment.

What is in need of explanation is why *this* time the Spaniards seized on their *fortuna*, while so many other times they did not. Wallerstein's general model of the capitalist world system cannot offer a satisfactory answer to this question. Nor can Wallerstein's general theory offer an explanation as to why Spain was not a member of the capitalist core in the first place, i.e., why, in Wallerstein's words, "Spain started down this path and then turned off it to become part of the semi-periphery."[32] Neither a general theory of capitalist development nor the inner systemic logic of the economic system alone can explain why Spain turned off the modern world economy in the 16th century and turned on again toward the capitalist core in the 20th century. Surely, the capitalist world system was the context or the environment that

30. See, e.g., Pierre Vilar, *La Catalogne dans l'Espagne Modern*, 3 volumes (Paris, 1962); Josep Fontana Lazaro, *La Quiebra de la Monarquia Absoluta* (Barcelona, 1971); Jordi Nadal, *Fracaso;* Gabriel Tortella, *Origenes, op.cit.;* Nicolas Sanchez Albornoz, *Economia Dual, op.cit.;* Santiago Roldan y Jose Luis Garcia Delgado, *La Formacion de la Societad Capitalista en Espana, 1914-1920*, 2 volumes (Madrid, 1973); Jose Luis Garcia Delgado, *Origines y Desarrollo del Capitalismo en Espana* (Madrid, 1975); Joan Clavera *et al., Capitalismo Espanol: de la Autarquia a la Estabilizacion, 1939-1959* (Madrid, 1978).

31. André Gunder Frank, "On the Roots of Development and Underdevelopment in the New World: Smith and Marx vs. the Weberians," in *Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment, op.cit.*, p. 29.

32. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (New York, 1974), p. 108.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

determined, in the last instance, both the opportunities and the conditions of possibility of economic success or failure. However, the decision itself to grasp the opportunity or to forgo it can only be explained phenomenologically by understanding the ideal and material interests of the Spaniards who made the decision. Now, it just happens that Wallerstein, in addition to being a good Marxist theorist, is also a good historical sociologist who knows how to look for convincing historical explanations when needed. His are, however, *ad hoc* historical explanations juxtaposed but not integrated into his general theoretical model.

Let us look at some of the explanations Wallerstein presents when analyzing the failure of Spain in the 16th century to grasp the opportunities offered by the birth of the modern world system: "If the Catalans were incorporated into a single system with the Castillians, which they were not, and if Charles V's imperial ambition had not both drained Castile and drawn him into inevitable conflict of interest with portions of his empire, conflicts that were self-defeating, then Spain might indeed have had some chance of becoming a core state in the European world economy. Instead, overextension merely exhausted Charles V and his successors.... [The] unwillingness of Charles V to take a Spanish nationalist perspective and adopt a mercantilist policy before the Castillian bourgeoisie was overwhelmed by the impact of rising prices, luxury expenditures of the aristocracy and inflationary and anti-protectionist effects of the Emperor's borrowings... Instead of moving against foreign merchants, Spain pursued the path of expelling Spanish non-Catholics."[33]

Finally, talking about the priority that Spaniards in their colonization of the Philippines gave to ideal-religious interests over material-economic ones, Wallerstein writes: "[Spaniards] took Christian evangelization as a greater priority than did the Portuguese, who were more sensitive to the limits of their power in this great Christian-Moslem encounter in 16th-century Asia. Chanu points out that the Spanish put great effort into stopping Moslem penetration in the Philippines. They succeeded to some extent but they paid an economic price: 'This deep-seated hostility to Islam, this inability to make deals with the Moslem princelings of the Moluccas — is this not the true explanation, far more than Portuguese hostility, why the Spaniards in the Philippines could not make a success of the spice trade?' "[34]

Now, these historical explanations are both sound and interpretatively convincing. After all, Wallerstein makes good use of the best available sources provided by the great socio-economic historians of this period: Braudel, Chanu, Elliott, Hamilton, Vicens Vives. Wallerstein's explanations are also consistent with the critical ones repeatedly put forth, at least since the beginning of the 19th century, by liberal Spaniards trying to explain what in Spanish literature is called "the decadence of Spain," which Wallerstein prefers to call the fall of Spain into the semiperiphery. Basically, these explanations amount to saying that the Spanish Habsburgs and the Catholic

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 180, 192.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 339.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Church, with the help no doubt of traditional economic interests, sacrificed the Spanish economy and the Spanish nation state — the two pivots of modernization — to the ideal and material interests of the "universal Christian Monarchy," the traditional medieval model of social order.

But explanations of this sort cannot be reached by looking solely at the Spanish economic structure, much less can they be derived from the structure of the capitalist world system. One gets to them by an historical phenomenological analysis of the Spanish social structure and of the unique Spanish religious and political culture. The analysis of the structure of capitalist development in the world system and in Spain can help explain how wrong economic decisions lead almost inexorably to economic failure. But such an analysis is not necessarily of help in explaining why certain Spaniards consistently took "wrong" economic decisions. (Wrong, of course, only from the perspective of an instrumental rational system of values.) These wrong decisions had indeed fateful consequences in pushing Spain away from the European core into the outskirts rather than the periphery of the system.

Spain was not able to come out of the general European crisis of the 17th century with the kind of energies typical of the other core states. It was only well into the 18th century that Spain realized how far behind the European core states she had fallen. The task of organizing the "catching-up" process became extremely difficult. It was complicated even more by the fact that certain institutions, classes and social groups in Spanish society, i.e., "traditional Spain," systematically refused to accept the view that the difference between Spain and Europe was one of quantifiable backwardness, claiming instead that the difference consisted in a qualitative unreachable cleavage between two mutually exclusive civilizations or models of social order.

Modern Spain did follow a capitalist development and a general political and cultural development in many ways parallel to the development of its European neighbors. Yet somehow Spanish development always failed to live up to the English or French models. These failures and the protracted conflict between the two Spains led to the elaboration of all types of rationales about the Spanish "character" and its alleged inability to adapt to the modern world. We need to know, therefore, why Spain could reconcile itself with the modern world system in the 1960s or, more precisely, to find out why "traditional" Spain paradoxically ended its long resistance to the modern world shortly after its overwhelming victory over "modern" Spain in the Spanish Civil War. Going back to our economic analysis, we need to know why this time the windfall profits of the European economic book were transformed into rational capitalist accumulation. Once again, Wallerstein provides a clue in searching for a plausible historical explanation. Talking of the oil exporting countries, Wallerstein points out that in order for the opportunities offered by the commodity shortages to be fully realized, state policy has to intervene "to translate the windfall profits into particular kinds of imports."[35]

35. Wallerstein, "Semi-Peripheral Countries," *op.cit.*, p. 106.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This is precisely what happened in Spain. The economic policy-makers tried to insure that the windfall revenues of the tourist boom were translated into imports of capital goods to modernize Spanish industry so that it would become world competitive rather than into imports of consumer goods or luxury items. But taking into consideration the history of the Spanish state or the economic policy record of the Franco regime, such an intervention of the Spanish state in such a rational economic direction was not to be taken for granted. Indeed, only a concrete historical analysis can offer an interpretation of the radical change in state economic policy that occurred in 1957.

At this point, Marxist analysis could retort that the capitalist state is nothing but the general staff representing the interests of the bourgeoisie and that the change in policy can easily be explained by the coming into power of a new class, or a new faction within the bourgeoisie, what Tunon de Lara calls the passage from an agrarian to a financial bourgeoisie.[36] In such a case, Marxist analysis would still need to explain why now and for the first time in the history of Spanish capitalism a faction appeared within the Spanish bourgeoisie which was prepared to take the historical role which Marxist theory has always assigned to the bourgeoisie — a role, however, which the Spanish bourgeois repeatedly refused to play or played only so half-heartedly that the theater of Spanish history alternated between farce and tragedy.

One of the problems which certain types of Marxist analysis have in viewing history derives from the fact that they already know the script in advance and thus seem to be unaware that historical actors have a tendency to improvise once they are on stage. The Opus Dei signifies such an improvisation in Spanish history. Not a *deus ex machina,* of course, but a new intrusion, nonetheless, which considerably altered the Spanish plot. Some Opus Dei members came indeed to represent very skillfully the ideal and material interests of precisely this new faction of the Spanish bourgeoisie which identified its future both with national economic development and with the new trends in international capitalism. Opus Dei members could play this role precisely because they themselves were the avant-garde or the carriers of the ethos of this new class.[37]

36. José Antonio Biescas, Manuel Tunon de Lara, *Espana Bajo la Dictadura Franquista, 1939-1975* (Barcelona, 1980).

37. In this context, for instance, Poulantzas' distribution of roles among the "national" and "comprador" Spanish bourgeoisies is extremely confusing. Contributing to the confusion is the fact that Poulantzas does not feel obliged to make concrete historical references. For a similar analysis see Acosta, *Crisis Franquismo, op.cit.* Acosta Sanchez views the Opus Dei members as representatives of a "denationalized bourgeoisie," which grew out of the "hegemonic financial bourgeoisie." In the case of Opus Dei, however, the classical Marxist differentiation between a "national" and a "comprador" bourgeoisie does no longer make sense. Opus Dei members were both, representatives of a new national bourgeoisie which furthered national economic development and representatives of a new "international" managerial class, which furthered the development of global corporate capitalism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SCIENCE & SOCIETY

An Independent Journal of Marxism

VOLUME XLVI, NUMBER 2, SUMMER 1982

CONTENTS

Manning Marable The Crisis of the Black Working Class: An Economic and Historical Analysis

Pradeep Bandyopadhay Marxist Urban Analysis and the Economic Theory of Rent

Sidney L. Harring The Police Institution as a Class Question: Milwaukee Socialists and the Police, 1900-1915

Paul N. Siegel The Style of *The Communist Manifesto*

SCIENCE & SOCIETY *is published quarterly at Room 4331, John Jay College, CUNY, 445 West 59 Street, New York, N.Y. 10019, by Science & Society, Inc. Subscriptions: Individual $15.00 annually (foreign $19.00 postpaid); single copies $4.00 (foreign $5.00 postpaid); Library and Institutional $25.00 annually (foreign $30.00 postpaid).*

LABOR

JOURNAL OF CANADIAN LABOR STUDIES

SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY OFFER

Each new subscriber to *Labor* will receive free of charge our special tenth anniversary double issue, which includes:

Peter DeLottinville: Joe Beef of Montreal: Working-Class Culture and the Tavern, 1869-1889
Ian Radforth and Joan Sangster: "A Link Between Labour and Learning": The Workers Educational Association in Ontario, 1917-1951
Satu Repo: Rosvall and Voutilainen: Two Union Men Who Never Died
Alan Dawley: Death and Rebirth of the American Mill Town
Bryan Palmer: Classifying Culture
Ian McKay: History, Anthropology, and the Concept of Culture

Make cheque payable to:
Committee on Canadian Labour History,
History Department, Memorial University,
St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada, A1C 5S7.

	Canada	Foreign
Individual	$15.00	$20.00
Institution	$20.00	$25.00

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ALGERIA 1954-1982: SOCIAL FORCES AND BLOCS IN POWER*

by Kuider Sami Naïr

1954-1962

Algerian colonial society entered a deep crisis at the end of WWII. This crisis reflected the inability of the metropolis and its colonial apparatus in Algeria to control the native petty bourgeoisie. Colonization was unable to create the conditions of a real economic and juridical integration of this class into the French framework. Thus the more dynamic native social forces found themselves, against their wishes, confined to a secondary role. Further, standards of living were declining, especially in the countryside. Earlier policies of driving people back into the mountains, begun at the time of colonial conquest (in the 1830s), were turning slowly but surely against colonial society itself. Hundreds of thousands of unemployed laborers were moving toward urban centers and influenced the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie which saw them both as a source of social support for future struggles and a source of pressure to break with colonial society. The existence of nationalist and radical political parties throughout the Maghreb encouraged the Algerian petty bourgeoisie to associate its own interests with those of the oppressed masses. Messali Hadj's *Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques (MTLD)* represented — in spite of the deep social cleavages which divided it — the coming together of this alliance. The crisis of the MTLD and the birth of the National Liberation Front (*NLF*) was a victory for plebian elements within the oppressed rural masses.[1] From then on, the Algerian movement of national liberation developed along two branches which complemented each other without always agreeing.

On the one side, there was the predominant petty boureoisie. This branch was split into 1) the NLF as the organizational form of the political struggle as well as the Algerian Provisional Government (*GPRA*) as the diplomatic apparatus occupied by city-dwellers, and 2) the *wilayas* (military regions) and border armies led directly by rural forces. This division was not immediately obvious, but it was real nonetheless. The army was primarily manned by mountain dwellers while the hierarchy was staffed by villagers. Furthermore, there were ethnic and tribal differences which were reinforced by the division into military regions corresponding with areas of ethno-tribal influence. The NLF's façade of unanimity and anti-regionalism could not hide this, especially after 1962.

On the other side, there was a profound radicalization of the masses in favor of independence, *outside* the sphere of struggles for the leadership of the national liberation movement. This second branch -- the more historically

*Originally published in *Les Temps Modernes*, July-August, 1982, in a special issue dedicated to the critical examinatin of Algerian state and society after 20 years of national experience. Translation by Jim Cohen.

1. Mohammed Harbi, *Le FLN, mirage et réalité*, (Editions Jeune Afrique, 1980).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

significant one — refused all compromises and bore the weight of the political and military anticolonial struggle. For example, it pursued the military struggle in 1960, when the *wilayas* were being pressured by the colonial army. Again, in 1962, it was this branch which prevented national independence from developing into a bloodbath opposing the conflict between the Tlemcen political bureau and the Algerian Provisional Government.

While the central *political* demand of these two branches was independence, things were not so clear at the *social* level. Because of its frontist and authoritarian character, the Algerian national liberation movement purposely swept aside social questions which, however, did not disappear. The petty bourgeoisie had not fought to challenge bourgeois production relations in Algeria, but tended to view its future within those relations in an Algerian national framework rather than a French one (see the writings of Abbas, Fares, etc.). By contrast, deruralized masses and mountain dwellers while not seeking to transform society altogether, aimed at changing their conditions of life radically. This blind radicalism, enlightened by no precise social project, burst forth in 1962. The clashes over the Algerian revolution's first serious program, the Tripoli program, embodied the contradictory logic of these two branches and prefigured their future orientations.

1962-1965

In 1962, weakened and paralyzed by internal contradictions, the national liberation movement inherited a disastrous social and economic situation. The colonizers' departure and the "scorched earth" policy of the *Organization de l'armée secrète (OAS)* intensified the weakness of a society already bled dry by eight years of war, economic destruction and displacements of population.[2] On one side, a radicalized mass movement called for radical transformations. On the other, the wealthier petty bourgeoisie with the support of certain factions of the sub-proletariat within the several power apparatuses fought the revolutionary logic of transformed social relations with the conservative logic of social mobility within existing relations. The rise of self-management, and its subsequent legitimation by the state, was both a product of a confused, chaotic political mass and social situation and an initial victory of the radicalized mass movement. But the strengthening of the army and the intensification of bureaucratization of power apparatuses set the limits of this radicalization. Up to the 1965 *coup d'Etat* however, there was a balance of power between these two groups.

The Ben Bella regime was more of a transitional political formula than a stable power structure — Ben Bella himself exemplifying this temporary compromise between social forces. His power was not based on any consensus, but rather on the weakness of state, bureaucratic and private social forces in controlling the mass movement, as well as on the weakness of the representatives of this mass movement within the structure of power. The charismatic relation between the head of state and the "people" only masked this reality

2. See Pierre Bourdieu, *Le Déracinement*, Editions de Minuit.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and reinforced the illusion of strength projected by a weak political regime destined to collapse. That the army was not controlled by either the head of state or by society prefigured the coming conflict and its resolution. Moreover, no economic policy could be formulated. The industrial options outlined in the Constantine Plan had been more or less adopted by independent Algeria, but the policy of going gung-ho industrialization was already on the agenda. But the Ben Bella regime did not have time to elaborate a precise socio-economic policy. The ritualistic invoking of a *sui generis* "socialism" hid a strategic vacuum since the state could not call on — and tended rather to hold back — the radical mobilization of workers. Also, the retaining of the party-form developed during the war, i.e., an indistinct group including all the personal ambitions, careerisms and incompetences of a disintegrated society — could not halt the processes of differentiation and conflicting socialization. The 1962-1965 period was characterized mainly by internal struggles for political power. Until 1965, there were shifting alliances between the party bureaucracy and certain factions of the army and the petty bourgeoisie within the state apparatus. But there was no one hegemonic bloc in power. In fact, a radical and relatively free mass movement outside the political sphere was an indication of this weakness. Only the army was in a position to confront this movement. That is why, in June 1965, the military seizure of power was presented as an answer to social "chaos."

State, Party and Army from 1965-1975

The political instability sanctioned by the *coup d'Etat* of June, 1965 was merely an expression of a broader crisis. Long-standing contradictions, struggles and social conflicts had only intensified since independence. The organizational crystallization of the social interests in conflict took place through the state's political mediation. The *coup d'Etat* was a military take-over which moved in two directions. First of all it subjugated all other groups fighting for power within the party and the state. This does not mean that the military tried to destroy these forces; on the contrary, it tended to instrumentalize them and mediatize them within a broader social project in which each group could pursue its interests. Secondly, it developed means to institutionalize the mass movement — in particular the trade unions — by offering social concessions which diffused conflicts, and deporting the unemployed to foreign countries, mainly France. The latter strategy was crucial in maintaining "social peace" in Algeria until 1970. Moreover, it began to bring together the "nationalists" in power and developed capitalism.[3]

Before attempting to reorganize society altogether, the military sought to rationalize the power apparatuses. Within the army, the domination of the "Oujda group" had not been completely established. Colonel Zbiri, former chief of *wilaya* number one, chief of staff and main ally of Boumedienne in 1965, rejected this rationalization and he was defeated in 1967. From then on, Boumedienne unified the army. His strategy for holding power consisted in

3. Better than any theoretical analysis could do, Kateb Yacine has shown this in his fine play, *Mohammed, prends ta valise*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assigning areas of influence to the various chiefs. In order to control the army, on which he depended, but of which he was suspicious, he strengthened military security (i.e., intelligence operations), composed mostly of professional intelligence officers and specialists in repression (mostly Kabyles and Oranais) military security expanded its influence over all of society.

Within the NLF party organization, the military controlled the bureaucracy and chose their leadership —always former military figures. Until 1975, the party had practically no power. Its militant base was often composed of individuals for whom party membership was the promise of upward mobility. It was more of a tool susceptible to manipulation than a meaningful political force. Indeed, when it became necessary to undertake mass mobilization in favor of certain social objectives (such as the agrarian "revolution") those in power sought "student volunteers" to compensate for the deficiencies of a phantom party. As the UGTA trade union organization (*Union générale des travailleurs algériens*), it was closely monitered and its "national" leadership consisted usually of those whose affinity for police activity was no secret. This picture changed only after 1968-1970 with the arrival of new blood from the PAGS (*Parti de l'avante-garde socialiste*, formerly the Algerian Communist Party), which was underground but tolerated.

It was at the state level that the military tried to base its hegemony. The economic policy from 1966 to 1978 led to the emergence of technocrats, who were to become the closest allies of the military. Outside the state the military favored the private capitalist sector. On November 1, 1965 Boumedienne proclaimed that "if the major means of production and the major [commercial] circuits are necessarily the domain of the public investment, it is in the national interest, and in the framework of our established choices, not to exclude, and particularly not to discourage, national private investment." The promulgation in 1966 of the Investment Code confirmed this positive attitude toward the private sector, broadening the advantages it had obtained as early as 1963. In fact, from 1965 to 1975, there developed tacit association between the public and private sectors, reinforced by ethnic, clan and matrimonial ties to state capital.[4] This policy *vis-à-vis* the "national" private sector enhanced the power structure's prestige and generated support within bourgeois and commercial groups for various development projects.

While from 1962 to 1965 there was no consensus among the various heterogeneous forces, things changed beginning with the three-year plan of 1967-1969. Having neutralized the mass movement the group in power now had a relatively stable and broad social base. Moreover, since Algerian foreign policy had not changed fundamentally since 1962, the USSR also provided concrete support with the rallying of the PAGS to Boumedienne.[5] This party's "critical" alignment reinforced the hegemony of the group in power par-

4. One could undertake a full study of marriages between state, party, and public enterprise functionaries and young women of the private bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. Cities such as Tlemcen or Constantine would appear as major suppliers.

5. See the letter from Sadek Hadjeres (secretary general of the PAGS) to Boumedienne.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ticularly over those sectors which it could not control directly (the unions' rank and file, the student movement). This power bloc was under military leadership: the army, rather than the technocracy or the bureacracy, was the determining force. In the final analysis, the army defined the disposition of the energy rent, and drew the parameters within which conflicts could develop. To maintain the balance of power, however, the military had to adopt a social and economic policy favoring the contradictory interests of various social groups. Thanks to the management of the energy rent, several things were possible: the technocracy could reinforce its social position; workers benefitted from a political wage not related to the intensive exploitation of labor power; the private sector could make enormous profits in manufacturing consumer goods. Such was the economic policy of a militant populism which constituted Algeria's "socialism."

Now, if the military dominated all organizational forces within the state and the party without reducing itself to any one of them, this meant that there was a relative hiatus between the *social content* and the *political form* of power. Indeed, the social content was capitalist: thus, the dominant class appears as *heterogeneous* in its position within the relations of production — hence the necessary conciliation of interests between the private bourgeois, the party bureaucrat, the army officer and the technocrat in a nationalized firm — but *homogeneous* in the pursuit of its interests, all of which boil down to the formation of profits. Their profits are accumulated to the detriment of workers in the private sector and of the energy rent in the public one. But *this dominant class is not a ruling class*; its structural heterogeneity denies it the coherence necessary for political power. The military plays the leadership role, correlating the interests of all groups. Although it provides coherence, however, it is also stuck in the mess.

The political form resulting from this is difficult to define. There are two erroneous interpretations. One defines this type of power as a variety of Bonapartism: the chief of state is seen as assuring the balance between social classes which are too weak to confront each other but too strong to neutralize each other. According to this interpretation, the dictator imposes himself with the support of classes other than those occupying basic positions in the relation of production.[6] The other interpretation, developed by Leca and Vatin, defines this form of power as "sultanism" in the Weberian sense.[7] Both interpretations share the same flaw: they do not account for the *specificity* of Algerian relations with *analogies* which are no doubt convenient, but too

6. For this interpretation, see Leucate and Ammour, *la voie algérienne*, Petite collection Maspéro.

7. Leca and Vatin, "Algérie: le systeme politique" in *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord*, 1977, pp.27-28. They write: "The Weberian term 'sultanism' seems appropriate to approach an understanding of political power in Algeria as a type of power whose holder tries more or less successfully to make himself independent of all groups having autonomous power bases, whether these be institutional, political, administrative or social. The Algerian president, as the constitution stipulates, is not an arbitrary sovereign counting only on himself, but a sovereign who has freedom of movement and takes care not to depend on others, seeking support in turn, or simultaneously, from given groups without becoming a prisoner of any of them."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vague. The Bonapartist interpretation does not hold because this form of power presupposes an economically developed society in which *organically structured classes* neutralize each other. What characterizes Algeria is precisely the absence of organic classes. Similarly, the notion of sultanism does not fit because the Algerian president — or sovereign — does not hold power by gaining support *in turn* from different groups, but rather because he is the structural *representative* of a determined group — the military — which establishes a framework of internal consensus. The head of state is not a traditional sultan but a political leader representing the basic interests of the group which brought him to power. As such, he constantly "navigates" among the various factions and is obliged to widen the bases of support of the group to which he belongs. The example of Boumedienne and the problems posed by his succession is indicative. With Boumedienne, political power belonged to the army —and not necessarily with those closest to Boumedienne himself. Succession was treated as an *internal* army problem, with the exclusion of Boumedienne's closest collaborators.

It is well known that neither the NLF's political bureaucracy nor even the Council of the Revolution established at the time of the 1965 putsch chose the successor: it was done by the national assembly of active army officers. In other words, in this type of regime, the head of state is a veritable political leader with prerogatives attached to his leadership functions, but who also has obligations attached to the conditions in which his power was originally obtained.

Therefore, while the *social content* of power is determined by capitalist relations of production — that is, the necessity of guaranteeing the mechanisms of capital profitability — the *political form* is of a *military-bureaucratic* type. In spite of very important differences, the regime established by the 1965 coup d'Etat basically resembles Nasserism, as analyzed by Anouar Abdel Malek.[8]

Economic Policy, 1965-1975

The pre-1965 political regime found it impossible to institute an economic policy; by contrast, the subsequent military was characterized by the effort to bring about "development" and to modernize the country's social structure. This economic orientation was directed "from above"and occurred in a very favorable socio-historical context: because of the energy rent, the regime did not have to create the conditions of extortion of surplus value (as was the case of absolutist Europe in the 17th centry) in order to stimulate the accumulation of capital necessary for the creation of a productive sector. This rent was not located within the capital-labor relation because the mobilization of value resulted not from the exploitation of national labor power, but from profits realized at the international level. We will not attempt here to analyze the theoretical model which guided the economic policy of Boumedienne and Abdesselam. As for its consequences, after 15 years this model has resulted in:

8. A. Abdel Malek, *L'Egypte, société militaire*, Editions du Seuil.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Panini Collection. UNESCO
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a) the unproductive mobilization of capital; the fall in labor productivity has been constant; no factory functions at more than half its capacity, with the average somewhere betwen 20 and 30%. Moreover, industrial growth has been very mediocre (8% annually at the greatest, which is nothing in view of the amount of capital investment); b) the expanded reproduction of unemployment intensified by a very high rate of demographic growth (3.7% annually); c) food dependency: in 1965, total exports of agricultural products stood at 30.2% and imports at 30.2%; in 1975, exports had fallen to 4.3% while imports were at 26.1%; d) the decay of agriculture; e) the serious extroversion of the economy, which has brought about external dependency. Thus, in 1965, total imports cost $10 billion; this had reached $30 billion in 1980. The public foreign debt at the end of 1975 was close to $9 billion, or $520 per capita;[9] f) the continual growth of technological, scientific and cultural dependdence; g) the constant regression of the infrastructure for social programs in view of the demographic boom; h) the disintegration of large urban centers, both in terms of population density (in Algiers, there are 2530 people per square kilometer; density rose by 70% from 1966 to 1978) and in terms of the decay of collective infrastructures; i) finally — and this is an indirect success but one which must be chalked up to this model of "development" — the very rapid growth of the private sector (competitive capitalism) in the least capital-intensive sectors of industry and those in which the rotation of capital is rapid (textiles, food, etc.). Here, productivity has been real, since the conditions of exploitation of labor are merciless.

Along with these results, there is a high degree of social inequality, characterized by the differentiation of society along six parallel axes: first, an urban bourgeoisie, *private and public*;[10] next, a middle bourgeoisie (wealthy traders, upper executives, etc.); a significant layer of "white collars" (the plethora of bureaucracy being a characteristic of Algeria); small traders, middlemen and artisans (immigrants have generally taken up small trade); a working class which is now fairly solid and which includes about one million workers; and, finally, an ever larger layer of unemployed and displaced people. In 15 years of "socialist development", the greatest success seems to have been in the creation of a new bourgeoisie.

9. According to Schnetzler, "The International Monetary Fund had calculated that for 1976 the loans used by Algeria corresponded to 4% of the GNP as against 18% in 1972. Algeria was thus becoming one of the most heavily indebted countries in the Third World, both in absolute terms and per capita." Schnetzler, *Le développment algérien,* (Editions Masson 1981), p. 158.

10. Schnetzler writes:" . . . the urban bourgeoisie, while having contributed to the cause of independence, is its greatest beneficiary. It took the place of European and Jewish executives and populated state administrations and public and private sector firms which have expanded steadily since 1962. It is far from homogenous. On top: the very wealty, heirs to fortunes gained in agriculture, trade, and rarely in industry, excepting certain forms of crafts; also, businessmen whose fortunes are recent — often very recent; much of their wealth is outside Algeria; many of them are the members of liberal professions (lawyers, doctors, pharmacists) who earn high salaries and whose money has in some cases found its way out of the country; and a portion of the upper state personnel. In Algiers, this milieu resides in certain districts, notably in luxurious villas overlooking the city." *Op. cit.*, p. 205.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Legitimizing the Bloc in Power, 1975-1979

It is in this context that major changes since 1975, and especially since the death of Boumedienne in 1979, must be analyzed. These changes have affected both the structure of the power bloc in 1975 and then, between 1979 and 1982, the recomposition of that bloc and its economic orientation. In 1975, social contradictions had become pronounced (with numerous strikes, especially in the public sector; failure of the "agrarian revolution", and galloping inflation), posing the question of the regime's *political legitimacy*. Institutional debates within the dominant bloc did not constitute the roof of an edifice under construction, but aimed rather to define the power positions — and thus the responsibilities — of each group. While remaining behind Boumedienne, the military was worried about the deteriorating situation. Boumedienne became aware of the difficulties growing out of this model of industrial development. The absence of a political party structure capable of mediatizing the regime's project with society made the regime all the less credible. As for the official trade union, it was becoming increasingly ineffective: workers saw it more as the regime's conveyor belt than as a organization defending their interests.

Boumedienne tried to turn this to his profit. Instead of strangling popular cries, he gave them a forum in the debate over the National Charter. As with the National Action Charter proposed by Nasser to the Egyptian people in 1962, this was a sort of pact between the regime and society.[11] As for its overall themes, they reiterate the political practice of the regime since 1965; "specific" socialism, plebeian nationalism, statist Jacobinism, technocracy tempered by a reformist religious traditionalism, reafffirmation of the role of the political leadership, subjection of society — in short, all the ingredients the regime had used to maintain itself in power. The *goal* of this operation was to persuade society to accept a project which was neither new nor subject to democratic debate, but a series of practices which had become national ideological objectives. The *function* of the operation was to consolidate Boumedienne's rule by, for the first time, clearly ascribing each group in the power bloc its place in the state.

The debates which followed, concerning the election of the president of the republic, the adopting of the constitution and the frequently reiterated project of reorganizing the NLF may be understood within this underlying logic of the balance of forces which was completely upset by the death of Boumedienne in 1979.

The Problem of Succession

The system gradually established after 1965 underwent its first major crisis after the death of its founder. The naming of Colonel Chadli Benjedid to the presidency of the republic — for he was named before being elected — was not proof of the solidity of the mechanisms left behind by Boumedienne. The institutional game, which consisted of designating the candidate at a party

11. See the analysis of Leca and Vatin in "Algeria: le système politique," *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord,* 1977.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

congress and then proposing this candidate to the people, was a mere formality which hid real confrontations. Of the two candidates vying for succession, Colonel M.S. Yahiaoui, party secretary, and A. Bouteflika, minister of foreign affairs, neither one could seriously be considered as the representative of a definite political current. Bouteflika, head of Algerian diplomacy, had no real influence; his image of a liberal open to the West could only play against him at a time when Boumedienne was being posthumously praised — by contrition — for his radical socialism. Moreover, the formal arena of the debate (the supreme echelons of the party) was not a favorable ground for him; party cadres inevitably choose among their own. For Bouteflika to have the slighest chance of prevailing, he would have had to be able to count either on the support of a strong and *organized* private bourgeois sector, or on solid ties within the army. But since the army operates on the hierarchical principle according to which the *primus inter pares* is always the senior officer in the highest rank, Bouteflika was defeated in advance. What is surprising is not his defeat but rather the fact that he entered the fray at all. Finally, the candidacy of Yahiaoui made that of Bouteflika appear to be anti-Boumediennist *de facto*.

Yahiaoui represented formal legitimacy: as party secreteary, he was *the* party candidate in terms of the constitution handed down by Boumedienne. Yahiaoui represented the upper state and party bureaucracy and had a certain influence within the army -- he had long been head of the military academy of Cherchell -- but he was nonetheless outside the army. He could claim no influence on any social movement, since the party is characterized precisely by its aloofness from society. In confronting Bouteflika, Yahiaoui had to stiffen his rhetoric and appeared as the continuator of Boumedienne's political-ideological line. The paradox was that both candidates neutralized each other since neither could present himself as the representative of the military. The army did not want to choose between a "left" and a "right" Boumediennist. The army in Algeria, as in many Third World countries, is first of all *the army in power*; what counted for it in 1979 was not to lose that power. That is why Colonel Chadli, far removed from the loud proclamations of bureaucrats and the knowing smiles of diplomats, eclipsed the non-military pretenders. Chadli was bound to obey the military, although some say that he did so without enthusiasm.

Boumedienne's succession thus reaffirmed the power of the military and at the same time highlighted the weakness of all other groups. This did not happen, of course, without certain concessions, especially toward the party. Yahiaoui, who was proclaimed party "co-ordinator" represented a bureaucratic apparatus without a social base: this apparatus could not influence real power — it could only be its instrument. Since 1965, the relation between political-bureaucratic and military interests had been decided in favor of the latter. The party is the instrument of the political leadership of the army — not vice versa. Secondly, the logic of this type of political regime leaves no room for a duality of power. Because the head of state is also head of the army, the party, and, *de facto*, the security forces, he cannot let autonomous power

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

develop outside his purview. In fact, this pseudo-presidentialization does not mean the exercise of a personal will to power — although this is an important factor — but attests rather to the fact that the head of state is above all responsible, for the whole of national policy, to the body which brought him to power. Now, the military can negotiate the content of its alliances with all other groups, but it can make no concessions regarding the principle and form of its domination. The party "co-ordinator" was thus eliminated.

The rise of Chadli also means the recomposition of the bloc in power. Because the economic situation was very difficult — growing unemployment, very poor performance of the service consumer goods sectors, etc. — the new head of state could not assume this legacy and preach continuity. But since he belongs to the same group as his predecessor, and since criticism of the latter would trigger reactions against the entire group, he could not propose radical change. That is why, in 1979, Algeria embarked on its own version of "change within continuity."[12] What remains intact is the principle of unity of political command and the submission of all other groups to the army. What is changing, slowly but profoundly, is the consensus both among the groups and within each group. Within the army, the new head of state is looking for support among young officers rather than among old "feudal" colonels mired in scandalous "affairs". He is seeking the centralization of the army and to relieve the heads of the eight military regions of anything more than symbolic power. He is also reorganizing the security forces. This corresponds to a recomposition of the bloc of the upper bureaucracy of party and state: new men emerging who were previously kept out; others, whose main principle has been to remain "legitimist" no matter who is king, are consolidating their position.

There is a tight interrelation between the political-military leadership and the upper state and party bureaucracy. But the novelty of the new hegemony is that there has been a split within the dominant bloc between the political (hence, non-military) Boumediennists and their allies (the PAGS and the technocrats) on the one hand, and most of the military on the other. Since 1980, there has been a systematic exclusion of this wing of the old leadership bloc.[13] In the same vein, there has been a growing influence of the *ouléma* group (religious reformers), as well as unambiguous overtures to the private capitalist sector. Criticism of gigantic industrial projects undertaken during the Boumedienne-Abdesselam period, is part of an intense struggle against certain technocrats and trade union leaders too attached to the "socialist management of enterprises." The results of the previous policy, which were at

12. Translator's note: "change within continuity" had been a major theme of Giscard d'Estaing's electoral campaigns in 1974 and 1981.

13. One of the climactic moments of this struggle was the practically total substitution of leadership of the UGTA at its 6th congress on April 9, 1982. This leadership either came directly from the PAGS or was under its influence. The upper bureaucracy blamed this leadership for "having allowed militants who were non-members of the ruling party — and Marxists what is more — to occupy posts of responsibility at different levels of the organization." *Le Monde*, April 10, 1982.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the very least unconvincing, makes this criticism all the more telling. For the PAGS and the industrial technocrats, the legacy is a rather embarrassing one.

The Emerging Project of Economic Development, 1980-1982

Since 1980, the new bloc has undertaken an evaluation of past efforts especially economic ones. From the standpoint of economic rationality as well as social equilibrium, it was impossible to pursue Abdesselam's policy. Boumedienne himself, shortly before his death, sought a change. The problem can be summed up as follows: large industrial units can only offer a partial solution to Algeria's social problems, while devouring its energy rent. State-run firms had become bottomless pits of investment. The solution recommended by the new minister of the plan, A. Brahimi, is based on three major choices:

1) To slow the rhythm of industrialization by submitting existing units to two kinds of control: first, strict financial control, including economic parameters of profitability and verification of actual completion of projects; and a rigorous technical control, allowing for a more flexible, less bureaucratic functioning of these large production units. The emphasis is both on respecting financial plans and on decentralization and even the break-up of state firms. The case of SONATRACH is significant in this regard; until recently it was a state within the state, and now is divided into several autonomous units.[14]

2) To re-orient the inputs energy rent toward the service sector and internal consumption. If one takes the 1982 budget as a reference point, the portion allotted to price supports for major consumer goods (grains, cooking oil, semolina, flour, sugar) has reached 3.86 billion dinars, three times greater than the 1977 level. The goal of this reorientation is to calm popular discontent and to social projects (housing, for example) which had up to now been neglected by the state in favor of industrialization. Furthermore, the portion allotted to national enterprises in the 1982 budget, 62.6% of which is covered by petroleum revenues, is practically nil.

3) To facilitate the activity and bolster the weight of the private sector in the economy; to replace the standard practice of illicit alliances between private and public capital with an official integration of private capital into the overall economic strategy. Thus, the resolution of the 6th session of the Central Committee affirms its appreciation of "the real and multiple contributions of the private sector initiative to the edification of the nation" and stresses "the necessity of correcting the negative aspects which hamper its evolution," calling "lucidly and responsibly for an effective mobilization of its real potential and important resources." (*El Moudjahid*, December 27, 1981) The sectors directly concerned by this reorientation include private agriculture, commercial firms, and small and medium industry. Moreover, the state monopoly on

14. It must be noted that the decentralization of these units has the political function of preventing technocratic power centers from becoming threats to the military-bureaucratic bloc.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

foreign trade, through which the old regime controlled private capitalism, is "fading away." It looks as if a policy of rampant break with this monopoly were being applied. Whatever the case may be, this overall reorientation does not aim solely to replace an anarchic development of private capitalism with rational development in a fixed framework; it appears more, in fact, like a growing political awareness of the power of the "national" bourgeoisie and an attempt — albeit a timid one for the time being — to associate its accumulation fund with that of the state. Obviously we have provided here no more than an approximate framework for what could become an overall conversion of the economic project of the military-bureaucratic bloc. We do no foresee a bureaucratic and authoritarian radicalization of the Boumedienne-Abdesselam perspective, but a complex, and as yet unspecified, opening to the private sector. It is this strategic axis which explains the struggle undertaken within the power apparatus of the military-bureaucratic bloc to check the technocracy and the partisans of "Boumedienne socialism" such as the PAGS.

However, it is equally obvious that this situation can only be transitory. Two scenarios are now possible: either the military-bureaucratic bloc will succeed in finding original forms of association with the private capitalist sector, which would modify the social base of the power bloc within a few years and bring about some changes in the leading political personnel — in this case it would be a successful "Sadatization," whose international support would come from French capitalism. Or else the groups excluded from power will succeed in reasserting themselves and securing positions of strength in the army. In that case, there would be, somehow, a change in power (for example a coup d'Etat or a "voluntary" departure of the current leading group). The first hypothesis appears to be the more likely one, for several reasons. The most eloquent of these is, once again, the real social and economic failure of the Boumedienne-Abdesselam project in the eyes of the population. The second hypothesis is not totally to be excluded, but it is rendered improbable by the lack of a new economic project on the part of the supporters of the old group. These two hypotheses, in any event, are both located *within* the current framework of the Algerian political system. The social forces which could burst open this framework and cause the majority of the population to enter political life do exist, but they possess neither a clear, conscious political program nor organizations capable of directing their actions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE REAGAN ERA

by Bogdan Denitch

The 80s are remarkable for, at least at their beginning, an absence of highly visible coherent organized social movements familiar to us from the late 60s and early 70s. This fact has a great deal to do with the increasing social meanness of political discourse as a politics of cutbacks and restraint makes the days of the Great Society, and even the Nixon era, look like a golden era of welfare statism. While there are more elected black politicians than ever before, the black social *movement* as distinct from black political machines and the ever-present black church, is noted for its absence from the political scene. Such radical politics as are found on the universities are not social or generational movements of students viewed either as a nascent new class or as a generational revolt, but rather a holdover from the previous period, as those who have been activated in the student movement of the 60s and 70s become faculty and discover that, despite their slogan of the time, some people over 30 apparently can be trusted to retain radical values and politics. The point, however, is it appears that you can increasingly *not* trust anybody *under* 30 to be concerned with anything but either a desperate careerism in the face of a dwindling job market or the newly fashionable apolitical hedonism of the narcissistical "me" generation.

If the two most visible social movements of the 60s — the blacks and the students — are quiescent, this is also true of the labor movement as a *movement*, although it is quite clear that organized labor is in trouble not only because of its absence of a social drive and elan in the name of broad social programs but even in narrow bread and butter organizational terms. Those two issues, as I will argue, are indeed linked.

Women, while increasingly active, both politically in the professions and in economic pressure groups, have lost much of the drive that the initial thrust of feminist discovery of oppression provided and have developed instead into a significant though *routinized* mass pressure clientele, predominantly of the white collar and professional women, which seems to be on the scene as a permanent new factor.

The more dramatic movements of protest loosely associated with leftist or egalitarian ideologies have been in retreat for almost a decade, and what is left of "left" social movements as distinct from organizations can be found in three areas: the new peace movement, the backyard democracy citizens movements stressing democratic empowerment along lines long proposed by Saul Alinsky and his followers, and the ecological movement. What is characteristic of all three of these is the limited vision and do-gooding politics which are visible in these "lifestyle" sets of concerns. These "movements" have little or no relationship to the blacks, the poor or the unemployed; they are supremely middle class movements. After all, it is entirely possible to make major ecological advances without affecting the power distribution in modern

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

industrial societies, particularly if the costs are passed on to the consumers and taxpayers. No ruling class has ever quailed at the vision of citizen inputs about the location of street lights and sewers and, in any case, the backyard democracy movement is sometimes driven by conservative and ethnic exclusivist drives just as often as by the vision of participatory democracy. And, finally, a peace movement with as abstract a goal as the freeze — a goal which can be paid lip service to by the doves and the hawks, by Kennedy and Reagan — surely does not offer the prospect of radical mobilization of *social* movements. The closest to a social edge around the peace and defense issues that we come to is in the activities of the Black Congressional Caucus, which links the vast expansion of defense expenditures to the wholesale assault on what is left of the welfare state.

The backdrop to the era of Reagan is not, however, provided merely by the retreat of social movements from contested terrains and at least the temporary paralysis of both the liberal wing of the Democratic Party and the organized American labor movement, but also by the entry of new forces into the political arena. The question is — do any of these qualify as social movements. Without going into overly academic definitional games, it would seem that at least some of the support for the Reagan administration went well beyond the traditional Republican and conservative publics in the United States and tapped a vein of right-wing populism which represents as much of a social movement as the more familiar left and egalitarian variants do. What I have in mind here are the Right to Life activists, the broader activization of fundamentalist religious groups and the increasing polarization within the religious community between its two activist wings — the right and the left — and, finally, the populist conservatism of the anti-tax movements which bear a close resemblance to Boyte's backyard democracy activists, except of course with different politics and different results.

Conservative Nostalgia and Social Movements

If we examine these three strands which activated the public traditionally absent from American party political systems and sub-systems, it is clear that it is the presence of these elements that has given Reaganism features that make the traditional American economic conservatives uneasy. After all, a Right to Life movement in a period of expanding welfare bills and with an explosive birth rate in the urban black and hispanic communities has unanticipated consequences in terms of social policy, above all for those who want to cut back welfare. One can hardly expect to do much cutting back when one realizes that the overwhelmingly larger section of dependent population in the United States are those covered by the Aid to Dependent Children, i.e., minor children and their mothers. Were the Right to Life activists to have succeeded in their view that abortion is quite simply murder and therefore a non-negotiable proposition since clearly murder is not something made more acceptable by poverty and social need, then one would expect a sharp increase, not only in dependent children but in dependent illegitimate children, and what is probably even worse from the point of view of conservative social policy, dependent illegitimate children of teenage single mothers. To round out the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nightmare of the "cool" budget-cutting conservatives, these dependents would also add to the increasingly black and hispanic numbers of poor, locked in large metropolises, who appear all but impervious to any attempts to break the cycle of dependence-unemployment-poverty-crime. Of course, most Right to Life activists exacerbate the contradictory nature of their drive by simultaneously supporting an absolute prohibition on abortion with a vociferous distaste for welfare, affirmative action and any scheme that could bring these families out of dependency. Apparently, the Right to Life ends at birth. However, inconsistency has never been a problem for social movements and it is clear that for the activists the cutting edge of the Right to Life movement, the enthusiasm and elan, are every bit as much directed against promiscuity, immorality and the general alienness of late 20th century modern American as they are at abortion itself. Thus, we are dealing here with a traditionalist anti-modernist movement that draws considerable support from the much broader pools of unease and discomfort that the rapid transformations of the post-World War American social scene caused for many. In point of fact, there seems to be an interesting congruence between the traditionalism of the Right to Life and fundamentalist Christian activists and the evocative nostalgia rhetoric of the Reagan administration and of Reagan himself.

The image projected by the president — in an era where mass media do much to shape the political dialogue, images are crucially important — is of an America, a Main Street America, which many of us vaguely remember as the land of the Andy Hardy movies and Grade B nostalgic pieces about small town virtues. But, then, since the president acted in no small number of such movies, it should not surprise one that this imagery comes so readily to hand. It is an America, let us remember, of the *Saturday Evening Post* cover. The men are all hard-working and vaguely WASP, the women demure and modest in their attractiveness and the children clean-cut and working hard at their paper delivery routes. The local drugstore has no association whatsoever with any drug harder than a lemon coke or a milkshake. It is, above all, an America with no blacks, no hispanics, no feminists — bra-burning or otherwise — no organized labor, although an occasional skilled craftsman may wander in, no police brutality and certainly not even a thought of drugs, abortion, gayness or pushy, assertive minorities demanding entry.

It is all very well to argue that this America was a fantasy in which only a small minority ever lived. In terms of political symbolism, small town virtues and Main Street America were evoked long after teeming polyglot urban and industrial centers sheltered the vast bulk of our population. It is as if that America, the fantasy one, was the real land, and the America of massive, non-WASP immigration, sweatshops, industrial unions, class and racial conflict, was a peripheral fantasy of radicals. Thus we have a politics of nostalgia which goes back to well-remembered symbols and which gives a social dimension to the equally nostalgic fantasies of Reagan's economics.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reaganomics — and Right-Wing Populism

Reagan's economic policy responded more, at least in its oratory and symbols, to right-wing nostalgic populist dreams than to the conscious economic interests of the American banking and industrial elites. This is, let us be careful here, not to say that many of the members of the banking and industrial elite did not and do not have within themselves a contradiction between their interests as captains of corporate giants and as ideologues of a free market, entrepreneur capitalism which bit the dust in the 1870s, to the extent that it ever really existed. American capitalism most certainly does not desire an absence of state intervention. Its tendencies are towards neo-corporatism, planning and the politics of social contract, and are probably better expressed by Felix Rohatyn than anybody around the Reagan administration. But while this may be so, the ideology of many of the American capitalists is right-wing populism and the mobilizing symbols of American mail order, mass conservatism have never been anything so palely anemic as the real program of Wall Street and corporate America. The right-wing populist program needed raw meat, catchy slogans and popular fantasies. And what after all can be more heuristic than the blessed notion that cutting back taxes for the rich is good for everybody. Imagine the joy in popular conservative circles when they found academics with legitimate Ph.D.s who not only rejected welfare-statist Keynesianism but argued that a reduction in the tax rate would *increase* government revenues. One could thus eat one's cake and have it by pursuing a policy that would vastly improve the lot of the rich without any substantial cutbacks in the little things the middle and lower classes have grown to expect: schools, sanitation, police protection and an occasional improvement in medical care. It was a public relations dream to have a genuinely popular presidential figure who could assert that America would again become No. 1, as secretly most Americans have always wished it would be, that it would undertake a vast buildup of military potential, thus foiling an expansive Godless communism without of course endangering world peace, since all it takes for the lesser breeds to be kept in line is an assertion of will. That, further, the undeserving poor would be put in their place, presumably in one of the many millions of new jobs which would be generated by a revitalized America, that the bowlegged bureaucrats in Washington and the State Houses would receive their desserts, by either being made to work for a change or through unemployment. That the deserving working poor would be unaffected by cutbacks and their social security payments and Medicaid would continue flowing. And all this with no cost whatsoever, but, on the contrary, with tax rebates. What is amazing is that more people did not vote for such a program since we were all assured that in other serious matters the only difference between the incumbent and the challenger in the 1980 election was the gross weakness and incompetence of Carter.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Right-Wing Populism and the Reagan Alliance

But back to the social movements. The reason why Reaganism had to involve right-wing demagoguery and fantasies is, in my opinion, because conservative Republicanism is very much of a minority movement in the United States. The natural ruling majority is the Democratic Party with all of its confused internal contradictions, and the relevant political debate in the United States probably runs *through* that party rather than outside of it. What was necessary, therefore, to elect a Reagan was not merely an incompetent Democratic presidential incumbent but a series of fortuitous issues which dramatized the relative decline of the United States as a world power. Nothing could have done that better than the months of American helplessness viewed in big-time television focused on the American Embassy in Tehran. These facilitating factors still, however, might have produced merely a Democratic successful challenger, and it is useful to note here that a bumbling late campaign by Kennedy, even with the Chappaquiddick monkey on his back, gathered an unbelievable 40 percent against a sitting president of his own party.

A Republican member of the establishment, let us say a Rockefeller type, would from the point of view of red meat American conservatism have been no improvement whatsoever. A slight shift in foreign policy, somewhat more caution with welfare state expenditures but no major departure on so-called social issues or what passes for them, which provided the elan for the right-wing activists. To repeat, those issues are: abortion, prayer in schools, poorly concealed dislike of blacks and hispanics and not at all concealed dislike of large urban cities and, above all, their dependent populations. The trouble is that those sets of dislikes by themselves cannot produce a majority. They thus had to be combined with conservative Republican interests and a general aversion to himself which Carter seemed to have endless capacity for increasing. (Throughout the entire Carter administration, I had a number of friends and colleagues serving it with varying degrees of enthusiasm but have failed to meet one yet who did not personally dislike Carter, his style and his entourage.)

The uneasy partnership between Republican Party conservatism and right-wing populism was thus born of a mutual need, if not love, since neither could win without the other. To be sure, the rewards distributed to the partners have been grossly uneven, with the populists getting the oratory and the symbols while the conservative Republicans got the tax cutbacks, a hawkish foreign policy and the appointments. One effect of this has been to keep the right-wing populists around as an organized force since they apparently feel every bit as much outsiders with "their" president as they did without. And, let us not forget that as far as style goes, former President Carter, with his sanctimonious teetotaling, small town, evident meanness, was almost as satisfying as the present president.

The conclusion, therefore, is that the forces focused in the right-wing populist movements and organizations will remain activated and, since the pendulum in electoral politics seems to be now swinging against conservatism,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

probably more vociferously so than before. What a Reagan interlude has meant has been a modernization of organizational skills of these movements, a wedding of right-wing fundamentalist populism with mail-order fund-raising and an increasingly skilled use of mass media. Most Americans are not even aware of the fact that these folk have enormous influence, if not control, over local radio and TV stations, through much of the heartland of America. A person can go through their entire lives watching the three major networks, educational TV and reading the *Washington Post* and *New York Times*, and be unaware of the fact that a surly politics of nostalgia, combined with a paranoid style and an increasing sense of despair, has created new social movements of the right.

Out of Electoral Alliances into Movement Politics

The all but inevitable collapse of Reaganism as an economic and social policy in the face of a stubborn depression and an economic world order singularly unresponsive to present U.S. policies will probably end the experiment of these marginal right-wing groups playing with main-line politics. I suspect that they will go back to a policy of abandoning the Republican Party and will concentrate on forming independent conservative and right-wing political parties and organizations. What this means is that their sense of being outsiders will be accentuated and that their politics will assume a harder and shriller edge.

What I am postulating is that the right-wing social movements may have had their high-water mark in terms of broad popularity and then discovered that popularity brought with it a diffusion of the original zeal and clarity. By analogy, one can think of them as moving to a more sectarian, hard-edge "movement" style as they begin to digest the fact that the most conservative American president in a century cannot help but betray them. The White House formally supported the constitutional amendment which would have banned abortion but it was clear that arms were not being twisted and necessary promises were not being made; that, in short, the White House did nothing to mobilize effective support. Since much of the right populist sentiment is out of tune with the needs and the moods of American conservatism and the real powerholders of this society, there is an inevitability to the script of betrayal.

But, then, there is another element. Right-wing populist "kook" groups have always been around. What was *new* was that they came out from under the rug and had an impact on mass politics. They, however, did not have that impact in their own right but by allying themselves, on the one hand, with the conservative political machine and, on the other, by tapping resentments and fears of many Americans who found the modern lifestyle assaulting them through the mass media to be profoundly alien and frightening. This last group, often including people who have traditionally voted for the Democrats, explains the bulge in the blue-collar vote for the president in the last election. But that, after all, was a vote that could be called a luxury vote. It did not seem to matter how one voted in other respects, in matters of social and economic

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and, yes, class politics. The two candidates did not sound drastically different and mass media have helped create a thorough-going cynicism among American voters about anything any politicians say. If no effect could be had on economic or social policies by how one voted, the voters then at least had the luxury of being able to "growl" at the incumbent Democrat. They showed their generalized displeasure with America's diminished place in the world, with the obstreperousness of the minorities, the gays, women, and all those who demanded a change in the rules of the game. I have never believed that that vote on the part of blue-collar, unionized voters reflected an anti-union sentiment or a conscious shift to the right. And my optimism, if it is that, seems confirmed both by poll data and subjective indicators, which show traditional blue-collar voters moving back to their familiar voting pattern. The hard lessons of an unemployment rate of more than 10 percent combined with the effective demoralization of broad sectors of the American economy are bringing home the lessons on which the traditional New and Fair Deal coalitions had been built.

The trouble is that it may now no longer be the right thing to have learned from this depression. While it is clear that, from the point of view of blue collar and lower white collar employees, Reaganism both in its real and ideological version, offers no relief, it is not however clear that the Democrats have economic and social programs that can help. They have, at best, values, prejudices which are less grossly offensive to the working population and to the poor. Their support for the industrial elite always included elements of a social contract which takes care of the unionized worker and provides some small aid and a good bit of social mobility for the vast underclass which new industrial society seems to spawn.

If I am right in assuming that Reaganism will be defeated and be replaced by a Democratic Party probably with something resembling the social contract, neo-corporatist ideas of a Felix Rohatyn: policies designed to maximize employment, combined with massive encouragement of investment and wrapped in liberal social values and oratory, we will be left with all the pre-conditions for social movements of the left and right to emerge. Why? In the first place because American politics, in the formal systemic arenas, are increasingly less capable of producing visible results. The whole process is far too bureaucratized on the output side and, while there have been major improvements on the input side, e.g., the Democratic Party is far more of a democratic arena and less of a creature of bosses and kingmakers than ever in its history, it turns out that grass root participation in the era of bureaucratic politics does not produce visible results. The entire system seems to diffuse pressures and while therefore excellent for preserving some kind of equilibrium, responds with glacial slowness in producing results where the needs are seen as desperate and urgent.

No one in the Democratic Party even pretends that there is much relation between the platform and what the party does or, for that matter, between the increasing ease of the participation of blacks, women and other excluded

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

groups and any visible and measurable gains for those groups. I cannot believe that a prolonged situation of dual digit unemployment, housing crises, urban decay and fallback in real living standards for the working and underclasses can continue without some new social movements becoming the vehicles for those resentments and demands that cannot get serviced by the formal political system.

A banal example: in a New York City where a Republican candidate for mayor has probably somewhat less chance than a Socialist, and where Republican legislators have to be treated as an endangered species, in the middle of the worst housing crisis in living memory, a Democratic mayor pours millions of tax rebate funds designed to help construct middle- and low-income housing into huge real estate corporations, building offices and gentrifying the city center at the expense of the middle and lower class tenants, with no visible protest. The unemployment rate of black youth, again in New York, has passed the 50 percent mark, and it is clear that if anything, less will be done in the immediate future to generate jobs or provide meaningful vocational training. At the same time, there is not a single major black elected official in the city administration. Again, with no visible social movement arising. Of course, there are protests and blacks have shown their displeasure in primaries. But I find it hard to conceptualize a continued disintegration of a metropolis without a whole range of social movements beginning to come on the scene. As evidence, one can offer such flash-in-the-pan phenomena as the New Alliance Party, a peculiar, very American blend of hip psychoanalytic theory, Third World oratory, media manipulation and pure paranoia; but they may just be the harbingers of a whole new generation of movements expressing frustration and resentment against a political arrangement which seems completely blocked.

Social Movements and the Left

The traditional left has always been notoriously weak in the United States and while there are minor scale revivals, particularly around the traditional socialist milieu of organizations, trade unions and activists, it would be strange if in the United States the socialists were to be more charismatic and successful in entering into a compact with social movements than their fellows in the mass industrial democracies. What I am postulating for the 80s is that among the many social movements, most of which will abort in blind alleys, it is quite possible that a substantial socialist left will arise out of a combination of social protests and steady organization building. In other words, out of a dialogue between social movement activists and competent broad-gauge politically trained socialist organizations. Its location socially would focus on four probable arenas for social movements: (1) the rebellious trade union rank-and-files, which find themselves challenging both progressive and conservative labor bureaucracies in an era of give-backs; (2) in the margins of Democratic Party grass-root politics, out of the activists who feel driven to go beyond the inadequate Keynesianism of liberal Democratic Party reformism; (3) out of the politicization of black and minority struggles where sheer economic need

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

begins to concentrate the mind of the activists on the need to move beyond nationalist and symbolically violent rhetoric to coalition-building; and, finally, (4) among a significant and growing section of academics and intellectuals who have been disillusioned both in the prospects of a liberal reformism and the quick fix of Third World-ist and authoritarian states.

All of these "locations" combine both political arenas and major and urgent economic needs. To take them in turn, clearly when a third of the automobile workers and steel workers find themselves out of work, where the industrial heartland of America is turned into a desert, no oratory about ecology or lifestyle or participation will even begin to reach those tens of thousands who think that they are being robbed by an unjust system. In the case of the Democratic Party activists, all the McGovern reforms notwithstanding, the Party has remained impervious to any programmatic thrust and its platform is a meaningless symbolic document. Many of the activists have for years regarded themselves as "to the left" of the Democratic Party and remain committed to it on pragmatic grounds. With the growing squeeze on middle class standards and the clear deterioration of the urban environment, radical solutions appear necessary rather than imaginative. (Whether they would work is an entirely different question.) Black political activists have for years been responsive to democratic egalitarian rhetoric, and the black church as well as the black political machines have been open to a more left-wing politics than any other sector of American society. It is hardly an accident that the only two socialist congressmen serving today are black. However, the weakness in the black community has traditionally been the absence of organization. Here a genuine exchange can occur between the organized radicals and a massive constituency. Both can learn from the other. My feeling is that social movements in this arena are overdue and when they appear they will speak with a rhetoric surprisingly like that of the traditional left. Lastly, young academics and intellectuals not only face a catastrophic economic prospect for at least a decade or two, but have in unprecedentedly large numbers been exposed to the radicalizing influence of an academy in which, perhaps alone in the world, Marxism and socialism have been taken as both novel and serious ideas. While, again, no more than in any other arena do I postulate majoritarian social movements arising on the left, significant activist minorities exist here, more significant than any seen in the United States since the heyday of the 1930s. But when one mentions the 30s, one must quickly add two enormous differences: one, that there is far less social and economic space for liberal reforms today than in the 30s because not only have expenses gone up enormously but so have expectations and, secondly, the socio-political system as such has been subjected to greater delegitimization over the decades. After all, at the end of the 1930s, the bulk of Americans still seemed to respect the symbol of the presidency and share a somewhat inarticulate patriotism about foreign and domestic policies. Neither seems to be the case today.

The 80s, therefore, are likely to be characterized by a surly politics of class cleavage and negative or low economic growth, turning the matter of distri-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bution of goods into an explosive zero sum game with a clash arising between the democratization of expectations combined with a dwindling of opportunities. Those seem to present an ideal backdrop, given the near paralysis of the formal political system, for chiliastic social movements of the left and right. These movements become significant only when combined with broader social organizations and political structures, and the prospects appear more likely that this combination or fusion will occur left of center rather than on the right.

THEORY and SOCIETY

Renewal and Critique in Social Theory

Editors: Rod Aya, Anthony Giddens, Erving Goffman, Martin Jay, Jerome Karabel, Charles Lemert, Theda Skocpol, Sharon Zukin

Free Sample copies are available on request

RECENT AND FORTHCOMING ARTICLES

Remembering Marcuse	*Martin Jay*
Missionaries as Anticolonial Militants	*Karen Fields*
Benjamin's Materialist Theory of Experience	*Richard Wolin*
Impact of Revolution on Social Welfare in Latin America	*Susan Eckstein*
Theory of Democratic Development	*Jonathan Tumin*
Social Science and the Consciousness of the Future	*Martin Spencer*
Sartre's Theory of Practice as an Approach to Class and Patriarchy	*R.W. Connell*
Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution	*Theda Skocpol*
Synthesis, or a New Problematic in Economic Anthropology	*J.I. Prattis*
Max Weber as Critical Theorist	*Donald McIntosh*

Subscription Information:

1982: Volume 11 (in 6 issues) For Libaries and Institutes:
US$ 80.00/Dfl. 200.00
For Individuals:
US$ 26.50/Dfl. 66.00

ELSEVIER

P.O. Box 211,
1000 AE Amsterdam,
The Netherlands

52 Vanderbilt Avenue,
New York, NY 10017

The Dutch guilder price is definitive. US $ prices are subject to exchange rate fluctuations

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE POLITICS OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT*

by Volker Gransow and Claus Offe

Since about the mid-seventies, the term "political culture," previously little used in West Germany, has loomed ever larger in discussions. It appears in scholarship and journalism as well as in everyday vocabulary. It is used by "conservative" as well as "progressive," writers. This gives the impression of a short-term "conceptual" trend. Its lack of clear contours, seems to relegate the term to an empty formula. One may ask whether previous ignorance of "political culture" was caused by West Germany being a country with a tradition of *un*political culture and political *un*culture. The term, however, can be used in an analytically meaningfully way. We want to demonstrate its usefulness by studying the relation between political culture and social-democratic government policy. This choice is not arbitrary— for it is the SPD — as both victim and perpetrator — that has created a state without identity which is West Germany, producing political-culture structures which ultimately threaten its own identity.

I

The term "political culture" generally refers to what was previously described by "national character" or "spirit of the times", i.e., the image and self-image of state-organized society. Such phenomenona can be examined through the concept of political culture in two ways: first, with the help of empirical social research, it is possible to discuss attitudes, opinions and values regarding the political system and its various parts. The multi-levelled word "culture" is here used in only one of its many meanings, i.e., as individual attitudes toward social objects. The second aspect is somewhat different: here the traditional German concept of culture is also ascribed to political culture. Political culture in this sense designates political ethics and morality. The first trend of research is hence descriptive; its models are the studies of Almond, Pye, Verba and other American social scientists since the fifties. On the other hand, the second current — whose *explicitly* evaluative interpretation of political culture has even found its way into everyday political idioms — is often based on impressions and speculations. this trend cannot simply be classified "Right" or "Left." Thus, social scientists with social-democratic or liberal attitudes represent the empirical trend, while undogmatic Leftists and conservatives both use the strongly evaluative concept of political culture *to the same extent*, although for quite different purposes. A striking example of the latter is the study by Martin and Sylvia Greffenhagen, *A Difficult Fatherland* (1979), in which — on the whole — a growing democratic potential is obser-

*Originally published in *Das Argument*, n. 23(1981), pp. 551-564. Translated by James Bohman and David J. Parent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ved in West Germany. Specifically evaluative assessments, by contrast, emphasize the increase of repressive state measures or the intellectual cult of negativism. That the West German political culture can be investigated with such different results and methods is attributable to three causes: 1) Only after the transition to social-liberal government politics were the means and methods available in the extent required by the American model. At the same time, it was only then that "more positive" results were at all possible, in the sense of studies based on Almond and other Anglo-Saxons' ideals of democracy. 2) The political discussion of "basic values" (*Grundwerte*) as the intellectual foundation of existing society and its political institutions begun in the Seventies as a reaction to economic and ecological uncertainties favored questions on the state of political culture. 3) "Autumn in Germany," the rise of anti-terrorist sentiment before and after the kidnapping of a big-Industrial symbolic figure reinforced suspicions, already raised by the *Berufsverbote*, concerning the extent to which the West German broke with the Prussian tradition of state-preeminence, German imperialism and fascism, and led to questions about the quantity and quality of democratic behavior.

In the face of such disparate sources and applications, one obvious strategy is simply to let the term "political culture" lie fallow, either to the left or to the right of the spectrum, due to its instrumentalization as a battle-slogan or because of the unresolved problem of the relation of facts and values. We do not want to yeild to this temptation simply because the study of political culture, first makes it possible to overcome the exclusive focus on political institutions and organizations, and, second, is more helpful in describing processes of political change. Yet, the criticism that both the "behaviorist" and the "normative" schools of the study of political culture are conceptually deficient should not be dismissed. These faults can only be overcome by integrating some results of recent discussions of the concept of culture. In France, in East Germany, and especially in Great Britain, a new, holistic conception of culture has been developed in the last twenty years, going beyond ethnological and anthropological traditions. Raymond Williams, in the course of many years of study of the culture of British workers, arrived at a concept of culture as a way of life. This concept, not only goes beyond the restriction to intellectual culture, but also beyond exclusive reference to the characteristic forms of life, such as living arrangements, clothes, and leisure activities. For Williams, as a context of life, culture consists primarily of how the nature of social relations are represented; to put it laconically: what Goethe is to the bourgeois, solidarity is to the worker (Vester). This also means that culture is more than a system of values; namely a praxis. Through the traditional Marxist formula of base and superstructure, the cultural process can be grasped only in a reduced form. Influenced by Gramsci, Williams proposes a cultural analysis of the "complexity of hegemony." By giving central importance to the hegemonial aspect, Williams takes a decisive step forward in investigating political culture and goes well beyond the hypotheses of established political science. Social struggles become an integral component

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of cultural study: a dominant culture is a system of practices, significations, and values constitutive of the meaning of reality for most members of a society. This dominant culture is based on a process of incorporation. Culture receives its reality in disintegrations and transformations of meanings and practices in education, social training in the family, the organization of work, and intellectual tradition. "Alternative and oppositional forms of life and culture must be viewed in terms of their relation to the effective, dominant culture as subject to historical change; their sources thus give us information about the dominant culture itself.[1] The distinction between "alternative" and "oppositional" is simply "between someone who seeks another form of existence and wants to be left alone with it, and someone who derives from this desire for another form of existence the claim to change society."[2] Thus, if one can speak of the cultural process everywhere in society, this means to start with the fact of a common culture. To speak of a common culture means to examine a people's way of life, and, at the same time, "the very idea of the commonness of culture can be used to criticize its disintegration and fragmentation."[3] This common culture is empirically present and describable and, on the other hand, exists only fragmentarily and demands change. That which is common is already contained in culture as a possibility, and it becomes reality by being liberating from its incorporated form of cultural hegemony. Thus, the dialectic of being and becoming is part of this very conception, and Williams' approach is neither ahistorical nor cultural integrationist, as some critics erroneously assume.

The essential difficulties of our study of political culture seem solvable on the basis of Williams' concept. This broadening and differentiation of the concept makes it possible to acquire a complex image of political culture, where material life-conditions and political praxis are no longer neglected, thus overcoming the narrowness of behaviorism. The degree of appropriation and change of life-conditions through the political activity of social individuals — i.e., the extent of their self-consciousness and self-determination can be regarded as a relative value-standard and thus could help solve the question of the criteria for evaluating progress or regression of political culture — a question now only raised in talk about the "lack" of political culture in Germany. Only in this sense, would the concept "political culture" stop serving as an empty formula, and become a more precisely defined area in the political problematic.

II

West German political culture at the beginning of the Eighties is fragmented. This is attributable to the considerable spread of authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, and fascism-envy. The picture of official political life gives grounds to assume that political co-ordinates have shifted: the shift from Brandt to

1. Raymond Williams, *Illuminationen* (Frankfurt a.M.,1977), p.197.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 194.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Schmidt among the Social-Democrats, from Kohl to Strauss among the Christian Democrats represents a reciprocal process; the atmosphere of the lack of desire for reform created by Schmidt conditions the programs of Right-wing populism that goes by the name of "Strauss."[4] The unwillingness to end the practice of *Berufsverbote* refutes the idea that *détente* with the East results in a decrease in hostility towards communists. Terrorism was met with a persecution of "intellectual sympathizers," where atttacks on Heinrich Böll and other prominent figures were just the tip of the iceberg. At the same time, at the end of the Seventies, the surveillance apparatus grew enormously. Yet, Germany is a special case. Prussianism, — absolute subordination under the state-organized dominant class — fifty years of imperialism, and twelve years of fascism have left deep traces. Under the battle-cry of anti-terrorism, adherents of the total state continued their struggle against communism in the Adenauer era. The "hump on Germany's back" remained up to the Eighties simply on the basis of a symbiosis of authoritarian traditions, coupled with a politics of "internal security" promoting polarization and surveillance. Much can be said for and against this view. More young people than ever believe in the significance and successfulness of political participation. House squatters fascinate large parts of the younger generation. About half of the West Germans believe that "citizen's initiatives" are meaningful and are prepared to take part in them. First, in the aftermath of the protest movement of 1968, then more and more as an independent reaction to the economic and ecological problems of the Seventies "alternative forms of life" and "new social movements" have emerged. The resilience and dynamism of these movements aroused general notice at the beginning fo the Eighties by a wave of *Instandbesetzungen* — the squatters' practice of occupying and restoring old buildings and apartments. Far from Bonn's atmosphere of professional power administration, a political culture based on communal households, nursery schools, street festivals, economic self-help and self-organization developed, all with a considerable range and radical democratic, ecological and socialist goals. Across party lines, but not without influencing them, movements such as the women's movement were organized. Impressions of this sort enable one to speak of a "left development" in the Eighties, though this hardly corresponds to the traditional conceptions of the German Left. The established Left among the Social Democrats and the trade unions, as well as among the marginal communist parties, has difficulties with this new type of German political culture because a decisive criterion of previous political activity is missing: namely, despite differences, the common orientation of the established Left toward political power. The Left remains confused about these "*changes in values*," a phenomenon first observed in the US. What this watchword means is difficult to say. For some, it is a process tendentially inclusive of all those who hold dependent employment for others, it concerns mainly youth and

4. Cf. the analysis in *Sozialliberalismus oder rechter Populismus* in *Argument-Sonderband*, AS 51 (Berlin, 1980).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the middle class. For still others, it is a shift to "postacquisitive values," for others, simple hedonism. Indisputably, however, in West Germany the majority of employees want to reduce their work-time considerably and a growing majority would even exchange a reduction of income for it. The wide-spread introduction of micro-electronics suddenly gives this shift of values a new relevance, though it is questionable whether the campaign begun hesitantly by the trade unions for the thirty-five hour week must be regarded as a sign for the emergence of a new class-struggle for individual and socially disposable time as a measure of social wealth. In this shift of values, a de-emphasis on the idea of achievement and a new emphasis on the demand for happiness can be clearly noted. This emphasis could turn West German political culture upside-down, if the tendencies for self-organization and a counter-public sphere overcome the egoism common to the "freak" and the achievement-fetishist. Perhaps, then a "New Party" would become more likely. But precisely the ambivalence of this shift in values shows that political culture in West Germany cannot be adequately analyzed in terms of Lenin's two-culture scheme (dominant versus the democratic-socialist), but must be seen as a complex hegemonic structure of incorporation and exclusion of alternative and oppositional political cultures in Williams' sense.

III

The political stability of democracy in developed capitalist industrial societies presupposes a particular form of political culture. Richard Löwenthal — one of the most influential social-democratic intellectuals of the older generation — has pointed emphatically to this connection. He develops a clear dilemma, which he sees confronting Western democracies. The one horn of the dilemma is the "totalitarian" danger, namely, the attempt to formulate scientific knowledge about the course of history, the single correct intepretation of the common good and strategies for its realization, and to make the knowledge thus acquired the foundation of political action; this is a premise which, in the view of theorists of totalitarianism, necessarily leads to the abolition of political and social freedom. The other horn is the danger that the political competition for decision-making positions in the state degenerates into a pure struggle of interests among social groups and political organizations. If democracy is considered and carried on as a competition among particular interests by both citizens and political elites, it could reach a point where both generally acceptable decisions and thus the function of government itself become impossible. The dilemma is clear: determining the content of the common good leads to totalitarian structures. However, the competitive democratic *refusal* to make such a determination, the equation of the "common good" with the specific *results* of the competitive process can lead to instability and the inability to govern. The solution of this dilemma is then assigned to the political parties as a task. They must, however, subject their concept of the common good to the restriction of legal procedures and in the case of defeat agree to accept the rules of democratic competition. Accord-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing to Löwenthal's analysis, parties must be oriented to some degree toward form and content, toward their own platforms as well as to the rules of competition. "A free democracy can only solve the problems of advances industrial society to the extent that parties are present who have the will and the capacity to propose and realize conceptions oriented to the common good for the public managements of the total economic and social development of society."[5] Such a party would apparently distance itself from both poles conceived of by sociologists studying parties: from the pole of a "Weltanshauung" or "class"-party (which indeed subscribes to a material definition of the common good but is not willing to place itself under procedural rules of democratic competition, and strives to gain control of the state *and* — following Lenin — to so transform it that its party-rule can no longer be challenged; and also from the pole of a "catch-all" or vote-maximizing party, which can and indeed must refuse any consistency of platform, any independent conception of the public good, in order to win and to retain majorities in the unending process of elections in modern mass-democracies. Instead, in Lo18wenthal's view, the party elites must "increasingly appeal to the communal awareness of the citizens" and thereby "cease to act as a simple coalition of interest groups; they must increasingly represent themselves as carriers of alternative conceptions of the total development of society and win over citizens to make their choice primarily in terms of the community."[6] An increasing "community consciousness of citizens" must even be regarded as "the basic condition for the survival of democracies in advanced industrial societies." This political culture — appealing to the parties, which in turn must develop and cultivate it, if democracy is to endure — consists for Löwenthal in the "feeling of solidarity with one's fellowmen," of "one's obligation towards them," "the consciousness of common ways of life and institutions" and "common values." The foundation and source of this commonality — communicated not via interests but precisely via values and norms — is history and the "historical identity of concrete community" achieved in reflection.

Thus, the question to be investigated is this: Does German Social Democracy, after achieving parity in 1966 with the Christian Democratic Union and since assuming the leading role in "the responsibility to govern" (again, reaffirmed in 1980), live up to measures and standards (as do other parties outlined) by one of its own leading theoretists? Did it derive its policies and program from a specific conception of "the historical identity of the concrete community" and, conversely, did it contribute to the heightening and spreading of the consciousness of such a community? Has it had as its goal to reflect a "collective political identity" (Glotz) of its citizens and in turn then to assure this identity?

5. Richard Löwenthal, *Gesellschaftswendel und kulturkrise* (Frankfurt 1979), p. 219.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 221.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IV

Social Democracy did not do all this and, consequently, it did not in the least cultivate the conditions for the stability of a free democracy postulated by Löwenthal. In demonstrating this, we shall not underestimate the fact that the peculiar nature of German history in the twentieth century makes it especially difficult for *any* party, especially a social-democratic one, to reflect any sort of consciousness of collective identity, conceived in terms of nation, class, or culture. As far as the *national* question is concerned, this history forbids any attempt to make the nation the reference point for an understanding of the common good, not merely because of chauvinistic and racist perversions of the concept of the "German Nation" in National Socialism; this cannot occur by reason of the economic, political and military integration with the West established in the Fifties, anchoring German politics unambiguously in lasting trans-national relations of dependency (NATO, Common Market). Along with these factors, there are also reasons peculiar to Social Democracy, like its project, realized under Brandt's leadership beginning in the Seventies, to normalize diplomatic and economic relations with the Soviet Union, Poland, and the GDR. Such normalization could only be accomplished against the political-cultural remnants of "striving for national identity" (understood as the "re-unification" of both parts of Germany). Today, the "German nation" is in no way a reference point that could be used as a basis for the political platform of *any* side in more than a marginal way. The energetic attempts during the elections of the Seventies to re-activate the old reservations of "national unreliability" of social democracy were equally unsuccessful. Second, as for the structural conditions of referring to class-categories, i.e., the possibilities of relating a political platform to a *socially* and *economically* defined identity, it must be remembered that the liquidation of workers' organizations by National Socialism, post-war prosperity, together with social-structural transformations in West Germany induced by this prosperity, lead to giving the term "worker" less the connotation of a collective identity and a common perception and interpretation of all societal spheres of life, than the character of a socio-statistical or at least political-organizational category. As with the word "German," the term "worker" is relatively empty of a meaningful content originating in communal experience of the past or orientated toward a future. The state, therefore, could hardly base itself upon them as its foundations. Because of the decreasing political-cultural relevance of the category "worker" for those who are forced to sell their labor-power, the SPD, as is well-known, drew the conclusion in 1959 to rid itself of the label of "workers' party," since this was also a liability in elections and subsequently declared itself to be "the people's party." The same is also true in the third case, that of collective *cultural* identities, under which religious affiliation has always been the most important category. While the political consequnences of the general effects of "secularization" are often overemphasized — e.g., the considerable weight of denominational factors can be demonstrated as much now as ever in the analysis of elections, as in the case of the constantly under-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proportional number of Catholic SPD voters among the total number of workers voting SPD, it must be kept in mind that, because of the national division, West Germany is a country with a confessional structure nearing parity — which in turn led to a party system that from the first was interdemoninatially structured. (The opposite is true in the Netherlands.) On the whole, then, West Germany, compared with all other Southern and West European countries has with an extremely low level of "pre-political" determinations of collective identity of the national, economic and cultural kind, on the basis of which parties and government could build on a repertory of justifications and commonly-shared interpretations of the common good. This state of affairs is further complicated by the fact that West Germany, again in contrast with most of its neighbors, has no "sub-national" collective identities, such as ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities or quantitatively relevant regional movements. As a result, it is not easy for any political party to base itself on any sort of pre-formed consciousness of collective identity, on politically relevant structures, or on a lived form of political culture. Löwenthal's thesis that this democracy without historical roots needs a consciousness of its historical identity to secure stability in times of crises or in order to develop, thus implies an especially difficult task under present German circumstances.

V

Social-democratic politics in the Seventies are admittedly not only passive victims of this typical vagueness of West German political-cultural structures, but rather have actively and causally (though certainly not "consciously") helped in their further disintegration. At present, therefore it is likely to become their own victims, i.e., victims of their own refusal to claim political hegemony and to renounce the concrete formulation of the politica-cultural basis of such hegemony.

This danger ensues first from the fact that German social-democracy represents an extremely *statist* version of reformism. It is certainly characteristic of all modern social-democratic parties that they recognize welfare state party democracy as the definitive political order and renounce in their programs to seek changes in constitutional liberties (for example, the guarantee of private property) and of the procedures of political will-formation and decision (as in the case, for example, with concepts of council-democracy). This basic political-strategic decision, for which a whole series of serious theoretical justifications and historical experiences can be cited, certainly does not of itself require the transition from a *unconditional recognition* of parliamentary democratic procedures to a *restriction of all alternatives* in reformist politics to statist forms and procedures. Crudely put, the methodical premise of social-democratic politics is "We'll do it for you!" The pay-back in exchange for voters' allegiance to the SPD is the administered and administrative care for the "quality of life," for a universal well-being arranged and administered by the state.

We do not want to draw here a balance of the *content* of the success and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

acheivements of statist and reformism in the Seventies: it is well-known the in education, as well as in social policy, they were anything but impressive.[7] What is more interesting are the consequences of a form of politics which always conceives of changes as administrative intervention and legalization, as the exclusive statist re-ordering of life-conditions. This particular form of a state-mediated and, therefore, to a certain degree, "other-determined" emancipation, clearly has the advantage of partially compensating their wage-laborers and other disadvantaged categories for their structural or conjunctional deficiency of social power through politically-set and legally implemented claims and regulations. Such statist correctives of power-relations in society, however, always have the negative consequence of supporting what is exactly opposed to their intention, in that those compensated are not only *unburdened*, but are at the same time *deactivated*; i.e., they are themselves prevented from conceiving and autonomously realizing their own conceptions of what is necessary to improve their own lives. Citizens are reduced to objects of administrative care, not only in the positive sense, but in the completely negative sense that they are not only spared their own struggles, but are also prohibited from taking part in them. As Preuss recently formulated it: we stand before the problem that "we cannot do without sovereign power (i.e., the statist conception of reformism), because it represents the weak, the unorganized, the general interest of society . . . , and at the same time we have to recognize as a hinderance to the development of less alienated forms of social life and norms for action."

The statist management of social problems, generally cut off form any connection with the experiences, forms of action and values of the social base, becomes inextricably entangled in the problem that it can never be certain whether or not its solutions will be experienced and accepted as such by those effected. Every modernization not only has the positive aspect of improvement, but also, more frequently, the, at least, ambivalent one of restructuring —brutal and irritating invasions and encroachments. Citizens are confronted with new conditions whose utility and contribution to the spiritual "quality of life" would be evident only if the result of the re-structuring had been explicitly guided by norms of political culture. The less this is the case, the more the danger ensues that the results of reform and planning will be experienced as the modernist busy-buddyness of adminstrators and "experts" who contribute nothing to improve the quality of life. Any strictly statist conception of reformism loses not only the active power and social resonance which can be decisive for its success, but it also loses the chance of self-correction in light of the needs of those effected by its actions. The contradictions and problems resulting from a rigorous and one-sided statist conception of reformism are evident today not just in the success which rightist demagogic critique of bureaucracy, the welfare-state, and the general state-interference with citizens' rights. They frequently are also evident in the fundamental hostility

7. Cf. M.T. Graven, "Socialliberalismus und Reformismus," in *Stadt und Monopole,* III, Argument-Sonderband, AS 36, (Berlin, 1979).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with which the participants in "alternative" economies and culture confront Social-Democratic administrators of statist rationality. Together, both factors do not rule out the perspective of a self-paralysis of social-democratic statism.

The second aspect that supports this fear is the *total lack of any normative perspective* in the political culture of the ruling or co-ruling social-democracy. The "basic values" offically canonized by the party, namely "freedom," "justice," and "solidarity," have not been translated into concrete conceptions of the "good-life" or of the "quality of life," in the workplace, the city or family. Interestingly enough, the objects connected to the negative value of "peace" (negative in the sense of détente and the *prevention* of war) are still the most successful symbols of social-democratic politics. Moreover, there is a pervasive programmatic arbitrariness which could be described as "embarassed liberalism," an abstract and mindless will to modernize. This is in part perceived and deplored by leading social-democrats themselves. "One of the cardinal sins of Social-Democracy since Godesberg is the relegation of the question of meaning to the isolated private sphere, according to the motto: you'll have to handle your spiritual problems yourself." Glotz concludes from his diagnosis: "The workers' movement must redefine its old task: it must win over people for the world-wide social struggle . . . But to do this it must learn once more not to underestimate the meaning of the ethical-political factor of history." Admittedly, Glotz does not inquire further into the political, organizational and theoretical pre-conditions under which this could happen. If he were to do so, it would turn out that social-democratic political culture is precisely one which does not offer any resonance for such a proposal. For that positive "SPD culture," the regeneration of which Glotz voluntaristically demands, cannot be brought into harmony with the SPD's organizational and governmental praxis. The objective nature of this split (which, by the way, is seldom so clearly self-conscious as in Glotz's formulations) *is* the SPD's culture.

Compared with Christian, communist and even liberal or radical parties, social-democratic parties suffer disproportionally from the dilemma of the inability to incorporate into their programs a traditional repertoire of value-orientations, a militant class-culture, a Christian ethic, or a bourgeois pathos for freedom. They are more defenselessly exposed than others to the "dilemma of modernity." The pluralization of their electorate along with the shift to a general people's party, makes this unclarity of value-premises even more acute. In the case of German social-democracy, this is even more intensified by the West German state's paucity of collectively respected political symbols — a paucity unparalleled in Western Europe. Political holidays (June 17 and July 20) refer to events outside the geographical and historical boundaries of the West German Republic, not even to its own founding — itself something quite unique. The "capital", Bonn, represents nothing but the purest accident. Persons who could symbolize social-democratic traditions, if they have survived fascism, have either died in the meantime or are too old for political activity. They have been replaced by a "team" of younger "doers and shakers"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

who are almost indistinguishable and for that reason alone, useless as personal bearers of symbols. The "poverty of meaning" of social democratic politics and its actors is not lessened but crassly parodied by the stiff attempts to cultivate military tradition (or by the much more innocent habit of the social-democratic ex-chancellor to wear headgear symbolic of his North-German origins). In the context of German history, social-democrats have as good a symbol at their disposal to exhibit who they are and what they stand for.

The symbolic and normative un-clarity of ruling social democracy is matched by the "*openness*" that is a basic feature of social-demcratic domestic policy. There is no recognizable, even if only programmatically formulated socio-political project; no model of social life sought, comparable to that of both the communist and Christian opponents of social-democracy. Instead, there are *formal* goals: the electoral-political strategy of appealing to *all* social groups. strata and classes; the methodological premise of promoting variability, mobility and innovation. The basic principle is not to "decide" options, but rather to "keep them open." The social-democratic process, as its theoretical proponents like Peter Glotz, never fail to point out, takes place in an atmosphere of readiness to discuss and co-operate with every one. Appealing as this rejection of doctrinaire baggage may appear at first glance, it immediately becomes clear that this "openness" is an alibi for the almost unconditional readiness to accomodate to the given social-economic conditions for power and extortion. Whoever is "open" in principle exposes himself powerlessly to the action of those economic, political and cultural structures who can use this "openness," but in which the chances for influence are quite unevenly distributed. On this account,social-democracy, which has almost no firm commitment but this openness, decays into a type of politics describable both as "power-possessed" and "power-blind":"power-possessed," because almost any normative platform will be dropped to preserve the social-democratic "responsibility to rule;" "power-blind," because the real consequences and useful opportunities resulting from this "openness" are forcefully repressed and ignored.

The abstract, normatively and politically diffuse, purely statist will to modernize which characterizes social-democratic governmental action more than any other party, has latent consequences that constitute the third element of social-democratic political culture: the forced *uncertainty of the institutional parameters of all realms of social life.* In the last election, conservative and reactionary forces in West Germany made good use of this theme, but the very *possibility* that they could do so with such resonance is a fact which must be attributed to the unintended consequences of the statist striving for modernization. The great historical perspective of the socialist workers' movement emerged by adding to the technical-industrial process of modermization in capitalism a historical significance beyond its limitations, conceiving the destruction of the old simultaneously as the construction of the new and deriving from the unfolding of the human and objective foces of production the pro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ject of a satisfying and just social order. But modern social-democracy has lost sight of any connection between destruction and construction, modernization and liberation — a connection which today can no longer be merely conceived in "productivist" terms. Social democracy carries on and legitimates technical-industrial-bureaucratic modernization, without adding to it a positive, practical meaning; i.e., without being able to jusfify it otherwise than negatively through appeal to the ever-present *fear* of growth-stoppages and unemployment. This mindless imperative of modernization without perspective has, however, permitted the dramatic growth of the significance of those institutions at whose expense modernization took place; the significance of particular identities, based on age and sex roles, the significance of regional and ethnic communities, the significance of an intact natural and urban environment. Certainly, the mixture of "progressive" and "reactionary" motives which are accumulating at this point into an "anti-modernist" protest-readiness is difficult to unravel; but just as certainly a "modernist" social-democratic policy in education, family, technology, regional autonomy and economic growth is neither in a position to hold back, nor to direct this process to plausible goals and instead encourages this readiness to protest towards to "pre-modern" structures and values. To the extent that the constructive side of the modernization process, the furthering of emancipation, becomes ungraspable, the costs and negative experiences of its destructive side become all the clearer. It is these costs which social -democracy, as the political administrator of modernity, is held responsible for and made to re-pay politically by the new social protest movements on the one hand and the right-wing populist forces on the other.

A fourth feature we want to describe as the syndrome of social-democratic political culture is related to the contradictory nature of the claim to "openness": that characteristically abstract readiness to modernize. This refers to the *repressive* character of social-democratic politics, manifest everywhere and against those who intransigently follow their own line and do not accept cooperation, willingness to compromise, mediation and technocratic management, but who insist on their own life-style and autonomy, their own insights and experiences. The connection between "openness" and "repression" is in no way mysterious: a party who praises itself for its oppenness and which in fact has the deserved fate of trying to balance all relevant social power groups against all others, naturally must carefully plan to keep under control those forces (in its own ranks and outside) that could disturb the balance. The SPD — and a good part of the labor union leadership allied with it — is consequently filled with irritation against political forces which could damage their electoral acceptability or their capacity to make deals and coalitions. Moreover, to the extent that a *positive* integration of party-members, voters, and dependants can no longer take place for lack of a recognizable hegemonic project of a specifically normative conception of socio-political goals, then the problem of mass-integration is solved *negatively*, i.e., by excluding social minorities and "deviants." Both considerations make clear how and why the principled

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"openness" of a political power such as social-democracy must necessarily lead to highly illiberal forms of repression. From the notorious agitation of the social-democratic mayor of Berlin in 1967 against the student-movement ("just look at these types!") to the no less notorious decisions to enact the "*Berufsverbote*" in 1972 and the reform of criminal procedures in 1977, to the latest technocratic fantasies of the leading criminologist, Herold, who would like to transform the function of the police from a preventative to a "social-sanitary" one throughout the social-democrats' domestic policy there is a clear willingness to almost automatic repression, explainable in every case by one formula ("symbolic confirmation of one's own immunity to militant ideas and practices") or another ("mass-integration through images of an enemy"). The distance and mistrust between many intellectuals and artists suspected of "deviation" and the bearers of "sub-cultural values and life-styles" on the one hand, and the governing social-democracy on the other, is by now equally great — perhaps even unbridgeable. The government and offical party practice of exclusion and restriction, of symbolic and repressive discrimination of "deviant" elements expresses, among other things, a remarkable mistrust of the level and solidarity of political beliefs among the people; seen by foreign observers as "hysterical," the official campaign to eliminate "terrorists" from society, "sympathizers" from the university, and "enemies of the constitution" from government service, non-conformist authors from the editorial staffs of the media, make sense only when one assumes that the actions and utterances of these groups could fall at any time on fertile ground and dramatically "infect" the political and cultural public, i.e., when it is assumed that the population has no sort of "autonomous" political-moral powers to defent itself against "deviations."

That this is the case must in part be attributed to social-democratic political culture. As the fifth characteristic of this culture, we would like to cite the negative finding that despite all educational reforms, social-democratic government practice has not succeeded in destroying *the hard core of sovereign-statist and authoritarian*, pre-democratic traditions and attitudes characteristic of German political culture since even before fascism. Social-democratic modernization is an *external* process, not accompanied by a modernization of values, attitudes, and forms of political association. Traces of an authoritarian, aggressive "political naturalism" resting on categories of age, sex, nationality, and race can be found as much today as in the Fifties. One can even agree with the conservative political scientist Hennies when he asserts in West Germany that today democracy is "emotionally mostly irrelevant." The "naturalization" of social power and social privileges and the depreciation of socio-political conflicts directed at a redistribution of power and privilege are the two main characteristics of authoritarianism: what is, is so by nature, and to want to change it is thus condemned as unnatural. One must only recall the storm of indignation and anger that burst when the police administration in Berlin attempted — not on the grounds of the long-needed extension of all citizens' rights to foreigners, but purely for considerations of police tactics and strategy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

— to recruit Turkish residents for police service: Turks, who are the targets of unabated resentment cannot by nature be policemen, and the bearers of authority and higher status *over Germans*. The weight of such political-cultural "matters of fact," also expressed in the widely but latently-held desire for the physical liquidation of all violent criminals or in the desire for the psychic separation of "gifted" and "ungifted" children in different types of schools, inhibit any attempt by social-democratic political culture to mount a decisive and possibly successful enlightenment campaign — perhaps not even to the extent that it might be necessary for the party to assert itself electorally in the long run against the growing mobilization of the authoritarian-naturalistic syndrome by Right-wing Populism.

VI

It is not just that the policies of the social-democratic government have not furthered democratic stability in West Germany. With the combination of statism, the absence of normative principles, susceptibility to existing power-relations and repressive exclusion, the SPD is increasingly becoming a party whose basis can only be found among strata of political power administrators. Traditional social-democracy is thus eroded, losing its "oppositional" elements, without being able to integrate "alternative" ones. This development has the appearance of tragedy, only because another kind of reformism based programmatically on *social* forces and struggles, open to alternative and oppositional cultures, and thus regaining normative perspectives, is quite conceivable.



RSJ 12 (1982) £5.00/£2.00 Pp. 160
Special Medicalisation Issue

This issue concerns both the medicalisation of childbirth and the limitations of left criticism of medical practice.

'Unnatural Childbirth?' takes up issues arising from recent struggles for the right of expectant mothers to choose their own methods of giving birth. In 'Who Controls Childbirth?', Janet Jennings draws on her experience as a midwife to describe how medical procedures rob the mother of joy in childbirth by intervening in ways which actually introduce additional risks as well as taking away control.

Is obstetric technology depressing? Shelley Day poses that question and then goes on to link the conflict over childbirth methods to women's wider oppression which often leads to the medical niche of 'post-natal depression'. She shows how that experience gets mystified as an individual illness, in turn attributed to technically defined 'vulnerability factors'.

Lastly Evan Stark asks 'What Is Medicine? in order to clarify the limits of narrowly medical approaches to *health*.

Subscription £13.50/£6.00 for three numbers

Special Offer: free copy of no. 5 with every order of three or more back numbers

Tel: 01-609 5646
26 Freegrove Road London N7 9RQ

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS IN THE SPD*

by Otto Kallscheuer

The claim that the German Social Democracy Party (SPD) lacks a theoretical perspective is certainly not new. It can mean a number of things: 1) When used by Marxist critics, it means that the SPD has the *wrong* theory (and therefore pursues wrong policies). 2) It can also mean that the development of theory within the SPD is politically irrelevant. Theory has thus nothing to do with political clarification, but it seeks to generate a superficial consensus in the face of internal contradictions in party policy. This is the criticism of Narr and Spori (1976) in their "Economic and Political Outlook: 1975 — 1985." They see theory as a random arrangement of assorted political props that "provides arguments for every shade of opinion in the party, but which neither convinces nor satisfies anyone." Finally, 3) it can also mean the SPD fails to promote *consciousness* of a basically correct political praxis. This consciousness is needed to enable the SPD to consciously regulate policy details as well as to mobilize and expand loyalty in education and ideology.

Such complaints are at least as old as the social-liberal coalition, but have never had much impact on SPD policies or on their leading proponents. Even today, any assessment of the SPD would not be particulary concerned with the "SPD philosophy." What is new, however, is that since about 1979, the SPD leadership itself has called for a stronger theoretical emphasis on "the ethical-political moment of history."[1] Hans Koschnik, the mayor of Bremen, called it an "inevitable task" for the SPD to win back a bit of spiritual radiance in society."[2] This new political demand for theory has political causes: growing difficulties between the party and the government coalition, a centrifugal tendency among SPD voters, and a growing uneasiness within the membership in the face of the ecology and peace movements.

It is becoming increasingly difficult for the SPD to maintain what Glotz has described as the conditions necessary for the survival of social democratic parties in the face of a constituency with increasingly heterogeneous interests and politics. This call for "more theory" is thus an attempt to use *theory as a means* to generate a "collective political identity."

Since the revisionism debate at the turn of the century the relation between "philosophy," social interests and political practice in the SPD has been analyzed by most leftist critics as one of conformity to "bourgeois ideology" or "reformist illusions." Such a diagnosis, however, postulates more than it explains, e.g., the congruence between working class interests and a Marxist

*Translated by Barton Byg and Philip Boehm.

1. It is no coincidence that "green" or "alternative" candidates began to win seats in state parliaments in the same year. Berlin *Wissenschaftsenator* Peter Glotz has undertaken a dialogue with the new youth movement as part of his political program. He sees the successes of "alternative" candidates in Berlin as typical of the "spiritual situation" in politics. Thus, he urges the "development of a communicative ethics" as "the theoretical background for a political praxis of dialogue." See Peter Glotz, "Staat und alternative Bewegungen" in Jürgen Habermas (ed.) *Stichworte zur 'geistigen Situation der Zeit'*, (Frankfurt, 1979), p. 487.

2. Cf. *Frankfurter Rundschan*, Dec. 5, 1980.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

philosophy of history. The following three purposes can be seen as part of a "philosophy" for political parties: a) *Theoretical Orientation* — in the double sense of recognizing the context in which parties operate as well as their goals. Here, the question of internal theoretical coherence is decisive. This includes the conceptual means of analysis as well as their consistency with the desired goals (the problem of the relation between the "objective," and the "movement"). b)*Social integration* of the members, constituents, and — in democratic systems — voters: the stabilization of a consensus around the party's political program and practice (in the sense of active mobilization or passive willingness to follow). In addition to material success for the social groups represented by the party, this requires "*symbolic capital*": the stabilization of a *culturally*-mediated group identity in the social life-world, if the agreement with party policy is not to depend on material benefits which must be constantly renewed. c) *Aggregation of Intellectuals* (classically formulated as the "alliance with the intelligentsia"), either as the carriers of "values," social norms, and "meaning," or as the possessors of specialized skills. In both cases, intellectuals also constitute a social interest group.[3] Regardless of whether they are seen primarily as "mediators of meaning" (Schelski) or as technical "problem-solvers" (Popper), their ability to create their own "cultural policy" and thus to help determine their country's political culture depends on the existence of a modern mass party.[4]

In the words of then President Theodor Heuss (FDP) at the conclusion of the 1959 Party convention, the Godesberg Program was "very clever, skillful, and also *political*."[5] Yet, it did not establish, but abandoned a philosophically-grounded position. The Godesberg Program was a political turning point since it inserted the SPD *within* the political system by addressing all relevant weak points in West German policies (integration with the West, the economy, German domestic politics).[6] It made a coalition government possible while broadening the social base to include white collar workers, civil servants, the new middle classes, and, above all, Catholic groups. Previous SPD policy based on a unity "between the rhetoric of class struggle, Marxist social analysis, militant anti-communism and the traditions of resistance"[7] had been inadequate. There was no Left alternative [8] to the *political* shift of Bad Godesberg or, at least, none was formulated. The party Left wing either criticized the new line's unjustified economic optimism (von Oertzen) or defended a basically Marxist world view (Abendroth and Lamm).

3. Cf. Alberto Asor Rosa, *Intellettuali e Classe Operaia,* (Florence, 1973) and Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*, (London, 1979).

4. Cf. Max Adler, "Das Kulturproblem der geistigen Arbeit", in *Der Kampf*, vol. 13 (1920).

5. See Willy Brandt, "Festrede zum 20. Jahrestag des Golesberger Programms," in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Nov. 17, 1979.

6. The decisive point here was Herbert Wehner's presentation of the SPD's German Plan in the *Bundestag*, May 30, 1960.

7. E. Schmidt, "Thesen zur Entwicklung der SPD-Linken nach 1945, in *Jahrbuch Arbeiterbewegung*, vol.3 (Frankfurt, 1975).

8. Cf. Jürgen Seiffert "Linke in der SPD," in Blanke, *et. al.* (eds.) *Die Linke im Rechtsstaat* Vol. I., (Berlin, 1976).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The consequences of this political shift for the role of the party in comparison to the SPD Marxist tradition were the following.

A) With respect to the Marxist heritage, theory's decisive function disappeared. The abandonment of the Marxist philosophy of history created a vacuum since there was no "paradigm shift" in theory. The SPD's classical Marxism had an obstructive as well as a directive function. This obstruction was not due to historical materialism or the critique of political economy. Neither did it derive from the *political contents* of Marxist theory within the SPD labor movement. Problems emerged, however, in the *theoretical form* which this political orientation adopted: SPD leaders rejected an *ethical* basis for socialist policy[9] in favor of a conception of the "necessity" of a socialist order which could only be substantiated by the objective laws of development of capitalist production. Politics were therefore grounded on a "deterministic objectivism," in which the materialist view of history was no longer a theoretical hypothesis, but (in the form of philosophical materialism) became a *substantive philosophy of history*[10] During the Weimar period, criticism of these objectivist traits of social democratic Marxism came largely from Left groups who suspected a connection between official party theory and SPD "immobilism" in the face of worldwide depression and the threat of fascism. [11] In addition, the chairman of the 1953 SPD program commission, Willi Eichler, had been a student of the philosopher Leonard Nelson, who, in the tradition of Kantian ethics, rejected any deduction of ethical "necessity" from history.[12] Yet, with the rejection of the necessity of socialism as a "law of nature," socialist theory becomes problematic. Socialist goals become merely historical possibilities, and the notion of a more just social order depends upon ethical and political justification. But the Godesberg Program did not clarify the relation between ethics and politics. The confrontation between a Marxist view of history (Gurland and Abendroth) and the neo-Kantian tradition (Nelson) of an ethically grounded socialism (Eichler, Weisser, Henry-Herrmann) played no role in the formulation of the actual party program and disappeared into the archives.[13]

9. Cf. the discussion assembled in Sandkühler and de la Vega *Marxismus und Ethik*, (Frankfurt 1970).

10. See Arthur C. Danto's *Analytische Philosophie der Geschichte,* (Frankfurt, 1980, p. 22, 29), who defines a substantive philosophy of history as one which "sees both present and past from the perspective of the future, in reality of the ultimate future..." Danto cites Löwith's interpretation of this as a "systematic interpretation of history according to principles that unite historical events and processes according to an ultimate meaning." In the Weimar Republic this economic objectivism was enlarged by a concept of the State, marked by a covertly linear philosophy of history designed to defend the democratization of the "community" through the rationalization of economics and administration. See also Giacomo Marramao, *Il Politico e le Transformazioni* (Bari, 1979), pp. 153ff; and Lucio Colletti, *Ideologia e Società* (Bari, 1968).

11. The Left groups were primarily the "Socialist Workers' Party" to which Willy Brandt belonged; the "Internal Socialist *Kamp-Bund*" from which Willi Eichler came; and later the resistance group "New Beginning" of which Fritz Erler was a member.

12. For an account of Nelson's problematic outlook, see Willi Eichler, "Etischer Realismus," in Specht and Eichler editors, *Leonard Nelson zum Gedächtnis*, (Frankfurt-Götttingen, 1953), p. 135ff.

13. Cf. the theses of the "Meeting of Social Democratic Scholars" in Mehlem, April 12 - 14,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

B) In the Marxism of traditional social democracy, the *social integration* of the constituency was based on the SPD's identity as the party of the industrial working class.[14] Although the Godesberg Program attempted to transform the SPD into a mass-based party by appealing to other social groups and potential voters, it failed to produce a new form of integration. With the so-called "end of ideology," an active relation of the membership to politics or ethical values was replaced by the material self-interest of wage-earners, to participate in the "Economic Miracle." The political culture of a labor movement depends of the formation of an explicit political organisation and identity out of the working classes' often silent "moral disapproval" (Max Weber) or the implicit "sense of injustice" (Barrington Moore).[15] Aside from the Lassallian program for a "reconciliation of State and workers,"[16] Marxist theory contributed decisively to the development of the self-definition of a working-class party. Yet, it also insisted both on the objective necessity of the political party for social emancipation and on the inevitability of socialism. That form of Marxist class culture, however, was marked by a "negative integration," i.e., the inclusion in the capitalist process of accumulation and a simultaneous exclusion from equality of political rights.[17] The Marxist class culture of social democracy — a common, unifying value structure and a fatalistic trust in organisation — persisted in the changed political conditions of the Weimar Republic.[18] Against the background of post-war capitalist prosperity, however, the Godesberg Program diminished this *socially integrative* character of the old "popular Marxist" assumptions of the SPD's labor clientele. For social democratic activists, they were replaced, at best, merely by the traditional trust in the organisation.

C) While the German labor movement has its own cultural-historical tradition, the SPD never took seriously the intellectual's "cultural relevance" (Max Adler). The increasing number of intellectual "functions" in capitalism, which Kautsky recognized in 1895, led to no consideration of the "political issue posed by intellectuals" (Gramsci). The SPD failed to set any specific political goals for intellectuals beyond their ideological recruitment for the working class party and the long term integration of the "intellectual pro-

1954, which were only published in 1978. Meyer sees the introduction of the Godesberg values (Freedom, Justice, Solidarity) "on faith" as the result of a compromise over irreconcilable differences. See Thomas Meyer, *Grundwerte und Wissenschaft im Demokratischen Sozialismus* (Berlin/Bonn, 1978), pp. 88 - 101.

14. Richard Löwenthal writes that up to 1933 the SPD "remained what it had been in 1914: a party of the working class not in the sense of revolutionary Marxism, but limited to the defense of workers' interests. It was committed to democracy, but had no concept of the evolution and transformation of all of society."

15. Regarding the "unwritten moral sense, based on experience" of subordinate social classes, see Axel Honneth "Moralbewusstsein und soziale Klassenherrschaft", in *Leviathan*, 3/4, 1981.

16. Cf. W. Dressen, who rightly points out parallels to the SPD today in his "Von der preußischen Industrialisierung zum Lassalleschen Arbeiterverein," in *Aesthetik und Kommunikation*, n. 36 (1979).

17. Cf. Dieter Groh, *Negative Integration und revolutionäre Attentismus*, (Frankfurt, 1974).

18. New studies have described the social integration of the Weimar SPD as a "*social democratic camp*" that provided psychological protection and political identity internally, but which remained externally immobile. Cf. B. Rabe, *Der sozialdemokratisch Charakter* (Frankfurt, 1978).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

letariat" into the ranks of wage earners. This cultural-political "camp mentality" was due to two factors. First, German intellectuals between 1871 and 1933 were mostly rightist, anti-democratic and (in the Weimar Republic) anti-Semitic. Secondly, in the German, or rather "Prussian," political tradition, the intellectual was never the labor movement's liberal voice of freedom against the State but, rather, a functionary: a regular bureaucrat, an industrial bureaucrat, or a party or labor union functionary. Thus, culture was always subordinated to the priority of administration in the authoritarian State or of organisation in the labor movement.

The social and ideological broadening of the SPD into a mass party presented an opportunity to redefine the socialist movement as cultural as well as economic and political. However, the Godesberg Program led to no significant rejuvenation of the party's cultural endeavors. After 1959, the classic "alliance" with the intellectuals amounted to shared expectations regarding modernization rather than fundamental agreement on theory or "basic values." This modernization was to lead to a *democratization* of the political system in order to replace the narrow world view of the "Christian Democratic Union (CDU) State." Many young academic, technical and administrative intellectuals implicitly hoped for a convergence of modernization and the democratization of social, cultural and political life. After 1969, this also became an important link with the cultural values of the "new Free Democratic Party (FDP)." As in the case of the "growth pact" between labor unions and the welfare state, there was a "modernization pact" between the SPD and the intellectuals. This, however, was constantly undermined by the SPD in terms of the emergency laws, the Great Coalition, the Radical Decree (*Berufsverbot*), anti-terrorist laws, and political censorship. Even the student movement's breakthrough to a radical and democratic hegemony in West German universities — truly revolutionary in German history — occured, not because of, but in spite of SPD policy.

If philosophy implies a *systematic* construct of ideas, relating political action to theory, then the present SPD clearly no longer has an *explicit* philosophical position. The Godesberg program gave up the Marxist philosophy of history which had shown itself less and less useful in the post-war period. However, in a colloquial sense, there is still a kind of SPD "philosophy." The departure from a Marxist philosophy of history was not a categorical departure from a conception of historical *progress*, but the implicit adoption of a theory of modernization based on the assumption of the compatibility of processes of industrial growth, growing social equality, and the interventionist State's "Reason" (ethical as well as economic). For the SPD, the welfare state allows the reconciliation of State and workers which Lassalle unsuccessfully sought in the authoritarian Prussian State. Thus, the departure from the Marxist culture of class and the social democratic "camp" did not mean the abandonment of working class interests but, rather, the "universalization" of *workers' interests* to citizens of the welfare state.[19] The SPD's implicit "philosophy"

19. See Samuel Bawles, "The Post-war Accumulation Process, The Keynesian State and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

becomes the *form* of SPD government policy and the form of the processing of this policy within the party.

Since 1959 the SPD has concentrated entirely on taking over the government. *It never developed a culture of opposition!* For this political culture of government responsibility one can distinguish an expansive phase (the Brandt era: "hopes of reform") and a restrictive phase (the Schmidt era: "practical exigencies"). However, the *ambivalence* common to both periods is more important here, as evident in the "philosophically relevant" aspects of SPD government policy. This policy has been fixated on *state* forms for the advancement of political content and the attendance to social needs. This "etatist" concept of policy was, of course, already present in the Weimar SPD.[20] During the SPD-FDP government, however, the SPD concept of progress as the rationalization of society through legislation and administration has become obvious. Administrative reorganization (e.g., jurisdictional reform) or attempts to unify educational systems have created the image of the "omnipresent bureaucracy," the "administration inaccessible to citizens" and the unchecked self-direction of bureaucratic (ir)rationality which now makes the SPD the main target of both "alternative movements'" impatience with the State, as well as of the Conservative, neo-liberal campaign against "too much State."

SPD policy has been fixated on quantitative, and in the past on exponential, economic growth. This was linked to a more equal distribution in the context of *less social conflict* (since there was no redistribution of existing wealth) which, however, ignored the "social cost" and the "social limits" of expansion.[21] SPD's concern with the modernization of social relations is similarly ambivalent: it retains the emancipatory intention of replacing traditional hierarchies and the rural-clerical narrowness of the "CDU State" in favor of "openness," tolerance and rational calculability. Yet, no consensus concerning social norms has accompanied this enlightenment to make up for the loss of traditional relations, values and "sources of meaning" for individuals and social groups. The commitment to representative forms of political delegation and neo-corporatist co-operation with organized combinations of groups engenders a further ambivalence in the SPD concept of democracy, not only in regard to the tradition of class struggle, but also concerning "new social movements."[22] Due to their loyalty to representative democracy, SPD politicians are exclusively concerned with majority interests and fail to recognize minorities. This leads to the inability to even perceive, much less productively address, social movements and interests that cannot or will not use institutional channels of representation.

Capital-labor Stalemate", unpublished paper read at the "5a Settimana Internazionale di Studi Lelio Basso".

20. See Volker Gransow and Claus Offe, "Political Culture and the Politics of the Social Democratic Government," in this issue of *Telos*; Giacomo Marramao, *Il Politico e le Trasformazioni* (Bari, 1979); and Gian Enrico Rusconi, *La Crisi di Weimar* (Torino, 1977).

21. See Erhard Eppler's criticism of "the practical exigencies of growth" in his *Wege aus dem Gefahr,* (Reinbek, 1981), pp. 42ff.

22. Adam Przeworski, "Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon," in *New Left Review*, No. 122 (1980), p. 29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Danger of Delegating Politics to the State

The SPD world view bases the realization of freedom and justice on economic growth and the modernization of social relations. These are guaranteed politically in the last resort by the welfare state, which leads to certain differences with respect to the situation in classical liberalism, where the realization of freedom and justice is a simple matter.[23] The freedom of (propertied) individuals is a question of basic rights (natural rights) which pre-exist the State and which the State must respect and legally guarantee. Furthermore, justice is established via the distribution of goods and income: not by the State, but by the "invisible hand" of the market. The greatest freedom and justice thus depends on the limitation of state intervention in society and in the economy. While the SPD has long included liberal *freedoms* in its concept of democracy, it does not regard them as pre-existing the State, but as the results of the legal order sanctioned by the State. That individual freedoms in bourgeois society are not simply "given," was quite clear to the labor movement in its struggle for general and equal voting rights.[24] The SPD attempted to correct *economic liberalism* with Keynesianism. This, however, was limited by the indirect character of the State regulation of the market and by the "privileged position" of private capital. The SPD criticised *political liberalism* to a much greater degree, claiming that the role of the welfare state in shaping society is no longer restricted to a "minimal" area but in principle addresses all of society.

This SPD concept of the welfare state, has recently been attacked both by the neo-liberal criticism of "too much State" and by the alternative movements' aversion to State and bureaucracy.[25] The reasons for the neo-liberals' campaign against the welfare state are obvious. Bobbio has shown that this is an *anti-democratic* criticism, because it demands "at once a minimal and a strong State." Such a State is to keep out of the capitalist economy but at the same time repressively contain social conflicts and thus eliminate the so-called "non-governability of democracy."[26] The identity of neo-liberalism with capitalist domination needs no explanation. In contrast and despite a certain amount of ambiguity, the potential of alternative movements' criticism of bureaucratic consolidation and repressive controls in the welfare state is basically democratic and participatory.

The new oppositional force ranging from the ecology to the peace move-

23. See Norberto Bobbio "Liberalismo vecchio e nuovo," in *Mondo Operaio*, n. 11, 1981; C.B. MacPherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*, (Oxford, 1977); and C.A. Cohen, "Freedom, Justice and Capitalism," in *New Left Review*, No. 126, 1981.

24. Wolfgang Abendroth distinguishes the socialist concept of justice from that of classical liberalism as follows: "The belief in the inherent justice of the existing economic and social order is given up. Thus, these orders are molded by the organs of the State in which the democratic self-determination of the people is represented." Cited in K. Kremendahl and T. Meyer, editors, *Sozialismus und Grundgesetz* (Kronbreg Taunus, 1974), p. 144. Furthermore, the classical liberal concept of freedom for "independent" property owners becomes decreasingly relevant. Therefore, as Greiggenhagen puts it in *Vorwärts*, May 21, 1981, social security today must be seen as the basis of personal freedom rather than the old-liberal concept of property.

25. Christel Neusüss, "Der 'freie Bürger' gegen den Sozialistaat," in *Prokla*, No. 39 (1980).

26. Norberto Bobbio, *op. cit.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment, not only arose in opposition to the SPD, but also cannot foreseeably be integrated by it. The SPD policy model shares the liberal identification of politics with the realm of the State, but draws opposite conclusions. Classical liberalism rejects a political regulation of the society of free property owners and demands non-interference by the State in the market economy. Because the SPD always considered the State the true "community" of socialization, it has favored an increase in State responsibility. In economic policy, the SPD has accepted the structural dominance of capitalist relations (in the sense of the "Keynesian compromise" between the labor movement and capital). In terms of social relations, it has sought the democratization of society exclusively in the form of broadened State authority. By contrast, "new social movements" represent attempts to socialize politics rather than delegate it to the State. By way of grass-roots organization, they seek to avoid the "paradoxes of modern democracy" (Bobbio) — bureaucratization, the experts' lack of accountability, mass-society and the reduction of political alternatives. Although experiments with "direct democracy" or "democracy from below" are certainly not a global alternative to representive democracy, they do embody a politicization of social life that cannot simply be absorbed by the State's administrative rationality.

The new movements also make demands unanswered by the SPD's political culture. New "post-industrial" images of freedom are mixed with old truths which the labor movement left behind on its march toward the State. The solidarity of the labor movement has long since "passed on into the heaven of institutions"[27], and thus has generally lost its character as a morally binding force. Implicit in the formulation State/Society, whether in its liberal or in its Marxist form, was a consciousness, which the SPD has now lost, that society is the location and constant source of conflicts. A part of the new youth movement expresses a need for *autonomy from institutions* as opposed to the the SPD version of *freedom through* democratic institutions. This is not to be confused with anti-democratic attitudes; it represents instead the need for self-determined avenues of democratic participation in political decision-making, not as a "civic duty" but as a possibility for individual choice.

The SPD and the Intellectuals

Despite the social opening of the SPD in the 60s and 70s to include generations of intellectuals of the "new middle classes," there was never a conscious, *political* "alliance with intellectuals. The party itself was also more interested in the "anti-ideological pragmatist" than in the critical intellectual, questioning the consistency of current policy with socialist goals.[28] Focus on center voter potential served as a SPD "secret strategy" to keep the tactics of the Godesberg Program out of public debate. This however, led to important consequences regarding the relation between the party and the intellectuals — especially in terms of diminishing hopes for the *modernization* of social relations, which was

27. Neusüss, *op. cit.*
28. Rabe, *op.cit.*, pp. 141ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perhaps the only remaining bond between the two. The first massive *democratic* dissent of intellectuals was prompted by the SPD's support of emergency legislation, which provoked the construction of an extra-parliamentary opposition during the period of the great coalition.

Later, hopes for reform in the SPD-FDP coalition under Brandt led to a greater convergence of the impulses for *modernization* and *democratization* and, consequently, to a greater ability of the SPD to integrate new intellectuals. But the SPD failed at the time to address the need of these generations for theoretical orientation, and "theoretical discussion" took place mainly outside the party.[29] Thus, the party remained unable to develop a cultural policy to address the consequences of modernization — especially in education. It also failed to meet rationally and democratically the ensuing crisis of traditional values and hierarchies. Instead of reacting with arguments, it resorted to administration (and, in some cases, to repression). Thus, it relinquished all hope of influencing the cultural potential of the 1968 New Left and was also helpless against the revitalized source of social integration found in the conservative values of the "*Tendenzwende*" of the mid-seventies. The SPD could culturally influence neither the New Left intelligentsia nor the "old liberals," many of whom defected to the neo-conservative camp — the "renegades of the center" as Habermas aptly called them. All that was left to the SPD was to follow the voters and mobilize "State consciousness."

The current situation is characterized by a general crisis of the intelligentsia. Since it is considered a "crisis of modernism," the SPD intelligentsia is the least likely to offer solutions. Doubts about the "legitimacy of the modern age," expressed in the ecology, feminist and youth movements, drove some '68 intellectuals to "silence"[30] — retreat into literature or a re-discovery of traditions of practical philosophy as critique of civilization (partly in the French version of "post-modernism"). Some intellectuals resurface as what Asor Rosa calls intellectual *specialists* — "oppositional experts" on the side of grass-roots movements. This "spiritual situation of the times" finds the SPD intellectual helpless![31] More enlightened SPD politicians such as Vogel and Glotz have indeed attempted to maintain contact with intellectuals' reaction to a "loss of meaning" and a "cultural crisis" (Löwenthal) by staging "dialogues." However, this not only makes the culturally conservative SPD itself nervous, but also disquiets the addressees ("youth," "peace movement" . . .), since "meaning" by definition cannot be engendered adminstratively — which is the sole policy associated with the SPD.

In Search of an SPD Philosophy

Complaints regarding the SPD's "theoretical deficiency" reflect the intellectuals' own experience (or justification) of their withdrawal from SPD policy in

29. H. Heimann, *Theorie ohne Praxis* (Frankfurt, 1977).

30. "Are German Intellectuals remaining Silent?" was the theme of a debate in the *Frankfurter Rundschau* in the summer of 1981, subsequently published as a book (Berlin, 1981).

31. Cf. the contributions of SPD intellectuals to Jürgen Habermas' anthology *op.cit.* Cf. also my review, "Stichproblem zur geistigen Situation der Intelligenz," in *Leviathan,* No. 2, 1980.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the late 1970s. At that time, the absence of a theoretical orientation, especially toward the "theoretical discussion" of the New Left, was also perceived within the SPD as cultural-political shortcoming. An "Initiative for Democratic Socialism in Higher Education" was even created to provide arguments against the anti-reformist intelligentsia, from the social sciences, in an area where attempted higher education reform had been administered but not shaped by the SPD. For the first time in the post-war period a kind of cultural policy was attempted by the SPD, or rather, by some SPD intellectuals with well-meaning moral support from the party leadership.

Several efforts were made to develop an explicit SPD philosophy. These included: a) the attempt to adapt the political philosophy of Popper's "critical rationalism," as an opening toward the "anti-ideological" modernist intelligentsia; b) the attempt to expand the three basic values of the Godesberg Program (freedom, justice, solidarity) into a distinct, quasi-philosophical basis for democratic socialism, as an opening toward the humanist intelligentsia; c) the attempt to reconstruct a "constructive paradigm of transformation" for socialist reform policy out of the writings of Eduard Bernstein, the father of "revisionism," as an opening toward the reformist party-intelligentsia. The common denominator of these attempts is their hostility toward the anti-reformist Marxism of the academic intelligentsia, or its basic assumption of the "impossibility of reform" of democratic capitalist systems and the need for a "revolutionary break." Of course, the thesis of capitalist democracy's *absolute* ability to reform is in itself just as *metaphysical* as its (supposed) antithesis, the *absolute* inability to reform. The priority of democratic forms as the arena of conflicts (or of class struggle) is an *ethical* claim. Their success, however, is an empirical question of social and political power relations. However, the question concerning what policy could carry out democratic reform in an ethically desirable and effective manner was totally lacking in the SPD's philosophical initiatives.

Recycling Popper and Bernstein

This can be seen best in relation with the SPD adoption of Popper's philosophy as a "theoretical basis of ethical and democratic socialism."[32] Formulated during WWII in opposition of "totalitarianism of the Left and Right" (the Hitler-Stalin Pact!), Popper's "critical rationalism," is biographically more liberal than social-democratic. It was meant as ammunition against Marxism in three ways: 1)Against Marxism's promise to bring humanity happiness, critical rationalism's ethical ideal seeks only a reduction of human suffering (*negative utilitarianism*). 2) Against Marxism's solution to problems (revolution), critical rationalism substitutes Popper's theory of falsifability. Since there can be no knowledge of "truth" or, in this sense, of the common good, the only thing possible is the elimination of false hypotheses through falsification. Thus, the goal of policy is the most intense *pluralistic competition* among

32. Here I follow Helmut Spinner's *Pluralismus als Erkenntnismodell*, (Frankfurt, 1974); and his *Popper und die Politik*, Vol.I, (Bonn/Berlin, 1978). Of course, rejection of Popper's social philosophy says nothing about the usefulness of his philosophy of science.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

theories and programs. 3) Finally, the distinction between "pluralist" and "non-pluralist" theories provides a demarcation criterion in higher education policy between scientific (i.e., critical rationalist) and non-scientific (i.e., Marxist) theories and their proponents.These claims of the "new critical rationalism," which were accepted in both SPD and CDU higher-education policies, are not tenable.

First, as a criterion for policy evaluation, "negative utilitarianism" replaces "the greatest good for the greatest number" with the least suffering for the lowest number." Apart from the arbitrary decision as to where less suffering ends and more happiness begins, negative utilitarianism is no better than its positive counterpart unless suffering can be objectively measured (but who can do so, accurately, other than a totalitarian State?). Yet, if this formula is not applied as a criterion for good and bad policy, it remains, at best, a vague and empty appeal , unable to describe even the SPD welfare state.[33]

Secondly, the generalization of Popper's theory of the fallibility of knowledge and of his pluralistic competition of theories into a "socio-political pluralism (of institutions, interests or group interests) is neither rigorous nor plausible, but simply *incorrect*."[34] It is a result of Popper's "liberal prejudice" and misunderstands regulating conflicts of interest for the expression of differences of opinion. Such an "intellectualization of politics" actually amounts to depoliticization.[35]

Thirdly, the neo-positivist distinction between scientific and non-scientific theories currently hypostasized by Popper's students into a "methodological super-ego"[36] is of no help in labelling one theory, more "pluralistic" than others. "Theoretical pluralism, only exists if there is indeed a plurality of theories standing in a relation of mutual criticism. Thus, *no* viewpoint can sensibly claim to be 'pluralism' itself . . . and be allowed to exclude alternative views as 'non-pluralistic'"[37] This concept of "monopoly pluralism," directed mainly against socialist views in scholarship, is thus rightly criticized as a "campaign slogan" against the students' revolts. As a result, Popper's "critical rationalism" is not a *political* philosophy which can remedy the SPD's theoretical shortcomings. On the contrary, it indicates conformity to the general political mood.

Such attempts to formulate a new "SPD philosophy" were generally failures. After the "Popper fad," and SPD-sponsored "Commission on Basic Values" tried to develop "value-based socialism" and bring about a "Bernstein Renaissance." These efforts have had no influence on theory or on cultural

33. See U. Günthur, "Poppers politische Ethik und Methodologie,"in Theodor Meyer editor, *Grundwerte und Gesellschaftsreform* (Frankfurt, 1981).

34. H.F. Spinner, *Pluralismus op.cit*, p. 235.

35. As H.F. Spinner, (*Popper und die Politik, op.cit.*, p. 97) puts it: "The assumption is the conflicts of interest can be seen as mere differences of opinion as long as vital needs (interests) are met. Thus, the intellectualization of politics according to a liberal prejudice neglects the components of most social problems which cannot be reduced to mere differences of opinion, and denies their political nature. The result would be a systematic *avoidance of the problem*."

36. *Popper und die Politik, op.cit*, p. 37.

37. *Pluralismism, op.cit*, p. 238.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy.[38] The theoretical failure was due mainly to the *internal* theoretical inconsistency of the proposed new paradigms while their irrelevance for cultural policy resulted mainly from lack of clear *external* distinctions. These theories did not set the SPD apart from its Marxist tradition and the basic world-views of the CDU and FDP. Neither "critical rationalism" nor the Godesberg Program provided a profile sufficiently distinct from the competing democratic parties. The "revitalization" of Bernstein, legitimate in the face of the "fatalistic" Marxism of the Second International, did indeed link up with specific traditions of SPD theory.[39] But it failed to break with the Marxist reformist tradition and was of little help for current policies. Neither the SPD "Marxist Left" nor the young socialists were able to grasp such inconsistencies in the party's official theoretical efforts.[40]

Two Social-Democratic Philosophers

How did the SPD react "philosophically" to the crisis of consensus (within the party) and to the breakdown of the "modernization pact" with the intelligentsia? Two opposing political ethics, formulated by two leading social-democratic politicians, illustrate the SPD response: Helmut Schmidt and Erhard Eppler have provided *two opposing socio-ethical definitions of "politics".*

Schmidt presents a glamourless view of political morality as the ethics of responsibility. [41] The ex-chancellor finds moral principles relevant for judging practical political aims and for evaluating the "moral foundation" without which politics would be unscrupulous. However, he contends that other "pragmatic" considerations determine actual political decisions: choosing means according to substantive rationality, calculation of side effects, educated guessing among risks. Schmidt's definition is: "Politics is pragmatic action for moral purposes or moral goals." Regarding the relation of social interests and political institutions, the ex-chancellor refers to Kant: "conflict serves a positive function for progress. And I think that the strengths of democracy, its learning capability, . . . thrive only in a climate, . . . which permits discussion and conflict, even fighting." Conflict here is conflict of *opinion*, democracy is "not a condition, but a process," in which "the common good must be constantly redefined." Thus, it is desirable to have the greatest possible competi-

38. The most significant and promising attempt has been Thomas Meyer's *Bernsteins Konstruktiver Sozialismus,* (Berlin/Bonn, 1977) when he provides a reconstruction — or extrapolation — of a theoretical paradigm for socialist reforms.

39. It is important to recall that Eduard Bernstein did, after all, join the USPD in WWI in protest against the SPD's "social chauvinism" (Lenin): The basic values (Freedom/Justice/Solidarity) have since adopted by the CDU and FDP, albeit in a different order. Cf. Theodor Meyer, Grundwerte und Wissenschaften im Demokratischen Sozialismus, (Berlin/Bonn, 1978).

40. Notwithstanding several theoretical shots in the arm to motivate, more than justify the Left's Marxist convictions (i.e., from hardly original adaptations of "state-monopolistic capitalism," "Euro-Communism" and, with it, Austro-Marxism.) In this crisis , the SPD's "Marxist left" is as impotent as Glotz' "readiness for dialogue." The old New Left, the Frankfurt School, and the "green" and "alternative" movements offer a better chance for serious debate on the 'Crisis of Marxism' than the SPD Marxists.

41. See Schmidt's speech at the "Kant Conference" of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. For a more thorough analysis of this speech, see my "Immanuel Kant in Bad Godesberg", in *Il Centauro*, No. 4, 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion among definitions of "common good." The *social* conflict (of interest groups), on the other hand, reaches its limits where it threatens the stability of the political system. "Too much fighting is not good for democracy." Schmidt's philosophy aims at a plurality of opinion, *social* conflict, but with *stability* of the political institutions' ability to act and decide. The logical consequence of this is *tolerance*, which in West Germany, unfortunely, is "not so secure as one might wish for a stable democratic society."

Tolerance demands that conservative interests renounce attempts to ensure stability by preventing conflicts of interest and opinion (such as Ludwig Erhard's concept of a "structured society" developed in the 60s). On the other hand, tolerance forbids seeking a state-established world-view, and demands open discussion with new protest movements — not the "criminilization of a minority" as the CDU advocates. But what if this diagnosis is wrong? What if new movements do not accept the limits of "symbolic protest," conflict between generations or differences of opinion concerning the "search for meaning?" What if the electoral success of the ecological and "alternative" movements extends the conflict into the political system itself? What happens to tolerance when the pre-established harmony between social conflict and institutional stability, between the monopoly of values and the monopolistic powers of decision, no longer functions?

It is no accident that Eppler, the leading exponent of the "ecological" wing of the SPD, and sympathetic to the peace movement, does not come out of the party's classical cultural tradition. Coming from the democratic and pacifist wing of political Protestantism, Eppler is now chairman of the party's "Commission on Basic Values." Thus, he urges the party to programmatically renew its political identity after the collapse of the pre-established harmony between industrial and "ethical" growth. In contrast to Schmidt's ethics of responsibility or Lowenthal's work ethics as a foundation for SPD identity, Eppler proposes a radical distinction between ethical universalism and the practical exigencies of industrial society. Thus, *ethical criteria* can be established for choosing among different technological strategies, whether it is regarding work and living in industrial societies,or relations with the Third World. Secondly, he urges the SPD to integrate *conflict* of social values and groups *into its institutions* through plebiscites, local participation, and the defense of minority rights. Thirdly, he sees mere tolerance of modernism as inadequate if the SPD is "to create on a new spiritual basis a sufficient bond between workers. . . and the driving forces of the times, embodied mainly by young people."[42] Eppler's critique of the "ideology of practical exigencies" is also a *critique of politics* in the spirit of a Christian "return to ethics." In the context of post-conciliar theology, Eppler himself refers to a "second Reformation" which should be able to address, in the spirit of an "ethics of brotherhood," questions raised by the ecology and peace movements concerning the legitimacy of the modern era. Just as the representative Church is to be renewed by an "involved Church" of brotherly — not modernist or agnostic — openness, so should the SPD renew

42. Eppler, *op.cit.*, p. 128ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

itself as the "party of peace and reform" by becoming the partner of new social movements.[43]

There are few signs of an "SPD philosophy" within the party. It is a great theoretical and cultural-political failure that neither the SPD's Left or Right has critically taken up the only ethical tradition of intellectuals in the labor movement that has developed independent of party Marxism, i.e., the *tradition of ethical Kantian socialism*, which today is falsely rejected by the Left and praised by the Right for being anti-Marxist. In truth, socialists such as Max Adler, Karl Vorländer, Siegfried Marck and Franz Staudinger were never anti-Marxist, but wanted to free historical materialism of "naturalistic fallacies." At best, they were tolerated on the SPD fringe. This only *seems* to have changed today. Granted, Kant is now more or less accepted as a liberal and enlightened forerunner of social democratic reason, but his *method* is still not taken seriously. That would mean critically adapting the current Anglo-American discussion of "Kantian constructivism in moral philosophy", for socialist theory.[44] In this discussion, Kant's postulate of *autonomy* is taken as a point of departure to avoid the SPD's mistake of projecting the "basic values" of freedom and justice into the "*social contract*" as an "article of faith." Instead, it constructs criteria for evaluating social and political structures according to the degree of freedom for *all* and equality of opportunity in *all* social realms (from production to culture) that can be realized through them. Such normative criteria, as a first step, are empty without a socio-theoretical diagnosis. They can thus only lead to a socialist political theory if they are more than a "regulative idea in social dialogue"[45] The second step is to fill them with social-scientific findings concerning *actual social inequality* in capitalist class societies. Thirdly, a theory of political action must raise the issue of the social (individual and collective) *subjects* of social change, if it wishes to aid the development of a *democratic culture*. Without this, a process of socialist emancipation of *all* members of society is inconceivable.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 228ff.

44. John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LXXVII, No. 9, (Sept. 1980).

45. Meyer, editor, *Grundwerte und Wissenschaft im Demokratischen Sozialismus, op.cit.*, p. 202.

U.S. Postal Service. Statement of Ownership, Management and Circulation. 1. Title of publication: Telos. A. Publication No. 10770. 2. Date of filing: Sept. 28, 1982. 3. Frequency of issue: quarterly. A. No. of issues published annually: 4. B. Annual subscription price: $38.00. 4. Complete mailing address of known office of publication: Box 3111, St. Louis County, University City, MO 63130. 5. Complete mailing address of the headquarters or general business offices of the publishers: same. 6. Full names and complete mailing addresses of publisher, editor and managing editor: Publisher, Paul Piccone, Box 3111, St. Louis, MO 63130. Editor, Paul Piccone, Box 3111, St. Louis, MO 63130. Managing editor, Joan Toeniskoetter, Box 3111, St. Louis, MO 63130. 7. Owner: Paul Piccone, Box 3111, St. Louis, MO 63130. 8. Known bondholders: none. 10. Extent and nature of circulation: first number in each category is average number of copies each issue during preceding 12 months; second number is the actual number of copies of the single issue published nearest to filing date. A. Total no. copies: 4145; 4280. B. Paid circulation. 1. Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors and counter sales: none, none. 2. Mail subscription: 2193; 2172. C. Total paid circulation: 2193; 2172. D. Free distribution by mail, carrier or other means; samples, complimentary, and other free copies: none; none. E. Total distribution (sum of C and D): 2193; 2172. F. Copies not distributed: 1. Office use, left over, unaccounted, spoiled after printing: 1952; 2108. 2. Return from news agents: none; none. G. Total (sum of E, F1 and 2): 4145; 4280. I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete. (signed) Paul Piccone, publisher.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NATIONAL UNITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE: THE STATE, PEASANT FOLKLORE AND MONO-ETHNISM*

By Claude Karnoouh

At the beginning of 1890 the Prague bourgeoisie, proud of belonging to the most industrialized and cultivated "nation" of Central Europe triumphally celebrated the first exposition of popular Czech art. Impassioned with the enthusiasm and romantic *élan* of the Pan-Slavic literary and populist movement, it discovered, with the naive astonishment of a neophyte, the proximity and strangeness of a culture which it had till then disdained or simply ignored. Fascinated, moreover, by the copious productivity in Germanic learned culture, which expressed and transmitted its thoughts in German, it found itself confronted with an intellectual and moral contradiction. To reclaim the specificity of its belonging to the Slavic world distanced it from Germanic modernity, since this Germanic modernity rejected the most archaic rural world, which, after the disappearance of the Bohemian aristocracy, had conserved the ethnic and linguistic marks of its cultural originality.

In that same period, all the European nations were converging on Paris to celebrate the cult of technical and scientific progress in the magnificence of a universal exposition. Despite the attraction of industrial products, the organizers, out of exotic curiosity, called for some products of the popular art of the countries of Balkan Europe, newly promoted to the rank of nation-states. For the occasion, the German king of recently-founded Rumania — reduced at the time to the united principalities of Moldavia and Valachia — offered some peasant costumes which can still be viewed today in the storage-rooms of the Musée de l'Homme. When they are seen in light of later donations (offered by museums or collectors), one notices with astonishment and bitterness that the royal donation has nothing in common with popular crafts. They are nightgowns similar to Parisian fashions except for a few embroideries in gold and silver dust whose designs suggest the geometry of peasant decorations. And one smiles when the imagination dresses the body of robust peasant women with these flimsy fineries of Danubian Bovarys, drole caricatures of the worldy damsels of the Faubourg Saint-Germain!

Do not misunderstand me! This cultural myopia, this lack of discernment must not be confused with the awkward output of a country engaged in the hesitant quest of an authentic learned culture. Today, after a hundred years of independence and of political upheaval, the tourists have the leisure to buy clothing and various objects or to attend singing and dancing performances which the authorities attribute to popular creation. But again these are weak copies, fabricated by veritable industrial studios or conceived within a framework of theatrical presentations. Like the royal gift, the merchandise offered by

*translated by David J. Parent

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Socialist Rumania shows the state's disdain for the peasant world, despite the perpetual references that decorate the rhetoric of its political discourse. The relations of the Central European nation-state to its peasantry are stamped with an original contradiction, linked with the establishment of these relations, between a wish for imported (constitutional, institutional, urban, and industrial) modernity and the axioms of a peasant thinking alienated from modern history.[1]

Modernity and Peasant Society: The Problem of Mono-Ethnism

The specificity of problems posed by national identity to the states born of the dismantling of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires is due to the conditions that prevailed at their birth.[2] They represent a bastard compromise between the strategies and tactics of the great Western powers and the emergence of the national movement among the intellectuals and autochthonous bourgeois. At the end of World War I, the disappearance of the Hapsburg Empire was not universally accepted. Essentially, convinced by Masaryk and the "Czech" lobby, Wilson was the one who imposed this solution on the Allies. Neither France, nor still less Great Britain wanted the dismantling of a very ancient historical formation which restrained the appetites of Russian and Prussian imperialism. Even within the vassal nationalities, the idea of total independence did not come close to a unanimous opinion, and numerous disputes arose as to the opportuneness of a definitive break with the ancient tutelary power. Certain nationalistic leaders, with a foreboding of the grave perils encountered by the Balkanization of the Empire, hoped to use the monarchy's military defeat to at last obtain guarantees of a federal power regarding equality of rights and duties of all ethnic groups assembled into one same territorial entity under shared sovereignty.

Identical hesitations arose during the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and these were in part responsible for the Balkan wars of the turn of the century. For, only Western minds, strangers to ethnic phenomena, could imagine stable frontiers — founded on linguistic and ethnic unity — in the heart of regions whose originality resided, on the contrary, in the inextricable interlapping of languages, peoples, and religions! From Macedonia to Galicia, everything was cultural instability and pluralism.[3] Yet, once these pluri-ethnic empires disappeared, the ethnic problems which had partially undermined them were posed anew for the nation states. Czechoslavakia, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, each of the elites of the dominant ethnic group exerted upon its minorities the intolerance with which it reproached the empires.[4]

1. F. Fejtö, *Histoire des démocraties populaires*, (Seuil, Paris, 1952).

2. Cf. below. Identical problems had also been faced by the Baltic countries.

3. Cf. J. Cvic, *La Péninsule Balkanique*, (Plon: Paris, 1918). N. Iorga, *Histoire des Roumains*, 4 vols. (Bucharest, 1937). A Mousset, *Le monde slave* (Paris, 1946). F. Dvornik, *The Slavs in European History and Civilization* (Rutgers, New Brunswick, 1962). F. Eckhard, *Histoire de la Hongrie*, (Paris, 1969). J. Droz, *L'Europe centrale, évolution historique de l'idee de "Mitteleuropa,"* (Paris, 1960). V.L. Tapie, *Monarchie et peuple du Danube* (Paris, 1969).

4. Certain ethnic groups were never able to obtain independence. Such is the case with the Ruthenians of the sub-Carpathian Ukraine.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Once raised to the status and role of a nation-state, each one had to import a constitution, a civil code, a penal code, etc., from France, Germany, Belgium — though the elaboration of these rules, based on a social contract, could not constitute a synthesis of social relations corresponding to the cultural and economic development of the majority of the population. For some, like Serbia, the time was not very far past when the king meted out justice in a public square in front of his palace.

How, then, can a people be identified with its institutions and its laws, when they were imposed on it by a juridical and political colonialism? What did the ideas of parliamentary democracy or constitutional monarchy mean to a free mountaineer, living in the tribal organization of Montenegro or Albania? Again, it was under almost identical conditions, or ones slightly modified by a semi-colonial economy, that the new Commmunist regimes were installed, supported by an empire that had long been a menace: Russia. The aristocratic and bourgeois regimes had failed in their socio-economic mission by foundering in the dictatorships and court intrigues more or less manipulated by the great powers.[5] Today the same question remains. What does international Communism mean to the Carpathian shepard, the Hungarian peasant in Transylvania, or the ancient warrior of the Albanian mountains? If we believe in a still living popular literature, for many it is a cataclysm linked, depending on the cases and regions, with the unfurling of the "Muscovites" or Asiatics. But the peasantry is not a submissive and passive group; numerous revolts repressed with difficulty punctuate the modern rural history of Central and Balkan Europe.[6] But these battles never had a state as the objective; they were and still are a matter of assuaging a fiscal, religious or linguistic oppression which had become intolerable. The idea of a static sovereignty of the Rumanian peasants in Transylvania, of the Slovaks in Galicia, or the Bulgarians in Dobroudja is a completely recent creation, due in part to the relative stability of the national frontiers after World War II. In this regard, one should recall the exemplary loyalty to the person of the Emperor Franz-Joseph among the Rumanian, Polish, Croatian and Hungarian troops, comprised essentially of peasants. Only Czech troops, strongly represented by numerous workers, defected when they found in the Bolshevik revolution a double justification for their defection: Pan-Slavism liberated from a Czarist obscurantism, and a proletarian message.[7]

5. Fetjö, *op. cit.*, "Introduction."

6. Whether in the course of the numurous agrarian reforms or during the collectivizations, the peasants always opposed the will of the state, which caused them to make the most important human contributions to deportation.

7. a) In 1916 the Emperor's death partly broke this loyalty since the military oath was not made to the Empire as a state, but to the Emperor as a person. The majority of the populations of Central Europe considered Franz-Joseph as the Emperor of Peace; for, since Sadow (1866) Austria had known neither war nor colonial adventure (with the exception of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina). b) Rumanian troops protected the Emperor Charles IV after he had renounced the royal and imperial throne on November 13, 1918. c) After the return of Transylvania to Hungary by the accords of Vienna (1940), the Rumanian conscripts participated in all the battles of the Hungarian army without any significant revolts.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The nation-state must, thus, justify its precarious existence to its peasantry; but none — except, ever so feebly, Yugoslavia — promised a real federal policy based on ethnic autonomy.[8] Thus, it seems impossible to envisage recourse to the ethnicity of its peasantry as a proper tactic to conciliate a numerous and often majority population. This was and is an ideological instrumentalization destined to establish and legitimate the mono-ethnic nation-state. For only the peasant groups and communities had the features of a mono-ethnic social organization, while the political and intellectual elites, on the contrary, participated in a linguistic and cultural Europeanism. Let us not forget that French had the status of quasi-official language in Bucharest, as German did in Prague or Lubjana; and until the beginning of World War II all the elites of Central Europe were educated in Paris, Heidelberg, Vienna or London.

As an ideological tool, the peasant-reference is indeed not a marginal phenomenon in the state's ideological apparatus. The notion of the nation-state is elaborated in the crucible of Hegelian political philosophy and develops throughout the nineteenth century in the various schools — rightist or leftist neo-Hegelians — that will foster the future political leaders of Central European states. The theory of the modern state is based on an implicit axiom, mono-ethnism, which is conceived within the framework of the slow social and historical formation of Western Europe. But how can it be achieved without throwing into turmoil for several decades people who for centuries had known only the territorial authority of multi-ethnic empires? Because of their social and cultural archaism and their historical immobilism, the peasantries of Central and Balkan Europe were the only groups capable of offering the ethnic references necessary for the ideology of the nation-states — a movement of thought which moved the elites of all political tendencies of the national movement. Only the Austro-Marxists, particularly K. Renner, extolled a national federalism based on the territorial framework of the rural populations.[9]

The ideological import of the role that fell to the peasants can be perfectly illustrated by recalling the fundamental themes of Zionism. Unlike all the peoples of the Hapsburg Empire, the Jewish communities had only a very small percentage of peasants. But when it came to imagining the future Jewish state, the Zionist ideologues could not escape completely either mono-ethnism, or the idea that the peasantry had to form the social base.

Born in the heart of Central Europe, when the nationalities were seeking to emancipate themselves from Austria's bureaucratic and Germanic tutelage, formed by militants who stemmed from Galicia or Ukrainia, fed by daily and

8. Not until 1968 and the Prague spring revolution did the Czech authorities grant Slovakia a relative autonomy, which was very quickly revoked after the Soviet occupation. The dispute had lasted since 1918 and the Nazis exploited this latent conflict to create the Slovak State in 1940.

9. K. Renner (Synopticus), *Staat und Nation. Zur österreichischen Nationalitätenfrage. Staatsrechtlich Untersuchung über die möglichen Prinzipien einer Lösung und die juristichen Voraussetzungen eines Nationalitätengesetzes* (Vienna, 1899). K. Renner (R. Springer), *Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um den Staat* (Vienna, 1902).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

secular relations with the Polish, Slovak or Ruthenian peasants, Zionism, to its advantage and profit, took up the idea of the nation-state — though without escaping from the dominant discourse. And since the Jews did not have a peasantry, they invented one, made it an ideal to be realized late. And it is not one of the least ironies of history that today in Israel one can see the effects of this ideology. An industrial and highly developed country, the Jewish peasantry represents only a very tiny minority of the active population, concentrated in the socialist production of the *kibbutzim*. Thus, despite an industrial and capitalist economic reality, ideologically the permanence of the nation-state is based on the *kibbutzim*, the historical place charged with all the pioneer's hopes and victories. For an insight into this, see how political leaders, from Ben-Gurion to Golda Meir, base the legitimacy of their power on them. From this viewpoint, Israel, like all the states emanating from the central empires, belongs to 19th-century Central Europe.

In Central Europe today we rediscover an analogous ideological situation in which the contradictions between the economic state and the sociological reality of the population are more evident, since the modernist discourse on the rural economy in socialist countries has ended in a practical failure. Collectivized or independent, the peasants of socialist countries have not yet lost their popular traditions and their religiosity, still living testimonies to the archaism of their culture.

But the ethnic discourse was not able to satisfy the centralizing ambitions of the nation-states; it also required that each one mark its new existence and its recovered or newly acquired political autonomy by explicit appeals to modernity, but without referring to the singular course of its own modernity, since it has been imposed on it in quasi-uniform manner. This imported modernity implied uniformity in dissimilarity rather than identity in difference. From the state, royal, liberal republican, or Communist viewpoints, the variations between the states seem less than the analogies which unite their destinies. The institutions, the general political orientation of the states of Central Europe lead them toward the uniformization which they so much dreaded when it was being accomplished under Austrian rule. Due to the centralized administration, taxation, the civil and penal codes borrowed from the Napoleonic Code, the system of scholarization and conscription, they all draw from the same political source. As for their transformation into people's democracies, it can be regarded as a change of model, a new source of totalitarian political will.

What could be more alike than the dormitory blocks, the suburbs of Bucharest, Budapest, Athens, or Belgrade? The shores of the Black Sea, whether Rumanian or Bulgarian, were no more spared by the urban cancer than were the French or Italian Riviera: "savage" capitalism or triumphant socialism, the models come to resemble one another, even if the beneficiaries of surplus value do not belong to the same social classes. Coming from Western Europe, modernity served not only as a thought-model but also as a model for action for the elites who cannibalized and caricatured it to adapt it to

UNAUTHENTICATED
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

factitious or archaic powers. To rig out Rumania, in the aura of its independence, with a German prince and a constitution modeled on the Belgian constitutional monarchy reassured the Western governments, but without bringing closer to power the peasant masses subject to the large feudal landholdings of the oligarchies. Today, to transform these more or less theocratic peasant peoples into a nation of workers and functionaries devoted to the cult of the Party once again supposes similar procedures. Whether by force or by persuasion, when long-term results are studied, the Communist future of Eastern Europe shares an identical road — despite negligeable local variables. The West or Soviet Russia, each imperialism saw and sees the promotion of its models — which are not without common analogies at the price of annihilating those who resist them too much.

Nonetheless, this élan of industrialization and bureaucratic centralization around an ethnic group and a dominant language, the nation-state, this emergence of relative comfort and consumerism after centuries of famines still appeals to peasant-references to rediscover at the heart of the rural world the essence of its difference and the ultimate recourse elaborating national unity.

Politics and Human Sciences

All the nation-states of Central Europe use their folklores for political ends. Each proclaims, both inside and outside its borders, the antiquity and supremacy of its popular traditions. Thus, the Rumanian Bureau of Tourism recently had the ramps of the Paris Metro covered with posters with the evocative heading: "To the country of true folklore," while the Bulgarians would like to get us to go contemplate *in situ* the "true descendents of Thrace"! In appearance these are public relations arguments aimed at providing the various states, through tourism, the foreign currency necessary to purchase industrial products. Yet, it would be wrong to reduce these slogans to a mere publicity campaign aiming to incite Western middle-class tourists to seek a cheap tan and a shoddy exoticism.

This state of mind is not new, and the socialist regimes must not be accused of puerile and vulgar innovations. Already, in the last century, E. Rénan was revulsed at seeing the linguists of Central Europe and Russia transfer the political struggle to comparative philology. The first example of these political transpositions opens a long series of Byzantine debates and is very enlightening about the ideology of the nation-state's relations with the humanities. The Czech nation had to acquire a new prestige when in 1817 the philologist Hanka claimed to have discovered the manuscripts of ancient medieval poems (mss. of Kraklove Dvur and Zelena Hora). At last, the antiquity of Czech culture could no longer be challenged by Austrian imperialism. But, fifteen years later, these texts were shown to be "false, skillfully reworked or almost genially invented by Hanka; but he had believed it possible at the moment to serve his nation's prestige by a fraudulent procedure."[10]

10. V.L. Tapie, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The more or less conscious manipulation of ethno-linguistic, historical or archeological documents is thus not a byproduct of Stalinist totalitarianism; it emerges at the very moment when the Central European intelligentsias began acquiring national self-consciousness; it participates fully in the contradiction between the mono-ethnic will of the nation-state and the pluri-ethnic reality of the populations that occupy the territory which it claimed as its own. The fallacious argument is almost always at the center of the perpetual debates between the Hungarians and the Rumanians on the origin of the populace of Transylvania.[11] The same quarrels animate the contradictory theses of Rumanian and Bulgarian scholars on the subject of Dobroudja. Again, today, a violent Yugoslav polemic opposes Yugoslavs and Bulgarians on the subject of Macedonia. At the beginning of July 1978, the scientific and political authorities of Sofia were reaffirming that there can be no Macedonian problem since the Macedonain language and culture are just an element of Bulgarian culture. The Yugoslavs, on the contrary, worried about preserving an ever-precarious federalism, proclaimed the originality of Macedonain culture; this concession of cultural autonomy is, however, not without political designs, since a disputed frontier exists between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, concerning this geographical region. No one can regulate such a problem by statements similar to mere public relations campaigns. This attitude reveals a cynical disdain for the most obvious ethnographic realities. How can an ethnographic truth be decided and proclaimed, since this people is divided between three states (Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Greece)? To treat the Macedonians honestly and with a certain insight cannot be conceived without eliminating all references that appeal to the sovereignty of states.

For the countries of Central Europe, the philological, ethnographic, historical and archeological discourse justifies *a posteriori* the legitimacy of power as well as its political orientations. The Communist state did not innovate, on the contrary, it follows a political and social will long ago applied by the bourgeois state. From this viewpoint, the Stalin era represents a falsification of ethnographic phenomena for the sole profit of the Russians' Pan-Slavic imperialism.

Despite ten years of Stalinism, during which the nation-state dissolves partially within the framework of a new empire — in the name of a new universalist myth, since the end of the fifties we have been witnessing a veritable revival of peasant and ethnic references in the ethno-historical theory of the people's democracies. Similar to the nation-states which emerged from World War I — which the Western powers let tear one another apart as long as they respected the models of the tutelary powers — the people's democracies and their autochthonous bureaucracies find in national totalitarianism a very efficacious instrument to establish state mono-ethnism. Thus, the tourist

11. A. de Bertha: *Magyars et Roumains devant l'Histoire* (Paris, 1899) N. Iorga, *Histoire des Roumains de Transylvania et de Hongrie,* 2 vols. (Bucharest, 1916). A. Domanovsky, *La méthode historique de M.N. Iorga* (Budapest, 1936). N. Iorga, "Une nouvelle histoire de la Hongrie," in *Revue historique du Sud-Est Europeen* (Jan. March 1936).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

slogans belong primarily to the internal discourse of the party apparatus, which proposes to rural and urban populations a single code to decipher their folklore. If ethnographic theories and orthodoxies undergo transformations under the contingencies of history, the relation between the state and folklore (i.e. the peasant traditions) did not therefore remain any less identical.

National Identity and Folklore in the People's Democracies.

We are familiar with the diversified appearance of peasant folklore, which, from village to village, from valley to valley, is modified and transformed without respect for political or administrative boundaries. If mono-ethnism (ideal of the nation-state) is the essential principle on which the village communities are built and perpetuated, it can be a question only of phenomological analogy. For peasant mono-ethnism in Central Europe was characterized by a restricted spacial extension, reduced sometimes to several villages. On these territories belonging to vast multi-ethnic empires, the slow displacements of populations were frequent and going back a long way. Do we not see the Jews and the Ruthenians of Galicia in the course of the 19th century settle in northern Transylvania and Bukovine, the Serbs move up toward the North, the Rumanians and Bulgarians colonize Dobroudja, etc?[12] For the indigenous person, unity and difference, identity and strangeness are the categories which escape all determinants for elaborating the ethnic theory of state sovereignty. However, if the study of European peasant cultures requires autochthonous vision as an anchorage point, it can still not be satisfied with it: it is also obliged to make comparisons. To affirm, confirm, or invalidate the irreducibility of cultural categories requires first a strict determination of the classes of phenomena and not an anarchic and discontinous comparison, such as is so frequent in the ethnography of Central Europe. By privileging the atomized approach to cultural phenomena, elaborated on the basis of *a priori* categories, alien to the indigenous consciousness, one favors all the ideological manipulations; for the importance and interest ascribed to this or that feature of social and cultural organization oscillates according to the political imperatives of the time. An ethnic and village community never formed an arbitrary collection of phenomena, but on the contrary a context of relations with specific forms, invested with meaning by the natives who rationalize them with their own sociological theory.

Whatever his approach, the scholar free of all nationalist ideology is inevitably led to oppose ethnological and historical theories presented by the nation-state. If he privileges the local community, he will bring to light the empirical and conceptual heterogeneity of folklore within the framework of national boundaries; if, on the contrary, he privileges comparison, he will be led to exceed these same boundaries to elaborate the vastest regroupings whose limits break territorial-state entities. The nation-state's cultural theory and

12. I. Nistor, *Romanii si Rutenii in Buscovina* (Bucharest, 1925). J. Cvic, *La Péninsule Balkanique* (Paris, 1918). T. Papahagi, *Graiul si Folklorul Maramuresului* (Bucharest, 1925). C. Iancu, *Les Juifs en Roumanie* (1866-1919) (Aix en Provence, 1978).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy, on the contrary, seek to unify the folklores of the territories which it subjects to its sovereignty, in order then to better differentiate them from neighboring countries. It must accelerate the processes of centralized unification which are braked by slow economic development or quite simply failures, and bend a decidedly recalcitrant history to its will. As can easily be discovered, the ethnologist and the nation-state have, on any topic whatever, neither the same theoretical hypotheses, nor the same practical ambitions. Finally, and it is also a question of moral commitment, I will add the ethnologist must not favor one ethnic community to the detriment of another and that despite ideological snares and errors of thought he must promote the principles of reciprocal autonomy . . . .

If, from a theatrical viewpoint, I tried to show that the peasantist references of the state are an axiom of its own theory of legitimacy and not a series of verbal concessions destined to conciliate the rural populations, this analysis must not, however, lead us to neglect its effects on the social and cultural life of village communities. The apparent concessions made to the peasantry by states engaged in rapid industrial development imply, by reason of their folklore choices, deep transformations in the processes which construct ethnic identity. The roles are mixed up; from a doer, the peasant is changed into a spectator, from a producer of culture he is transformed into a consumer. He is despoiled of his creative power for the benefit of specialists, folklorist-ideologues, who decide, modify, limit, add, in short, reorganize and fix the elements of ceremonies and rites. Is this not the establishment of a veritable censorship camouflaged with the help of all sorts of "scientific" justifications? It is an absolute and absurd will to control, intended to impose the canons of a moral and learned aesthetics trivialized by the immediate plans of political power.[13]

The already ancient organization of folklore presentations removes the peasantry from its own local identity to the extent that it is led to contemplate some performances resulting from a synthesis between different regions that are strangers to one another. The folklore is detached from the times and places which condition it: the village, the region, the ethnic group, the religious and natural cycle of the seasons — which are replaced by the cycle of administrative life.[14] Finally, by scheduling a calendar of radio and television competitions similar to the one that regulates sport championships, the state transforms folklore into a vast enterprise of national and international leisure. Peasant culture is then just a pretext for the accomplishment of a perverse will that manipulates rural archaism for the exclusive profit of the Party-nation, the last avatar of this contradiction between imported modernity and the peasant substratum of the population. Popular creation is channeled, all its spontaneity is fixed within the rigid framework of houses of culture which, from village, factory and school all the way to the capital, duplicate the Party's political apparatus on the cultural plane. Folklore thus rediscovers the place

13. I. Mezioiu, *Spectacolul NunFilor* (Bucharest, 1969).

14. These festivals celebrating the cult of the state and the Party at present serve as references to the various folklore manifestations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assigned to it by 19th-century political theory and which the bourgeois state was unable to give it: it constitutes at last a part of a hierarchically structured whole subject to the ideological constraints of the politburo. From the peasants' viewpoint, however, this transformation has neither the same meaning nor the same practical implications. Outside these authoritarian manifestations, the nation-state produces categories which are ambiguous to peasant thinking.

The peasantry, as well as an important part of the workers, have, despite Stalinist repression, preserved the modes and styles of traditional popular expression. There was a time when certain ritual practices and their train of versified litanies sent their authors to exile. Whether it be in the course of daily work or on the occasion of rites of passage (baptisms, weddings, funerals), popular discourse today again has its libertarian qualities. The evocative and responsive power of "popular literature" is such that the state is forced to use the talents of professional folklorists to reformulate political propaganda and activism in the conventional style. Thus, radio and television programs of popular pseudo-poetry, apocryphal texts that extol the merits of collectivization, encourage respect for the production norms and celebrate the greatness of the Party. The state's tactical return to peasant references also presents contradictions on the occasion of folklore festivals. In Rumania, for example, certain festivals provide the occasion for great interregional gatherings in the course of which troops of dancers and singers, the official folklorists, the political authorities, and the spectator share in the cult of national unity, of which the Party and its chief representative are the most perfect metaphor. But once the official festivities are over, at the edges of the assembly area, next to the refreshment stands, displays of pottery and Gypsy tinsmithery, the peasants parody and deride the political solemnity of these meetings.

For the state apparatus this ideological revival of the peasantry is not without dangers; it runs the risk of compromising a fragile and sometimes unsteady mono-ethnic national identity. The peasantry always tends to reactualize the strong potentialities of local ethnicity and thereby it developes its centrifugal forces. But the political bureaucracies of Eastern countries sense the perils which archaic peasant ideology contains; they know, by their own experience and social origin, the irreconcilable opposition between the social contract principles on which the peasant community is based and the Hegelian-Leninist principles on which they establish both the materiality and messianism of their own power. Also, the Communist parties, besides the rigid organization of folklore, must, concommitantly, reinforce the images and social values attached to the model of which they are the "vanguard": the worker. But this is not an ideological instrument capable of affirming the autonomous and original power of the nation-state; on the contrary, it underscores both the internationalism of a world process of industrial development and its technological dependence on Western capitalist countries.[15] Only the peasantry can give the state the framework within which the plan of national independence can be

15. This can be confirmed by simply looking at the economic statistics of the communist countries whose foreign debt sometimes puts them in the rank of underdeveloped countries.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

carried out since, despite its past submission to various foreign sovereignties the peasantry has preserved the ethnic and linguistic identity desired by this same state.

For some two decades Eastern (Central and Balkan) Europe has been constructing a new social man. This ideal citizen of the post-Stalin Communist state is once again a bastard compromise between worker and peasant, in which the first would carry the promises of an ever-awaited future affluent society, legitimated by the historical fidelity of the second. Bearer of an authentic ethnic and linguistic identity, the traditional peasant remains a danger to the nation-state, which tends to confine him to the role and status of eponymic ancestor. A silent and passive figure, mute image of the permanence of the modern state, mythical and mystified hero of the national epic, all discourses appropriate and intepret him without ever letting him liberate his own word.

autogestions

Revue trimestrielle - 15e année - nouvelle série

numéro spécial

Un travail sans emploi.
La société duale en question

Un bilan critique des mouvements alternatifs français et allemands.

Textes de I. Granstedt, A. Gorz, Y. Friedman, F. Partant, E. Eppler, J. Huber, etc.

N° 8/9 printemps 1982, 250 pages, 55 F

Avez-vous vu passer la gauche ?
N° 10 - été 1982, 35F

Demande d'abonnement et de numéros à adresser aux Editions Privat
14, rue des Arts
31000 Toulouse

Abonnements (4 nos/an) :	Individuel	Institution
France	120 F	145 F
Étranger	130 F	170 F

Vente au numéro en librairie.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New

Habermas

Critical Debates

edited by John B. Thompson and David Held

The essays in this book, all of them published here for the first time, provide a long-overdue critical discussion of Jürgen Habermas's ideas. They include: *Habermas and Marxism*, Agnes Heller; *Habermas's Concept of Critical Theory*, Rüdiger Bubner; *Habermas's 'Overcoming' of Hermeneutics*, Thomas McCarthy; *Cognitive Interests and Self-Reflection*, Henning Ottmann; *Science and Objectivity*, Mary Hesse; *Universal Pragmatics*, John B. Thompson; *Habermas and Practical Reason*, Steven Lukes; *Labour and Interaction*, Anthony Giddens; *Habermas's Theory of Social Evolution*, Michael Schmid; *Crisis Tendencies, Legitimation and the State*, David Held; *Critical Sociology and Authoritarian State Socialism*, Andrew Arato; and *Reply to My Critics*, Jürgen Habermas.

336 pp. $30.00 cloth, $12.50 paper

Outsiders

A Study in Life and Letters

by Hans Mayer

"Mayer means to know exactly how bourgeois society increasingly took away the rights of women, homosexuals, Jews, how these people deprived of rights reacted to the provocation: with camouflage, self-hate, antitype, transmutation, tragic protest."

–Peter Demetz, *Der Spiegel*

Professor of German at the University of Tübingen, Hans Mayer has also published major studies of Buchner, Wagner, Thomas Mann, Hesse, and Brecht.

448 pp. illus. $35.00

Write for our brochure on books in the series, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought.

28 Carleton Street, Cambridge, MA 02142

(Credit card orders accepted by telephone: 617-253-2884)

THE MIT PRESS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE 1930S IN THE LONGUE DURÉE OF SOVIET HISTORY*

by Gabor Rittersporn

Inevitably, the importance attributed to the 1930s in the context of Soviet history seems to vary a great deal depending on what is considered to be the central phenomenon of the period. It is an irrevocably bygone period of initial and more or less temporary troubles to those who regard it as a provisional stage in which the original ideas of the October Revolution were realized or a modern socio-economic system was established; a moment of no particular import, to those who are inclined to conceive of the evolution of the Soviet Union as a constant and practically inalterable chain of successes, failures or atrocities; a key era, to those who believe that these years were those of the definitive affirmation or distortion of traits or potentialities of the regime that was heir to a Russian or revolutionary tradition — there are as many possibilities of interpretation as there are ways to understand Soviet society. Yet, knowledge of this period is crucial to an understanding of the processes which constitute the Soviet phenomenon. My findings, however, tend to question most current interpretations and, especially, to advise against any hasty conclusion on the particulars of that epoch.

For these experiences show mainly how extremely precarious almost all one believes to know about the socio-political history of the 1930s is, if one makes a systematic and critical study of the original sources, much neglected until recent years. So, instead of drawing the broad lines of a vast historical panorama I will merely sketch some central problems as a provisory balance allows.[1] I will try to grasp and locate in the historical evolution of the USSR some of the main questions of the daily functioning of the socio-political mechanisms of the 1930s and the means of control and regulation which

*Translated by David J. Parent.

1. I will take the liberty to refer to my following works, from which I am here merely presenting some general and sometimes conjectural conclusions: "L'Etat en lutte contre lui-même — Tensions sociales et conflits politiques en U.R.S.S., 1936-1938," in *Libre*, no. 4, 1978, pp. 3-38; "Héros du travail et commandants de la production — La campagne stakhanoviste et les stratégies fractionelles en U.R.S.S., 1935-1936," in *Recherches*, no.32/33, September 1978, pp. 249-275; "Société et appareil d'Etat soviétiques (1936-1938): contradictions et interférences," in *Annales E.S.C.*, no 4, July-August 1979, pp. 843-867; "Staline en 1938: apogée du verbe et défaite politique," in *Libre*, no. 6, 1979, pp. 99-164; "Qui lit la *Pravda*, comment et pourquoi?," in *Le débat*, no. 2, June 1980, pp. 82-91; "Du Goulag de la littérature à l'histoire de la politique pénale en U.R.S.S., 1933-1953," in *Critique politique*, No. 7/8, 1981, pp. 3-68; "Conflits sociaux, luttes politiques et gestion industrielle en U.R.S.S., 1934-1941," paper read at the University of Birmingham in June 1981 at a conference on Soviet industry and working class between the two world wars; "U.R.S.S.: une système demeuré réfractaire à toute réforme," in *Le Monde diplomatique*, August 1981, pp. 7-8; "La grande faiblesse de la productivité en Union soviétique," *Ibid.*, June 1982, pp. 20-21; "Uneasy Alliance: Soviet Penal Policy and Judiciary Apparatus in the 1930s," working paper for the third annual conference of the National Seminar on Russian Society in the Twentieth Century, Philadelphia, Jan. 1983; *Phénomènes et réalités staliniens — Tensions sociales et conflits politiques en U.R.S.S., 1933-1953.*, forthcoming. *Telos* no. 41 and 46 published two of these pieces in translations not as precise as one would have wished.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these mechanisms implied. My purposes to apprehend some features of the social relations of the period and of the ways they were reproduced and mediated, and to try to appraise the place which their stage of development gives to the 1930s in the *longue durée* of Soviet history.

As for the evolution of the social structure between the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the war, certainly nothing defines it better than the consolidation of the position of the ruling elite and of the middle strata of the regime, as well as the recognition and sometimes even the ostentatious display of these phenomena by official practice and discourse. Although the social status of the cadres and even leading functionaries of the Party-State remains rather indecisive throughout the years of the New Economic Policy and although the rapid promotion of people of working-class origin and the noisy exaltation of proletarian virtues that characterize the beginning of industrialization seem to authorize certain specialists to speak of a "cultural revolution," the very offical respect with which the regime begins to treat practically all bosses from 1939 on, the distinctions and privileges granted quite spectacularly to the administrative and technical cadres of the national economy and, especially, the definitive elimination of any real possibility of control over the activities of all the hierarchic superiors by their subordinates, even at the Party's lowest strata, leave no doubt as to the weight which superiors and dignitaries of all types are gaining in a relatively short lapse of time.

The strategy of industrialization imposed at the end of the 1920s and the collectivization of the agriculture enabled the Party-State to take charge of the actual management of the essential activities of society and to increase its role and authority compared with the prior period, and tended to dictate and institutionalize modes of action and behavior that distinguished the representatives of the regime more sharply than during the N.E.P. era when their functions and privileges were at times openly contested. Often inseperable from manifestly violent and unpopular measures, these modes of action and behavior did not inevitably assure an efficient, regular and controllable functioning of governmental and economic mechanisms. They could, however, guarantee the primacy of the Party-State's initiatives and enable the cadres to keep their posts or to advance within the apparatus. In fact, they offered possibilities for concealing failures and shortcomings, for not performing unpleasant tasks, and for deflecting official measures from their original purpose by using them for the personal profit of the responsible functionaries, all this while pretending to implement them faithfully.

Toward the mid-1930s, all sectors and all hierarchic levels of the apparatus became the scene of actions and counter-maneuvres incessantly launched, parried, and relaunched in order to ban ineffective, unpopular and disorderly practices and to punish their prepetrators, and to deflect punitive expeditions onto scapegoats or their initiators. But this virtual civil war, the so-called "Great Purge," turned out to be far from able to put an end to this kind of prac-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tice, although it brought drastic changes of personnel in the ruling apparatus. The affirmation of the dominant role of the Party-State thus implied modes of action and behavior which were inherent in the normal functioning of governmental and economic mechanisms and which could not be expunged, even by eliminating the vast majority of officials who habitually practiced them.

It seems revealing that, despite a quickly abandoned attempt in the early 1950s, no purge comparable to those of the 1930s was launched to change the officials' typical modes of behavior, although these have not lost their unpopularity and disorganizing impact to this day, (but the brutality which was customary to them during and after collectivization has substantially diminished —especially in the last twenty years). This relative tolerance shows that, even though it is necessary to combat the most dangerous manifestations of the apparatus's practice, starting with the end of the thirties there is an ever greater tendency to recognize that this practice is indispensable in order to maintain the State-Party's distinction, and that this latter's pre-eminence must be guaranteed by all means, even at the cost of aggravated tensions, discontent and conflicts, which the cadres tend to provoke within the apparatus as well as between its representatives and the rest of society.

For, apart from the obvious impossibility of eliminating the inefficient, irregular and violent aspects of the administrative and economic mechanisms' functioning, the abandoning of radical efforts to discipline recalcitrant officials was necessitated by the increasingly open disobedience of the masses and the need to counter this by closing the ranks of the apparatus, which internal conflicts had severely disorganized. The often excessive measures to ensure order and discipline had been provoked partly by the masses' resistance to the policy of the regime. Under these circumstances the renunciation to energetic actions against the implementation of such measures signals all the more clearly the official recognition of the cadres' preeminence and the tacit ratification of most of their management methods because it coincides in time with the vigorous disciplinary measures against the working masses that mark the last pre-war years and will begin to be moderated only after 1950.

The dangers represented by the working people's unruliness are made clear by the firmness of these measures and especially by the priority which tends to be given to them, even over the quest for more controllable means to guarantee the functioning of the apparatus and lessen social tensions than during the 1930s. Implemented and perfected about at the same pace as the conflicts provoked by collectivization and industrialization are getting exacerbated, the Party-State's repressive measures certainly have a crushing impact and gradually prevents open manifestation of the masses' resistance. But the systematic and often excessive reprisals with which acts of revolt are often punished in the early 1930s merely force popular opposition to express itself more covertly, in patterns of daily behavior and in the spontaneous refusal to cooperate with the apparatus. The sometimes draconian measures taken by the authorities throughout the 1930s, 40s, and 50s to fight these behaviors and this refusal are a clear indication, as the alarm-signal by which their rec-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rudescence can serve to close the ranks of the apparatus, that their political impact is not at all underestimated. In general, it is a more or less instinctive and surreptitious sabotage of the fundamental relations between the Party-State and the rest of society, which are established and maintained through the relationships of work and ownership imposed by the regime.

Normally, these relationships are not created without intermediary between the regime and the ordinary working people. They materialize above all in institutions and techniques of administration, of material production and distribution, and of cultural and scientific action, whose functioning and development imply the expertise of more or less specialized agents. The great majority of them not having access to the political bodies where the strategies for applying these institutions and techniques are decided upon, the specialists of their management are often compelled to carry out decisions and projects that are not necessarily compatible with their social and professional aspirations, while their work tends to transform them into representatives of the Party-State and to oppose them to the masses. One of the most remarkable changes brought by the 1930s is certainly the official recognition of the importance and particular status of this middle stratum, the "intelligentsia," in 1938, and even its assimilation to the leaders by the regime's discourse starting with this date.

In speaking of the Party cadres, during the 1920s and at the beginning of industrialization their unimpeachably proletarian origins were customarily stressed, while after 1938 their level of education and diplomas were cited in their praise. On the other hand, whereas for a long time it seemed as if the leaders' style in dressing was supposed to symbolize that they belonged to the people, the photographs of high dignitaries in workers' jacket or peasant's shirt became more and more seldom in the newspapers from the last pre-war years, so that toward the end of the 1940s less and less pictures in workman's blues were published, even of Stakhanovists and elite kolkhoz peasants, and more and more in suit-and-tie, attributes of the bureaucrats and conservative intelligentsia on the caricatures of the 1920s and 30s.

The respect which began to be paid to specialists toward the end of the thirties, in fact emphasized the importance which the Party-State placed on institutions and techniques of control and socialization which the regime needed, as well as on the expertise which their management implied. But if the non-working-class extraction of a number of cadres tended to justify official suspicions as to the eventually hostile intentions which could motivate one or another professional act frowned upon by the authorities approximately until 1938, the spectacular "rehabilitation" of the "intelligentsia" did not necessarily mean that the ways of using institutional and technical means to make people and to ensure order and discipline were not charged with potential conflicts between the Party-State and the middle stratum. Far from it: the noisy campaigns to fight the often more imaginary than real adversaries of the genuinely "Soviet" techniques and sciences and the tumultuous controversies about supposedly "bourgeois" tendencies in academic and cultural

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

circles during the second half of the forties show that these means did not bend without resistance to the Party-State's political needs and that their expert implementation could entail the danger of alienating the specialists from the regime.

The contradiction between the political use and the nature of the institutional and technical instruments of control and socialization is, basically, one of the central phenomena of Soviet history of the 1930s. It appears perhaps nowhere as distinctly as in the problems of the mediation of the system's fundamental social relations through economic policy. In fact, precisely collectivization and industrialization, the process of creating the means of economic control, tend to prevent these from being capable of establishing and reproducing by primarily economic means the socio-political relations which the regime implies. Eminently political enterprises, collectivization and industrialization had above all to guarantee the primacy of Party-State's initiatives in the essential activities of society, and certainly nothing better characterizes their implementation than the sometimes bitter opposition of vast segments of the population and the preponderance of administrative and even military and police measures. It was more or less inevitable that the product of these measures would bear the mark of the violent and confused circumstances of the veritable civil war from which it stemmed, all the more since one of the main objectives pursued by the Party-State was precisely to prevent the development of socio-political relations defined by the internal mechanisms of a modern economy and capable of extricating themselves from this monopoly.

Under these circumstances, the economic means of social management proved to be not only far from capable of translating the Party-State's policy into facts, but they were sometimes such as to make specialists of their manipulation and certain producers dangerously independent, especially in agriculture.

Thus, even if they did not cease trying to impose an effective economic framework, of which the reorganizations and reforms envisaged during the Stakhanovist campaign were a typical example, the impossibility of instrumentalizing the mechanisms of industrial and agricultural production in order to maintain the Party's political monopoly left no alternative to administrative and even police interventions. The effect was, however, merely to close the ranks of the economic cadres and specialists, to reinforce their attachment to professional and corporatist values, and to incite them to circumvent the most restrictive measures or to try to deflect them.

Whereas this reaction merely generalized the application of managment methods alien to economic mechanisms as such and increasingly prevented their functioning from being regulated by financial means or by the real material needs of the consumers, the producers and the state, they seemed to justify the administrative and punitive zeal with which both cadres and the masses were habitually harassed. The proliferation of disciplinary and penal sanctions nonetheless entailed the danger of making the relations between

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political management and the rest of society immediate as well as that of rendering the nature of these relations too obvious, although the manner of administering these measures could obscure the reasons and the effects of their implementation. Local and institutional circumstances and the particular interests of the officials in function of which these sanctions tended to be taken, amplified, weakened, or sabotaged, were very often extremely specific and unrecognizable not only by those who were exposed to them, but also by those who had ordered or halted their application. The complicated set of measures, counter-measures and their effects was one of the typical manifestations of the modes of action and behavior of the officials, a phenomena inherent in the daily running of the governmental mechanisms, which made practically impossible to regulate the use of the only means of socio-political control which was entirely at the Party-State's disposal.

Thus, if the disorders immanent in the apparatus's functioning made inevitable to take very energetic disciplinary and punitive measures against any official suspected of violations at all levels of the hierarchy, the fact that their administration had to be entrusted to the very same agencies whose operation was to be corrected did not at all guarantee that they would be implemented adequately. Quite the contrary, the systematic application of punitive measures within the apparatus implied the risk of unleashing a kind of war of all against all within its own ranks — a war which the officials would wage with all the means which their functions put at their disposal, and most of which were perfectly legal, as was the case in 1937 — while the necessity to guarantee the Party-State's political monopoly made obviously impracticable every attempt to resort to control-mechanisms independent of it. The control which the masses would have exercised through the *soviets* was at any rate just a fiction, from the very beginnings of the regime. The collective bodies of the Party were equally endowed with a more or less restricted right to control the activities of the leading functionaries, including the primary organizations where ordinary members were often in the majority. But nothing characterizes the effective control of this type of collective organisms than the extreme skill of those among them that were comprised of cadres to subvert perhaps the majority of disciplinary initiatives which they ought to have taken against their members between 1935 and 1938, while the open manifestation of social antagonisms within the Party was to stop an excessively successful mobilization of the rank-and-file in 1937.

No doubt, these are the circumstances that explain the notable diminution of the role and prerogatives of the Party cells and committees at all hierarchical echelons, after 1938, as well as the political marginalization of ordinary members, despite a remarkable recruitment starting in the last post-war years. Being after this period merely an instrument of socialization and selection for the grass-roots militants and for subalternate cadres, the Party becomes in principle obliged to submit to the orders and actions of leading and control organs acting normally behind closed doors and very far away, even from members and officials occupying posts at relatively high levels. Little adapted

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to make understandable the strategy which the apparatus must turn into facts, these sometimes quasi-military orders and police actions have a tendency to render the Party-State's policy less and less comprehensible, while its application will no less than before be a function of local and institutional circumstances and of the particular interests of the cadres. Thus the reproaches of the 1930s will be repeated during the swiftly aborted attempt in 1952 to launch a new frontal attack in order to put an end to the official's typical modes of action and behavior.

If, in the 1930's, the institutional and economic mediation of socio-political relations could function only by resorting to means quite remote from industrial and agricultural production, mediation through the regime's officially proclaimed norms, values and rules also required methods of dissuasion and persuasion very foreign to ideology, culture or education. The survival of the terminology in which the Party militants and cadres had conceived revolutionary changes during the twenties obviously tended to make it hard to understand the realities which emanated from the upheavals of the following decade's first years. Attachment to this terminology as well as to norms and values inherent in it is, however, very revealing, since it shows the disinclination to adapt, however slightly, the conceptual framework and the hallowed references of the regime's representatives to a daily experience which they were less and less able to understand.

Despite their notable inability to seize everyday realities, it was more and more inevitable that the hesitation to draw official discourse and imagery closer to the system's real problems changed into a more or less instinctive refusal, since it was impossible to call certain urgent questions by their real names and bring them to light without questioning the regime's *raison d'etre* as such. In fact, the contradistinction between the political use and the immanent nature of the institutional and technical instruments of economic socialization was as undesirable a subject of reflection, discussion, and especially controversies and eventual struggles as the conflicts provoked by the officials' patterns of action and behavior or the masses' reactions and inherent in the normal functioning of relations of domination and subordination. Thus nothing perhaps shows more clearly the real importance and the stakes of the socio-political tensions and antagonisms with which these phenomena were charged than the camouflaged way of designating the repercussions which had to be fought as problems *a priori* alien to the nature of the system. The image of the carrier of absolute evil evolves from that of the "enemy of the people" of bourgeois or *kulak* origin, from the militant of old defeated opposition movements who is a disorganizer of the Party-State and inclined to take harsh measures against ordinary working people and, in any case, quite easily identifiable as an official or even leading functionary within the apparatus, all the way to the sketchy portrait of a "secret agent" in the service of foreign powers and practically impossible to locate in the social hierarchy, which imposed itself quite definitively during the last months of 1937. Significantly, the stages of this transformation follow faithfully the development, the crises

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the abandonment of the attempts to appeal to the Party's collective organism to end the regime's disorders.

While the difficulties of seizing the system's intrinsic maladies offered many possibilities to the true targets of the purge-campaigns to deflect in all directions the crusades launched against "enemies" of all kinds, the exaltation of officially ideal virtues proved to be hardly less problematic. It was not easy, indeed, to explain the norms and values inherent in a socio-political order whose regular reproduction could run counter to the interests of vast segments of the population as well as of the ruling apparatus. Under these conditions, a standardized frame of reference was absolutely necessary, and severe sanctions had to be imposed on those who seemed not to respect it, though these references had obviously little to do with everyday realities and seemed to lend themselves readily to all sorts of conjectural and arbitrary applications. The remarkable uncertainty as to the sacrosant norms and formulae until the end of the thirties had tragic consequences for a great number of "deviationists" of all kinds, who became victims of police persecutions.

1938, however, marks an important date in the development of the ideological mediation of the Soviet regime's fundamental socio-political relations. From the last months of this year, a treasury of *par excellence* canonical precepts was available, the *Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)*, and until the mid-fifties it was very often enough to master just the key concepts of its famous 4th chapter to have an adequate and authorized vocabulary to express oneself on almost all phenomena of the system. Even if it was not absolutely out of the question after this date to "unmask" the more or less imaginary hostile intentions of persons "guilty" of "theoretical" errors, this book symbolizes the confirmation as the only mental instrument admitted by the regime of an offical conceptual framework and discourse, more and more fixed and practically liturgical. A corollary to this canonization of a mode of representation almost completely cut off from reality was the practice of obsessively invoking just one universal legitimatory reference, the ritual habit of appealing on every subject to the infallible genius of a Supreme Leader, capable of foreseeing, deciding and realizing everything — and this precisely when it had to be admitted tacitly in the everday practice that the internal mechanisms of the system were unmanageable. But if the Leader was omnipresent in discourse and in the canonical dogmas, he became hardly more manifest during the last half-dozen years of the period which bears his name than the omnipotence attributed to him and due to which he was supposed to master the obviously chaotic functioning of the Party-State.

The post-revolutionary period, the 1920s were, in many regards, years of more or less limited but relatively open choices as to the means of establishing and reproducing the fundamental socio-political relations of the new regime and as to the Party-State's role within the system. The N.E.P. policy translated accurately this ambiguity and the resulting uncertainties, even if the circumstances under which it was decided, at the summits of the Party-State, to end this policy — a relative weakening of the apparatus's grip on the rest of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

society — show how restricted the number of options was and the nature of those that were really conceivable. For these circumstances characterize marvelously the determinative importance of the Party-State's strategic goals, as early as the 1920s, though the instruments of socio-political control at its disposal during this epoch made it incomparably less equal to the task of realizing them than after it had taken definitive charge of the everyday management of most essential activities of the population through collectivization and industrialization.

The takeover of the national economy and the annihilation of one of the last bases of resistance, the small peasant propriety, concluded a long process of integrating within one sole apparatus the management of practically all activities that could influence the system's reproduction and guaranteed the primacy of the Party-State's initiatives in almost all important areas of social life. Far from making the regime's functioning predictable and controllable, the political monopoly and the need to guard it tended to make uncontrollable both those who were supposed to represent and defend it, and the relations which these latter were supposed to maintain with the rest of society. Thus Soviet history of the 1930s can be understood as the history of quite unproductive attempts to subject the reproduction and mediation of the system's fundamental socio-political relations to an effective control capable of assuring both the supremacy of the Party-State and social peace.

The 1930s, the period of appropriation and expropriation by the Party-State of the principle means of control and socialization, were marked by the often rudimentary or nascent state of these instruments and especially by the affirmation of their eminently political character and by their tendency to put systematically in question the relations of subordination and domination within the elite as well as between it and other social categories. This phenomenon was understood little enough, and became less and less comprehensible within the conceptual framework which the regime had to impose, while the outcome of the vigorous attempts to remedy the system-inherent dysfunctionings showed clearly that they could not be eliminated completely without undermining the dominant positions of the apparatus. Given the persistence of the problem, the hypothesis is perhaps not far-fetched that the weakened intensity, since the 1950s, of the formerly murderous intra-Party conflicts stems probably less from the certainly often remarkable development of institutions and techniques of socio-political control than from the Party-State's capacity to adapt to the chronic disorders of the regime's internal mechanisms.

From this point of view, the 1930s are the first stage of a long apprenticeship, extremely costly in human values, the first typical cycle of a long series of conflicts which persisted even recently, although under considerably changing forms and involving less and less victims in the course of time. Passing quite rapidly from very energetic attempts to subject the system's functioning to the ideal and unavowed rules of reproduction of the Party-State's dominant positions to an unstable but necessary compromise within its ranks

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to save the apparatus's unity of organization and action *vis-à-vis* the rest of society, the tumultuous cycle of events between the years 1934 and 1939 is a model we rediscover at the heart of the Kafkaesque consequences in the 1940s or of the failure to launch a new edition of the so-called "Great Purge," in 1953, as well as behind the experiments of administrative and economic reforms which mark Soviet history since the end of the 1950s. Despite the notable transformation of the terrain of the confrontations and the remarkable diminution of the importance of the means of open coercion they entail, especially among the elite, what is at stake, the Party-State's predominance in the system, has not changed at all. The 1930s is the epoch of the first clear manifestation of the irreducible difficulties of using the instruments created by collectivization and industrialization, in a way which would avoid social and political conflicts — this is probably the trait that gives those years a specific place in the *longue durée* of Soviet history.

The
Sociological
Quarterly

Volume 23, Number 4 / Autumn 1982

FARBER: *Systematic Generation of Theory in Family Sociology*
ROCHBERG-HALTON: *Situation, Structure, and the Context of Meaning*
HARTNAGEL: *Modernization, Female Roles and Female Crime: A Cross-National Investigation*
TURNER and TURNER: *Gender, Race, Social Class, and Self-Evaluations among College Students*
BAILEY: *Post-Functional Social Systems Analysis*
HOELTER: *Race Differences in Selective Credulity and Self-Esteem*
CHANG, LORENZ, and YAMANAKA: *Modernity and Fertility Preference in Taiwan*
FLORA: *From Sex Roles to Patriarchy: Recent Developments in the Sociology of Women*
WARDWELL: *The State of Medical Sociology*

Annual Subscription Rates: Individuals, $12.00; Institutions, $18.00; add $2.00 for foreign postage. Checks must be in U.S. funds. Mail subscriptions to:
Department of Sociology
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
Carbondale, Illinois 62901

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Crises in Eastern Europe:

THE END OF NOMENCLATURE?* A CONVERSATION WITH HENRYK SZLAJFER

QUESTION: Could you describe briefly the government's and the independent workers' movement's proposals on self-management?

SZLAJFER: The basic difference can be briefly formulated as follows: Who should own the enterprises? The self-management agencies, or the government together with them? Should the director be subordinated in part to self-management, but mainly to state authorities? The struggle today hinges on these three points. But there are also important questions dealing not only with the rights of self-management, but restrictions to which enterprises qualify as economic units. This means that there is a demand to abolish the system of instructions and administrative orders and to realize the central economic plan through economic mechanisms themselves and not via telephone instructions.

QUESTION: Do you mean economic mechanisms?

SZLAJFER: Yes, but with the reservation that this does not apply to a few fundamental investments that must be made by the state. The state will still have the right to create new enterprises and economic branches and to make strategic investments. Of course, that should be supervised by parliament and not be like today when the government chairman's office has a free hand in making new investments. This has had the catastrophic effect that, in practice, almost all central plans approved by parliament are thereby broken. Secondly, there is the problem of so-called nomenclature. The subordination of the director to the state and the naming of the director by the state means that the whole system of appointments is based on clique criteria that have nothing to do with qualifications. The general qualification of our top managers is very, very low. A genuine self-management that has the right to name its director will be able to hold an open competition for the director the enterprise needs. The government is trying to impose a solution in which such self-management can be established for small- and medium-sized enterprises, but in which the approximately 200 largest enterprises would have only limited self-management — which means simply to exclude all large industry from self-management. The movement will not be able to accept this. If this happens, it will mean the destruction of the self-management movement. We then will have no power. A further demand, which is being strongly discussed today, is parliamentary reform, i.e., the right to institute a second chamber, the self-management chamber, in parliament. However, on this question, discussion is still undeveloped — till now that is just one solution and there is still no concrete program as to how this chamber should function.

QUESTION: Would this demand be synonymous with breaking the monopoly of the party or the National Front to nominate candidates for the Sejm, the Polish parliament?

SZLAJFER: No, it is a question of a second chamber that would deal mainly — if not exclusively — with economic and social questions. It will not be the highest authority in the land. It should have the right to discuss economic decisions made by the first chamber of parliament and probably also to protest against them and to lodge a veto.

*Originally published in *Gegenstimmen*, 6 (December 1981), pp. 10-13. Translated by David J. Parent. Henryk Szlajfer is a Solidarity expert in the FSO factory in Warsaw — the plant that produces the Fiat-Polski — which employs more than 20,000 people. He is also an active member of the "work group for a supra-regional initiative of the Cooperative of Workers' Councils," the so-called "Lublin Group." The conversation, with a collaborator of *Gegenstimmen*, took place at the end of August 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

QUESTION: The delegates to this chamber would be the delegates of the regional self-management councils?
SZLAJFER: Discussion of this has not yet begun. It is conceivable that the parliamentary representatives of this chamber will be elected on the basis of self-management groups of large enterprises and of the regional self-management committees.
QUESTION: What kind of division of labor could there be between Solidarity as a trade union movement and the self-management committees?
SZLAJFER: Within the factories, that is clear. Solidarity as a union should concentrate on the workers' rights, on all questions that have to do with wages and salaries, the bonus system, living and working conditions, safety measures. Self-management, on the other hand, represents workers as owners of the enterprise. Solidarity should monitor the activities of self-management as it would a factory owner — whether he meets the workers' demands for better wages and working conditions. Self-management will deal mainly with the actual management of the enterprises, for the enterprise to earn a sufficient profit under the given circumstances with the given price structure, to increase investments, etc. This kind of natural division of labor is quite clear. To characterize the interrelation of the two movements, the following point is also important: In the current stage, the self-management movement is not subordinate to Solidarity, but it can be built only through Solidarity, by its help and defense. There is no other power in the country that is interested in genuine self-management. Their collaboration is therefore very strong in practice, and must be so. After a few months of hesitation, Solidarity now has also given its full support to the self-management movement.
QUESTION: Aren't there also economic problems connected with the introduction of self-management in Poland? Such a system could favor certain economic sectors or enterprises, which could make gains within the framework of the present system of investments and it could be a disadvantage to others, but from the social standpoint — as far as the need of goods produced — it could be very important. If workers in this system work only for the profit of their own enterprise, will it not be difficult to establish a balance between the sectors in the national plan?
SZLAJFER: What national plan?
QUESTION: Surely there will continue to be some kind of national plan?
SZLAJFER: Yes, but today there is no national plan.
QUESTION: Good. Let's put it this way: Is there in self-management the awareness that the authorities' central deciding power must be replaced by a new national plan?
SZLAJFER: That there has been no central plan at all is an important point. There is none today, and there has been none for the last 70 years. What we have is a centralized system of administration and not a central plan. Of course, this problem is one of the most difficult: that, so to speak, today the starting position of a few factories is better than that of others. To change that, we must first change the whole price system. Secondly, we must also develop a system of how the central organs — i.e., the administration — could, by means of the budget, balance the negative incomes that arise, for example, in the pharmaceutical industry, based on the difference between the production costs and the low, subsidized consumer prices. Another example is public transportation, which is also subsidized by the state, which in the majority of cases means, under the present price system, that losses and not profits must be booked. But that some enterprises work with a deficit is no argument against them or against the workers employed there; losses in this kind of enterprises should be covered by the state,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

precisely because there is a social reason for it. That is in Poland a very obvious process — but it was overused or misused by putting on the budget list enterprises for which it was not necessary. An example is the Polish steel industry. Today, it is operating at a loss. The reason is that, under the policy of long-term investments, the price of iron and steel is very low, i.e., it was intentionally kept low by the government and does not cover production costs — thus, steel plants register losses. At the point where we now stand, investments must be limited; we must also hold down wasteful use of materials. This means simply that the price of steel must be raised in order to create a negative incentive for other enterprises in the misuse and excessive use of steel. The same is true of coal, where the price today is between 400 and 800 Zloty per ton, whereas it costs between 2000 asnd 6000 Zloty to mine a ton of coal. While all mines are operating at a loss, there is, on the other hand, a tendency in the whole economy to waste coal. In this sense, we spoke of the fact that the introduction of self-management must be connected most closely with a very complex and deep economic reform, since otherwise all these contradictions of the present system are only intensified by enterprise self-management. Obviously, when economic mechanisms compel a wasteful use of raw materials, energy, etc. — and they actually do this — then the mere replacement of the director by self-management does not change the situation.

QUESTION: Does this mean that it is not enough to develop plans on the level of enterprises or even regions?

SZLAJFER: We say that self-management must be linked with economic reform. We have put together and disseminated something like the ten commandments for self-management committees. The first commandment is: hands off the management of enterprises before economic reform begins! The self-management committees should at this moment concern themselves with the forms of waste in an enterprise; they should demand of the director that idle machines be repaired, or that the work-place be provided with this or that equipment; but they should not today go so far as to take over the management of the enterprise themselves. For, under current circumstances, that could compromise the whole concept of self-management; in factories operating at a loss workers will then hold self-management responsible for these losses.

QUESTION: There is a second great problem here. You say that self-management must be linked with a basic economic reform. That means a change of the investment structure, which would also result in a shift of work forces into more profitable sectors. Thus, there can be layoffs. Should self-management take responsibility for this?

SZLAJFER: That is one of the most difficult problems. It does not affect production workers: the main problem is with the management staffs. Now there is, for example, the demand to liquidate the majority of so-called branch ministries and finally create a single economic and trade ministry. Within the enterprises there is also a surplus of personnel in management. In many mines the ratio of productive workers to management is 1 to 2. In a medium-sized mine employing 6000 to 7000 people, about 1000 would have to be fired from the management staff. Some of these people could simply change jobs — there are great shortages of workers in the service sector in all large cities. The engineers in management could be retrained and reincorporated into the production process. In large cities and in big industry that should be no problem. The difficulties lie in small industry outside big cities.

QUESTION: Now what is the relation between union asnd self-management on this question?

SZLAJFER: Of course, self-management will be interested in rationalizing the employment of workers. It will be the duty of Soliarity to defend those people who must

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be laid off. This conflict cannot be solved by abstract considerations. The self-management committees must develop a system for changing professional qualifications together with the union. A second point that is being discussed today has to do with people who are five or six years from retirement — especially those in trades that are harmful to health should, if they want to, be able to retire early. Thus, part of the workers could be removed from the market. The next step would be to develop a system of job placement. Our labor offices no longer function as such, they recognize enterprise needs very badly. Even today, there are branches in which there is a strong demand for workers — in modern industries, in the energy industry, or in the food industry. Finally, a system must be developed for transferring people from enterprises that are shut down or reduced in force to other enterprises. But the problem will still remain of some people who are left unemployed. For them, employment must either be found outside big cities, which means reducing the number of those who farm on the side. (About two million people who have a piece of land also work in a factory.) Through agricultural credit policy, one could create incentives for people to work exclusively as farmers. This would free at least half a million jobs for other people.

QUESTION: Would you agree that open unemployment on a large scale for a long period of time could endanger the entire reform project?

SZLAJFER: Yes. For us, this means to stress that Solidarity as a union should prevent the government from carrying on this kind of employment policy. We must compel the government now to think about how to create new jobs by economic means.

QUESTION: Won't productive workers also have to be released if investments decrease, e.g., in the steel sector, and prices therefore rise and less steel is produced?

SZLAJFER: Not absolutely, for that will be mainly a stimulus for enterprises to save steel and change technologies. Today steel is so cheap that a great deal of it can be wasted. The numbers speak for themselves. We use steel about on the same scale as France or England, but about 25 to 30 percent of it is simply waste. For the same product in Poland about two or three times as much steel is used as in other countries. That is why our machines are so much heavier. There is currently no restraining mechanism for enterprises, compelling them to be thrifty in their use of materials.

QUESTION: Nonetheless, for the sector that produces the raw material that is wasted in other fields, this would mean a cut in production and therefore a reduction of production workers.

SZLAJFER: Not for the mines, not for energy production, not for raw material in general. For steel, such a problem can arise. But the majority of steel workers are skilled technicians, who can easily find employment in other branches of industry. Something else that alleviates the situation is that most of the steel industry is concentrated in Silesia where there is no problem finding a job, for instance in the raw material sector.

QUESTION: In closing, let's go back to the political implications which you see for the self-management movement. Let us assume that economic reform is carried out in connection with the establishment of self-management organizations on the enterprise and regional level. That would obviously mean that the power of decision of the central authority, as it exists today, will be sharply curtailed. Don't you believe that this is a challenge which the state apparatus cannot accept, since it threatens its very existence?

SZLAJFER: Of course, that is a challenge to the existing state apparatus. As for the question of whether it can accept such solutions, I am not sure, for earlier no one thought it could accept Solidarity, i.e., an independent union. On the other hand, I think that the question of self-management will in the coming weeks and months become a main occasion for a possible confrontation between workers and government.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For some demands are — this can be said openly — directed against the monopoly by the state and party apparatus, especially top management, in controlling the economy. And this is the backbone of the party's and the state apparatus' control over society. The state apparatus' only chance would be to smash the entire self-management movement and to try to reintroduce the old centralized system of economic management. The hopes of such a policy are quite bleak; it cannot be accepted. And more importantly, to smash the self-management movement means to drive Solidarity back into a corner — that would lead to a direct confrontation between the union and the government. I believe that the government will try instead to find some kind of accommodation. Some implications of the whole movement, its further consequences, are surely political. But we say that we are fighting only for keeping promises anchored in this ideology and in the constitution. That is why this is such a hard nut for the government to crack. It can hardly claim that this is an anti-socialist movement.

QUESTION: What are the main differences from the Yugoslav experience of self-management?

SZLAJFER: First, there is no Solidarity in Yugoslavia. That is decisive for all other differences. Secondly, we in Poland do not reject — as was the case in Yugoslavia in the 1960s and early 1970s — the state authorities' right to make a few important central investments. We do not reject the concept and the necessity of a central plan. What we reject is the method by which the central plan is produced and realized. But in Poland the central plan will be realized only with difficulty. Not because anyone would oppose it, but because it would be a fiction. Next year we should try to concentrate on a few programs for a few sectors of the economy, among them food, the health system, mining, raw materials and the export industries, rather than building a single central plan. To set up a central plan under present conditions means that one would have just a sheet of paper. The economy is so disorganized that we need time to bring it back into shape.

THE EXTENT OF THE DEFEAT*

by Paul Thibaud

The entire history of Solidarity in the last year can easily be depicted as leading inevitably and logically to failure; its repression, the attempt to destroy it which has been taking place since December 13, 1981, can readily be portrayed as a return to normality, to the equilibrium point.

The whole strategy of the "self-limited" revolution was based on a certain confidence placed in the Communist Party. Not to want to change power but to control and reform it was a gamble on the rationality, the political capacity of the apparatus of the Polish United Workers Party, which was expected out of reasonableness, humaneness and patriotism, to play the game without being physically forced to do so, since there was no means to remove it and this was publicly acknowledged. Not futilely, it will be said, does one thus reach an impasse on power, and it will not be hard to show that because it culpably forgot essential force through unreasonable confidence in the adversary, Solidarity was locked in an illusory logic.

*Originally published in *Esprit* (March 1982), pp. 100-110. Translated by David J. Parent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Impossible Negotiation

From the first, when some affirmed that the Polish movement was a purely union movement, a control force whose only objective was to make a place for itself within the system of the "people's democracy," an agonizing question was rampant: what if the others do not, and cannot, accept the consequences of the invasion of an enormous foreign body into their system of power? In the text published in October 1980, Jacek Kuron was already worrying because he foresaw the "disintegration of the system"[1] by the intrusion of Solidarity. He drew a grave conclusion: the social movement ought to formulate and progressively apply an entire program of democratization, especially of economic reform — the only means of preventing a total collapse. Other Solidarity experts and militants since September 1980 worried about this tendency to organize the movement as a counter-power; for them the aim was not to overpower the government, but to limit it and compel it to reform itself.[2] This dilemma, already formulated, constantly marked Solidarity's action: to base everything on negotiation or to prepare for negotiation to fail.

The history of Solidarity since Gdansk 1980 was marked by the difficulty and even the impossibility of negotiating seriously. There was persistent oscillation *vis-à-vis* the functionaries of the apparatus between contempt and oversight on the one hand (not to see them, to delegitimate them, to pretend they did not exist) and on the other hand, the realistic acknowledgement of their prerogatives (the clause in the accords on the party's leading role in the state). In fact, neither of the two attitudes was possible: one could neither forget power nor consent to what it was; it would have been necessary to reform it by pressure and negotiation.

But from the first, the Solidarity militants felt that negotiation was a danger, a snare: one must never forget that one was dealing with men of bad faith. Even before Bydgoszcz's fundamental crisis over a minor incident, Karol Modzelewski put it very well: "If confrontation is truly inevitable, the whole problem is to know whether we should wait standing or on our knees.... If we show ourselves weak and hesitant, the confrontation is in ever greater danger of coming."[3]

These words contain the same logic of defiance which Krzysztof Pomian speaks of[4] and which was deeply anchored in the people. The movement's moderation, very real incidentally, could sometimes lead one to forget grievances against power, or to forget power, but with greater difficulty to come to an understanding with it. For their part, the rulers always saw to it that negotiation was a permament guerrilla warfare, a sequence of crises and reconciliations rather than a constructive process.

The deep desire to ignore power thus led Solidarity into a sort of introversion. The movement often tended to be preoccupied with itself rather than with the context in which it stood. The question of power did not cease to reappear as a repressed goal. Polish society was overjoyed at rediscovering itself and its identity independently of the power that held it captive; it tended to dream of a kind of vanishing of this power, setting greater importance on the discourse of self-affirmation than on the strategy of transformation, giving priority to being over action. Certainly, the sudden vogue of the self-management theme[5] marks, at least as much as does a desire for activity, for

1. Jacek Kuron, "Un chemin sans retour," in *Esprit* (January 1981), pp. 68-75.
2. Cf. article by Kazimierz Woycicki, in the same number.
3. "Une discussion dans Solidarityé," in a special issue on Poland of *L'Alternative*, p. 101. The discussion reported took place on March 8, 1980, at the National Commission of Solidarity.
4. K. Pomian, *Pologne, défi à l'impossible,* Editions ouvrières, p. 161.
5. This theme was not at all predominant at first. According to K. Pomian, the workers "do not want to create councils and become owners of the Polish economy. They want the roles to be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"taking things in hand," a dream of self-sufficiency, of independence from power. More precisely, the theme of self-management appeared when, toward spring, the desire to remain aloof from power changed into the desire to exclude this power from social and economic life.

This is manifested in October in the program adopted by Solidarity at the Gdansk congress.[6] This program develops a detailed plan for a "self-managed Republic" encompassing not only the economy but also the administrative and regional structures, cultural life, and even the state (22nd thesis: "We consider it useful to examine the necessity of creating a self-management organism at the highest level of state power"), without saying how such a project could be realized within the framework of the "relations in force in Europe" and of "international alliances," which the preamble to the program declared to accept out of a "sense of responsibility."

Of course, almost all factions of Solidarity rallied to self-management because, in view of the government's inaction and the economy's decay, it was necessary not to maintain a simply vindictive attitude, not to be a "union of sailors on a sinking ship," in Jacek Kuron's famous expression. But the elaboration of self-management projects also made it possible to bracket off the agonizing question: what to do with power?

Quite often experts and negotiators were Solidarity's scapegoats, notably after Bydgoszcz and after the compromise on self-management adopted in September but debated again during the second session of the Solidarity congress. The results and course of certain negotiations can certainly be discussed, but obviously, beyond this, the fact of negotiating imposed a certain reserve on the union. Hence Walesa's naive relief when at Solidarity's very last session he stated that he would no longer go the route of compromise: "I held on as far as Radom (the meeting of the presidium on December 3) and now I realize that I will go no further," and this says a lot about the difficulty of being "moderate." "You all believed I was a traitor."[7]

Under these conditions, the realization of the Gdansk program was becoming hard to envisage. It is at any rate typical that the procedures imagined for implementing it were those that contorted the established power: either a referendum by means of which the law on self-management would be modified, or an active strike to gradually take control of all economic and social life.[8] The normal procedure, the voting of a law by the Diet, succeeded in only one single case, the legalization of censorship.

The impossibility of negotiating marked the entire history of Solidarity. At first, this was the effect of the strategy of a government that was both impotent and ferociously attached to its prerogatives. Then very soon it was, as it were, internalized by the movement itself. The course of the discussions on a national agreement sums up this process. As proposed at the end of September by S. Olzowski, a meeting was organized between Glemp, Walesa and Jaruzelski, which legitimated the idea; then the government spread an interpretation which for Solidarity meant joining the old discredited post-war National Front on the same footing as puppet parties. The proposal of such a capitulation obviously reinforced in Solidarity the idea of an action tending, by a series of *faits accomplis*, to seize power from the party, and made the task impossible for those in charge of negotiations. After Gdansk 1980, as a result of government provocations and the "logic of defiance," negotiations between the union

well-defined: owners on one side, non-owners on the other" (quoted in *Pour la Pologne*, Editions du Seuil, p. 56).

6. Mostly translated in the special Poland number of *L'Alternative*, pp. 181-194. Complete French translation in a pamphlet of the University Presses of Lille.

7. Cf. *Libération*, "La dernière réunion de Solidarité," reissued in a special unnumbered edition of *Libération*, pp. 176-177.

8. Cf. Z. Kowalewski on Solidarity's projects for Lodz, *Le Monde*, Jan. 6, 1982.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the government could be held only clandestinely and were resented more and more by the grassroots membership as a threat of treason.

The terms of the problem could have truly changed only if the party had reformed, if it had acquired a certain democratic legitimacy.[9] But what legitimacy? The party could not claim to be the authentic representative of the Polish nation — a role occupied by Solidarity and the church. But it did have to be representative enough to assure the necessary mediation in relations with the Kremlin. It was being asked, on the one hand, to renounce its theoretical legitimacy, and on the other to become in practice acceptable, modest, and efficient.

One gets the feeling that the opposite happened. The party did not engage in a practical dialogue with Solidarity, which would have made it capable of governing; it did not even try to govern, to manage. On the contrary, it engaged in a relation of mimetic rivalry with the union movement (which, moreover, explains the conversion of old "liberals" such as Barcikowski, Jaruzelski's current right arm). The extraordinary congress of July 1981, with its exhibition of signs of democracy (confrontations, criticisms, secret ballots) was an imitation of Solidarity — a hollow imitation, though, for real decisions (the replacement of Kania) were not made there, and the mass of Poles remained indifferent to an affectation of liberalism in a party which exercises a dictatorship. This demonstration in fact resulted in further cutting off the party from the majority of society and removing it from the role it played.

It would have to be understood, moreover, why at the very moment when the official party was presenting such an edifying spectacle, the secret party, the real power, far removed from indiscreet eyes, was preparing to brutally retake its due. Pomian insisted on the fact that the Polish United Workers' Party stood the test which Solidarity meant better than might have been expected. The affectation of democracy which marked the preparation and proceedings of the congress plays a role in maintaining membership, at least until recently. But, on the other hand, the party's duplicity in surreptitiously preparing the murder of a democracy to which it pretended to be rallying enthusiastically compromises forever the essential articulation between the apparatus and the militants, necessary "to produce the appearance of the participation of the masses in the exercise of power. . . . to hide the division between those who collectively monopolize power and those who succumb."[10] The splitting off of the Party from its apparatus could be one of the prices paid to get out of the "dark period" when certain of its notable men felt threatened with a "moral lynching," as Jaruzelski says.

Vis-à-vis the party, the Solidarity militants thus had to act according to one of these contradictory imperatives which are said to cause schizophrenia: they had the *duty* to have *confidence*. The result was an ambiguous behavior in which the desire to revoke this heavy duty showed through the more one swore to remain faithful to it. More seriously, the (explicit or latent) antagonistic obsession with the party led Solidarity to lose contact with a part of Polish society which was suffering from the situation more than it was crushed by uncertainty and worry. No doubt, Solidarity's confidence declined a lot in the last months to the point that Jan Litynski exclaimed on August 1, at a round table published in *Rabotnik*,[11] "Solidarity is losing points and deceiving," B. Geremak noted: "The catastrophe is clear, it is engulfing us," while Z. Bjuak reported: "Our movement is weakening."

9. A question very clearly formulated by Aleksander Smolar in "L'ancien régime et la revolution en Pologne," in *Esprit* (June 1981).

10. K. Pomian, *Pologne, défi à l'impossible, op.cit.*, p. 56.

11. "De l'autogestion aux partis politiques," in *L'Alternative*, p. 166; reprinted in *Pour la Pologne*, p. 173.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the absence of possible useful dialogue, the circumvention of the question of power thus had negative and even discouraging consequences. That is why many advocated that Solidarity drop its defensive attitude. Thus, the advocates of the "active strike" and of a general strike probably had an accurate estimate of the situation. Adam Michnik told me on December 9 that there was no radicalization in the large enterprises. According to a poll taken in mid-November,[12] 26 percent of the inhabitants of Warsaw supported the proposals to suspend the right to strike proposed by the party.

Solidarity was evidently suffering from an inconsistent position: it had neither the means for effectively influencing power, nor was it a candidate for power. The image of the future given by the program approved by vote at Gdansk was not of a *different* power, but rather of a drastic diminution, of a socialization of power. Walesa reminded one of a preacher, a singer, an actor, a guru; never did he give the appearance of a possible head of government. Certainly, the absence of any other image of possible power played into Jaruzelski's hands. At the round table cited above, J. Kuron said: "Part of society could turn toward the idea of a strong government as if it were a ray of hope. We already see such a conception developing around Jaruzelski." Even an informed and non-conformist journalist (in September, in a letter to the party mailed after his exclusion) reflected the naiveté and extent of the illusions generally held on the subject: "General Jaruzelski's personal authority, honesty, and good will."[13]

The Jaruzelski myth was, as it were, engendered by the situation itself. One can even believe that the legitimacy granted to him (and through his person, to the Polish army) was like a transfer of the legitimacy they would have wanted to grant to Solidarity but which its own inefficiency (as a counter-power and also as a future power) deflected from it. In part, Jaruzelski was certainly, for certain imaginations whom the situation misled, the one who occupied in the government the position which Solidarity could not. In a way, 1982 repeats, in the form of a violent swindle, what was produced spontaneously in 1956 and 1970; a party leader's capitalization on the hopes aroused by a social movement — a transfer made easier, as Michael Heller said, by Solidarity's patriotic ideology. From Gdansk to December 13, the theme of an understanding between the components of national reality[14] accompanied the entire history of Solidarity. (Jaruzelski's achievement is a sort of hold-up on this common patrimony, made easier by Solidarity's error which, after having favored belief in a national compromise, abandoned this theme.)

Under these conditions, one can think that Jaruzelski could hope to force Solidarity to negotiate, and to accept hard conditions in the framework of a "national understanding." He had little to fear, apparently, from some offensives prepared by certain elements of Solidarity exasperated by the constant bad faith of the governmental partner. If he did not negotiate it is because for him to negotiate with Solidarity was above all precisely what had to be avoided. Contrary to what many people expected, in Poland at the time, military action was not a prelude to negotiation, but the burial of any idea of negotiation. A way of making Poles understand, as the general said with a straight face in his inaugural address, that "socialism is irreversible, that it must thus be accepted whatever one may think."

12. Published by Tygodnik Solidarnosc, quoted by J.Y. Touvais in *L'Alternative*, p. 197.
13. *Pour la Pologne, op.cit.*, p. 169.
14. Cf. in *Ouvriers 80* the picture of the negotiators (Walesa and Jagielski in the foreground) after signing the accords, separated by a long table that forms a continuous barrier, but united in singing the national anthem. "At last a Polish day . . . after 35 years," a worker comments.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What Chances Are Left?

Must one, then, conclude that Solidarity had poor leadership? Must one conclude that it was doomed, and thus senseless, from the first? Both conclusions are inadequate.

As to the tactics used, some variants can be imagined that would have made Jaruzelski's task more difficult when he decided to attack, that would not have favored the illusions which served him well in the first days. But the decision to use, then, destroy, Solidarity did not depend on that, nor even on the fact that the means to do so were found. Solidarity was at the mercy of Russia and of hostile violence. A movement for which taking power was forbidden could not neutralize the army and the police very long by the mere pressure of a social consensus opposed to repression.

As for the plan to compel the apparatus to share power, it seems certain that it was not realizable: the strategy of circumvention was an optimistic gamble on the adversary. Those who, like myself, believed in this strategy[15] ought to admit it. But it must be added that though the party could not be won, it is however not lost, the strategy employed still retains certain chances. If the attempt failed from a lack of the necessary accomplices, among the communist leaders, many reasons prevent us from proclaiming Jaruzelski the victor.

(1) The new power has no hold on society. One of its heralds, the minister Rakowski, admitted this in Frankfurt: "We do not see with whom we can re-establish the economic system" (*Liberation*, May 5, 1982). With Western aid hard to obtain and Soviet aid terribly insufficient, Jaruzelski's position is materially weak.

(2) Solidarity's stance has maintained the unity of the Polish nation: the movement's duration and quality of action won it important support abroad. These two reasons probably prevented a more brutal repression, particularly a direct intervention of the Soviet Union. Brezhnev and his Poles are sometimes said to be great strategists to have won at such slight costs. In fact, with reduced means, they brought in a victory of reduced scope. The reasons that held them back risk preventing them from striking a new blow if the prime minister declares that he has not been firm enough, for, as a policeman said to Radio Warsaw: "The enemy is not conquered, just paralyzed" (*Liberation*, January 13, 1982).

(3) The December 13 action repeats brutally the refusal to negotiate which was formerly implicit in the government's attitude. This end of non-reception ("It is time to say: enough!" to quote Jaruzelski) can be effective only if it engenders fear and discouragement in the populace. It is hard to obtain such a result against a movement as little centered on power as Solidarity. What was a weakness can here become a strength. More precisely, having dismantled the Solidarity organization, the government faces two dangers: first, terrorism due to anger, and second, the diffused unanimous resistance which its glaring bad faith justifies, against which the Church cautions. How to escape this dilemma without falling into what the regime most fears: negotiations in which the adversary would not be dishonored?

(4) The tactic endorsed by certain resistance leaders seems to be a long-range strategy. The statements of Bujak, fugitive leader of Mazowsze Solidarity, formerly not considered extremist, are valuable indications in this regard: "I see a real possibility of paralyzing the dictatorship or, at least, of forcing its liberalization, i.e., of compelling it to restore the rights of suspended organizations" (quoted in the *New York Times*, repeated in *Liberation*, January 18, 1982). Likewise Stefan Bratkowski: "You must transform numerical superiority — 99.5 percent to 0.5 percent — into a crushing

15. Cf. *Esprit*, January 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

moral advantage which will immobilize the night-sticks, tear gas and tanks" (*Le Figaro*, January 25, 1982). Such words, in my opinion, are not just ways of consoling oneself. They reflect real possibilities.

Because the Polish junta has caused tanks to roll in the streets does not mean that it has won the battle. The objective was, after having knocked out the enemy, to divide or subjugate him. The months-long confusion of a good part of public opinion, the favor which the army and its leaders enjoyed seemed to give good chances to the maneuver. Having paralyzed the movement by thousands of arrests, the government could select good interlocutors (Walesa, the church, moderates, intellectuals not engaged in Solidarity), those who could be made to capitulate. At the same time, the "realistic" (economic) part of the reform program would be implemented. The final result would thus be the ideal of the regime's liberals: a Kadarization, i.e., a cynical illusionless truce between the regime and the people.

This route is not being followed: the announcements of negotiations, the establishment's allegations that the state of war is over, that prisoners have been released, contacts renewed, etc., always turn out to be bluffs. There are more and more political detainees, purges of magistrates, police-raids, threats against the clergy; the party "liberals" are worried about vengeful tendencies... The question of relations with the individual peasants (the questions of crop deliveries) remains a matter of concern. The attitudes of riot and resistance are so widespread that after two months a new series of arrests was needed.

This flagrant hard-line (which could have become even harsher) is a solution only if, on a more or less long term, it destroys the adversary and makes him surrender. This is not being achieved. It is interesting to note, for example, that fear does not seem to have petrified the Poles, as numerous demonstrations showed, and that the police have not succeeded in arresting any of the Solidarity directors who have gone underground since December 13.

Of course, the brutal affirmation of the "irreversibility of socialism" is a very hard blow for a movement which, after having granted its adversary a "methodological" confidence, had too easily persuaded itself that this adversary was weak. Jaruzelski's "That's enough" does not annihilate the movement, but it deprives it of all political hope, at least for the moment, while awaiting the elaboration of a new strategy.

The current question is thus: can resistance continue for long without any idea of what can be obtained, simply in order to resist? In the Polish case, the answer to this question is not necessarily negative. If the public and civil strategy, the strategy of self-management, has left the movement exposed to police attacks, it also reduces the efficacy of this attack. First, because it relies on autonomy, on grassroots initiative, this method has prepared possibilities of resistance much stronger, in the long run, than the Czechoslovak strategy of political reform from above. Secondly, the church and Polish religious culture must be taken into account. Of course, the church will not furnish a political alternative, but popular piety is for the resistance a support beyond politics, a source of inspiration outside the world and its vicissitudes, an element of permanence and depth.

In early December Poland was politically at an impasse. It still is. Moreover, the burden is entirely on the rulers to get out of it, whereas before the military takeover Solidarity bore a part of this responsibility. That Solidarity has disappeared from the public scene does not unblock the situation. Until a new event, the match is stalemated between the government and Polish society, and neither can subjugate nor eliminate the other.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This impasse, which is laden with potential violence (the violence of famine, prison, rebellion, repression) makes it impossible to consider the matter settled. Poland is for the Soviet system a new example (after Afghanistan) of failure compensated by military force, a new example of socialism that does not even succeed in concluding a minimal practical compromise with the people (as in Czechoslovakia) where even resignation is not achieved and must be replaced by a certain amount of force. If these are placed alongside the economic and social failures in Russia itself (agriculture in a shambles, increased infant mortality), the entire system appears fragile, and moreover this is likely to encourage the Polish resistance.

Here we find the question of the attitude of Western countries, European ones in particular. The last ten years have produced fundamental changes that the governments have not really assimilated. First, public opinion finds it harder and harder to admit that there is ever anything new in the East, that democracy is structurally interdicted there, that the Helsinki accords are just scraps of paper. Secondly, Eastern Europe's commercial and financial dependence on the West has become very great at the end of 15 years of detente, investment and trade. The West has means of pressure which it still has not learned to use.

Solidarity's failure is due to its having tried a way toward liberty in a framework which provides none, where progress can be made only by force. Solidarity's means were too weak for this task, at least immediately. From the outside, we could have increased them; for example, the proposal of economic reform accompanied by some kind of Western financial aid would have reinforced Solidarity's position toward the *Nomenklatura*; for this, it would have been necessary to conceive something which no one yet had any idea of: a democratic strategy on a European plane. From not having dealt with, or even seen this problem, "free" Europe today shares in the Poles' failure. The difference is that they, for their part, tried everything that was possible. That is not the case with us.

A SOCIAL MOVEMENT: SOLIDARITY*

by F. Dubet, A. Touraine, M. Wieviorka

The anger felt in France against the Polish military coup was mixed with a lot of ignorance, mistakes and perhaps some projection of the image reflected by Solidarity. Some people saw in it nothing but a workers' movement fighting against Stalinist bureaucracy; others took it to mean a movement for the defense of freedoms; still others viewed it as national liberation. All this was in keeping with the ideological choices within the French political scene. This anger did not rise up without misunderstandings. It is useful to clarify, therefore, what this movement is in order to be faithful to the spirit of Solidarity which expressed itself clearly against case-hardened blockheads. Solidarity is an extraordinary movement in the history of this century. It is at one and the same time working class, democratic and national. It should also be shown how this social movement is, at the same time, a force for the beginning of the liberation of a society pitched against the state. In order to do so, one should recall the history of that movement with which all of Polish society has in the end become identified.

*Originally published in *Esprit*, March 1982, pp. 3-15. Translated by David Berger.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Class, Democracy, Nation

Solidarity's strength lies in that since August 1980, the movement has come to represent the working class, democratic principles and finally a not-completely sovereign nation within the Soviet empire. Solidarity draws its strength and the force of conviction of its militants from the complete integration of its three aspects that reinforce and reflect one another.

The class aspect is quite clear. Of all East European countries, Poland is the one with the strongest and most constant tradition of workers' struggles, in spite of the authorities' efforts to subject workers to party control, official trade unions and to "workers" ideology. Already in 1956, the "Polish October" burst out in the Poznan strikes; in 1970 Gomulka resigned after the mutinies in the Baltic ports; in 1976 strikes broke out in Radom, Ursus and many other cities. The year 1980 started with strikes in Lublin; then in August in Gdansk and Szczecin.

The movement grew apace in the great industrial regions and set in motion the entire Polish working class. The trade union's stronghold is in the shipyards, the steel mills, the car and tractor plants, textile industry, mines, etc. The militants' language is the same as that of most trade union workers. The free trade union is first of all a tool in the workers' struggle out of the same sense of being exploited like workers in capitalist societies. They denounce the absence of rights, the overbearing power of the overlords and administrators, bad working conditions and low wages. In Silesia particularly, miners protested against occupational diseases, speedups, a work week of six and even seven days, piecework wages, etc.

These "classical" workers' demands were sharpened by the economic crisis felt since 1977. Increased wages no longer covered the increased costs of available consumer goods. Workers felt that they did not benefit from the fruits of their labor; they denounced the growth of inequalities during the past years symbolized by the scandalous enrichment by certain leaders. They also felt that they had been cheated by Gierek whom many had confidence in. In many cases these workers are often very experienced and their self-respect and professional skill is offended by the absurd bureaucratic management, the waste of effort and talents.

The workers' consciousness that gives life to Solidarity is not only defensive but also anxious to retain the gains endangered by the crisis. It is likewise a proud consciousness speaking up on behalf of progress and economic growth, a rational and just economy which some have called "socialist," others "self-administrative." It speaks up against a management frequently absurd, authoritarian and wasteful of work and skills. Polish workers reject most of the symbols peculiar to the workers' movement in France; the latter have been taken over by communist powers. They do not address each other as "comrade"; they do not sing the Internationale; to them the red flag represents chiefly the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Solidarity is animated by a tremendous working class consciousness in its appeal to free unionism, the union of workers of the world, its fight against the ruling class, whether or not it is identified with the party apparatus and the state.

In a society where the state and the party aim at controlling everything, the existence of a free trade union — even though it accepts the party's "directing role" — is a major and democratic event. In August 1980, the Gdansk accords opened an area of freedom which endorsed society's overall democratic aspirations. These accords recognized the basic democratic rights of society: the right to strike, freedom of expression, access to the media, the freeing of political prisoners, the reinstatement of those excluded for dissident opinions. These democratic demands were subordinated to trade union demands; they even increased as time passed. Dissident intellectuals

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had fought for these freedoms for many years. In 1968 students and intellectuals had been severely suppressed. In 1976, intellectual groups closely associated with the Catholic intelligentsia had demanded the application of the Helsinki accords and respect for human rights. They joined Solidarity spontaneously and were constant advisers to the trade unions.

In an expressive and voluntary way, Solidarity stands out against the style of political life prevailing in Poland.It is never a question of building a "new" avant garde as against the one in power. In its organization, Solidarity wants to give a living example of democracy and openness as opposed to authoritarianism and secret-mongering characteristic of those in power. Even at the risk of being at times slow-moving, democratic ways are the rule in the trade unions. The militants' tolerance and serious-mindedness make it possible to liken the growth of Solidarity to a step-by-step building of democracy. Most of society's ideological tendencies are found in the trade union appeal to honesty and not to "virtue," as a basis for an emerging democratic society.

Solidarity is a national movement. It is not red flags that flutter over the plants but the Polish colors; it is not revolutionary songs that one hears but the national hymn and slogans. Solidarity speaks for the Polish nation subjected for 36 years. It is futile to ask whether Solidarity militants feel more like workers than like Poles; they wish to act on behalf of both of these aspects in an integral manner. Rarely has one encountered a movement so strongly recalling a forbidden historical memory. The demands are defended on behalf of Poland. Everyone remembers Poland's past and its present subjection to the Soviet Union. The striking teachers demand first of all the right to teach Polish history and literature. Milosz was welcomed in Gdansk like a hero. It is also a well-known fact that the Polish nation is strongly inclined toward Catholicism and the permanent presence of religion is indistinguishable from national assertion. The meetings that we have arranged between priests and Solidarity militants demonstrate that for everyone it was Catholicism that made it possible to come out against the ascendancy of a party and an ideology felt to be foreign. Solidarity is indeed not a movement centered on national liberation or comparable to Third World struggles; the image of a nation subjected to the Soviet empire is constantly present. The perspective of the movement, it is clear, is liberation from foreign rule, the keystone of the system of domination.

The three phases of Solidarity activity are not juxtaposed; on the contrary, they make up a strongly unified whole. The linkage between working class consciousness and democratic demands was built up clandestinely by the KOR militants and their sympathizers around the periodical *Robotnik* (*The Worker*). It was in the name of the right to defend and organize themselves that intellectuals of various persuasions upheld the workers' struggles and aided the victims of the 1976 Radom repression. Similar activities were undertaken by the ROPCIO militants in other areas. Through the efforts of these militants, many of whom were imprisoned, the defense of workers was recorded in the manifesto of democratic rights. In this connection, it is essential to underline the growth of political thought by a large part of the Polish intelligentsia who gave up revisionism in the 1970s — the idea of building a "good" party and a "good" communism — in favor of "liberal" thought. Their aim was less the idea of overthrowing existing power than the attainment of areas of democratic life, rights, and sectors of autonomous social life. Because the struggle for power is forbidden due to international threats and the memories of Prague and Budapest, it was necessary to build democracy from below, on a limited scale, by obtaining freedoms which would expand. As a matter of fact, the Gdansk accords were set down in that spirit; the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

emphasis was on freedoms rather than on liberty: a "self-limiting" movement, Jacek Kuron called it.

The personality of Walesa, a worker and a "Pole," a trade unionist and a practicing Catholic, is the symbol of the fusion of workers' and national actions. In his case, as well as in that of militants with whom he worked, it is difficult to separate the language of class and of nation. Workers frequently attributed the Polish economic crisis to the USSR's plundering. In the case of shipyards and mines, the defense of the means of production stands for the defense of national resources: it was rumored that coal and ships were sold at a loss to the USSR, which in turn resold them at a higher price.

Catholicism secures the ties between the democratic and national sectors of Solidarity. The French frequently fail to understand how a presumably conservative church can play a democratic role in Poland. As Michnik put it so well, the Polish church was the only important and popular social force capable of resisting the totalitarian ascendancy of a power perceived as the agent of a foreign system. The church preserved a treasury of cultural and moral values and has become democratic by the very fact that it escaped the power discourse. The Polish church plays a democratic role because it did not compromise, while "progressive" Catholics who flirted with the authorities lost all credibility. "It is thanks to the pope that Poland is not a Soviet state," the militants said. This role of the church is consciously perceived by the militants; they tell us that it becomes increasingly important in the history of Poland the more the nation is subjugated, for then the church becomes a refuge for the enslaved and a locus for autonomous national expression.

The fusion of the national, working class and democratic sectors of Solidarity is strengthened by the character of the adversary fought against. Whether one acts as a worker, a citizen or a Pole, in all cases the adversary is the same: the Communist Party. It is this party that administers enterprises and appoints managers; it is the one that largely decides on the plan and the direction of the economy; it is the universal employer. The party also represents absolute and arbitrary power. It is in its "administrative role" and its monopoly of power that laws imprison opponents, that elections are a joke, that thought is censured and the police omnipresent. Undoubtedly, the party never completely carried out its totalitarian vocation. In 1956 the church and small peasants escaped its grip while intellectuals and workers never submitted. Nevertheless, its totalitarian bent really constitutes its character, since nothing escapes its vigilance. If the adminsitrators no longer believe in their own words, they nonetheless demand society to submit to it, come what may. After the communist and socialist Polish Home Resistance was liquidated by Hitler and Stalin, the Communist Party, without having a base as in Czechoslovakia, appeared everywhere as the tool of Soviet domination in Poland. The hopes placed in Gomulka's national communism were dampened within a few months. All during the events of 1980 and 1981 this illegitimate party could only brandish the threat of Soviet intervention. The entirety of Polish society thus came to oppose the party's total power.

A Silesian miner explained that Solidarity arose from the "anger of a nation." Here "nation" does not have any nationalist overtones but bears connotations very close to those brought out by the French Revolution. it comprises at one and the same time the struggle of citizens against absolute power: the fight of those oppressed against the mighty ones and the opposition of a national community adhering to democratic principles. The party, in turn, embodies the privileges of the *Nomenklatura* and interlinkage with the Soviet system. Solidarity is a trade union, but it is much more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than the expression of a social movement; it is also an agent for the defense and liberation of a society against the state.

Social Movement and Liberation Movement of the Society

Being a social movement or, more precisely, a trade union movement, it speaks in the name of workers, protesting against working conditions, inadequate wages or difficult access to consumption and especially to housing. All of the classical aspects of working class consciousness are present in Solidarity. Being a national movement, Solidarity fights for social democracy, for workers' rights.

Being a movement for the liberation of the society, Solidarity opens up areas of freedom that it snatches from authorities, not in order to take over control, but in order that a society released from the ascendancy of the state may live democratically. This movement will allow agents other than themselves to make their appearance. By its very existence, Solidarity facilitates the birth and then the development of other organized forces. It is thus that a complex movement in the countryside gave birth to trade unions: rural Solidarity. It is thus that in the wake of Solidarity, independent unions of teachers, students, consumers groups try to develop and that an independent trade union of militiamen is being prepared.

Then Solidarity plays a central role in a direct manner in the self-management movement, whose goal is to eliminate the party and more especially the *Nomenklatura* in the enterprises in order to substitute for it workers' control. This self-management, it should be understood, is something quite different from the ideas of self-management proposed in France. It concerns in effect the election in the enterprises of workers' councils whose delegates will be retained for their reliability and their competence and whose responsibility will be the management of the enterprise — the director, in theory, having to carry out the decisions of the council. Self-management has been the war horse of the movement ever since April and May 1981. At the outset it was something desired by a relatively marginal number of Solidarity members before being taken over solidly in the autumn of 1981 and during the Congress. The militants then came out for it strongly, for it is a system in which the party is expelled from the enterprise in favor of a rational and active manager. The party's economic method — Solidarity has always maintained this — risks in certain cases of coming into conflict with workers' interests.

In fighting for self-management, Solidarity came out for an economic agent at the enterprise with whom one could then argue and negotiate. It is for this reason that it has always avoided the multiplicity of responsibilities between the self-management committee and the trade union in the enterprises.

Finally, especially since the Congress and in a break with the contents of the Gdansk accords, providing for the maintenance of the principle of the party's leading role, Solidarity seeks to free the country's overall political life. It is not a matter of trying to seize power but of requiring political guarantees — this in contrast to the required acceptance of economic reforms that must involve additional efforts on the workers' part. Here Solidarity fights to do away with censorship and the party's monopoly over the media, but also for free elections in a country that it wishes to democratize.

In August 1980 the social movement and the movement for liberating the society were closely tied in the sense that the latter one defines the conditions of existence of the former. The Gdansk accords are above all the acceptance by authorities of the formation of a free trade union, and the constant fight for respecting these accords would be a mixed trade union and political action aiming to assure to trade unions the conditions for functioning. Afterward, a distance at times important, the primacy of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the liberation of society appears between the working class nature of the agent and political subjects.

This double meaning of Solidarity is not only evident in a more positive aspect, directly centering or involved in a direction of a conflict relation with an adversary, which is evidently the party. It may also include negative aspects. Being a social movement, it is then tempted by its integrality to maintain the working class definition of the agent, without being able to involve him in a social conflict. The emphasis shifts to the working class rather than to the trade union, with low-key and anti-intellectual overtones. Such an orientation arose from the moment that the economic situation forbade Solidarity from putting forward classical trade union demands: how can one ask for higher wages when the stores are empty? How to consider negotiation when production is slack or impossible for lack of raw materials, energy or spare parts? This gives rise to a certain populism: an appeal to a workers' nature that may very well give rise to a revolutionary break and result in populist rather than workers' attitudes, rude rather than controlled, the foretaste of which have been the hunger marches of the fall of 1981.

Being a movement for the liberation of society, Solidarity may very well be convinced that no agreement may be possible with a power which for the past 35 years has not give up anything that has not been snatched from it by force. No form of co-responsibility is possible and rather than undertake a search for formulas of national understanding, the movement has set up forms of action that go in the direction of a revolutionary break. Such forms of action may have marked class characteristics, e.g., when an active strike is organized, i.e., by guaranteeing production, but controlling its use. They may also have nationalist connotations, e.g., when teachers decide, in spite of official instruction and programs, to teach Polish history and literature which the authorities try to do away with.

Such tendencies for rupture which appeared in the last months of the movement's existence may cause those who advocate it to become autonomous from Solidarity, although continuing to give it political support. It is thus in particular that the KPN (Confederation for an Independent Poland) saw a growth of its members beginning with the fall of 1981; and before the round of arrests on December 13 a variety of strictly political groups began to sketch out the picture of an overall new partisan force.

These two defensive forms of Solidarity are the expression of the breaking up of a movement that feels a growing tension between the search for a negotiated solution to the economic and political crisis, and the conviction that such a solution is impossible. In practice, they may intermingle, giving rise to a populism which, on behalf of the working class and the nation, calls for a challenge to intransigence, to the refusal of all compromise, i.e., all agreement, in terms so basic at times that it reaches to the point of rejecting those who are neither workers nor Polish: i.e., the Jews.

The Evolution of Solidarity

It is true that Solidarity, a radical and total movement, was able to control and restrict itself. Its activities never took on a revolutionary turn and confined themselves basically within the enterprises. Nevertheless, one may pose the question: could such prudence last? By its very nature, its radicalism, did not the movement tend toward an inevitable rupture with the regime? The breaking point which in Hungary took place in a matter of several days, and several weeks in Czechoslovakia, was not reached in Poland until after many months. Must it not be acknowledged that after having obtained free trade unions, after having set up self-management committees in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enterprises, Solidarity little by little was entering the political arena? In particular, it prepared to intervene in local elections, refusing certain proposals by Jaruzelski, preparing to create a social committee for the national economy, calling at the time of its congress on the peoples and the workers of the Soviet empire to recover their rights and liberty.

Among those devoted to Solidarity, to the value of its protests and its work of liberation, there are numerous ones who are ready to admit that the Polish situation ran inevitably toward a breakup, economically and politically. If this is intended to mean that all libertarian action is incompatible with a totalitarian regime it is only uttering a truism. Solidarity leaders were convinced from the first day that what they were doing was in principle intolerable to the Soviet Union and the Polish party leaders. But the real problem lies elsewhere: why was this intolerable fact tolerated for such a long time and why no longer at a certain time? If in answering this question one states that Solidarity little by little brought forward directly the matter of political power, this would be a serious error. An analysis of the fact leads to different conclusions. In fact, one should mark four basic aspects in the historical evolution that led to the *coup d'etat*.

The main reason was the crisis and the breakup of the party. It is wrong to represent the Poland of fall 1981 as dominated by the confrontation of two opposing political forces. The party which controls political and economic life, which imposes its laws on the mass media, makes or fails to make economic decisions and controls the army, militia, and secret police, that all-powerful party is in fact impotent.

Workers have been leaving it in droves. In the enterprises, the first party secretary can no longer exercise the same authority as before. Party administration is disorganized to the point that the official buildings resemble what French ministers felt in May 1968. The most direct cause of the military intervention is the collapse of the party, being forced to become militarized or perhaps to make place for a strictly military action, so feeble did its capacity to rule become. All witnesses agree that local authorities could no longer administer, that the managers and leading cadres in enterprises did not dare make any decisions. This crisis was not the result of any active pressure, or political aggressiveness on the part of Solidarity. It was much more the result of the inability of the government to take up economic measures. The party was evidently not an ideological organism but an *establishment*. Because it was the country's all-powerful master, the country's crisis necessarily broke it up.

It would be useless, however, to deny that the worsening of the crisis led Solidarity to raise its voice. One should also be specific about the import of the often aggressive language of certain leaders of Solidarity during the fall. At no time did Solidarity talk about taking over power. On the other hand, at the top as well as at the bottom of the movement, the nationalist and almost integralist language was being reinforced. Already during the Congress, many had an unpleasant suspicion toward KOR intellectuals. In the Federation of Mazovia the authority of Bujak intimately associated with Kuron, was attacked on several occasions and endangered by pressure of the "true Poles." A leader such as Jurczyk, president of the MKZ of Szczecin, made a speech embarrassing to Solidarity, in which he proposed "getting" at party leaders and eliminating the Jews who had wormed their way to the head of the party. This "radicalism," whose rise was felt during the fall, had nothing to do with that of the democratic opposition and those whom the party designated as anti-socialist. Rather, it points to the crisis and the breakup of Solidarity, constituting a less serious counterpart to the party's crisis and breakup. Walesa's weakened position — an echo of comments by Rulewski, a desperate opponent of Walesa since Bydgoszcz and the

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Warsaw accords — shows that the base, exhausted by economic difficulties and deceived by the party's behavior after the June Congress, retired within the enterprises and the affirmation of national rights. Among the radicals, the democratic sector of the movement weakened at the same time that a nationalist sector with anti-Semitic and populist sentiments grew stronger. This radicalism remained a minor factor in the trade unions, but at the level of the national commission it was translated into a rhetorical aggressiveness and a refusal to negotiate. Once more Walesa succeeded in assuming control of the national commission through the presidium.

If one takes into consideration the plans of action rather than the statements, one is struck by the fact that at all levels Solidarity continued to hope and to prepare for institutional solutions to the economic and political crisis. From the summer of 1980 to the fall of 1981, instead of decreasing, these institutional solutions have been increasing and taking on a growing importance. The fight against censorship and freedom of the press, the request for a second chamber at the Diet — an economic chamber where Solidarity's influence would be crucial — the insistence on self-management methods aiming above all to insure the recruitment of competent and independent managers of enterprises, the interest shown in local elections planned for February 1982; all this shows that Solidarity militants never thought that the search for institutional solutions had become exhausted. The deeper the economic and political crisis seemed to be, the more the idea was widespread that it was necessary to call on neutral intermediaries — whether it meant managers or intellectuals, and especially economists. It should be stressed once more that at no time was there a revolutionary atmosphere in Poland and that some demonstrations in the streets by students, particularly in the spring of 1981, were not supported or approved by Solidarity as a whole. Solidarity's internal life was not at all dominated by the frenzy of grand mobilizations. What is surprising is the mixture of legality and *esprit de corps* observed everywhere and which calls to mind more the traditions of British trade unions than the example of French revolutionary thrusts.

If one looks at the social conflicts that multiplied at the end of 1981, it will be seen that the most serious ones were the fierce strikes that paralyzed large enterprises, cities and even entire regions. These strikes were basically defensive: protests against want and misery as in the case of Zyrardow, protests against what was considered aggressive actions at Sosnowiec or the Zielena Gora region. Solidarity's leaders endeavored to settle these conflicts; they feared that they might degenerate into hunger mutinies with Solidarity the chief victim. Walesa himself took personal charge in settling most of the disputes. It is therefore absolutely impossible to claim that Solidarity's leaders were irresponsible firebrands ready to involve the movement in violent confrontation with authorities.

One must, therefore, give up the over-simplified idea of a rise of the conflict toward extremes, of a tragic and inevitable climb toward the final catastrophe. The economic crisis expressing the party's impotence resulted in disorganizing and weakening of society as well as of the authorities. The difference lies in the fact that the popular movement never lost its self-control while the party at bay gave in voluntarily to direct force in agreement with or at the demand of the Soviet Union. In this connection one should recall Chile, where the Christian Democrats, feeling impotent, chose to call on the army in order to get out of a crisis it did not wish to face.

It is important to erase the image of a rise toward a breakup because to do so will remove a serious mistake concerning Solidarity. The latter was never a political movement, although its actions did have political effects. Solidarity was always a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

movement defined more by convictions and a collective identity than by a program, or even actions. What stands out most during this entire period is the fact that, although it could prescribe almost everything, Solidarity never gave in to the temptation to do so; not only out of prudence, but also because all of Polish history taught it that the affirmation of social and national consciousness always goes beyond the Poles' capacity for collective action. If December 13 marked the end of a fight, one could talk of the death of Solidarity. If one acknowledges, however, that a social and national movement had been born which lived more by the affirmation of itself than by its conquests, then it is clear that the *coup d'etat* and the ensuing repression will destroy Solidarity as little as the partitions of Poland in the past have destroyed its national consciousness.

The main result of this period is not the destruction of Solidarity: it is the disappearance of the communist model, the definitive failure of the totalitarian goal of the party-state stamping its ideological and political categories onto social life. From now on, authorities can no longer claim to express or represent society; it is but a system of domination, restraints and repression. It can still talk about the requirements of the international situation or on behalf of production, as is being done by Chilean authoritarian leaders; it can no longer talk about the requirements of the working class. Moreover, its task of the reconstruction of the economy will be more difficult because of its brutally anti-popular character.

The decline of the totalitarian model in Eastern Europe is surely not to the advantage of democracy. At least one knows, after the Prague Spring and above all after the 16 months of Solidarity, that the power of arms and the people's will are confronting each other. In this case it is not correct to mention Nazism or fascism, for the regime of a putschist state that cannot even try to mobilize the people cannot impose its laws on it. It must be compared to the state of Franco or Pinochet rather than to that of Hitler or Stalin. If this regime goes beyond repression, it will be to develop and reinforce a managing class of heads of enterprises involved at the same time in the economies of the East and the West as is already true of a certain number of Hungarian heads of enterprises. After totalitarianism either pure force will remain or a civilian society will reappear. What seems out of the question at the present time is that the latter will be reshaped by popular forces; this is the meaning of Solidarity's failure. On the other hand, is not the great phenomenon at work in Eastern Europe the rise of an industrial administrative class? Nationalist statism has at times speeded up in the capitalist world (Germany and Japan) the creation of large concerns. The more repressive statism of the communist countries may allow the creation of a managerial class that at the same time remains subject to a militarily super-powered but less modernized empire. The nature of the communist process of creating a managerial class is that it continues to subordinate it to an imperialist military and political power. It is for this reason that the working class, democratic and national consciousness of Solidarity cannot disappear. Tomorrow as yesterday, the claims of national sovereignty and of political democracy will be tied up with the defense of workers' rights.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"EXPERIENCE AND THE FUTURE" AND THE POLISH CRISIS

By Andrzej Swidlicki

The Origins of "Experience and the Future" (DiP)

"Experience and the Future," known by its Polish acronym, Dip, originated in small circles of journalists and scholars who began meeting to discuss policies affecting their work. With two exceptions, they were former employees and free-lance journalists connected with the popular Warsaw daily *Zycie Warszawy*. A lively newspaper at the beginning of the seventies when it acquired its Thursday supplement *Zycie i Nowoczesnosc*, [1] it was taken over in 1973 by a new editor-in-chief, Bohdan Rolinski. The paper became dull and more subservient to authorities. Some 50 journalists who lost their jobs began to hold discussions. They were neither dissidents nor oppositionists but sort of "incorrigible positivists."[2] They were neither party members[3], nor Catholics. This distinction is important since, as a DiP organizer put it, non-party members are the most underrepresented people in post-war Polish society. DiP participants wanted to discuss the political, economic, as well as the moral crisis in Poland. In an atmosphere charged with unfounded optimism, they were among the few who used the term "crisis." The aim of these informal discussions was to seek a solution. DiP had no ambition of becoming an organization. Rather it was to be a spontaneous, civic initiative which sprang out of "the spirit of moderation and realism." Only in 1978 did DiP become more than a small informal circle of friends and acquaintances.

1978, the 60th anniversary of Poland's rebirth as a nation, was an important year: the democratic opposition movement formed after the 1976 strikes came into its own; Kracow's Cardinal Wojtyla became Pope John Paul II; "the Flying University" first started its activities; unofficial literature defying censorship began to flourish to a scale unprecedented in Eastern Europe; and the provisional Founding Committees of Free Trade Unions were set up in coastal cities and Silesia. The economic situation, reflected in a foreign debt that had become unmanageable and in food shortages approaching catastrophic proportions, as well as the catapulting of the Polish Catholic Church onto the world stage, were premonitions of the crisis leading to the August 1980 events. Despite the steadily worsening situation, the ruling party apparatus behaved in an increasing authoritarian manner. Corruption and favorism were so widespread that some people spoke of "the anarchy of social and political life and the demoralization of the nation." There was an unprecedented increase in expenditures for the

1. The idea of this supplement was paradoxically supported by Stefan Olszowski then CC secretary in charge of the press and propaganda. Its first editor-in-chief was Stefan Bratkowski, one of the main proponents of DiP. (Jerzy Szperkowicz, *Odra*, October 1981.)

2. The concept of *positivism* has a very special significance in Polish social thought; born in reaction to the failed 1863 uprising, it emphasized down-to-earth practical work as opposed to the revolutionary ideals of romanticism. It stressed the need to create an economic infrastructure. In post-war Poland it came to mean something different — the belief that desired changes within the system could be brought about by "cultivating well one's own garden." It should be distinguished from *revisionism*, which attempted to transform Polish communism from above by convincing the people in power of the necessity for change; and from the *democratic opposition*, which addressed itself directly to public opinion and advocated the idea of pressure from below.

3. Except for Stefan Bratkowski, Jan Malanowski, and Witold Zalewski.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

militia and the security apparatus.[4] Yet, authorities were realistic enough to avoid a collision with the growing opposition, which drew its strength from national traditions much older than the post-war period of communist rule, real and still unresolved social problems and, above all, from the Catholic Church's growing stature.

Though they did not attempt to suppress the opposition by force, authorities wanted to discredit it. To counteract the growing popularity of the "Flying University," an independent organization of the democratic opposition, they decided to initiate a series of officially sponsored lectures on attractive subjects. The Society for the Free Diffusion of Knowledge (TWWP) was created for this purpose. Professor Andrzej Grzegorczyk of TWWP asked Bratkowski to give a series of TWWP-sponsored lectures. Seeing an opportunity to open a public forum. Bratkowski seized the opportunity.[5] Thus, DiP surfaced as more than a small, private discussion group.

Although DiP could be said to have had the authorities' tacit approval it was not actually formed by the authorities.[6] Bratkowski explicitly rejected any such suggestion. Speaking at the meeting of the party cell at the Warsaw branch of the Polish Writers' Union on October19, 1979 he said: "DiP participants are not interested in any personal power struggle, but simply in changes for the better. DiP did not originate because of tacit approval, discreet support or encouragement in high places, as foreign commentators have suggested. On the other hand, DiP did not want to, and cannot, be identified with any of the non-party groups with political ambitions. DiP does not intend to exclude anybody who wants to take part in constructive discussions for the purpose of which it was set up, but it is not a dissident group . . . it was born out of a desire to work for . . . social reconciliation in Poland."[7]

Noting that DiP participants are members of Poland's intellectual establishment, George Schopflin aptly described it as "a loyal opposition inside the power elite but detached from its direct functioning."[8] But DiP was more than that. As Bratkowski put it, DiP was also "a certain intellectual attitude." As such, it was viewed with suspicion by both the party and dissidents. The party looked on DiP as a dissident initiative. The dissidents, on the other hand, thought of DiP as a party-inspired movement.[9]

But DiP cannot be described as an internal party opposition. Despite the fact that some of its participants were party members, and three of the future members of the Editorial Team signed Ochab's letter of October 1977,[10] DiP was not tied to any faction within the Communist Party. Neither did DiP follow euro-communism, although Bratkowski stressed many similiarities between the Polish Communist Party and the

4. "Prologue to Gdansk: A Report on Human Rights by the Polish Helsinki Watch Committee. Information Service for Polish Affairs (UK) (London 1981).

5. Bratkowski was a popular journalist and author. It is not clear whether Grzegorczyk realized the implications of his choice.

6. These rumors can be traced back to Stefan Olszowski, who, after the 1976 food riots, was appointed head of a party task force to make recommendations for economic change. He chose the task force that came up with the "Report on the State of the Republic and Ways of Rectifying it"; See Ruth E. Gruber, *UPI*, 10 June 1981 and Robin Jerman, *New Tork Times*, 27 August 1980.

7. *Biuletyn Informacyjny* KOR 7 (33) September/October 1979.

8. Cf. the introduction to the English edition of the first two DiP's reports. (Pluto Press. London, 1981.)

9. This misperception is found in Adam Michnik's description of DiP organizers as "a caricature of the 1956 Polish reformers," and Bratkowski as"an ideologically motivated collaborator.";See Michnik's article in *Aneks* no. 27, (London 1982) and Stefan Kisiclewski's piece in *Der Spiegel*, April 5, 1982.

10. In October 1977 a group of 14 former Politburo and CC members of the PUWP called for a programme of political and economic reforms sending a letter to the Politburo addressed to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Italian Communist Party.[11] Some traces of the social-democratic ideas as well as Polish socialist thinking left, however, their mark on major DiP reports. Though it would impoverish the overall picture to exclude DiP from the democratic opposition, it was not quite in step with the movement either. The most important difference between DiP and other groups of the democratic opposition hinged on a dispute whether to attempt to change the system "from within" or "from outside." DiP proposed a reform from without based on cooperation between various social groups and the authorities. Such cooperation depended on the authorities' willingness to compromise with society for the country's common good. The Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR), on the contrary, advocated pressure from outside. It appealed directly to the public, urging "self-organization" to pressure authorities to make concessions. In KOR's view, it was meaningless to talk about "social agreement" or "negotiated compromise" when the authorities did not have an "organized" meaningful partner with whom they could compromise. But DiP did not have illusions about petitioning the authorities: it presented its reports to the country's highest political authorities because it saw the need of involving them in the proposed reforms. The sponsorship of the Society for Free Diffusion of Knowledge (TWWP) had solved many problems. The group was open to the public and thus avoided the label of "armchair philosophers" or "dissidents." TWWP assured the group's organizers that there would be no formal conditions regarding the topics discussed or the group's organizational framework. The first plenary session convened November 14, 1978 in the Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw's Old Town. The topic under discussion was welfare policy in Poland. Two professors of sociology, Jan Malanowski and Jan Rosner, presented their papers. Some hundred people took part. It was composed of an impressive cross-section of Polish intelligentsia. It included people such as: Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Jacek Wozniakowski, both Catholic writers, and film directors Andrzej Wajda and Krzysztof Zanussi. The future deputy-premier Mieczyslaw Rakowski, the editor-in-chief of the Warsaw weekly *Polityka*, also participated but soon severed all relations. It was agreed at the meeting that plenary sessions would be held twice a month, bulletins would be published, and decisions would be taken by a simple majority during plenary meetings. A 20-member Service Unit, later renamed the Editorial Team, was set-up to coordinate discussions. It was not, however, empowered to represent the participants. Despite a few critical statements, the authorities' initial reaction was mildly sympathetic. The following day Andrzej Werblan, the Central Committee secretary in charge of science, presented, through professor Janusz Reykowski of the Polish Academy of Sciences, his opinion on "Experience and the Future." Werblan was pleased with the subjects selected for debate as well as the course the debate took. He expressed his interest in the future activities of DiP.[12] DiP organizers were pleasantly surprised. They had expected an adverse reaction. Their fears were soon confirmed when the Politburo member Jerzy Lukaszewicz, who was Werblan's superior, indicated hostility to DiP's aims. Learning somehow about Lukaszewicz's attitude, Werblan swiftly changed his initial stand and recommended the dissolution of the "Experience and the Future" discussion forum.[13]

first secretary of the Central Committee, — Edward Gierek. Among the signatories are 3 future members of the Editorial Team of DiP: Cezary Jozefiak, lecturer in Economics, University of Lodz, Jerzy Szacki, professor of sociology, University of Warsaw and Jan Strzelecki, professor of sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences. See Peter Raina: "Political Opposition in Poland 1954 - 1977". (Poets and Printers Press: London, 1978), pp. 444-451.

11. B. Margeritte, *Le Figaro*, September9, 1980.
12. Cf. Jerzy Szperkowicz' article in *Odra, op. cit.*
13. *Odra*, November 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Key DiP members were then called on the carpet. Bogdan Gotowski was asked to appear in the Central Committee Department of Science. Professor Stanislaw Czajka, who conducted the conversation, indicated uneasiness with the fact that so many journalists had taken part in DiP's meeting of November 14, 1978. According to Czajka, DiP had no permission to debate matters so crucial to the country. Czajka presented Gotowski with three demands: 1) the next plenary session could not be called; 2) the protocol from the first plenary meeting could not be written; 3) other DiP participants could not be informed about the first two demands. Gotowski rejected all three demands. Meanwhile, Stefan Bratkowski spoke to Jarema Maciszewski, director of the Central Committee Department of Science, and Klemens Szaniawski and Jan Malanowski met Jan Markiewicz of the Department of Social Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN). It was suggested to DiP organizers that, due to the high academic status of many of the participants, "Experience and the Future" ought to change its sponsor. PAN was suggested, since TWWP activities allegedly were purely educational and it was not a suitable body to sponsor a discussion forum.

On December 14, 1978, during a plenary meeting of the Department of Social Sciences of PAN under Markiewicz' chairmanship, a resolution was adopted assuming sponsorship over "Experience and the Future." The name was not changed, neither were the rules concerning the admission of new participants and the principle of the free exchange of views. No changes in the Service Unit were announced. DiP was to publish its own bulletin. It seemed that all obstacles to the group's further activities had been removed, and a new plenary meeting was called to deal with "law and order". This meeting called for December 21, 1978 never took place. In all of Warsaw, DiP organizers could not rent a suitable place to accommodate some hundred people. "A coincidence? Who would believe in accidents of this kind?" asked Pawel Tomaszewski of *Dziennik Lodzki*. He wrote: "The ploy used was simple — first we stroke the cat, then quietly strangle it."[14]

Before the proposed plenary meeting, authorities presented DiP organizers with new demands. On December 15, 1978, the Department of Social Sciences of PAN revealed the contents of proposals presented to it by the Central Committee Department of Science. According to these proposals, the meeting scheduled for December 21 was to be cancelled, topics for dicussion had to be presented to PAN beforehand, and the procedure for recruiting new participants had to be changed. These proposals amounted to depriving the initiative of its independent character. The Service Unit rejected them. As a result, the organizers of the December 21 meeting could not find a suitable place to accommodate it. The Service Unit then sent the minutes of the first meeting to its participants together with a cover letter asking them about what to do next? After acquainting itself with the views of DiP participants, the Service Unit decided to conduct its future activities with the aid of a questionnaire. It was not an easy decision. It amounted to denying the principle of open activity which had been so strongly stressed by Bratkowski, Gorski,[15] and others. The authorities repression, however, backfired. Had they agreed to the open activity of "Experience and the Future," the initiative might have ended with a few statements unpleasant to the authorities. The decision to block this initiative generated resistance. The DiP organizers were not ready to accept the end of their initiative. What they had to say was in their opinion far too important to hold back. What was intended to stifle DiP proved to be its driving force.

14. "The DiP Story", *Dziennik Lodzki*, January 8, 1981, section.
15. Jan Gorski, *Kurier Polski*, July 31 - August 2, 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

August 1980 and Beyond

Although DiP was surprised by the extent of the workers' protests in summer 1980, some of its members joined Tadeusz Mazowiecki's commission of experts advising the Inter-Factory Strike Committee (MKS). DiP participants joined lecturers from the Flying University at the "historic spontaneous congress of Polish culture" held October 12, 1980 at the Warsaw office of the Catholic Intelligentsia Club (KIK).[16] When asked, after August 1980, about the need for the further existence of DiP, Malanowski gave two reasons why DiP should not discontinue its activities: 1) The relatively meager degree of social self-awareness about changes taking place, hence the need to prepare diagnoses; 2) The need to establish a forecast for the future, since the changes taking place in the country were of an on-going character.

DiP not only continued, but after the beginning of September 1980 it was able to operate in public. A second plenary session was held with 24 participants.[17] Five working groups were set up: law and order, agricultural affairs, public health, educational reform and cultural affairs.

After the imposition of the military rule on December 13, 1981 the authorities' attitude towards DiP became openly hostile. In the aftermath of the military take-over, journalists were requested to sign declarations of loyalty, and a purge was carried out in the newspapers. Two popular Warsaw cultural weeklies *Kultura* and *Literatura* were to cease publications. A few members of DiP Editorial Team lost their jobs. The sharp and brief campaign against the Union of Polish Journalists, chaired by Stefan Bratkowski, culminated in its dissolution on March 20. One of the members of the Editorial Team, sociologist Jan Strzelecki was on the list of those detained or interned after December 13.[18] Bratkowski himself was said to be in hiding for some time, and another member of the Editorial Team, journalist Jerzy Zielenski, committed suicide on December 13.

Propaganda attacks multiplied; DiP was declared an opposition movement. The army daily *Zolnierz Wolnosci* accused DiP of filtering revisionist views into the party ranks.[19] The same newspaper even accused DiP of being "inspired by Western intelligence services."[20] The newly emerged "expert" on Poland's democratic opposition movement, Jerzy Kossecki, maintained that the international organizational structure of DiP was "based on Mafia patterns," largely on account of the fact that its members maintained contact through correspondence.[21] He overlooked the fact that such a form of contact was imposed on DiP by the authorities. One of the most orthodox party ideologists, the Rector of the Central Committee's Higher School of Social Sciences, Norbert Michta, accused DiP of "megalomania" and "messianism."[22] Analyses attributed to DiP continue to appear clandestinely. The best known is entitled "A Provisional Assessment of the Situation as of December 20, including the Factors of a Short-Term Prognosis." DiP continues to be mentioned frequently, not only in the tightly controlled official media, but also in many underground publications that sprang up clandestinely after December 13. Stanislaw Kowalski, most likely a pseudonym of one of the Bialoleka internees, urged DiP participants to continue their work, despite the imposition of martial law. In his clandestinely printed analysis he

16. AP, October12, 1980.
17. Gorski, *Kurier Polski, op. cit.*.
18. John Darnton, *New York Times*, December 24, 1981.
19. *Zolnierz Wolnosci*, February 28, 1982.
20. *Ibid.*, April 19, 1982.
21. Radio Warsaw, March10, 1982, 16.05 hours.
22. *Trybuna Ludu*, February15, 1982.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

called DiP's reports "a basis for the discussion on the current state and future perspectives of the country." While condemning the imposition of martial law on the Polish people, the document calls for the convention of an international conference on Poland.

Report on the State of the Republic and Ways to Rectify it

In January 1979 the Service Unit, with the consent of the TWWP, sent out a questionnaire comprising a set of six questions.[23] Forty-nine responses were received, which formed the basis for the first DiP report, entitled "Report on the State of the Republic and Ways to Rectify it." In the introduction to the report, its authors analyse the collective state of mind in Poland. they note a post-war Polish paradox, the product of too many failed hopes and expectations. They claim that radical changes in the social and political system are both indispensible and at the same time impossible. This situation gives rise to conformity, "internal emigration," and blind hatred. According to the authors, to find a way out of the present malaise, it is necessary to locate the sources of social apathy and social disease.

The report distinguishes between the social and political order and the method of wielding power. It is the latter that DiP respondents hold responsible for the widespread loss of faith in the regime. The authors are profoundly disturbed by the crisis of public institutions which do not conform to their national traditions. The country's parliament, once famous for its 3rd May Constitution, is now largely comprised of "appointed" deputies. Criminal law, once very progressive, is twisted to suit the government's political needs — e.g., the 1976 trials of Ursus and Radom rioters. A new ruling class has developed. It has created privileges such as better accommodation, health care, shopping and recreation. Public life is full of false pretenses, such as the pompous opening of half-completed industrial plants, the half-hearted struggle against corrupt officials, the forgery of statistical data, etc. As a result, no one — including the authorities — know what the situation really is.

A dangerous cycle has developed in Poland: there is an outbreak of social dissatisfaction, followed by a takeover by a new party chief who rewards his loyal men by promoting them at the expense of those who owe their positions to the old guard. This leads to a transient liberalization and a return to the old methods of government, followed again by mounting social discontent and renewed protests. This dangerous cycle, which resulted in government changes in 1956 and 1970, could, according to the authors, turn into national calamity. The only way out is for the leadership to regain public trust. Its current tactics of "mudding through" cannot indefinitively substitute for a comprehensive policy. Confidence only be won back through broad democratic reforms in public life.

The report outlines a series of changes aimed at legality, equality, openness, and public participation in government. It urges an end to the current practice of the party's encroaching into government and administration. Other demands include an independent judiciary, and trade unions more representative of workers. The taboo on mentioning Polish-Soviet relations is, according to the authors, a short-sighted

23. The six questions where: 1) What are the crucial issues for our country in the social, political, economic, cultural, educational and other realms? 2) What assets do we have to develop our country; how can we use them; and what negative and obstructive factors block their full utilization? 3) What threats, both immediate and long-term, are evident in the present political, social, economic, and cultural situation of the country? 4) What reforms are necessary for Poland to develop in the best possible way? 5) To what extent are contradictions among the interests of various social groups the source of current and potential conflicts? 6) What do I expect my own and other social strata to do now?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy. History could not be twisted to suit the current situation. This can only create resentment. As a consequence of a "forced friendship," a dislike for all things Soviet grows, whereas Poland should have friendly neighbors and good relations with the USSR. The report also emphasizes that experts who were not necessarily party members should have a say in decision making.

The report provides both a social panorama and a detailed analysis of the progressive decay of the country's political institutions, the deterioration of economic prospects, and mounting social problems. It outlines a comprehensive program for political change, entailing a division of powers, extension of the role of representative bodies, greater credibility and full freedom of information, and the strengthening of autonomous institutions at different levels of public life. It is, in other words, a program aiming at reform through political evolution. To put it briefly, the report was "a diagnosis of the crisis" which followed.

The report was never intended for publication. A limited number of copies, however, were presented to the first secretary of the PUWP, Edward Gierek, the head of the State Council, Henrzk Jablonski, the speaker of Parliament (Sejm), Stanislaw Gucwa, the head of Pland's Catholic Church Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, and professor Tadeusz Kotarbinski.[24] Malanowski admitted that the DiP organizers were skeptical about appealing to the authorities. Nevertheless, they felt they could not bypass the top representatives of the official party dominating political life.[25] Two points in this first DiP report are worth stressing. First, there is reference to official Marxist ideology, which in Gierek's Poland was merely a "fig leaf" for a system of bureaucratic conformity. The authors of the report had few illusions about its strictly ceremonial functions. Second, the report pointed out the necessity of replacing solutions imposed from above with solutions negotiated between society and the authorities. This was to be taken up by representatives of genuine soical forces who made their voices heard after the August 1980 workers' protest.

"Which Way Out"?

In 1979, Poland, for the first time since WWII registered a negative growth rate (minus 2%). The country's national debt approached a staggering $20 billions. Nonetheless, the media stuck to its position of making it seem as if everything was a success. Realizing the effects that the deterioration of the country's prospects might have on society, DiP organizers were anxious to avoid "a nervous overreaction on the part of authorities who, confronted with outbursts of popular anger, might resort to the use of force." So in December of 1979, the Service Unit approached some 300 intellectuals, scientists, and academics and asked them how Poland's crisis could be resolved. 149 responses were received, including 51 from party members. These responses formed the basis of a 75-page report,[26] titled "Which Way Out". It was DiP's warning, reminding the authorities of their responsibility to reverse a path which is heading toward

24. Only Kotarbinski acknowledged receipt of the report. According to rumors, however, the report was duplicated in 200 copies for internal use by Central Committee members.

25. Malanowski *Zycie Literackie op. cit.* A few months after the report was unofficially published by NOWA, Lukaszewicz, during a meeting with editors-in-chief of major newspapers, mentioned "Experience and the Future" as "one of those forces that prepared the ground for discussion in the 8th PUWP Congress." Gierek's party leadership apparently never bothered to acquaint itself with the report. Instead it was Lukaszewicz. He, in turn, discouraged by the sheer size of the document, passed the task to someone else. See J. Szperkawicz, *Odra* November 1981 *op. cit.*

26. This report has been published in English by M. E. Sharpe Inc.(NY 1981); and Pluto Press (London 1981).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

still greater catastrophies: "the negative changes," says the report, "will progressively grow and may reach the avalanche stage and grow into open social conflict." Noting that the majority of people felt overwhelmed by the difficulties of everyday life and thus sank into apathy, distrust, frustration, and dissatisfaction, the authors explicitly stated: "We need complete truth." The steps leading to credibility entail changing present methods, curtailing censorship, revolving elite privileges, and tempering the autocratic style of government — in short, a change in the present methods of wielding power. It requires not only telling the truth, but also seeking cooperation and agreement with broad social forces. To be credible, the government must prove to the public "that all fundamental decisions which affect the fate of the nation are taken within the country and that Poland's national integrity is secured among the allies."

The report cites three goals: to preserve national identity, to establish a basis for democratic co-government between party and society, and to create a modern, functioning economy. The economic reforms the authors propose include: improvement of planning methods, rationalization and control of capital investment, a freeze on wages and prices until the positive effects of economic reform are felt, tackling the two bottlenecks of Poland's economy (transport and energy consumption), raising labor productivity, cutting inflation, abolishing the privileged position of State Agricultural Forms (PGR), and supporting small and medium size industrial units. The main goal of the proposed economic reforms was to change the role and prerogatives of the central bureaucracy in determining the shape of the country's economic life, to change the ineffective style of management of the nation's economy, and to increase society's share in decision-making. The reform could only be carried out with substantial financial assistance from abroad, but further credits, according to the authors, could be secured once Pland's balance of payments improved.

The success of the reform depended on society's participation. But this was unlikely, without far-reaching changes in the country's political atmosphere. In order to utilize the nation's resources and energy, it was necessary to persuade the people that they in fact work for themselves. "In the present atmosphere," said the authors, "readiness to work is paralysed by fear that our resources and efforts will be wasted or used by someone else." The feeling that Poland does not work for itself is a common obsession among Poles. So, in addition to economic reforms, the report called for comprehensive reforms of the PUWP — reforms that would result in greater internal party democracy, acceptance of alternative programs of action, limitation on tenure of office, and openness of party life. Calling the crisis "unprecedented in Poland" post-war history," the report called on the people to demand rights written into the Constitution and to put constant pressure on authorities to bring about necessary changes. Indeed, the following passage could have been written by a democratic opposition writer: "Society must itself counteract the progressive stagnation and feeling of helplessness... Civic courage is necessary along with the capacity for self-denial and the knowledge that one does not act in isolation. A nation lasts only as long as its members keep the feeling of responsibility alive, as long as they are not a mere collection of subjects but a society joined by shared common goals, consisting of citizens conscious of their rights and duties." Society had, according to the authors, certain duties towards itself regardless of the authorities behavior." The report unambigiously paid tribute to the various groups of "democratic opposition," which in "a situation when normal ways of ensuring the respect for human rights are lacking took it upon themselves to claim these rights on behalf of the citizens."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There are several weak points in the report. The authors did not specify who was to provide the impetus for change. It was also unclear how far social pressure should be applied on authorities. How should society go about implemeting the reforms if the authorities refuse to cooperate? Certain conclusions of the report — particularly with the benefit of hindsight — might strike one as naive. For instance, "Which Way Out" names the Central Committee among the institutions which might be a civic forum, along with professional organizations, the cooperative movement and the Sejm. Finally it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the social and political order from the way power is exercised in a communist state. It is much more difficult to hope for a partnership between the rulers and the ruled in a situation in which the rulers have neither authority nor title to rule. The course of events demonstrated that the authorities were not motivated in their actions by "enlightened self-interest," but by hostility to change and an in-built mechanism of self-preservation. What counted above all was safeguarding their privileged position.

"Society Faced With the Crisis"

In February 1981, DiP issued its third document, entitled "Society Faced With The Crisis."[27] Unlike the two previous ones, the third report was not addressed to the authorities. It was not compiled in response to a questionnaire. Thus, it can be considered a true reflection of the views of the editorial team rather than a survey of public opinion. The document contains a description and an evaluation of the situation in Poland after the August 1980 strikes. The authors point out that the officially proclaimed process of renewal is based on shaky foundations. The reforms which were to guarantee it, had not been implemented. Moreover, these reforms may be deliberately limited to a minimum, which could only result in their failure. Still, the report paints a rather optimistic picture of Polish society. It is based on the following premise: 1) Political activity embraces broader sections of society than ever before in post-war Poland. In particular, workers are pouring new life into dead party slogans about the leading role of the working class; 2) Traditional barriers dividing various social groups are being overcome, and the danger of social atomization is being resisted; 3) The post-August movement is characterized by self-discipline and organizational instinct; 4) The summer 1980 events demonstrate once again the massive support enjoyed by the Polish Catholic Church; 5) The solution to Poland's problems takes the form of a negotiated settlement, a compromise between two sides not simply extracted by one side from the other — although an element of pressure exercised by one side on the other cannot be overlooked; 6) Ideology is reduced to a mere pretence; socialism is no longer automatically identified with the current line of the party elite; 7) The party is badly split between the apparatus and — rank-and-file members.

These hopeful signs do not, however, overshadow potentially explosive political, economic and social conflicts. The most serious potential for such conflict between the party elite and society lies, according to the report, in the chronic lack of foodstuffs and other consumer goods. The authors also cite the party's weakness and the independent labor movement's lack of experience as major factors engendering social conflicts. To overcome Poland's crisis, authorities must meet social demands for law and order, strengthen the position of the representative bodies through their separation from the executive bodies, respect the judiciary's independence, restore the credibility of the media, reform of election procedures, abolish privileges and inequality in the courtroom, guarantee the inalienable right of ownership to peasant farmers, limit the *nomenklatura*, and pass a new trade union bill guaranteeing unions' self-government

27. *Kultura*, September 1981.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and freedom of action. The PUWP's position in the country's social and political life as well as its internal structure, must be redefined. Some of the most needed changes are: 1) The party should devote more efforts to planning and less to the country's day-to-day administration; 2) The party must not be identified with the state bureaucracy, which alone must be responsible for day-to-day tasks; 3) The party apparatus ought to be subservient to party bodies which emerge through elections. They, in turn, must maintain closer ties with regional party organizations; 4) Office tenure within the party should be limited; 5) Rank-and-file PUWP members ought to have more say; 6) Privileges attached to a particular function or office in the party opening the way to personal gain should be abolished; 7) The ideology of the Polish socialist movement before 1948, when the Communists imposed their rigid interpretation of ideological dogma, should be revived.

The authors of "Society Faced With The Crisis" fear that confronted with the prospect of such deep changes in the way the country is run, the PUWP apparatus will entrench its positions — irrespective of the dangers such an attitude might have for the country as a whole. In particular, they fear that the party bureaucracy will compromise the idea of new trade unions by setting obstacles in their path; that it will oppose the setting up of self-regulating mechanisms in the economy and obstruct the creation of new rules of conduct in relations between trade unions and authorities.

The third DiP report emphasizes the great potential for the future of the country after the August 1980 events. A process has begun that could become the foundation of a new political and economic order. For this order to become reality, the old rules of the game, bad habits, standards, and attitudes must be overcome. But rulers fear new leaders and new social forces. They distrust new forms of social activity, and they are not in any hurry to grant society a share of power. On the other hand, in spite of the hopes aroused among the people, it is apparent that they lack confidence in the permanence of the current changes. Both authorities and society draw their own conclusions from past experiences, — especially from the 1956 and 1970 crises.

Poland Under Martial Law

The mood of DiP participants in the wake of the December 13, 1981 imposition of martial law was pessimistic and fearful. Few participants were inclined to put forward concrete proposals for breaking the stalemate in which Poland found itself. Still, DiP stood by its commitment to preserve independent forms of thinking and a free exchange of views. Thus, a fourth report, "Poland Under Martial Law," was prepared during February and March of 1982 and was issued in April. Though the report is not a petition to the authorities, copies were sent to General Jaruzelski and Cardinal Glemp. This fourth report, prepared on the basis of consultations with DiP participants by the members of the Editorial Team, draws heavily on previous DiP documents. The aim of the fourth report is somewhat narrower than that of previous ones; it is limited to an "objective critical and dispassionate" evaluation of the situation in order to look for solutions without "bitterness, cynicism or blind hatred towards the regime."

The report begins by pointing out various negative consequences of the imposition of military rule which it labelled "a method of solving Poland's internal conflicts alien to Polish traditions". First, the democratic transformation of society was abruptly stopped. The aspirations and hopes of many individuals and social groups were cut short. Second, the successful military operation of December 13 lulled the authorities into a false sense of security. Third, the conditions for carying out long-awaited economic reform were described by the authors as "ideally bad." Without trade

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unions and self-governing bodies, the reform was to be implemented by the very people most opposed to it, *i.e.,* the central bureaucracy. The very spirit of the reform had become distorted, and it could not succeed without a change in the style of government.

The report condemns the party apparatus for the attitude it took toward reforms between August 1980 and December 1981. Throughout this period, with very few exceptions, the party apparatus adopted a "siege mentality" and dragged its feet to avoid carrying out the undertakings it had grudgingly accepted. Some PUWP leaders adopted such a posture out of incompetence, others out of ill-will, still others simply decided to play safe and did nothing. The tone was set by party hard-liners who hoped to disarm society by disenchanting it with Solidarity through shortages and mounting difficulties of everyday life, thus provoking a nervous outburst which would justify the use of well-tested repressive measures. The threat of Soviet intervention was brandished at society to cower it into submission. As a result, both the party and Solidarity, although internally disjoined, became entrenched in their positions.

The report's third chapter sketches three courses of action open to the autho ities:

1) Confrontation between the present "party-military complex" and society. This option is characterized by the desire to eliminate from public life people, organization, and institutions regarded as a challenge to the authorities' near total power. It implies imposing a tight ideological corset and concentrating decision making in a few hands. Its aim is to eradicate all traces of Solidarity, to pacify the workers, and to secure supplies from the countryside, if necessary, by force. It would also be directed against the intelligentsia to prevent independent "opinion centers" from emerging. The autonomy of higher education and professional associations would have to be eliminated or sharply curtailed. This option involves the least risk and is the most internally consistent. Yet, it tends to block the economic reform, encourage a drop in agricultural production, rules out prospects for some form of accommodation with the Church, and thus provokes terrorism as well as increases international tension.

2) The "Kadarist" option. Here authorities would secure total, almost uncontrollable power while carrying out a successful economic reform. Although a genuine national agreement would be ruled out, certain "goodwill gestures" aimed at intellectual circles or the Church might be considered. This option might find some proponents among technocrats, scholars, journalists, and party members. It is also consistent with the long-term interest of the Soviet Union. This option implies that the Poles would have to overcome the crisis without making significant concessions and it is feasible only under two conditions: continued economic assistance from abroad and the presence of some form of cooperation between authorities and society. Neither of these conditions are likely to be met.

3) The "optimistic" option. It involves granting certain rights to society and introducing meaningful, if not overall, change in the political system. It is the best option, yet the least probable. It would require authorities to show respect and understanding for the values and hopes embodied in Solidarity and to adopt the agreements from Gdansk, Szczecin, and Jastrzebie as the starting point for negotiations. The internees would have to be released and amnesty proclaimed. Although adoption of this course of action lies in the interest of society, profound disbelief in its feasibility rules it out. The ideal would be a genuine national agreement, but that would require a new political system, the prevention of which was probably a major reason precipitating military rule. Another obstacle to this option lies in the difficulty

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of negotiating guarantees acceptable to both sides. Despite the skepticism with which this option might be greeted, it had undeniable merits. It was the only option which could secure financial aid from abroad, protect the interests of all the parties concerned, and engage society in overcoming the crisis. Moreover, this is the only option likely to end the vicious circle of Polish crisis which peaked in 1956, 1970, and 1980. At the risk of being called utopians, the authors emphatically declare: "There is no other way for Poland except for social agreement. We cannot afford to start all over again."

The greatest merit of the fourth report is that it was published at all. The authors do not hide the fact that work on the report was accompanied by intensive soul-searching, since the imposition of the military rule put in doubt the very ideas DiP stood for. But the unnatural conditions under which the work on the report was carried out left their imprint on the final product. Some of the findings of the fourth report are to far-fetched. Is the "Kadarist" a viable option or just another method of achieving the objectives of the first option?

Is it reasonable to place society on the same footing with the authorities? According to the authors, "both society and the authorities are victims of the same stalemate which leaves little room for hope." But the authorities cannot be described as victims, because they succeeded at least in their short-term objective, which was to hold on to the old methods of wielding power, irrespective of the overall cost to society.

Both the fourth DiP report's scope and method are somewhat narrower than in the previous three documents. Is it feasible to present a credible analysis of the current situation without discussing the events before the imposition of military rule?

In the opinion of the Editorial Team it is premature to assess Solidarity's activities. Such an analysis might be misunderstood in the light of the military rulers' current official propaganda and hostile attitude. The authors merely stress that such an analysis must respect the hopes of millions of Poles embodied in this movement. Solidarity, after all, is not yet a thing of the past. But how it could influence the course of events the authors did not say. The report likewise does not analyze the situation within the party. They admit that they simply do not know. The power struggle in top echelons does not show signs of abetting and the situation in local party organizations is murkier yet. The authors note that the position of the etatist military and party apparatus is stronger and more rigid than before. But several important questions are left unanswered. What is the political base of the authorities and the all-powerful Military Council of National Salvation (WRON)? What has become of the PUWP after December 13? What is the relation between the party and the military? Which groups within the ruling "party-military complex" might be inclined to seek accommodation with the Church or society at large?

The second chapter, devoted to international repercussions, claims that "the Polish events are an unexpected gift to the neo-Conservatives in USA under President Reagan and strengthen the neo-conservative trends on the ascendence in the US." This claim is topped by the even more astonishing statement: "the Russian politicians are thus faced with an undoubtedly fundamental question: is the present trend in US policy a permanent one?" The authors clearly overestimate the importance of US opinion where Soviet leaders perceive their vital interests to be threatened. Moreover, it is rash to assume that the motives behind Soviet decisions are based on pragmatic calculations. The analysis of the international scene shows further weaknesses. For the Soviet leaders to intervene openly in Poland, the authors said, was "the ultimate, unwelcome option." On the other hand they acknowledge that the Soviet Union

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would not hesitate to intervene openly if there is real danger of Poland leaving its sphere of influence. This contradicts what the authors said earlier about the danger of Soviet intervention being artificially whipped up by propaganda to frighten Poles into submission. How the danger of Poland leaving the Soviet sphere of influence could materialize under the present military rule is not clear.

Chapter four, dealing with social attitudes, betrays the limitation of the authors' experience to Warsaw's intellectual circles. What the situation is in other parts of the country, or with other social groups, they do not know. As for themselves, the authors propose a "realism which is not identical with resignation." But this is too little and too general. The authors are well aware of the old, still unresolved dilemmas of the Polish intelligentsia: where are the limits of cooperation with the authorities? Under what conditions does cooperation become collaboration? The authors see "the gravest danger with potentially the most serious consequences in the climate of helplessness and resignation which is borne out of it and takes different forms." The still graver danger, well realized by Solidarity leaders underground, is that authorities might somehow succeed in incapacitating society. To prevent social atomization, the authors call for: readiness to help the needy or the repressed; care about common symbols or tokens important for preservation of Solidarity or social consciousness; helping the spread of unoffical information; participation in unofficial culture; and, above all, demanding rights and the observance of law in general. In conditions of lawlessness, the Editorial Team emphasized that "we have to raise the issue of civil rights even though it may sometimes seem an abortive effort." In so doing, society helps authorities realize a fundamental truth — they cannot rule without society cooperation. Paradoxically, this conclusion that the primary aim of independent action is to prevent social atomization would not have been acceptable to the same Editorial Team at the turn of 1979/1980 when the second DiP report was compiled.

After the traumatic experience of the military takeover, DiP still cannot understand that the PUWP has no use of reformers. The authors of the fourth DiP report, noting that PUWP hardliners antagonized society and tried to influence Soviet leaders prior to the December 13 military takeover, still cherish illusions that the PUWP might still contain some individual with a foresight, courage and talent of a statesman.

Experience Without a Future?

In his interview to Warsaw's daily *Kurier Polski,*[28] Jan Gorski, member of the Editorial Team, pointed out that DiP set itself a specific task; namely, to establish horizontal communication channels among Polish intellectuals. In his opinion, various societies and professions within the Polish intelligentsia were isolated; their old tradition of cooperation and integration was threatened by a deliberate party policy aiming at atomization and setting groups in opposition to one another. A manifestations of this worrisome trend was the disappearance of discussion clubs. DiP's organizers felt they could fill this gap. DiP's participants are neither "epigonens" — the final product of the decay of the system of "real Communism" as Adam Michnik calls them,[29] nor are they an internal party opposition. In fact, the difficulty in specifying who they are, as well as the criticism coming from various quarters [30] attests to their intellectual integrity as to the political imagination of their propositions.

28. Gorski, *Kurier Polski, op. cit.*

29. "Polska Wojna" *Aneks* 27,(London 1982).

30. DiP was often criticised for the utopian character of its proposals, minimalism, disregard for national interest, revisionism, postulating half-measures, demagogy defending the status quo, and many similar sins.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Perhaps, the fundamental objection leveled against DiP participants has been that they expected authorities to respond by themselves. While it is true that DiP believed in the authorities rationality and "enlightened self interest," many of its members emphasized the need for constant public pressure if the party was to embark on any meaningful program of action. In fact, the purpose of DiP's reports was twofold: to appeal to the authorities and to influence society. To achieve both these goals, DiP strove to establish itself as an independent "think-tank. It failed to influence authorities, and the chances that the present "party-military complex" headed by General Jaruzelski will need an independent think-tank are worse than slim. But its objective of expanding social consciousness has been achieved. There was hardly a single independent initiative without DiP's participation or cooperation. The significance of DiP's reports lies in the fact that they advocated national agreement and negotiated compromise, and that this comprehensive evolutionary program for political change has been absorbed into the main stream of political life in Poland.

OUR GOAL MUST NOT BE REVENGE*

by A.M.

I am often asked whether I believe the political underground movement in Poland makes any sense. Before answering I would like to ask a counter-question: was Solidarity a historically significant fact, or was it just an incidental episode in Polish history? If it was just an episode, then it was to be expected that the ruling Communists could eradicate all traces of it — and not just on the house walls. But if it was an authentic movement of national rebirth, then it could not be replaced by artificial creations — such as the "Committees for National Salvation" which are being established on instructions from military comissars. If that should be the case, then the Communists' plan is pitifully unrealistic, and every activity of the rulers, whether with guns or with "bugging" devices, would be unable to liquidate Solidarity.

No underground has ever been able to function well under the Communist system. Though the Communists have not achieved much, one thing they have succeeded in doing is to smash popular resistance, especially in the form of conspiracies. As history shows, they have always mastered this ability perfectly. It is enough to compare the Polish underground in the German-occupied "general administration" from 1939 to 1941 with Russian-occupied Lemberg: conspiracy could prosper right under the Gestapo's noses, but in the NKVD's territory it was doomed.

Why? Apparently the Nazis, in their occupied territories, demanded merely calm and order as well as obedience to their laws and regulations. They were not interested in establishing a political organization of the subjugated peoples, since they wanted to make them into slaves. Under their rule, the Poles had to have no illusions: the execution commandos were accompanied neither by the promise of a better future nor by declarations of loyalty of Polish Hitlerites. The Soviet conquerors proceeded otherwise. They smashed all social groups, political and cultural organizations, sport

*Originally published in *Der Spiegel*, 32 (August 1982), pp. 88-91. Translated by David J. Parent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clubs and trade unions; they abolished civil rights and confiscated property; they made men not only their subjects but their property.

Unlike the Nazis, the Communists imposed their own form of organization on the Poles; they allowed the poor to plunder the property of the rich; they produced declarations of submission; and they tried to keep executions and deportations secret. They imitated the spirit of the Crusades: they had come to spread the new faith. But they left themselves one door open: theoretically, everyone could be converted to the religion of the allegedly progressive system. (Incidentally, those who now proclaim that Poland never had a Quisling ought to remember Wanda Vaslevska.)[1] The Poles have reason enough for national pride; they don't need to twist their own history. In short, the Communist system never has had to deal with a continuous conspiracy, first because of its bloody terror and later due to the new political system which was possible only because Stalinist terror remained firmly anchored in the people's memory.

A precondition of the Communist dictatorship had always been the smashing of social ties. Society's only form of organization was the power apparatus and its institutions, which served to destroy human solidarity and to discipline the people. Under these conditions a psychology had to develop which was peculiar to peoples enslaved by Communism. Long periods of apathy were, however, repeatedly interrupted by powerful political explosions. But they were never accompanied by a reform the people could understand or accept or by a carefully conceived plan for an alternative policy. There were outbreaks of protest, but no reform movements. Reform programs were formulated but did not reach the factories. Independent political thinking has never functioned in Communist countries: there was only subservience to the authorities and manifestations of social rage.

The workers' rebellion that erupted in August 1980 and the appearance of Solidarity put an end to this psychology. In the course of those 17 months people obtained a taste of freedom, they became conscious of their solidarity and their strength; they began to feel that they were a national community of citizens. I do not want to idealize Solidarity, its activities and functionaries. I know how numerous the residues of the slave mentality were in it, and how much demagoguery and pettiness there was. But those are inescapable components of any mass movement whose unavoidable heritage stems from years of subjugation. Solidarity was the first mass movement to last for many months and to strike deep roots in Polish hearts and minds, in factories and homes. Consequently, the resistance movement against the military regime has a broad basis and the underground has a good chance of surviving the recurrent police actions. Its chance resides in the tradition of Solidarity, in the achievements of the democratic opposition before August 1980, in all the historical experiences of the underground during the 19th and 20th centuries.

This considerable stock of experience serves as a book of knowledge about the value and methods of illegal resistance. Today, this book must be reread so that old patterns can be adapted to the new situation. Many accusations have been made against the Poles in the course of their stormy history, but never that they were incapable of conspiracy. I am one of those who for more than ten years have rejected various concepts of conspiratorial action. Today I am for the underground. We have no choice. Jaruzelski has made the choice for us. Today for us resistance is required by Polish honor and reason: by honor, because a people that humbly tolerates the suppression of its

1. Polish authoress who, after 1939, became the Soviet Union's principal agent in the Eastern territories of Poland occupied by them; later she was the head of the Moscow-aligned Association of Polish Patriots, from which sprang the first post-war government.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

freedom does not deserve that freedom; by reason, because a people that sees a real chance to regain its freedom and does not use that chance will never be free.

There is not much cause for optimism today. But who, ten years ago, could have foreseen the origin of a democratic opposition, an independent press, and finally August 1980? Of course, what was cannot be a model to copy, but it is a valuable tradition, a precious heritage, and a proof of all that can be achieved by people who want to do something rational for their country.

The underground is today a fact; the question is, what role can and should it play? Let us first make clear what it should not be. It should not be an underground state with a national government, parliament and army. It cannot be so, because it has no mandate for this. Our country today needs many things, but certainly not a self-appointed national government. Poland today needs democratic representation, but not the kind of pseudo-parliament that could be developed under conditions of a conspiracy. A Polish underground state could exist under the Nazi occupation, when there was no middle way, when the war was going on. Only a blind man could unthinkingly draw a parallel between Poland's situation during the German military occupation and the present situation of the country now under the present military council.

This is true especially of an armed conspiracy and every attempt at terrorist activities. It must be said clearly and directly: armed actions today can only be the work of stupid people or provocateurs, and it is a duty of the underground to protect society from such activities. Terrorism brings no concrete results except acts of vengeance; however, it starts a spiral of terror, intensifies hatred and cruelty and scares broad strata of the populace from underground activities.

What is needed in Poland today is not terrorism, but a broad underground movement with the goal of reinstituting civil society — a movement encompassing cities and villages, factories and research institutes, universities and high schools. Solidarity's role in this movement seems to be self-evident.

The question of the institutional form of this broad movement remains open. Clearly, there must be room for a sort of resistance-fund in its framework to provide self-help for victims of repression and for people fired from their jobs. Of course, an educational movement is also necessary so that people do not forget independent thinking. Theoretical work is necessary so that society has a clearly formulated view of the future democratic Poland. Journalistic activity is necessary to circulate thoughts about Poland and the world, ideas, intellectual matters, and social knowledge. Also important would be a higher center — appointed by Solidarity leaders to take a stand on the basic problem of national existence. The establishment of such a center is a precondition for the efficacy of action, although it entails considerable risk.

Life is always richer than the organizational structures, and an underground union must draw its strength from its roots in the factories, not just from an apparatus of professional functionaries. Such an apparatus is necessary to preserve communication between the various strata, to organize inner-union structures, or to prepare pamphlet campaigns. But such an apparatus, isolated from great parts of the populace who live with the everyday problems of the state of war, can easily lose contact with reality and become an army with generals and no soldiers.

The self-image of the functionaries of such an apparatus is therefore of great importance. They must always realize that a resistance movement makes sense only if its deeds are understandable to every Pole, if it remains open and tolerant and always remember that the "Dobrovsky-Mazurka" — that "Poland is still not lost" — can be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

played on different pianos. This does not mean that every action directed against the military council is sensible. For example, the "turtle-idea," with the slogan "Work slowly!" which is cropping up here and there, does not seem very rational. This slogan made sense during World War II. For then the Poles were supposed to be working for Hitler's army. Today, however, it is hard to judge whether all fruits of their labor are being used to harm the national interests. To apply Lenin's formula, "The worse, the better!" to the current situation in Poland would be pure nonsense and a destruction of the work-ethic could cost the Poles a lot in the future. Methods must be sought which lead to the formation of a civil society and do not merely bother the military junta.

But, most of all, people must be shown a strategy of hope, a meaningful perspective for their efforts and the risk they take. Without such a strategy, without faith in the efficacy of action, the underground will be unable to build up a broad movement of national resistance. It would be a moral testimony or an angry reaction, but not a goal-conscious movement armed with patience and consistency — not a movement that can win. The main goals of the underground Solidarity are clear: to build a genuine society, the freedom of Poland and of people in Poland. No political miracle will help the Poles if they do not help themselves. Never will a democratic Polish state arise with democratic structures in society.

Two scenarios for a meaningful perspective are possible: the scenario of an explosive change and the scenario of a "long March." The first involves a powerful spontaneous explosion of societal rage. This explosion can — should it be repressed in blood — lead to a polarization among the ruling cadres and revive the problem of a compromise with Solidarity. The underground must be ready for both the explosion itself and subsequent negotiations. It must be considered how bloodshed can be prevented and at the same time the justified demands of the populace be supported. A detailed design must be developed for a possible social contract, for which an end to the state of war and a general amnesty for the victims of this state of war are absolute preconditions.

The question of a genuine compromise between the power apparatus and the populace seems to be put on the agenda only when the military council has suffered a spectacular defeat. But this does not mean that a head-on collision should be sought between the underground and the power apparatus. A confrontation today would have to lead to a tragedy since the military junta will stop at nothing. Just to preserve its power, it would not even be deterred by the prospect of a bloodbath. So a compormise must stem from the recognition of realities. And if it is to be a real compromise, then it would also have to define precisely what "the Party's leading role in the state" and what "respect for existing alliances" means.

There can be no compromises concerning the independence of the union. Solidarity may decide to reorganize its structure and revise its program, but such a decision can be made only by a union congress. A consent to interference by the power apparatus in the internal affairs of Solidarity, i.e., to a leading role of the Party in the independent and self-managed union, would lead not to a compromise but to the liquidation of the union.

Also significant is the program of the so-called international alliances. A distinction must be made once and for all between the quest for truth about Polish-Russian relations, on the one hand, and anti-Soviet propaganda, on the other. The demand for truth about its own history is a natural right of every society. To judge the current international situation, a cool weighing of the expectations and possibilities, of possible losses and possible gains, is necessary. A clear definition of this is so important that it should be made the theme of reflections, independently of discussions with the Party or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with the military council — even for the "Long March" strategy.

This strategy presupposes the intransigence of the ruling elite and a prolonged struggle between the organized civil society and the power apparatus. During that time, essential changes can take place in the USSR, which are still hard to estimate and which cannot be counted on. But independently of these possible changes, there is no doubt that Poland will remain in the center of attention of every Russian government. In other words, I lean toward Stefan Kisielevski's view that our society should independently study the problem of Polish-Soviet relations.[2] This may sound far-fetched today. But if the matter should ever become relevant someday, the lack of a mature outlook would then be evidence of our unforgivable shortsightedness.

The concept of the "Long March" must have as its goal an isolation of the military council, i.e., a gradual diminution of the credibility of the previous system of government — also from the Soviet point of view. It is, without a drastic revision of the political map, inconceivable that the Soviet Union would simply give up Poland. But a situation is conceivable in which the Party — from the Kremlin's viewpoint — would seem totally unreliable, its army inclined to rebel, while the political price of a military intervention by the Soviet Union would seem too high. Polish society must be prepared for such a moment.

A continuous unleashing of anti-Soviet emotions at the price of a complete atrophy of political thought about Polish-Soviet relations is absurd and can lead directly to catastrophe. The strategy of such a "March" requires not empty slogans but consistency, realism, and endurance. It is a vision of toilsome, risky, often ineffective actions — a vision of repressions and suffering. It is, finally, a vision of hard work at reforming the economy and administration, the legal and educational system. This vision of a "reformed Poland" must be prepared in the general consciousness. Concern for the form of this consciousness will be determinative for the effectiveness of action.

As never before, the principle of a national basic education must be inscribed in the strategy of the resistance movement. We should repeat the words of the "Rota": "Every threshold will be a fortress for us."[3] Hence, the significance of the program for Polish families; it is a program of the social education of every individual child. In a broader sense, a kind of citizens' catechism must be formulated listing the basic duties and violations in Poland under martial law. Only one institution can propose such a family program and such a catechism and provide instructions acceptable to the Polish people. That institution is the Catholic Church.

Even before Dec. 13, 1981, Pastor Jozef Tischner,[4] in a conference speech, called the role of the church on the political scene that of a "witness" and not of a political institution. I believe — if I have understood this thought correctly — this witness should stand for honesty of agreements and vouch that efforts are made in the spirit of fundamental Christian values — of truth, human dignity and reconciliation. It would be false to expect a political program from the church. But a kind of citizens' catechism for the time of the state of war would surely go very well with pastoral care and the Church's concern for the moral state of the nation.

This distinction is essential. For, otherwise, the danger would exist that the people regard the episcopacy as a leadership of the political opposition and justify their conformism by claiming that the church replaced their own activities, which were left undone. It would have to be added that the church today is the teacher of the whole

2. See his article in *Der Spiegel*, 18 (1981).

3. A patriotic song from the beginning of the century, originally sung as a protest against Germanization campaigns.

4. Tischner is a well-known Krakow theologian — a personal friend of Pope John Paul II.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nation, and it would be most unfortunate if representatives of the resistance movement tried to appropriate this authority. Just as regrettable would be efforts to hide concrete programmatic or tactical concepts behind the shield of faith and of Catholic symbolism.

One more point: the church is infallible in matters of dogma or faith, but it can err — and has often done so in the past — when it is a matter of diagnosing the social situation. The underground will never fulfill all the needs of the social resistance movement. It can only be a part of this movement, and national interest requires that a common denominator be sought for various activities, various temperaments and various forms of concern for the common fatherland.

The resistance movement must at the same time be a school for freedom and democracy; and so will Poland present itself after the state of war. But every underground is under the shadow of the "demons" from Dostoevsky's novel. Every conspiracy demoralizes; in its darkness blooms a sectarian spirit that uses its own secret language. Everything is subordinate to tactics; truth has only an instrumental function; politically irrelevant values are treated with contempt. The underground forms a specific type of functionary — the conspirator, the "pro," whose qualities, useful in the underground, prove to be dangerous later. Such an underground "pro" must make discretionary decisions, he must be distrustful of other people, including his partners in the struggle. A democratic attitude is not the virtue needed in a conspiracy; pluralism of style is not promoted by conspiracy.

Activity in the underground isolates a person from the taste and smell of everyday life; it distorts his perspective, leads to a dangerous maximalism and to intolerance, particularistic thinking, a fanatical attitude. Conspiracy requires disobedience toward the enemy, but blind obedience to the underground center; it proclaims the equality of men, but itself demands hierarchical subordination. The conspiracy lives according to the word of the Gospel: "Whoever is not with me is against me." The conspiracy arises for the struggle against political repression — and becomes a dreamlike terrain for police activities. The police thrive on the clash with the conspiracy. It infiltrates the underground, starts provocations. Without the underground, the police lead a frustrated existence; thanks to the underground, it becomes a great power, a state within a state. Sometimes it is a sovereign state within a non-sovereign state.

Police activities, seeking to start provocations, cause a kind of anti-provocatory hysteria in the underground world, and it sometimes happens that the analysis of social processes is replaced by anti-provocatory announcements of the underground counter-intelligence service. A totalitarian regime sees every crisis as caused by the conspiratorial enemy; the anti-totalitarian underground gradually recognizes every failure as the work of police agents. Such are the dangers attendant on the underground. So it is also generally described by its political and ideological opponents. That is surely why such remarks are only rarely taken in a friendly sense.

The conspirator idealizes the underground, which should not be surprising, but precisely because of this, he must be reminded of how often and how closely he comes in contact with a mystification. He must constantly be reminded that a real defeat threatens him not from police terror, but from society's hostile indifference. An underground separated from the hinterland is condemned to degeneration and extinction.

These mechanisms, observed with a sharp eye by the enemies and readily exaggerated, can be better seen from the outside. If someday I again land in the underground, if I again must be on the lookout for an informer's eye and am busy preparing a conspiratorial meeting or writing a leaflet, then I will forget all that, losing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sight of the dangers, no longer having the strength, the time and the courage to analyze and describe them. So I write about them now, enjoying the security of a prison cell in Bialoleka.

The underground must correctly appraise society's needs and be able to find the appropriate means to satisfy them in each concrete case. It must be attractive and really useful to society. These things are self-evident. But to remain true to them, we must make it clear to ourselves and to those close to us how unrealistic are the expectations that the situation before Dec. 13, 1981, could return, a spectacular triumph of justice take place, virtue be rewarded, and crime punished.

The goal of underground Solidarity must not be revenge, but the building of a democratic alternative. Democracy is not a simple or easy solution; its birth takes place in pains; its strengthening follows amid conflicts; and its advantages become visible only after a long time. Therefore, one must not make glowing promises either to oneself or to others. We must not set our hopes on any prompt and final solution of Polish problems, but we must be prepared for risks, difficulties, and disappointments. This is usually the price of freedom.

I am not of the opinion that the underground today needs the moral ethos and organizational form of an army or party of the Leninist type. What is necessary are common goals and action. And respect for others. And also assent to pluralism. I believe that the underground must not promise a world without conflict. What it should offer is a program of practical reform; a program of social self-defense; contact with genuine culture and its values; participation in an authentic civil and intellectual life. And another thing it must offer is a bit of dignity, a bit of freedom, a bit of brotherhood. And the daily bread of truth — the truth that every compromise is provisory, that every political solution is only an apparent solution for, as the philosopher says, all solutions except death are apparent solutions.

Political engagement in a totalitarian dictatorial state is always the result of two human motivations, it always oscillates between moral testimony and political calculation. Both are dangerous, but both can be absolutely necessary. Whoever goes underground must give up his professional career and his family life. He must risk capture, prison, loneliness. He must put himself outside the law and thus give up all tactical-political considerations in favor of moral options and principles. To be active in the underground, however, also means again and again to sacrifice ethical considerations on the altar of politics. Politics first! It is hard to polemicize against this.

But for that very reason I also believe that people are needed in the underground who assign greater value to moral testimony than to political efficacy; who do not see the underground just as a breeding place of pretenders to the future power elite; who are conscious that their engagement will end as soon as "normal times" begin and an underground is no longer needed; and who realize clearly that in those "normal times" other virtues and other knowledge will be called for.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HUNGARY 1956 — 25 YEARS LATER*

by Mihaly Töröcsik

"Shut up" or "Not even worth ignoring" is the answer anyone gets who dares to disturb the pleasant climate — a climate whose dank warmth weighs down on Hungarian workers and intellectuals as soon as they are no longer ready to compromise. SZETA dissidents who criticize poverty in Hungary are "rebutted" by the Western media with the cutlets in the allegedly so overfilled butcher shops. And those who would like to cite the subtle repression are reminded of Kadar's liberal travel policy: after all, the man from Sopron can sip his wine once every three years along the Rhine, and if his Western friends pay for it, even every year.

All in all, Hungary remains the most cheerful barrack in the socialist camp. "But isn't it also true," writes Vajda, "that we can only choose between relatively cheerful and extremely sad barracks?" The standard of Hungarian "liberalism" must not and cannot be any camp regulation but only what is outlined in the classics of Marxism — a standard that is not met even 25 years later. Vajda writes this in an essay that introduces the Bibo-*Festschrift* as one of the most important recent events.

The retraction of the "Ausgleich"[1] [settlement] of the post-1956 era involved the overcoming of the intelligentsia's lazy compromise according to which "enlightened despotism" — after the 1956 route had proved unfeasible — "was good enough if no democratization is possible."

Miklos Haraszti describes how this 1956 compromise really took place for the majority of the Hungarian populace: "Power exercised on the basis of a lasting consensus brings tolerance into fashion, that moderate form of tolerance which spreads from the top down without reaching the masses. Thus, they can neither enjoy its benefits nor produce them. The elite and the middle class, however, can move more freely. Kadarist tolerance is, thus, calculated and not coerced like in Poland. Even its most yielding mood does not mislead it into tolerating uncontrollable movements."

The movies of the Kadar era, for instance, are parable-like, symbolic, or try in other ways to mean "more" than is actually stated. Films such as Laszlo Lugossy's "Thanks, It's OK" — which deals with the problems of young workers — are guaranteed never to reach their audience for "the entertainment of the elite and the rank-and-file were kept cleanly separate. Thus, experiments could be tolerated with fewer reservations."

The Hungarian opposition is in the process of retracting this compromise, this recognition of a pre-given framework. In almost 1000 pages, 76 authors commemorate Bibo and take a stand on his political ideas. Istvan Bibo died in Budapest in 1979 at the age of 69. He was one of the most important theorists of post-war Hungarian democracy. As a critic of communism, which he, however, rejected neither in principle nor as an ally, he was the protagonist of an independent East European "third way" between capitalism and socialism. In 1945 his article, "The Crisis of Hungarian Democracy," in the journal *Valaosag,* attracted considerable attention in Communist Party circles. Lukacs at that time called it a critique of democracy from the right.

Bibo here attempted a critique of the coalition parties and the related crisis of

*Originally published in *Gegenstimmen*, 6 (December 1981), pp. 13-15. Translated by David J. Parent.

1. This is in reference to the 1867 compromise between the Austrian monarchy and Hungary's magnate ruling class.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hungarian democracy in which he accused all parties of mutual distrust and of regarding voters as mere "ballotbox fools" (*Stimmvieh*). In 1950 — after a salami-tactic had succeeded in excluding non-communist parties — he was silenced, and worked as a librarian. During the last days of the Hungarian revolution, as representative of the populist Petöfi Party (successor to the National Peasants Party from the 1945 coalition), he was included in Imre Nagy's multi-party government as a secretary of state. Even after the occupation of parliament during the second Soviet invasion on Nov. 4, Bibo did not leave the government building and wrote memoranda seeking a compromise solution with the Soviet Union. "Bibo's proposal is absurd," wrote Vajda, "because he assumes that after Nov. 4, anyone could believe that the Soviet Union was at the given moment ready for a reasonable compromise. The content of his proposal is concealed behind the announcement of a *possibility in principle*. It is concealed behind the knowledge that the creation of a limited multi-party system and a socialist system based on conditional sovereignty in Eastern European countries is not absurd in principle, since this would not endanger the world-political balance which originated after World War II nor, therefore, the interests of the Soviet Union."

But the demands of the newly elected Central Workers' Committee could not be limited by such geo-political conceptions. They called for a multi-party system, the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the return of the Imre Nagy administration. Whereas Bibo wrote his memoranda alone, the workers' councils knew that the entire working class was behind them in their demands. Bibo had to pay heavily for writing this plan: he was imprisoned until March 1963 and after his amnesty he was again employed as a librarian — and completely ignored.

So why did the 76 authors compile this anthology, originally conceived to commemorate Bibo's 70th birthday, and what does this event have to do with the 1956 revolution? "The issue concerns Hungary's consolidation in the Kadar era, which, it seems, followed the year 1956 faster than the 1867 settlement followed the 1848 revolution, and which was as much based on lies as its predecessor.... The Bibo-*Festschrift* documents the retraction of this compromise" (Vajda). But the dissolution of the compromise applies only to the Hungarian intelligentsia, which — at least in part — recognizes its collaboration in this "construct of lies."

The Hungarian intellectual opposition hardly concerned itself until now with the extent to which the working class, whose serious defeat in 1956 with the smashing of its institutions, the workers' councils, first made this "compromise" possible, ever participated in Kadarism. It is not doubted that the workers were in part integrated through material concessions. However, the feeling of defeat, the physical liquidation of the most conscious groups of Hungarian working men and women, certainly left serious scars. In 1956 the intelligentsia itself was hardly threatened with mass repression as much as the workers were. "The true fighters and losers of the revolution were the workers," says Haraszti.

The logical conclusion is that true opposition can consist only in establishing continuity with 1956. "Kadarism's double talk is no longer regarded as an achievement, but as a lie" (Haraszti). This "quest for ancestors," as Dr. Andras Knopp, in his (spy-)report on the Bibo-*Festschrift* to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party sees it — the questioning and rejection of the entire historical course followed since 1945 — is the essential element of the commemorative volume. For the first time it places the Hungarian opposition in a historical continuity and seeks a link with the 1956 workers' struggles — though at first just symbolic.

Along with literary studies, all social problems of contemporary Hungarian society

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

find a place in the various sociological articles: whether the Jewish question in Akos Marvanyi's article, or the question of the Gypsy minority in the article by Zsolt Csalog. Even the question of ecology and the problem of atomic energy are addressed. To such themes the official party critique in the Knopp report merely interjects that the authors' main concerns are linked with various secondary issues, "each of which taken by itself is problematic from a political standpoint.... In the given situation...their common minimal program, however small its basis, is to make room for a healthy development aiming for a commonly oriented stance beyond the separation of the natural interests of social forces. To achieve this goal, they take up and support the real or supposed injuries, possibilities of separation of every minority (national minorities, the poor, Gypsies, religious groups)." This is what the (spy-)report says, along with detailed instructions on how to proceed against individual authors.

One thing especially irritates party officials: that for the first time, successful and marginalized members of the intelligentsia are agreeing and cooperating. But the *Festschrift* becomes a major political event only through the analytical articles — a good 20 of them. None of them deals exclusively with current questions, each approaches its subject with theoretical depth. The authors treat the values of democracy, the repression of the revolutionary élan of the Hungarian people, the need for limited sovereignty, the need for and limits of compromise (a theme Bibo examined quite often) and self-management. Several authors treat the question of the relation of state and society. All in all, however, the tone and spirit of the Czech Charter 77 prevails rather than that of the Polish opposition of the years 1975-1980. The almost total absence of Marxism, of the Marxist tradition, is noteworthy. This has been justified only in recent years in the Hungarian oppositional tradition.

Probably the most interesting contribution in the Bibo volume is Donath's. It examines Hungarian history between 1945 — the year of liberation, which was felt as such by the populace more than as an "occupation" — and 1956. Donath, a veteran Communist and under Rakosi in prison together with Kadar, contributed an essay titled "Istvan Bibo and the Basic Questions of Hungarian Democracy." In this article, which follows here in an abridged version, he examines the events of the Hungarian revolution from the perspective of the function of the self-management organs which had arisen even in the first days of the revolution in the form of workers' councils. Whereas for most portrayals, the events break off on November 4, for Socialists it can just begin there: on this day, when the Soviet troops first intervened and marched into Budapest bringing Kadar with them, overnight all previous bourgeois and rightists groups were abolished. The Imre Nagy administration retreated to the Yugoslav Embassy. At this point the Hungarian working class came on the stage as the only force capable of defending the revolution. The political defeat of the revolution was decided not on November 4, but in the week-long battles between the Kadar regime and Budapest's Central Workers' Council which the marionette government, supported by the Soviets, could oppose only with terror and violence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1956 AND SELF-MANAGEMENT*

by Ferenc Donath

For Hungarian supporters of social progress, the year 1945 began with an exceptional historical situation. The powerful domestic forces which had prevented the replacement of the feudal-hierarchic world by democratic social institutions collapsed right before our eyes. But what was the fundamental question of Hungarian democracy at that time? What was the question on whose answer the future development of social life most depended? Was it the coalition of the democratic parties and the maintenance of this alliance? Or the strengthening of the position of the leftist parties within the coalition, so that the political preconditions for the radical reconstruction of the social and economic conditions were secured? Or was it the struggle against fascism and reaction, the self-defense of democracy, which included the repression of forces of restoration — if necessary, by the political police — as well as the restriction of party-establishment and voting rights? All these fundamental questions were extremely important at the time and in the forefront of the political life of Hungarian democracy.

But the question of democratic transformation itself was: will working people succeed — and to what extent — in securing solid, institutionalized positions to manage public affairs? And can a process of development be set in motion that excludes not only a pseudo-parliamentarism — e.g., corrupt delegates — which disguises the dictatorship of a minority, but also to initiate a process that points beyond a parliamentarism that observes the rules of "pure democracy," because this is only popular representation but not popular rule?

A genuine democratic turn in Hungary could have involved a form of regulation of the running of public affairs, which would have gradually created possibilities to include all working people directly in the settlement of important questions of smaller and larger communities — all the way to the largest, the nation.

The proof that such a change was not an unrealistic, doctrinaire idea in 1945 is supplied by the question that was most important at that time for future development: the quick and successful implementation of land reform. It was the work of several tens of thousands of small peasants, working in the land claims committees, who with the active participation of hundreds of thousands of colleagues shaped and created the new democratic land tenure system. The laws themselves provided only a flexible framework for that.

In 1945 few in the upper levels of political life interpreted democracy in such a way that its measure is direct participation of the working people in running public affairs. Not a single political party advocated such a democracy or, at most, temporarily and in exceptional cases. Public life was concerned primarily with the events of representative democracy; The direct participation of working people in public affairs hardly appears in the press at that time; it is reported on as a secondary, insignificant event or even as an aberration of democracy. It appeared therefore that the Hungarian people did not want to participate in public life.

*Originally published in *Gegenstimmen*, 6 (December 1981), pp. 16-18. Translated by David J. Parent. Ferenc Donath is a founding member of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, which was established Nov. 1, 1956, in a democratic multi-party system. Its program endorsed the revolution, the multi-party system, and democratic achievements. Donath remained faithful to these principles and in 1958 in the trial of Imre Nagy, he was sentenced to 12 years in prison. He had already been jailed in the Rakosi era together with Kadar. Released in 1963 under an amnesty, he engaged in agricultural research and the development of Hungarian agriculture.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But the facts point in another direction. The popular movement of 1945 is not an exceptional phenomenon in our most recent history: Three times in past centuries *Hungary's working populace* has expressed its will to participate in the exercise of political power. In the course of the crises that have shaken society — such as the collapse of the monarchy, the fall of Horthy's counter-revolutionary system, and the complete bankruptcy of the Rakosi dictatorship — the working people in mass movements seized the leadership functions with a striking naturalness, and tried to set relations between working society and the state on new foundations. Without initiative from above, the workers' harmony and readiness produced democratic agencies of astonishingly similar constitution, in part already in 1945, but especially in 1956, when a popular movement that demanded the radical change of the exercise of rule swept along the entire population — a popular uprising accompanied by armed revolts in the center of the country and in some cities.

The main political demands — independence of the country, reestablishment of civil rights, a return to the multi-party system — temporarily unified the country's populace, and this agreement gave the movement much power and momentum. The revolt's triggering factor was the deep dissatisfaction of the various social strata with the system's economic policy, with the conditions of production and ownership, and not least of all with the state's efforts to put all of society's vital expressions under its leadership and control without consideration for people's natural, legal and moral feelings. The uprising was the elementary outbreak of the indignation of a nation deeply humiliated and violated in its human and national feelings. But the "will to change" which united the nation concealed the very different strivings of social classes.

The specific nature of the 1956 popular revolt is marked by the common support of democratic and anti-democratic movements for the same goals. During the uprising, within hours the following forces were united into one camp: reactionary restorators who, in the last analysis, wanted to return on decisive points to relations before 1945 — or a version of this covered with a democratic veneer; democrats who stood on the 1945 foundation and wanted to continue public life as it had been until its interruption in 1947-48, and social forces — primarily the working class that wanted to correct parliamentary democracy by direct democracy.

But even in 1956 the unity of political action did not abolish the particular and contradictory interests expressed in the mass actions to change existing property relations: it merely pushed them to the background. These mass actions have a special significance under a dictatorship. Extremely direct and authentic, they inform world public opinion of the strivings of larger groups in society, and at the same time they also comprise the accelerated phase of a class' acquisition of self-consciousness. From this standpoint, the activity of the workers' councils in the phase between Oct. 23 and Dec. 10 is extremely instructive.

The framework and arena of mass actions are the variously named popular organs and other forms of popular assembly, demonstrations and mass movement — in 1956 just as in 1945. But: (a) In 1956 the number of power functions of popular executive organs and their active participants was much greater than in 1945. (b) They were not created as the result of a government decree or central agency, as the majority were in 1945, but they arose spontaneously, against the intention of the state leadership. (c) Neither in their origin nor in their work did the political parties play a role. The establishment in the economy — especially in industry — of self-management organs in which worker solidarity dominated and which were not split by direct party membership would have had far-reaching significance for future political institutions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In 1956 the popular movement raised the key question: How should the relation between state and working society be defined? This question was raised again and again in practice in the activity of the Budapest Central Workers' Council and the workers' councils of other regions, even more in the organization of the national workers' council and in negotiations with the government. After Nov. 4, 1956, the workers' councils announced their claim to participate in decisions concerning fundamental questions affecting the country or society and the control of the state organs of power. They demanded the total revision of the exercise of power. A fundamentally new phenomenon in 1956 was that the working classes in their mass actions expressed not only that they wanted to exercise direct rule, but that they set out in common to create new popular power organs, changing relations of production and ownership as the basis of the system.

For what else did they do — after they had elected their workers' councils and empowered them to take over leadership in the factories — but start transferring the plants that had previously been government-owned to real collective ownership? They did not act according to initiatives from above, as in Yugoslavia, they did not wait for appeals from the government, whose composition was changing each day, they did not bother with the appeal of the union council which had lost its credibility and respect. They acted quickly and decisively when history put them before the question of what was to happen with nationalized enterprises. Should they possibly allow that "popular representation" might give the enterprises back to the capitalists? Or should they take them over and thus take the first decisive step toward the formation of real collective ownership?

Whether the Hungarian workers were merely following their wishes or their political instinct, or whether they proceeded with knowledge of important contexts, it remains an indisputable fact and a historical act that even before Nov. 4 in the elections for provisory workers' councils, when the waves of anti-socialist mood overflowed, they unanimously took a stand against the restoration of capitalist conditions and for the establishment of a really socialist collective ownership. Official historiography cannot point to a single decree of a workers' council in support of capitalist restoration.

The numerically largest stratum in 1956, the small farmers, expressed in mass actions that they also wanted to exercise direct rule to restore and secure individual ownership, based on freedom and personal family work. The working peasants dissolved the production cooperatives which had been established by force, which they regarded as camouflaged state property and treated as such. After Nov. 4, 1956, farmers' councils were established nationwide.

Finally, as regards the relation of the popular movement to the political parties, there is an essential and politically important difference compared with 1945. Then, the enterprise committees of the factories stood under the influence and leadership of the two workers' parties and the union. The workers left the type, the time and the manner of changing the production conditions up to the party and union leaders. In 1956 we see no trace of this trust. The workers — most of them, at least — no longer wanted to trust parties to represent their interests. And this distrust did not extend only to the Communist Party. They demanded a multi-party system both before and after Nov. 4. But numerous documents support the assumption — even official historiography mentions it — that they did this because they regarded the multi-party system as a guarantee against the uncontrollable domination of a single party and against their vulnerability.

Among workers, the development of an emancipation from parties has grown

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stronger. The decrees of the workers' councils that no party organizations are permitted in the enterprises were obviously directed primarily against the organized Communist Party — for no other party existed — but the main motive was that they wanted to ward off the breakdown of class unity, which they saw as embodied in the workers' councils.

These facts and relations show that the hidden but real basic question of Hungarian democracy, of social development in general, is direct participation of the workers in the exercise of rule.

HUNGARY IN '56*

by Andras Hegedüs

"The more time the events leave for thoughtful men to reflect and suffering mankind to unite, the more perfectly the product which the present contains in its womb will appear into the world."[1] But in the second half of 1956 there was little time in Hungary to reflect and unite. We came too late, "we came too late all the time," as the poet writes.[2] In 1956 the leadership had gotten into a state characterized not only by the fact that "it was no longer capable of leading with the old methods," but it had simply become incapable of self-renewal and starting over on a clean page. Such a situation has never been repeated before or since, except in Poland in 1956, 1970 and 1980.

But, first of all, I must lead the reader through the chain of events, because my conclusions are comprehensible and acceptable only when the reader is clear about the facts considered true by the writer. Facts are stubborn matters, but those who have not experienced them directly can know them only through communication. This communication is basically the historian's task. Since October 1956 over a quarter of a century has gone by. A new generation has grown up since then, with no personal experience of the events of that time, and the available sources of information are characterized by complete schizophrenia.

We see two sharply contradictory standpoints: according to one, what took place was a glorious revolution; according to the other, a base counterrevolution. Hidden behind these two schools of judgment — quite obviously to everyone — are political interests that permit only an either-or question, and offer absolutely no place for a sociological approach that seeks to understand the occurrences. The adherents of both standpoints must falsify a series of historical facts in order to make their respective standpoints plausible.

These two — rigidly contrary — approximations are becoming a more and more unpleasant burden for the historian as the years go by and 1956 itself becomes increasingly a matter of history. The new generation now wants to judge strictly on the

*Originally published in *Gegenstimmen*, 6 (December 1981), pp. 20-28. Translated by David J. Parent. Born in Western Hungary in 1922, Andras Hegedüs was politically precocious: at 23 the youngest representative ever elected; six years later he was a member of the Politburo; in 1951 he became minister of agriculture and forestry; in 1953-55 first vice-minister president; 1955-56 minister president. In 1956 he fled to Moscow, studied sociology asnd gradually revised his original positions. In 1958 he returned to Hungary and became a university professor, but in 1973 he lost his teaching post and was expelled from the party. Since then he has been living in Budapest.

1. Karl Marx, *Briefe aus den deutsch-französischen Jahrbüchern*, MEW, Vol. 1 (Berlin, 1972).

2. Endre Ady, *Die zu spät Gekommen.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

basis of historical facts and becomes rightly impatient when it is presented patently false, one-sided, and incomplete descriptions from one side or the other. It is about time for historians — in the interest of credibility — to construct the facts so that October 1956 appears not exclusively as a counter-revolution (Ervin Hollos, Vera Lajtai)[3] or revolution (Bill Lomax),[4] but to study the actual course of events and draw their own conclusions from the facts. Here I cannot take on the historian's task. I would therefore like merely to be of service with a few contributions for an accurate reconstruction of the events. Before going into detail, we must in the interest of clarifying certain things distinguish sharply and clearly the three stages of the events whose social characters differ fundamentally, and whose social actors also were not the same: 1. The development of the inner-party and democratic opposition movement and the demonstration organized by it on Oct. 23; 2. The armed revolt; 3. The formation of workers' councils.

Basically, the democratic opposition was located within the party. As for their ideas and goals, most of them at first never went beyond the framework of a more or less radical structural reform. Between them and the regime — including myself among the latter — there was no eventual compromise based on honest dialogue that could have prevented sharper confrontation. Yet, the members of the leadership at that time would have had to try this, knowing full well that through such compromises most of them would have lost their posts. I have repeatedly mentioned this, as well as that in July 1956, when Rakosi was removed, not Gerö but Kadar should have replaced him as first secretary; and not I, but Imre Nagy should have succeeded as minister president. Such a compromise would in all probability have forestalled the next phase, armed revolt.

But the men in power in Eastern Europe are rarely able to make compromises entailing the loss of their positions. They know that their future is insecure and they fear not only to lose their job, but also for their life and that of their families. This is because these societies have not yet developed a normal process for replacing the power structure. In this regard, the 1956 Polish leadership was a rare exception: with Ochab at the top they found the path of compromise with the opposition led by Gomulka and thus avoided an almost certain nationwide outbreak of a popular and national uprising.

As early as 1956 a polarization began to take shape within the opposition that had arisen in the power structure. Two groups stood opposite to each other: (a) The opposition within the party apparatus which was characterized by a certain anti-intellectualism. Its members wanted primarily to reform party life and guarantee that the show trials would not be repeated. However, they did not question the monolithic nature of rule, but rather regarded "exaggerated liberalization" with hostile feelings. And (b) The opposition composed mainly of intellectuals, which became increasingly a democratic opposition. They chose their solutions mainly in terms of democracy. At first, they still clung to the concept of a radical socialist democracy. Later, however, they increasingly demanded the return to the popular-democratic multi-party system,[5] and for this reason they came into conflict with progressive, oppositional forces of the party apparatus. In the summer of 1956 Janos Kadar was the leading personality of the first movement; Irme Nagy, of the second.

In July 1956 this simmering conflict became clear to everyone when Janos Kadar —

3. Ervin Hollos, Vera Lajtai, *Köztarsasagter 1956* (Budapest, 1974).
4. Bill Lomax, *Hungary 1956* (London, 1976).
5. From 1945 to 1948, Hungary had a multi-party system in which the four most important parties formed a coalition: the Small Farmers' Party (Christian-Social), the National Farmers Party (leftist populist), the Social Democratic and the Communist parties. Starting in 1948, these parties were gradually eliminated by the notorious "salami tactic."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with the consent of the Moscow leaders — took over the office of first ranking secretary of the Central Committee, without a complete rehabilitation of Irme Nagy and his immediate circle having taken place. However, Kadar was not thereby violating any previously agreed upon solidarity, for there never was such an agreement between the two groups. He was simply following the "party line," which for him remained the essential standard despite his years of incarceration in socialist prisons.

The opposition with the party was thus from the beginning characterized by a certain heterogeneity, which followed from the variegated composition of its membership. Among its members were: (1) "The shaken ones" — those Communist functionaries who had undergone a deep moral catharsis. After Stalin's death and especially after the 20th Congress, they turned inward and, with deep guilt feelings, asked the nation for "forgiveness." (2) "The offended ones" — those who, though they always grabbed their share, had not received the posts they thought they deserved. They also blamed the failures on the same "counter-selection" that had led to their being passed over (because of politically motivated, grotesque "Aryanization attempts," e.g., many old Jewish Communists saw their unjustified slighting in this light). (3) "The rehabilitated" — those who, despite their Communist convictions (if anything, they followed the party line too much) were illegally denounced and victimized in the show trials. In addition to the survivors, this groups also includes the dependents of the victims: (4) "Those without party affiliation who were attracted to popular democracy." The brief post-war phase of popular democracy between 1945 and 1948 attracted into politics a good number of activists who sought a public role but had previously been condemned to passiveness by the Horthy system.[6] After the introduction of the Stalinist model in 1949, most of them had been condemned to submission or inaction. In retrospect, they saw the first three years as a heroic age and rebelled against the condemnation to inaction and in some cases even against submission.[7] (5) Students who were sobered by the screaming contrast between the lecture material on socialism and the real situation. Their activity in the opposition also reflected their parents' dissatisfaction. (6) "The driven ones" who, for various reasons, found themselves back in the opposition. There is no movement in which they cannot be found, but a movement should not be condemned because of their presence.

In regard to social goals, three main schools developed within the inter-party and democratic opposition. As to the fact that there was just a little time to elaborate ideas, these differences remained quite amorphous, so that the representatives of the various schools could not clearly distinguish their views from one another: (a) Probably the reform movement must be regarded as the most important and strongest group within the institutionalized framework of the state leadership model. They did not want to change the institutional system, but merely the course of the political and economic leadership. They wanted the sort of personnel changes that would have provided guarantees for the implementation and permanence of such changes. This way of thinking is typical mainly of the intra-party opposition. (b) The adherents of the Yugoslav model of self-management constitute a numerically smaller but very active

6. After the fall of the Soviet or Council Republic in 1919, Admiral Horthy ruled until 1944 as regent governor of Hungary. The parties of the workers' movement were restricted in their activities, but under various cover names they were able to continue functioning.

7. This group included, e.g., the activists of the NEKOSZ and the National Farmers Party. NEKOSZ was the organization of those living in public student dormitories. This was a leftist association of students that was already active under fascist rule and later became the center of the national-communist movement. The left populist Farmers' Party advocated land reform. It resembled similar parties in Romania under Maniu and in Bulgaria under Stambolijski.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

group. Immediately after the total bankruptcy of the fallacious anti-Yugoslav slander campaign,[8] and right after the 20th Congress, which unmasked Stalinist tyranny, Yugoslav social relations became popular in broad circles in Hungary. At the same time, there were not a few who, because of their previous Yugoslav ties or sympathies, had ended up in prisons or internment camps and now, after their rehabilitation, came out as enthusiastic propagandists for the Yugoslav model of self-management. (c) Finally, those belonging to the third group had in mind a new version of the old 1948 conditions. Within this opposition movement — but only here — they were at first in a minority, but their numbers grew steadily. This standpoint could play a significant role even within the inter-party opposition during the days of armed revolt.

Contributing greatly to the tragic outcome of the popular movement was the fact that the opposition could not clarify its program and that later, under external influence, the majority accepted the demand for a return to the multi-party system with complete disregard for the country's geopolitical location.

The second phase of the popular movement — armed revolt — began on the day of the demonstration (Oct. 23).[9] Its unleashers had no organizational link with the members of the above-described inter-party and democratic opposition. Only very few of them later got involved in armed combat. People from various schools and pursuing various goals organized into a fighting community (*Kampfgemeinschaft*).

The Hungarian government's official white books[10] convincingly show that the domestic reactionary forces were reactivated in 1956 partly as a direct result of Western agitation, partly due to the domestic political crisis. At the same time, however, these books offer absolutely no evidence as to whether those forces played any direct role in the outbreak of armed revolt. The same contradictory standpoint characterizes the series of articles of the Hungarian party organ now published 25 years after the events. On the whole, the evidence shows that the armed uprising was neither planned nor prepared, but had broken out spontaneously because of various kinds of accumulated dissatisfaction.

Even today, it is important to draw a sociologically accurate picture of who among the rebels came from where and what goals they sought. According to domestic apologetic literature, the majority came from the underworld of counterrevolutionaries and criminals. According to the 1956 emigrants,[11] they were convinced, "sincere," freedom fighters who were joined, mostly by accident, by a few criminals. Participation in such armed conflict, hopelessly foredoomed, can result from very deeply felt impulses (dissatisfaction that incites to revolt, goals that arouse enthusiasm) or from a complete lack of countermotives, which results in a drift into the suspenseful adventure, heightened by slogans of the national freedom struggle. Both extremes were represented, along with many shades in between. The influence of the rebels lay not so much in the number of weapons (they were really few; in a city of two million, there were around 20,000 weapons, and at any given time the number of fighters, according

8. In 1948 the Cominform broke with Tito, since he was not ready to submit to Stalin's line. Parallel with this, in Hungary a campaign began against the "fascist Tito."

9. *On Oct. 23, 1956, with the 16-point demands of the students at the University of Budapest,* the revolution began. By evening about 200,000 people had joined this demonstration.

10. In 1958 four volumes appeared on "the activities of the counterrevolution in the fall of 1956." Despite completely distorted descriptions, they remain one of the most precise sources on the events, and on a careful reading provide the best refutation for the official interpretation.

11. In Hungary, various waves of emigration must be distinguished. 1919: mostly communists and social democrats, who after the fall of the Council Republic had to flee from the "white terror"; 1945: mostly conservative, reactionary elements who had to flee from the Red Army or from the justice system; 1956: mass flight of all strata, politically relatively inactive.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to various estimates, was never more than 15,000) but in the fact that they knew they had the support of a considerable number of people, including workers.

Even if, because of silence and misinformation, it is difficult to determine who can be regarded as the typical armed rebel, I want to try it — though this attempt could displease both sides. Otherwise, we cannot draw a realistic picture of the sociological background of the armed struggles. (1) With few exceptions, the leadership of the fighting groups fell into the hands of those former trained officers, low-ranking officers and reserve officers, who had left the army for various reasons immediately after the war or in the early 1950s. Many of them had been in prisons and internment camps. (2) Young workers to whom the regime offered absolutely no hope and who worked under bad conditions for low wages. They saw only senseless toil in their future and wanted to pay back those who were to blame. (3) The students, mainly high school students, who became increasingly more conscious of the contradictions between their living experiences in their parents' homes and what they learned in school, and increasingly sensitized to the violation of national feelings. In school they received military training, education in the spirit of the 1848 struggle for independence and grotesquely this now became the main motive for their armed struggle against the regime: (4) The "ragged elements" of the big city, who wanted revenge for their humiliation and marginalization. With weapons at hand, they felt powerful and took every opportunity to establish their superiority over others. (In urban revolts, members of this stratum are always present in great numbers among the fighters.) The importance of this last group rose constantly, because the prison gates were opened, and not only political prisoners but also criminals were freed. Of course, for the sake of completeness it must be mentioned that among the criminals there were some for whom essentially political motives played a role in their sentencing.

The third phase of the popular movement was the occupation of factories by the working people, the formation of factory "revolutionary committees," or workers' councils, which in part supported armed revolt, but in part protected their factories from the consequences of mounting anarchy. Most historians who study this period are unable to grasp the simultaneous implementation of this dual but contradictory function. The domestic forerunners of this peculiar, potentially political self-management movement initiated from below were the workers' councils of the 1919 proletarian revolution and the system of factory committees after 1945. Apparently, however the Yugoslav model of self-management also exerted some influence. But, even here, a direct influence by the members of the opposition who sympathized with this model cannot be proven.

The participants of this third phase of the movement were also very heterogeneous. The most important types were the following: (1) Older workers or functionaries who longed for public activity (old Social Democrats, union representatives) and whom we had condemend to inaction or practically persecuted under the Stalinist system. (2) Younger, trained technicians or white-collar workers, who had not accepted the illusory public sphere of the regime, and thus had been forced into a passive opposition. (3) Plant-level employees, who had achieved social renown in some area (sports, culture).

The dynamic groups whose active members became catalysts in the individual phases of the popular revolt expressed in one way or another the dissatisfaction of the underlying social strata. The power apparatus could not restrain these mainly because it had frozen the reforms begun in June 1953.[12] Thus, the basic complaints of both workers and intellectuals remained unanswered. (a) *Workers* (whose composition

12. Imre Nagy became minister president in 1953 and began relaxing Rakosi's policies. Two years later he was deposed and expelled from the party.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

incidentally was extremely heterogeneous because of the flight from the land, the mass declassification in the cities, etc.) were rightly dissatisfied with the slow growth of their living standard. They had not forgotten the lowering of their living standard in 1952, the massive work-norm regulations, the mandatory "peace-loan" contributions, and the Stakhanovite manipulations. Moreover, those who longed for public activity knew that they had wound up in absolute subordination asnd that all possibilities for the creation of autonomous interest representations and independent movements had been taken away from them. (b) *Farmers* who had owned land before 1949 were dissatisfied with the brutal collectivization, the frequent land consolidations and the state investment policy (after the land reform, most farmers belonged to this group). Members of cooperatives and workers on state properties lived and worked under extremely unfavorable conditions. It was generally known that the costs of rapid industrialization were mostly borne by agriculture through low prices, progressive taxation, etc. Basically, socialist industry was not supporting agriculture, but agriculture — and within it, private farming — bore the burdens of industrialization. (c) The *intelligentsia*, to the extent that its ranks were filled by the "people" (the NEKOSZ movement, which originated in 1945, played a significant role in this), demanded a national regime under which popular talents could develop in the service of national renewal and develop a blossoming national culture. But after the "Year of Changes" (1949), these hopes had been frustrated. The servile adoption of the Soviet model had become universal and it had resulted in the abolution of every autonomous national aim.

To this widespread dissatisfaction was added the above-mentioned deep crisis of the power structure, which turned out to be essential in the chain of events. This crisis also produced an increasing sense of guilt in those in power, resulting in internal opposition and paralyzing those who still stuck to the "line." The rehabilitation of the victims of the show trials against Communist Party leaders (Rajk and comrades) and of those condemned in closed hearings (Kadar, Kallai) was a disturbing experience for the members of the apparatus. What they had previously merely suspected now became a certainty. They had been pinch hitters in a hideous game when they questioned the victims of the show trials or exercised self-criticism for their lack of alertness for not having reported someone close who was later labeled a traitor in the trials.

Thus, criminals permeated the whole power structure and no one could escape a self-examination. All this climaxed in the fact that the *apparatchiki* were well aware of the methods employed during the Communist takeover before the trials and which, at best, could be justified only by the principle that "the end justifies the means." Though the rehabilitation did not generally affect illegal procedures used against non-communists (for example, the Ferenc Nagy "conspiracy" or the Mindszenty trial), the illegality of these trials also was evident to every right-thinking person. Similarly, most of those in power were responsible for the mass law violations after 1949, for the exile, for intimidating court judgments that replaced consensus, and for internments. All of this could not have been remedied by our silence, nor by the fact that the situation had become more bearable after June 1953. Only an intelligent reform policy could have restored the disintegrating legitimation of the power structure, thus enabling a nation with a long memory to forget.

In 1956, the Hungarian leadership showed itself unable to do this. But perhaps it is time to shift to the first person plural. In the real sense of the word we were no longer orthodox Marxist-Leninists. The majority of us were led by practical considerations, having to do with retaining power. Still, our belief in the correctness of our ideology, which was not so much a "guideline" for our practical activity as it was the confirmation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of our deeds (including misdeeds), played a central role. We disregarded the obvious fact that this ideology, which we portrayed as infallible, had, with the partial admission of the crimes of Stalinism, suffered a severe blow. This could not be simply postponed by attributing all problems to the personality cult, i.e., essentially to personal errors, while forgetting the errors in the system and in the ideology.

Dogmatic Marxism-Leninism, which rejected every critical approach, prevented any dialogue from developing between those in power and the opposition who criticized both practice and ideology, mainly on an ethical basis. This prevented us from agreeing on a common pattern of development modeled on the Polish example. The development of both the inter-party and of the democratic opposition must be regarded as a historical necessity. After all, the power structure was led by a group that had, shown itself unable, without outside pressure, to carry out the radical reforms whereby a compromise with workers, farmers and intellectuals could have been reached — reforms which could have legitimated domination in a sociological sense. This legitimacy turned out to be unattainable without this outside pressure. Without radical changes in personnel, it was an impossible task. This became increasingly clear to the main political participants in the summer and early fall of 1956.

This generated an extremely tense situation. The country demanded generally democratic processes. Those in power, including myself, feared that any significant concession entailed a weakening of power. Without such concessions, however, a mass movement threatened to develop, prefiguring a sharp confrontation. This danger was underestimated both by those in power and by the opposition. Government leaders tried to scare opposition leaders with the danger of a counterrevolution. But they did not really quite believe it themselves. Confronted with an increasing influence, the democratic and inter-party opposition no longer felt in command of the situation. At the same time, however, it acted with moderation and realism. The appeal of the committee of intellectuals which was worked out for the student demonstration on Oct. 23, still contained the following demands: "Comrade Imre Nagy and others fighting for socialist democracy and Leninist ideas should participate in the party leadership and government in suitable positions." "In the interest of further strengthening Soviet-Hungarian friendship, we should shape relations to the Soviet party, state and people on the Leninist foundation of complete equality."

Yet, under the influence of various radical elements, the demands adopted by the demonstration leaders of the Technical University already contained apolitical and unrealistic goals, such as: "Withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact," "Withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the country," "Declaration of neutrality." The slogans of the demonstration were formulated and passionately proclaimed on this basis. "Yugoslavs, Poles — our slogans are the same!" "Russia's army must go home, Do not let Stalin stand here!" chanted the crowds that had grown to several tens of thousands. The burning of red flags and the removal of red stars from public buildings began at the same time.

On the first day of the popular struggle, the old leadership showed its narrow-mindedness and inability to seek negotiation and a political solution. This is best documented by Ernö Gerö's speech.[13] Similarly, the demonstration's militant leadership, with its 16 points ignoring geopolitical factors, the division of the world and the Hungarian foreign policy situation, showed its lack of political understanding. The government leaders' behavior was seen by the masses as a provocation. The behavior of the demonstration leaders, however, was an invitation to the Soviet leadership.

13. Ernö Gerö, new party secretary, gave a speech on Oct. 23, in which he called the demonstrators counterrevolutionaries and fascists.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moreover, thinking in false analogies, the Hungarian leadership expected the same result from the appearance of Soviet tanks as in East Berlin in June 1953. Mistake followed mistake, and this could scarcely have had any other results than those that followed. The course of things could no longer be channeled in a direction that would have brought a rational solution.

The outbreak of armed struggle was not long in coming. On the very first day of the popular movement, gunshots echoed around the radio station. It is the task of historians to determine who shot first and when. All the preconditions for an armed revolt existed. Neither those in power nor the democratic and inter-party opposition had control of the streets. The masses' demands went far beyond what even the most radical reformers had ever considered realizable and meaningful. The initial outbreak of armed conflict was typically irrational. The demonstration's more radical leaders wanted to have the above-mentioned 16 points read over the radio. In order to do so, they wanted to occupy the radio station, not knowing that broadcasts could have been switched anytime to a bunker that originally served as an air raid shelter. (After the radio station was occupied, this switch actually took place.) Only leaders of a spontaneous movement can be so naive as to overlook such obvious connections.

The representatives of the inter-party and democratic opposition were just as unprepared for an armed uprising as those in power. As the leader of the first phase of the popular uprising on Oct. 23 and in the following days, Imre Nagy (according to various documents and my direct experiences) still wanted to proceed "according to the party." However apolitical this may sound, it was a direct result of his entire career. Imre Nagy ran increasingly into conflict with his role as a charismatic popular tribune, which he had established as minister of land reform in 1945, developed further in 1953 as prime minister, and perfected during the popular uprising. I still see him before me, sitting tired, collapsed in an armchair in Gerö's room. He still does not know whether he is heading toward the victory or defeat of that reformed socialism for which he had been working in recent years; whether he will be a successful popular tribune or a fallen opposition politician. His first reactions to the old leadership's proposals are resigned and tolerant. (He accepts the post of prime minister unconditionally, agrees to call on the Soviet army for aid, as well as to proclaim martial law and undertake other similar measures.)

At the same time, Nagy initially sought a compromise and a political solution with the armed rebels — although he still regarded them as opponents who had resorted to arms because of the old leadership's mistakes or under the influence of Western enemy propaganda. He was temporarily alienated from those leaders of the democratic opposition who immediately saw armed revolt as a national revolution guaranteeing the realization of their goals. This isolation was overcome on the third day of armed revolt, when the leaders of the various groups of democratic and inter-party opposition came into the party leadership.

Within this now very heterogeneous leadership, three contrary standpoints developed concerning armed conflict: (1) Armed revolt must be put down by force of arms; political concessions can be made, but only to mollify the mood on the streets and to neutralize the masses — the typical standpoint of the old leadership. (2) It is necessary to negotiate with the armed rebels without giving up one's own military might. Rather "staunch" party functionaries must be armed — the typical standpoint of the inter-party opposition. (3) Armed revolt must be regarded as a national revolution; one must assume its leadership and together establish peace, order and end encroachments. After some hesitation, on the suggestion of his advisers, Imre Nagy accepted this last

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

platform as early as Oct. 28.

Thus, the country was rapidly racing toward catastrophe. This could no longer be altered by the fact that the united protectors of order attained a measure of success in restoring public calm after Nov. 1. But this happened under domestic and foreign policy considerations which were becoming increasingly unacceptable, not only for the Warsaw Pact countries, but also for the Yugoslav leadership.

The apolitical and unreal demands of the student demonstration of Oct. 23 increasingly became the government's program. Thus, the apolitical stance of some militants became a fateful political error. This process was accelerated by Western propaganda, which was characterized by a kind of double game. On the one hand, it cheered the Imre Nagy government's precipitous and apolitical decisions, while on the other, it encouraged the rebels to strengthen their ranks and to extract from the government as many concessions as possible on the basis of their own force of arms.[14] The whole nation was exhilirated. Among the participants in the popular movement, no one paid any attention to reality any more. Thus, Nov. 4 reached Hungarian society both as a cold shower and as a fateful beating of military drums.

Afterward, a kind of pluralistic structure remained in existence for a time. Most social organizations preserved the autonomy they had fought for. The workers' councils and the revolutionary committees continued to function in the enterprises as self-management organs. It does not seem totally impossible to assume that even at that time a pluralism without a multi-party system could have developed. But at that time one was not yet ideologically prepared for developing such a model. General thinking gravitated between false alternatives: either a monolithic or a multi-party system; either socialism of the Soviet type or capitalism. Logically, the new regime saw only the first alternative as a safe basis for strengthening its rule.

After the uprising was defeated, impatience was pervasive on both sides. The principle "Whoever is not with us is against us" prevailed. This led to the tragic trial against Imre Nagy and others and to widespread repression of the first years. But those who entered into the restored power structure — at least most of them — drew their lessons from 1956. Even though hardly any essential changes were made in the institutional system, their policy — with smaller or greater relapses — is concerned with forming and maintaining consensus. The question remains whether this direct experience, which those still in power today experienced cathartically, is transmissable to the new generation of rulers. It will be especially fateful if historians neglect their duty and do not act as faithful chroniclers of history.

14. Free Europe Committee, *Die Volkserhebung in Ungarn* (Munich, 1956).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books from: Telos Press



Lucien Goldmann

Cultural Creation in Modern Society
$4.50 paper; $14 cloth

Essays on Method
in the Sociology of Literature
$4.50 paper; $14.50 cloth

Jean Baudrillard



For a Critique of the
Political Economy of the Sign
$4.50 paper; $14 cloth

Mirror of Production
$3.95 paper only

Marx and Engels on Literature and Art
Lee Baxandall, Stefan Morawski, eds. $3.95 paper; $9.50 cloth

Towards a New Marxism
Bart Grahl, Paul Piccone, eds.
$3.95 paper; $12 cloth

Essays on the
New Working Class
Dick Howard, Dean Savage, eds.
$4.50 paper; $12 cloth

Political Plays for Children
Jack Zipes, ed. $4 paper only

Send with check or money order (U.S. currency only) to TELOS PRESS, Box 3111, St. Louis, Mo. 63130 USA. *Foreign order add 10%.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE LEFT IN THE MALLANDS

by Pedro C.U. Cavalcanti

A more appropriate compromise name for the Falkland or the Malvinas would be a combination of the two: the Mallands Islands (in Spanish *mal* means "bad"). If anything, the Mallands War has been bad for the Latin American masses, world peace and Democracy. Such a defeat was clear even before the outcome of the battles, regardless of which side won, since the military all over the continent were immediately asking for more sophisticated weaponry to be paid by Latin Americans — thus intensifying their economic problems. It is well-known that weapons in these countries are almost always used against the very people who paid for them, jeopardizing even more efforts for democratization and to the betterment of social and political life.

The following notes do not deal with the war itself, or with history to prove who really owns these islands. Nor do they deal with the misfortunes of the British Left where the British Labour Party almost *demanded* military action from the conservative government. (Did it consider that military action impossible, so that Thatcher's image would be tarnished because of this alleged impotence? Or is the Labour Party so nationalist that it *really* wanted military confrontation?)[1].Similarly, they do not focus on the rest of the Western European Left, most of which went along with national geopolitical interests — especially since it could easily oppose a fascist dictatorship (the colonial issue was conveniently de-emphasized). By and large, the Left in power followed its "strategical needs" and played "Realpolitic" (England literally paid a price for that by making concessions in the Common Market). Other autonomous forces, like the Italian Communist Party, and other movements with no immediate hopes of gaining state power in their respective societies, could afford to take more critical positions. Spain supported Argentina. But Spain, after all, is "*la Madre-Patria*". As to the U.S. Left, it seemed to be at a loss. All of this, however, remains outside of the immediate task.

These notes will discuss *only* the Latin American Left in order to throw some light on why it behaved the way it did. It was not just another proof of the Left's incompetence, since that is part of a broader world-wide phenomenon: the abandonment of the very values upon which the Left was founded. (One could almost say that it confirms the deterministic argument that underdevelopment only gives rise to an underdeveloped Left). Worse yet, it revealed a fatal flaw in the present political outlook of the Left in Latin America.

From Nationalism to Thirdworldism

As is well known, during the war the Argentine Junta received overwhelming support from all sides in Argentina. As usual, since WWI, the Left could not resist the lure of "patriotism."[2] But what about the Left in other Latin American countries? What

1. As for the British Left that opposed the war — a very minimal section of British society — it would have been appropriate to call those islands "Malvinas," instead of "Falklands" to be consistent with its alleged anti-colonialism. True to form, the *New Left Review* has published a special issue on "War over the Falklands," n. 134, July-Aug. 1982.

2. In one particular case I am familiar with, a young man in exile called his mother from abroad in order to know what he should do, and was told to "come home, son, come home to defend your fatherland!"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prompted it to follow the Argentinian Junta? All their public arguments focused on the historical rights of Argentina over the Malvinas. Without a doubt, the British took the Malvinas in a typical colonialist fashion. Even the 1966, 1974, and 1976 United Nations resolutions treated the Malvinas case as one of sheer colonialism. Few people ever challenged that, even in England: negotiations with former British governments implicitly recognized that. But the fact is that after 149 years nothing had happened: the Malvinas remained the Falklands.

Historical rights are a powerful argument — especially for the Left. Unfortunately, history must have its agents. The Left was not concerned with the Malvinas before. It jumped on the bandwagon of the Argentinian military after the crises began, when it seemed an easy victory over "capitalism," "colonialism" and "imperialism," as defined by Leninism. Thus, the Left and the military Junta were on the same side. But that is not History's fault: it was the Left's choice. What mobilized the masses was nationalism. The overt political ideology was "thirdworldism."

Nationalism has been fundamental for the formation of new nations. It had an undeniable role in Africa in the sixties, or Asia after the end of WWII. Since Latin American countries were formed at the beginning of the 19th century, nationalism there played another role: the defence of weak and dependent economies against foreign domination and control. Thus, some nations have historically managed to establish mercantilist policies with the state playing a decisive role in key sectors of the economy. There, this modern mercantilism fought a "laissez-faire, laissez-aller" policy that could only benefit foreign domination and, presently, large transnational corporations. This is how there came to be vast state sectors in many Latin American countries, however, the state sector was never permitted to develop democratic traditions of social and working participation.

Nationalism has also provided a sense of national identity by emphasizing cultural traditions — especially in countries such as Mexico with past Indian civilizations. It generally tends to prevent those societies from being completely swallowed by North-American social and economic values, and patterns of behavior encouraged by foreign mass media such as TV and the movie industry.

But nationalism has a chauvinist counterpart which large sectors of the Latin American Left overlook. For example, in Brazil, the Left was persecuted while fighting for nationalist causes such as the formation of a state owned oil enterprise. After the 1964 coup, however, the Brazilian military not only vastly expanded state intervention in the economy, but also used nationalism to create a "big nation" spirit in order to gain popular support. Thus, anti-imperialism, the original impetus for adapting nationalist political positions, must be distinguished from nationalism. Yet, nationalism and anti-imperialism remain confused. This confusion partly explains the Left's behavior during the Malvinas crisis. It also throws light on why the left is always keen to find a "good nationalist general" to establish its dictatorship, which is, naturally, "liberating."[3] But, to the extent that, during the last few years, various right-wing dictatorships have appropriated nationalism, in many countries the Left has lost the monopoly of it. Considering the oppressive regimes that took over, it became awkward for the Left to play the same music. Thus, old nationalism turned into "thirdworldism."

3. In an odd kind of way, General Jaruzelski's *coup* appeared as a new development only because he did it in Eastern Europe. The Polish generals did not create any trauma for Marxist-Leninist forces in the Third World! They would love to have their Jaruzelski to impose "socialist" law and order.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This *thirdworldism* has been taking shape from the times of the Vietnam war, the struggle for the formation of new countries in Southern Africa, and the civil wars in Central America.[4] Today, thirdworldism has regained importance because of the decay of the Soviet Union and its loss of prestige as "the land of *The Revolution*." China dealt the first blow to the unity of that worldwide political movement. But China lost its initial appeal soon thereafter. And Albania, with all its purity, could not take over international leadership. The fact is that Poland scares the hell out of people. Who wants to live in a "socialism" such as that in Poland? And, of course, Afghanistan also adds to the perplexities concerning what socialism is all about.

So, it has become increasingly difficult to identify with Moscow, Chinese or Albanian versions of Marxism-Leninism. The totalitarian Left found its way out of this ideological impasse in Thirdworldism. Since it had become impossible to argue that Good was on the side of socialism and Evil was represented by capitalism, world contradictions were reduced to the antagonism between developed and underdeveloped countries. Thus, imperialism is evil — something undoubtedly true — and all exploited countries in the Third World represent revolutionary forces — something undoubtedly false. This has led to fantastic alliances such as the support of Khaddafi and so many other anti-imperialist Third World dictators. And since, "objectively," imperialism comes only from the West, geopolitical tactics silence any criticism of the Soviet Union. In a way, there is nothing much new in this more recent Left ideology. It is a new version of Maoism, city against countryside, or the Cuban theory of "foquismo," where the countryside also should encircle reactionary urban centers corrupted by capitalism. The only original feature is the playing down of "socialism," which has become an embarassing word.

Latin American Thirdworldism

The Malvinas war provided the perfect opportunity to pull Latin American Thirdworldism together. It allowed the resuscitation of nationalist feelings; not a very difficult task, and concentrated on the attack against capitalist imperialism — "the only one that is really a threat to Latin American nations." The Malvinas war was also an opportunity to show how the U.S. was not on the American side, since it sided with England. The same applied to Western Europe, which also sided with England. This was very important because it showed that European socialism was not really revolutionary, that social democrats are traitors, and that the democratic Left is but "a fraud and a disguise for the retention of the capitalist mode of production." The Thirdworldists saw this as a perfect historical moment to mobilize the masses to their cause.

But those hopes did not materialize. The naive argument that, whatever the war's outcome, an insurmountable division had been created between the U.S. and the Latin American countries, was obviously false. Whatever anger some Latin American governments may have felt against the U.S., now that the war is over things have fallen back in their proper place, i.e., Latin American right wing forces, military and ruling classes, have not broken with their main support and ally. National interests do not always take precedence over class interests . . . It is interesting that Marxists could have thought otherwise!

The Left's support for the Junta was justified with spurious arguments. First, of

4. Actually, its roots go farther back in the Bandung conference, in the movement of the nonaligned countries led by people such as Nehru, Nasser, Tito. Then, however it had another historical function. It helped to free the world from the Cold War atmosphere. It believed in the possibilities of creating an alternative world force.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

course, the support was not meant for the Junta, but for the Argentinian people (who, by the way, were supporting the Junta). Second, democratization was to follow the war. Democracy, of course, has yet to come. What is most absurd in this thesis is that, in case of an Argentinian military victory, the Junta, stronger because of the British defeat, would yield political power to civilians for the sake of democratic ideals. But deeper and more entrenched assumptions are responsible for the Left's illusions. Consider the very idea of Latin America.

There has been a frequent misuse of "Latin America" as a catch-all concept. People write books and articles about *Latin America*, when in fact they are really referring to a country, or a few of them, whose realities do not correspond to those of many other countries in the same geographical area. This is a typical manifestation of Eurocentrism or the Hollywood vision of "Latin America": in a sophisticated way, it portrays the image of lazy or drunk peasants taking their *siesta*, with corrupt and stupid military leaders running their countries. No one confuses Switzerland with Greece, Spain with Sweden, Portugal with West Germany or England with Italy even though all of these countries are in Europe. By the same token, there are no reasons to put together Brazil and Haiti, Mexico or Paraguay, or Nicaragua and Argentina, although all these countries are in Latin America. How can one think that, since they are all part of Latin America, it is possible to propose one political solution for all those nations? But this is precisely what some sectors of the Left do — especially the thirdworldist faction.[5] And, allegedly, the ultimate, necessary and definitive solution can only be the Revolution and the adaption of the Leninist model.

This mystifying way of looking at Latin America obscures the rich multiplicity of national realities. It attempts to provide uniformity to very different cultures and traditions — especially political ones. While one could understand how the intelligentsia of "developed" countries can make this mistake, the same mistake seems absurd if made by the Left in that very continent. Yet, it is commonly made. It is made, first of all, because the Latin American Left's alienation and its tendency to imitate its European counterpoint. Secondly, because it serves the political purpose of thirdworldism to hypostasize revolutionary examples (Cuba is the perfect model), as the only political solutions for the oppression and exploitation by American imperialism.

This thirdworldist ideology explains why the Left allied itself with the continent's agressive right-wing forces — especially those which have border problems with their neighbors.[6] As with ideologies such as nationalism, national chauvinists and Stalinist thrirdworldists again joined forces. This Left soon forgot the "disappeared ones" — the children of the mothers of Plaza de Mayo, and the price the Argentinian people paid and will continue to pay for this military adventure. Mass graves with bodies of over 1000 people were recently discovered near Buenos Aires. Many thousands are

5. While it may appear contradictory to refer to a Latin American Left after having argued that "there is no such a thing as Latin America," it makes sense to do so to the extent that it is unified by a totalitarian ideology in a particular geographical area.

6. It is not accidental that the Bolivian and Peruvian military were the first to support their Argentinian friends. Peru has problems with Equador, and would love to regain the present north part of Chile, which it lost in war at the end of the last century. Bolivia centers its nationalist feelings around the conquest of "*a salida al mar*" (a way out of the sea), also lost to Chile in the past. Similarly, it is no wonder that the Chilean military kept a very low profile during the whole affair: they had strong reasons to suspect that a solution similar to the one sought in connection with the Malvinas would eventually be sought in the dispute about the Beagle canal in case of an Argentinian military victory.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

still missing. But that did not bother these Leftist forces. Demonstrations in favor of Argentinian democracy, promoted before the war, were soon forgotten.

The Malvinas, of course, are an instance of colonialism. But Churchill was no less colonialist than Thatcher, and there was no problem with supporting Britain in WWII.[7] The Malvinas war was more than an anti-colonialist war. For the Latin American Left, it was a confrontation between the Third World and Imperialism, Good and Evil, Revolution and Reaction.

Thirdworldism is a simplistic answer to the problems of Third World nations. It replaces totalitarian Leftist ideologies such as Maoism, "foquism," and Stalinism as the pure essence of Marxism. Today, however, most people reject dictatorship as a solution to their problems: the failures of totalitarian socialism are too vivid in their minds. This is the reason why Marxism-Leninism today disguises itself as Thirdworldism.

The Democratic Left

It is all too easy to criticize the Left. More difficult, yet absolutely indispensable, is to propose alternatives. To do so today, it is necessary to abandon many cherished myths. It is time to stop assuming that all revolutions are always progressive. It was good that the Shah fell but there was no reason to embrace Khoumeini. Nor are revolutions progressive forever. China is a good example here. And those who shoot should not be confused with revolutionaries: for a long time many of the Left sympathized with Western European terrorists glorified as "urban guerrillas"!

It is also time to stop believing the *The People* are always right. Large portions of *The People* supported Hitler and Mussolini. Nor is the working class always on the "correct side of History": workers in Chile, e.g., the miners in El Teniente, did strike against Allende's government in a most unfavorable time and for corporative reasons.

Most of all, the Soviet Union today must be disassociated from the Bolshevik revolution. Brezhnev has as much in common with 1917 as Louis Bonaparte with 1789. Similarly, to denounce the Czech or the Afghanistan invasion entails being (should one say, *objectively?*) anti-communist: those invasions were carried out by communists. One must not fear being anti-Soviet — after all, there have been no "soviets" in the USSR in more than 60 years! Parts of the Left have internalized this fear so much that it demands special considerations when it comes to criticize the Soviet Union. These are people who still consider the USSR "the motherland of the Revolution."

The Soviet Union is definitely not Left. It is a totalitarian state, and all totalitarian forces must be considered as belonging to the Right. Being against Western imperialism does not make the USSR an ally of the Left. Stalinism is not a Leftist ideal. Neither was the Russian nobility, nor is Trotskyism: not all oppositions to a form of totalitarianism are necessarily not themselves totalitarian! It is time to uncompromisingly state that the Left is either for Democracy or it is not a Left anymore. This does not mean *liberal* democracy, but it must incorporate the liberal achievements. The Democratic Left fights for freedom and *equality* — conscious of the antinomies embodied in our struggle. Such a Left cannot talk about Poland without talking about Argentina. It is concerned with the right of self-determinism in Central America as well as in Afghanistan.

7. The Argentinian militay, of course, did not, since they were overwhelmingly pro-nazi. Only geography explains why they did not get involved on the Nazi side. Up to January 1944, Argentina was the only country in Latin America with diplomatic relations with Germany and Japan.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This Left must be ethically consistent. There are no good and bad concentration camps, there are no bad and "necessary" tortures. Political prisoners must be freed in Chile as well as Cuba.[8]. The Nicaraguan government loses support when it prevents a commission from Solidarity to visit its country: it encourages skepticism as the future of Democracy there.

If democracy as a consistent and endless search for more freedom and equality is the fundamental goal, it is necessary to take responsibilities even under the most difficult circumstances — and the Malvinas crisis did not even qualify as one. The Argentinian Junta's adventure risked increasingly the chances for more localized wars to "solve" frontier claims in Latin America. These questions of frontiers cannot be relevant questions for the Left. It is its duty to prevent this from becoming a national political priority in Latin America. In that continent, there is nothing even remotely comparable with a Palestinian right to a homeland.

The defeat of Argentina in the Malvinas war was a defeat of a militarist aggression by an aggressive military that for years has aimed its arms at its own people.

It is regrettable that it had to be done by the British navy, on a colonial question. And it is even regretable that the Argentinian people supported their oppressors. But it is suicidal for the cause of peace and Democracy that the Left does not immediately stand up, clarify the issues, identify the democratic forces, and take its critical position.

8. Cuba must no longer be regarded as a sanctuary where everything that goes on is either praised or glossed over in the name of protecting the 1959 revolution. Had it not been for the pressures by Mitterand, the poet Armando Villadares would still be in a Cuban jail after 22 years. Of course, it is great that all Cuban children can read! But after more than two decades it is time to ask *what* they are reading, as well as what *may* they read.

THE BENJAMIN-CONGRESS: FRANKFURT (July 1-3, 1982)

by Richard Wolin

Exactly ten years ago Suhrkamp Verlag published the first installment of an projected six-volume edition of Walter Benjamin's collected works (volume 3: *Kritiken und Rezensionen*) and simultaneously a volume entitled *Die Aktualität Walter Benjamin*, a collection of essays which sought to determine the contemporary relevance of the thinker who had died 40 years ago, but whose reception in West Germany was short of phenomenal. In 1972 Benjamin would have been 80 years old, and this fact served as the outward occasion for the Suhrkamp inquiry into Benjamin's *Aktualität*. The Benjamin congress in Frankfurt of last July sponsored by Suhrkamp attempted to accomplish a similar feat, though this time with a different external pretext: not only would Benjamin have turned 90 the month of the conference had he lived, but much more important was the appearance of his long-awaited *Passagenwerk* — volume five of the *Gesammelte Schriften* (Volume 6 of the edition, which will consist of autobiographical writings and fragments relevant to virtually all phases of his work, is scheduled to appear in 1983) — coinciding with the opening of the conference. Hence, one might say that expectations were high in a twofold respect: the public was anxious to receive information about the mysterious contents of the *Passagenwerk*; but also anxious to confront the questions of Benjamin's *Aktualität* in an era which had seen a crucial shift

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the critical reception of his work from a highly politicized, left-wing treatment in the late sixties and early seventies — in which essays such as "The Work of Art in the Era of Mechanical Reproduction" received pride of place — to a rather staid, conventional, and scholarly treatment in more recent years. According to some, Benjamin's work underwent a nearly lethal process of academic domestification which seemed diametrically opposed to his own self-understanding as a historical materialist in the 1930s.

If the conference failed in this latter respect, could it at the same time be held completely accountable for this failure? In other words, could one realistically expect such an artificial occasion — to be sure, conceived in part to publicize the appearance of a potential cultural sensation, the *Passagenwerk* — to generate answers to questions which history itself seemingly had withdrawn from the agenda of the day, as the retreat from politicized to privatized popular consciousness inexorably completed itself in the previous decade? Perhaps not; but on the other hand, one could seriously question whether it was the intention of the conference to address the consideration of *Aktualität* in earnest given the format which was selected: three presentations the first evening, without opportunity for questions or rebuttal; no fewer than seven the following day (with three pauses for questions and comments). It was clear that the organizers had planned to channel the majority of the discussion toward the third and final day, when no formal presentations were scheduled, but instead workshops had been planned on designated themes. However, this solution was itself fraught with problems. Although there had been as many as 250 persons present for the second day, the turnout for the discussion session the last day was too small (approximately 40) to warrant dividing up into smaller discussion groups. Certainly, the ordeal-like character of the second day, where the presentations lasted from 9:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. (with a merciful hour-and-a-half break for lunch), frightened off many prospective participants. And it would hardly be presumptuous to conjecture that had the content of the presentations warranted it, more unquestionably would have turned out for day three. At the same time, even more scandalous was the fact that with the exception of the discussion leader, Burkhardt Liunder, only one of the ten presenters deigned to show up for the discussion session of the final day — to his credit, Irving Wohlfarth. Hence, the possibility of any *real* exchange between those on opposite sides of the pre-established conference hierarchy was precluded for this reason.

But now to turn to the content of several of the more interesting papers. One of the few unqualified successes was the presentation of Benjamin's contemporary, Leo Lowenthal. Entitled "The Integrity of Intellectuals," Lowenthal managed to weave biographical data and substantive observations into a taut, informative, entertaining presentation. In this respect his piece stood in sharp contrast to several of the other papers which assumed the form of tedious scholarly essays rather than efforts to communicate to a really existing audience, and which often fell into the easy trap of citing and paraphrasing pleasing aspects of Benjaminian discourse without stopping to examine critically their presuppositions. The biographical parallels between the careers of Benjamin and Lowenthal are striking: both achieved renown for path-breaking studies in the social study of literature, both took leave of their assimilated Jewish backgrounds in favor of a radical Marxist intellectual orientation, and both ironically had *Habilitationsschriften* refused (Benjamin in 1925, Lowenthal the following year) at the same University which that evening had donated its facilities to pay homage to Benjamin some 55 years after the disgrace. It is also worth pointing out that it was Leo Lowenthal alone among the editorial board of the *Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung* who spoke out urgently in favor of the publication of Benjamin's first Baudelaire essay in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1938; although, as is by now well known, his efforts were overruled by Adorno.

It is common practice to speak of the unequivocal failures endured by Benjamin. Lowenthal's talk had the merit of explaining these outward failures — the most notorious being the case of the *Habilitationsschrift* — in terms of Benjamin's "integrity as an intellectual": an integrity which made it impossible for him to remain satisfied with a bourgeois vocation, which caused him to act, personally and politically, "always radically, never consistently" (to borrow the title of Irving Wohlfarth's paper, which was itself borrowed from a Benjamin letter of 1926), and which accounts for his intransigent refusal to leave France in 1940 until the eleventh hour ("for me there is no substitute for the Bibliotheque Nationale," Benjamin once said). The contradiction which stamped Benjamin's life as a radical intellectual in the 1920s, one with which he constantly wrestled and one whose relevance persists today, is the following: the social position of the radical intellectual implies a sense of solidarity with contemporary progressive social movements, and yet at the same time demands a measure of distance, a breathing space, from society through which alone the intellectual becomes capable of exercising his or her critical function. For the radical intellectual, solidarity is never reducible to a posture of obsequious servility to existing social movements, but remains inseparable from the maintenance of critical vigilance. This insight was the dominant motive in Lowenthal's presentation. As he observed at one point: "Benjamin stands on the side of marginality, of negativity; he remains on the outside, someone who refuses to participate." It was this staunch refusal to go along, to play the game as it were, which goes far toward defining the essence of the concept of radical intellectuality. It also accounts for the fact, as Lowenthal astutely pointed out, that although Benjamin's name has so often been linked with various familiar theoretical currents — Marxism, theology, literary criticism — the integrity of his conduct as an intellectual precludes attempts to reduce his theoretical vision to any one of these terms taken individually. For when applied to the realm of intellectual endeavor, the category of integrity means precisely: to proceed without the artificial comfort of a pre-established all-encompassing world view. Lowenthal concluded with an apt warning concerning the ease with which the celebration of a thinker as a "*Klassiker*" in Germany can lead to ritual citations and forgetting. In this way he ended, in a fully Benjaminian spirit, by brushing this occasion against the grain.

Rolf Tiedemann's presentation provided information and illuminating commentary concerning the much-heralded *Passagenwerk*. He began his talk with a prudent reminder. Those who hope for a cohesive, integral work, the crowning achievement of Benjamin's literary production, which would also in some way confer unity on his lifework as a whole, are likely to be disappointed. For the *Passagenwerk* consists of the following materials: two early outlines from the late twenties (when the work's title was "Pariser Passagen: Eine Dialektische Ferrie"), and it was conceived of not as a book but an extended essay (possibly to be written with Franz Hessel, Benjamin's co-translator of Proust whose work had, along with Aragon's 1925 *Paysan de Paris*, constituted one of the original sources of inspirations for the project); an unpublished essay from the same period, "Der Saturnring oder Etwas von Eisenbau"; 50 pages of notes to this first stage of the work; then (following a hiatus of approximately five years) the first formulation of the new, book-length version of the project, the already published Exposé of 1935, entitled *Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century* (and though he still referred to the work as the *Passagenarbeit* at this point, the arcades themselves now figured as only one of six parts of the study as a whole); a 1939 version of the Exposé, bearing the same title but composed in French (likely at the request of Max Horkheimer who had hoped to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interest an American patron in publishing the work); and finally, the chief part of this work-in-progress, 900 pages of "Notes and Materials" whose compilation coincided with the later version of the project (i.e., from 1932 until Benjamin's death in 1940). In actuality the "Notes and Materials" section is rather evenly divided between Benjamin's own preliminary apercus (i.e., brief observations strongly remniscent of the 1939 "Zentralpark" sketches for his Baudelaire study) and mere citations, hundreds of them, virtually all culled from French sources. In sum, then, none of the contents was intended for publication as such, and only the four outlines of the project — the most important of which, the 1939 Exposé, had been previously published — and the "Saturnring" piece could be considered in any sense finished wholes. Whether the *Passagenwerk* fragments constitute, as the Suhrkamp bookjacket description implores, "one of the most incredible fragments of German literature, surely comparable to the *Philosophischen Lehrejahren* of Frederich Schlegel and Nietzsche's *Will to Power*," is questionable.

However, a partial answer to this question, at least within the context of Benjamin's literary activity in the 1930s, was provided by Tiedemann's excellent presentation. For he adroitly pointed out a fact which perhaps many an astute Benjamin-scholar had suspected all along: namely, that the major literary and philosophical studies of the 1930s — from the "Work of Art" essay, to the Baudelaire monographs (a sort of *Passagenwerk* in miniature), to the seminal 1940 "Theses on the Philosophy of History" (whose critique of the doctrine of "progress" was originally conceived as the "theoretical armature" of the Arcades Project as a whole) — are themselves works preparatory or essential for the *Passagenwerk*, and therefore afford insight as to its methodological intentions and purport which is at least as valuable, if not more so, than the hitherto unpublished Arcades torso. Or, to state the same point in even stronger terms: one could say that the fragments of the *Passagenwerk* themselves remain incomprehensible unless they are simultaneously understood according to the theoretical guidelines set forth in the aforementioned actually completed studies from the 1930s.

But to come to the central question, for which Tiedemann's talk sought to provide an answer: why did Benjamin acquire such a fascination for this peculiar nineteenth century architectural style — the arcades — and what did he expect this monumental study of 19th century cultural life to achieve? Or was this fascination merely one more instance of an idiosyncratic personality, who had previously attempted without success to habilitate with an obscure work on an equally obscure chapter of Germany literary history, 17th century baroque drama?

A final answer to this question would require a much more detailed investigation, but Tiedemann's response provided an essential clarification. The key is to be found in the central theoretical categories of the Arcades Project: categories such as myth, phantasmagoria, commodity fetishism, ambiguity, and the always-the-same. Unlike Marx, Benjamin was interested primarily in the phenomenal side of commodity fetishism rather than its noumenal aspect (concrete labor, use-value), i.e., the promise of utopia embodied in commodity production. This utopian promise was contained in the possibilities opened up by the industrial capitalism for a life beyond the realm of necessity; however, because of the distorted nature of the relations of production, the fulfillment of the promise remained withheld. This contradictory situation accounts for Benjamin's employment of the concept of *ambiguity* (which played an especially strong role in the 1935 Exposé); for it was a situation which simultaneously attracted — because of the utopian potential — and repulsed — because of the perverted reality. The upshot of this dilemma was that commodity production lulled humanity into a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trancelike stupor: commodity-fetishism, which Benjamin interpreted from the standpoint of consumption and not production, turned into a phantasmagoria of ever-newer, more seductive objects of consumption and, insofar as it constantly presented the appearance of utopia while withholding its realization, thereby regressed to the level of myth: that is, the eternal recurrence of the always-the-same, the spell-like compulsion to repeat, which characterized mythical world-views. It was the dreamlike semblance of reconciliation projected by the glistening, commodity-filled arcades of the 19th century which was the magic spell that Benjamin wished to penetrate and break. For Benjamin considered the attempt to awaken from a dream as the "best example of dialectical transformation."[1]

At stake for Benjamin in this project was the fate of art in the 19th century. Through the study of this fate he hoped, as Tiedemann noted, to accomplish for the sphere of culture what Marx had achieved for the sphere of material production. The phantasmagorical character of cultural production in the 19th century — its arcades and interiors, its passages and panoramas — was embodied in the remnants of a dream-world which because of the hellish, mythical grip in which it held humanity, had become something nightmarish. As Tiedemann observed, Benjamin's methodology as an historical materialist, his emphasis on concepts such as "Dialectic at a Standstill" or "Now-Time," which would bring the past into a wholly unique relation to the present — a relation charged with "Messianic cessation of happening" — and thereby redeem it from the standpoint of the revolutionary hopes of humanity, was very much akin to the Blochian ideal of dreaming forwards as an anticipation of the future.

In the foregoing depiction of the theoretical program of the *Passagenwerk*, the extent to which many of the basic categories from Benjamin's so-called metaphysico-theological period found their way into the later study should be unequivocal. Whether conventional prejudices are brought to bear against the admixture — in our modern, disenchanted world — of metaphysical insights with "serious" historiography, the significance of Benjamin's attempt to *reverse* the focus of the historicist approach to historiography — for him it was less a question of recapturing the past in its original, pristine givenness than of seizing its meaning in relation to the present conceived as a moment of danger — should serve as a watchword for all contemporary historical study.

The Thursday morning (July 2) session witnessed a rather farcical discussion of Benjamin's work by W.F. Haug. According to Haug, Benjamin's avowed desire to become the greatest critic of German literature of his day was equivalent to the wish to become merely another superstar of the culture industry. When Alfred Schmidt, the moderator of the morning session, and anything but a "Benjaminian," reacted by declaring Haug's presentation "a burial of Benjamin, and a second class one at that," he was not very far from the truth.

The Thursday afternoon session was brightened by intelligent readings of Benjamin as a reviewer and critic by Jörg Drews and Martin Lúdke. Drews stood up to rather facile treatment of Benjamin by Fritz Raddatz, who concluded that Benjamin was a poor literary critic on the basis of his reviews alone. On the one hand, Raddatz had neglected to take into consideration the political and literary necessities of Benjamin's activity as a reviewer in the late 1920s and early 1930s; and on the other hand, he failed to consider his more detailed literary studies of the same period. As Drews showed, the polemical character of Benjamin's reviews threw doubt upon the traditional role of the

1. Walter Benjamin, *Passagenwerk*, p. 1002.

ARCHIVED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reviewer as a mere purveyor of cultural goods. Moreover, it is not difficult to discern that the very same theoretical insights which were developed at length in his literary essays were also to be found — albeit in abbreviated form — in the reviews. In this vein, Drews attempted to counter the not infrequent argument that Benjamin the reviewer — and critic — proceeded arbitrarily, irresponsibly, and idiosyncratically. At the same time, Drews's presentation was not uncritical. He inquired — pertinently — how truly generalizable several of Benjamin's professed criteria for the task of the "critical redemption" of past works of art are — for example, his recommendation that works be rescued from a specific "moment of danger" and raised to the level of the "Now of recognition." On the other hand, this critique seemed to jibe poorly with Drews's earlier approving citation of a famous remark by Habermas, to the effect that Benjamin's existence as an intellectual had so many "surreal" aspects that one should not confront it with demands of logical consistency.

Lüdke showed effectively how Benjamin's work as a critic is not something that should be treated merely historically, but rather was based on a "theory of the modern," whose key concepts were "experience and truth" — or rather: their decay — and which remains extremely relevant from a contemporary standpoint. Perhaps the following claim by Lüdke best summarizes the way to conceive of Benjamin's contemporary relevance: "There is little to take over directly from Benjamin but much to learn."

The presentation conceived of and delivered in the most "Benjaminian spirit" was Hermann Schweppenhäuser's "Kunst: Eine unvollendete Weise bestimmter Negation des Mytheschen und des Historischen." Art constitutes an as yet *uncompleted* form of determinate negation insofar as it always contains an illusory (*Scheinbar*) component; a component which, given the nature of art, simultaneously veils as well as reveals. Thus, as a form of appearance, art always contains a pretension to being something which it actually *is not* — or, to emphasize the moment Schweppenhäuser sought to highlight, a pretension to being something it is *not yet*. It is precisely this anticipatory dimension of aesthetic illusion which was so essential to the work of both Benjamin and Ernst Bloch; a dimension which both calls into question the dominant reality principle — albeit within the limitations prescribed by the realm of "aesthetic illusion" — and also participates in the establishment of a new one. In this sense art as a form of determinate negation remains something "incomplete"; it represents a promissory note ultimately to be paid in full by society itself.

Yet the sphere of culture, insofar as it is forever imbricated in the sphere of *Schein*, also has a mythologizing, affirmative function, one which critical works of art always attempt to explode. As Schweppenhäuser showed, the affirmative moment of culture which was also a concern of Benjamin's; and in this case Benjamin's mission was a defetishizing, ideology-critical one as opposed to the redemptive critique he reserved for those more unique moments of aesthetic-cultural life which merit resuscitating and preserving in face of the threat of historical oblivion. Benjamin identified the most intractable stages of cultural illusion as the "oldest" and "newest" — i.e., myth and commodity fetishism — and attempted to show in the *Passagenwerk* how these moments could be found in the nineteenth century to coincide. History in the form of a nightmarish *Wiederholungszwang* (compulsion to repeat) was a real illusion the *Passagenwerk* sought to expose.

It was also clear that Schweppenhäuser, more than any of the other participants, felt most at home with the metaphysico-theological components of Benjamin's thought. The artist "lies at the fissure between creation and name-giving," remarked Schweppenhäuser at one point. That is, he or she is charged with the task of translating the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

speechlessness of things or the downtrodden elements of humanity into meaningful terms. He or she thus expresses the suffering of those denied a voice in history to date — prehistory. Behind this description of the artist as "between creation and name-giving" lies Benjamin's early theological philosophy of language; the language of God is creative, for through it He engenders the world and everything in it; while humanity has been charged with completing God's task as it were through the name-giving capacity with which it has been endowed, and thus by naming animals and things it elevates them, redeems from a fate of speechless anonymity. Benjamin concentrated on literary works of art, without doubt partly owing to the centrality of the linguistic dimension. Yet, others (Augustine, Schopenhauer, and Bloch In *Geist der Utopie*) have privileged music among the arts, insofar as its lack of concreteness or physicality (evidenced by the fact that its medium is, as opposed to the plastic arts, time rather than space) allows it the greatest affinities with the supersensible. At one point, Schweppenhäuser offered the following felicitous definition of the difference between the arts: "Poetry and literature *spiritualize* the sensuous, they are name-giving; the plastic arts *represent* the sensuous and thus take on a sign-character; and music is the art which gives sound to those who are dumb, lament, or rejoice — yet only a sensuously sounding voice not a verbally articulate one."

In the preceding I have primarily attempted to capture the substance, however sketchily, of those papers which merited recounting. I would like to conclude with a brief treatment of the discussion session which took place on the final day of the conference (July 3). If anything was apparent (at least as far as the morning session was concerned), it was a pronounced sense of frustration: frustration perhaps in part due to the trifling possibilities for participation during the previous two days of the conference; but at least as important was the sense of frustration stemming from the aforementioned theme of *Aktualität*. For it had rapidly become apparent that whereas in the politically charged years of the late sixties and early seventies the relevance of Benjamin's work was readily explicable,[2] in the more politically soporific climate of recent years the question of precisely what in fact constitutes the contemporary significance of his literary *oeuvre* remains not only *open* — and herein lies the rub — but far from self-evident. It was precisely this element of self-doubt (confusion?) which seemed predominant in the discussion session. For in the discussion itself, the following contradiction seemed omnipresent: here were assembled 40 or 50 people who were for one reason or another intensely consumed by the figure of Walter Benjamin, yet a precise explanation of the reason for this preoccupation seemed in no way transparent. It was an issue with which everyone struggled — i.e., the issue of *Aktualität* — but which no one seemed able to respond to satisfactorily. Moreover, the various accounts (monologues) which attempted to provide a plausible explanation to the question of Benjamin's *Aktualität* were largely so personal and privatized, that even a semblance of consensus seemed totally lacking. Does this mean that Benjamin's brilliance is one which blinds rather than illuminates? Does it mean that the tragic aura of Benjamin's historical persona fascinates, but repels a deeper understanding? The presentations of

2. This belief itself now seems sufficiently naive given ten years of historical hindsight. It was an era which witnessed the republication of his essays on Brecht and when the reception centered around themes raised by his more "engaged" writings of the thirties, such as the "Work of Art" essay. Thus it makes sense to inquire whether or not certain of his works take on different degrees of relevance in different historical periods; and more, generally given the suppression of critical and independent artistic expression which has taken place in this century in the name of "commitment," whether it is really Walter Benjamin the self-professed "strategist in the literary struggle" who deserves critical rehabilitation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Tiedemann, Schweppenhäuser, and certain others would suggest a negative answer to this question. But undoubtedly part of the problem of coming to terms with the work of such a complex figure as Benjamin stems not only from the plurality of theoretical tacks with which he experimented at various stages of his intellectual development, but also from the self-consciously hermetic guise in which his theory itself was couched. It is almost as if Benjamin, consciously fearing the uncritical posthumous adulation to which he might one day be exposed, somehow unconsciously brought that which he feared most to pass. For "hermeticism" — for want of a better word — is a double-edged sword: by its very nature, it both *preserves* a thinker from and *exposes* him or her to misunderstandings. And this is the dialectic to which Benjamin — himself an undialectical thinker, as Adorno never tired of pointing out — and his fragmentary *oeuvre* have been subjected to date.

MORE ON *TELOS* AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

by Paul Breines

Berman may be right that the budding dispute over social movements is a comedy of errors ("Reply to Benhabib and Breines," *Telos* 52). For one reason or another everyone these days seems to feel pretty defensive about their politics; little things, even nothings, have a way of setting us off. Berman, for example, had no way of knowing that I had submitted my comments on his own comments on the West German peace movement with the title, "On Berman, *Telos*, and Social Movements," the point being to connect problems I sensed in his piece with related and more basic ones in the journal as a whole. I was then surprised to see my note published under the heading, "On Berman and Social Movements" (*Telos* 51), which gave it from the start a somewhat more personal focus than I had intended. On the other hand, I did refer to Berman by his first name. This now appears to have been a misguided gesture toward friendly debate, for he took it as a deep affront: no less than my refusal to recognize his intellectual or academic status. Oi, oi, oi.

Then I got him really worked up by suggesting something that is both obvious and explicitly affirmed by Berman himself: parallels between his article and Piccone's artificial negativity perspective ("is it unnatural to learn from one's teachers," Berman asks). He promptly charges me with seeing him as little more than a Piccone clone with nothing truly his own to offer. I think this is what they call over-reacting. For in his sensitivity to being misread or even being made invisible, Berman overlooked that I spoke of his article as standing "more or less in the vein of Paul Piccone's recent commentaries on social movements," and referred later to "Russell's approach *or* to Paul Piccone's artificial negativity arguments" (emphasis added). In any event, I am happy to state categorically that I believe Berman's flawed approach to social movements to be genuinely his own.

My talk of a shift in the *Telos* position further provoked Berman to charge that I had written "as if the critics of the peace movement had conspired to put together a party line tract designed to sabotage international solidarity" (p. 106). Funny: I thought I had said the diverse perspectives on the German peace movement "might give the impression that there are some differences among *Telos* editors. Good: there are."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Then we move from pathos to something less tolerable. For it turns out that Berman believes he has discovered a *real* conspiracy. "The history of the [peace movement] issue itself indicates that if anyone has the power to decide on a tendentious basis which articles do and do not fit within our political project, it was the pro-peace movement wing, which managed to prevent the publication of material other editors had hoped to include. Perhaps this is the 'shift in *Telos*' position'."

What's the point of this level of debate? Is it the declaration of war it seems to be? Or did Berman merely figure he was supposed to write in the long-standing *Telos* tradition of imitating the most tawdry features of leftist and academic polemics? Either way, I would like to know more about the "pro-peace movement wing" in *Telos*, who constitutes it, and how it operates, especially how it managed to suppress publication of certain articles. This latter charge in particular is rather serious and ought to be substantiated or explicitly retracted. Meanwhile, lest readers worry overly about the activities of the pro-peace movement wing, they should note that this supposed wing did not manage to prevent publication of Jeff Herf's article (*Telos* 52) calling on the left to support NATO's double-decision strategy. In fact, I hadn't noticed that this supposed wing even thought of trying.

Amidst all of this, Berman is quite right that the central issue is the relation of critical intellectuals to social movements. It is in this connection that I spoke of a shift in *Telos*' position and would like briefly to amplify the thought. By way of quick preface, rather than conspiracy I see democracy at work here. My concern is not with the machinations of any cabal but with the prospect that the journal in its majority (or the majority of those who take part in the political debate) will freely and via open discussion adopt a political stance with which others of us will refuse to associate. To avoid speaking ominously: by 'others' I have in mind myself and Seyla Benhabib.

In one sense, my talk of a shift in *Telos*' position is mistaken. As I noted (*Telos* 52), "from the start *Telos* has had a tension-ridden relation to social movements, domestic and foreign, and this has been one of the journal's strong points. It has never shied away from skepticism, critique and loyalty to theoretical reflection." Forgive a lapse into nostalgia, but I have memories of the many *Telos* conferences between 1969 and the mid-1970's at which, with the regularity of Kant's strolls in Königsberg, someone or some group present would come forward with roughly this refrain: "You creeps, what does this nonsense about phenomenology, ontology, and dialectics have to do with the working class, the oppressed and their struggles? When are you people going to get out of your ivory towers and into the streets?" I also recall bumping into or hearing from occasional friends around 1975 who, having previously despised *Telos* for its distance from the active movement, were coming to find the journal's position helpful in their own efforts to sort through the rubble of the New Left.

This is not to glorify *Telos*; only to indicate that, in part, the recent developments troubling me do not amount to a complete shift, but are continuous with a long-standing posture that I have fully shared. There is, though, a new element: I wrote that "an underlying spirit of solidarity with opposition movements seems to be snapping and giving way to a kind of homogeneous hostility to activism in the West, to a politically disenchanted conceptuality" (*Telos* 52). The new mood (or intensification of an old mood) crops up in various passing comments which, in the absence of clarification, will contribute to giving *Telos* a definite and unfortunate political persona. Piccone, for example opens his Introduction to *Telos* 52 with reference to "the recent surge of new movements (which) has rekindled the hopes to reconstitute a meaningful emancipatory political movement unshackled by either the statism of the Old Left or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the superficiality and narcissism of the New Left. More often than not, however, the multiplicity of interests, demands and aims are rhetorically combined by hasty syntheses which do not help in the least either political activity or theoretical understanding." At least he qualifies his argument with "most" of the New Left and "more often than not." But the impulse to condemn is still too quick; the anticipation of failure too pronounced; the rejection of the New Left too facile and complete. In a similar (yet entirely independent and highly original) manner, Berman in his article speaks in passing of the "activism of the 1960s which Adorno criticizes for its hostility to theory."

These are asides but they constitute a thesis of sorts: the 60s movement is not only dead but quite appropriately buried in History's dust-bin. Whatever we do in the future, it must have nothing to do with that old crap. Am I wrong? I'm anxious to stand corrected. That Piccone, Berman, and anyone else is not ready to make concessions to mindless activism is admirable. What bugs me is the conditioned reflex toward negativity, a pre-fabricated negativity you could call it.

But wait! What was that zipping overhead? That defender of "intellectual rigor," able to leap "positive bombast" in a single bound; who can stop with one hand an onrushing "rose colored manner of thought;" that valiant enemy of all those who would advocate the "supression of criticism;" that man who can quote Adorno at the drop of a hat? Is it an intellectual? An activist? No, it's Metacritic! Disguised as Orville Lee, mild-mannered member of the *Telos* group, Metacritic uses his powers of criticism to combat the likes of Benhabib and Breines, those heinous peddlers of the "blank check theory of social movements." With rare courage, Metacritic lectures these craven symps of mindless activism as to the true meaning of Critical Theory, while exposing their own pathetic crimes of "positive thinking." With his keen sense of justice and balance, Metacritic is ready to announce that "this is not to say that contemporary social movements should not address nuclear disarmament and peace goals." Yes, kids, Metacritic can be a model for all of you who seek to "remain free of the ideological debris attending the uncritical commitment to praxis." What? You hadn't noticed any widespread uncritical commitment to praxis? You say you haven't noticed much praxis, period? Well, that only shows why Metacritic is needed now more than ever. For, with his x-ray vision he can show that when Breines and Benhabib call for a "blinding of critical insight," they are only resorting to that old adage: say something good or nothing at all. And *this*, notes our peerless debunker, is what motivated the McCarthy witch hunts (p.110). So, all who fear confronting criticism: beware. For when Orville Lee steps into that phone booth outside the *Telos* office and in a flash changes into Metacritic, you can sleep safely knowing that criticism will triumph.

Meanwhile, criticism is in some difficulty. Berman is right that Benhabib and I object to negative approaches to the peace movements. Here is an example of a negative approach: the task is "to examine closely the most well-meaning plans for peace: not simply by joining in the military-technical discourse of the self-appointed experts but by scrutinizing the social impulses and cultural motivations behind the contemporary peace movements. If disarmament and military disengagement become important issues in the United States, which recent developments indicate they might, one wil have to ask, for example, whether they are driven by internationalist anti-war sentiment or by down-home nativist isolationism, both of which have strong credibility in this culture. One will ask furthermore what social groups and what social interests contribute to the spread of such impulses and whether cooptation is part of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the landscape. Finally one will have to look at the specificity of the particular programs and the source of their legitimacy." This is from the final paragraph of Berman's "Reply to Benhabib and Breines." It seems a fair summary of his research program and a confirmation of what I am complaining about. For Berman seems to think that the choice is between taking a movement at face value, which he rightly rejects, and proceeding as if movements are guilty until proven innocent. Well-meaning plans for peace? Berman wants to know the supposedly underlying motivations and the background interests that may be manipulating the well-meaning plans, and whether, as if it weren't always, cooptation "is part of the landscape." I'm sorry, but I read these as preformed accusations, not as guidelines for a critical approach to social movements.

REPLY TO OUR NON-CRITICS

by Andrew Arato & Jean Cohen

This reply ought to have been superfluous. We would have been simply grateful that our piece, "The Peace Movement and Western European Sovereignty" (*Telos* No. 51) has not elicited the kind of criticism and use of language (reminiscent of Marx and Lenin at their worst) to which Bookchin (*Telos* No. 52) subjected Whitebook's careful, balanced, scholarly articles: "The Concept of Nature in Habermas" (*Telos* No. 40), and "Saving the Subject" *Telos* No. 50). On the other hand, genuine criticism can have a salutary effect: Berman's brilliant reply to the provocation of his critics (however justified) is far superior to his original article. In short, we would not have minded being neglected and we would have liked being challenged. In neither case, however, would we have written again on the subject unless we had something new to say. In fact, we do not. Unfortunately several pot-shots taken at us by Orville Lee III, Paul Piccone (the first) and Jeffrey Herf cannot be allowed to go unanswered for two reasons: 1. they are based on misrepresentation and/or misunderstanding; 2. these distortions are not innocent, but represent political positions and theoretical blindspots that must be addressed. Ordinarily, we would ignore accusations of "technocratism", "liberalism", or "moralism": indeed next to Bookchin's epithets for our close friend and colleague (and his), these are pale enough. But words like these should be used with some intersubjectively shared meaning. Moreover, our words, like anyone else's, should be allowed to represent themselves without the filter of editors who constitutively edit and "non-critics" who compulsively misunderstand.

1. The charge of *technocratism*: To be sure, O. Lee does not use this word, but he does inded charge us with wanting to be "experts putting forth critical perspectives and information" in other words "knowledge hegemonic (sic) intellectuals posed as experts". He cites p. 159 of our article which indeed says: "intellectuals can of course participate in movements on an equal basis or address them as experts by providing necessary information and critical perspectives." Leaving aside the point that he forgets the first idea altogether, that of participating on an equal basis, the passage seems damning enough. It is however not one we had written. What we wrote was: "In-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tellectuals can of course participate in movements on an *entirely* equal basis or address them *in two possible intellectual capacities: as social scientific* experts providing necessary information and*/or as social and political theorists providing* critical perspective" (omitted words underlined). Lee of St. Louis in effect addresses part of his criticism to what P. Piccone (also of St. Louis) wrote in our name. But it gets worse. He also invents things even Piccone did not think of editing in. No line of the article in any of its forms suggests that experts should "tell movements what to do". (Lee, p. 114) We restricted their function to providing the type of information that movements actually need and ask for (as part of the bases for their decisions). This new role for experts was not invented by us (we have as much gut dislike of the exaggerated claims of experts as anyone else) but by the movements themselves: the ecological movement (needing information on existing and alternative technologies) the peace movement (needing information on strategic and military matters) and above all Polish Solidarity (needing information and advice on everything from law to economics). The use of experts has of course possibilities of conflict built into it, but that is another matter. As far as the role for critics goes, and this is the only role we indicated for ourselves (see the same p. 159) not only is our article completely consistent with the immanent critique that is apparently demanded by Berman and Lee, but we daresay that the few ideas of Lee's that are valid were already contained in it. Perhaps what Lee resents is that we ourselves apparently have offered some strategic suggestions to the peace movement toward the end of our article and did not confine ourselves to a purely negative position. First, regarding this objection, we made clear that we were not writing (as he implies) in the capacity of experts. Second, while we were not particularly clear on this point, it should have been obvious that our strategic suggestions were also not in the capacity of critics, but of intellectuals seeking to participate in the discussions "on an entirely equal basis". What we wanted to avoid above all are charges like the ones occasionally directed against Castoriadis, of tearing down the existing strategy of the movement and giving the illusion (never intended by Castoriadis, of course) that the only alternative today is to follow American policy. It is our *opinion*, one that we seek (perhaps in vain) to introduce into all relevant discussions, that there is a third (and perhaps other) strategic alternative.

2. The charge of *moralism*: Before this charge made by Herf (*Telos* No. 52) can be discussed, the far greater danger of being interpreted in exactly the opposite way, as "militarists" who call (along with Herf) for the strengthening of NATO and nuclear arms (the American line) needs to be dealt with due to a rather astonishing misinterpretation that crops up in Lee's text. He writes (p. 109), "the rejection of American anti-Soviet rhetoric and German's NATO responsibilities converges with West German capital and banking interests (which Arato argues)." (Lee, p. 109) Again, we are dealing with a double misreading and misunderstanding. The first was in fact Benhabib's (*Telos* No. 51). She links the charge that the West German peace movement serves the interests of West German capital, in fact made by Piccone and perhaps Berman (though the latter surely has a more differentiated position in his reply to his critics) to a remark made by one of us (Arato) which indicates "a remarkable convergence of attitude" of the peace movement and of European banking and industrial interests. She forgets to specify that the remark (*Telos* No. 50, p. 19) was explicitly related to attitudes concerning martial law in Poland and not to the whole range of activities characteristic of the peace movement. She further assumed that the phrase "remarkable convergence" means roughly the same thing as Berman's "mass cultural expression". In other words, she attributes a classical Marxian reductionist bias (which she at

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

least seems to share when she leaps without explanation from the discussion of German capital to the SPD-FDP government) to a phrase that in itself indicates only that the convergence of two things with entirely different origins is indeed remarkable! Lee, who seems to have read the line only in Benhabib's text, takes the next step and goes on to interpret the phrase in question as if any opposition to American rhetoric and NATO armaments would be *only* an expression of German economic interests. A doubly false reading which at least becomes clear in Herf's reading that accuses us of the opposite, namely "agnosticism" concerning the NATO double decision and a consequent falling into "moralism". Here it is not a question of misreading but of a misinterpretation based on his own different but indefensible position. We are not agnostic concerning the double decision. Coming out for the freeze means that we are in the present situation against the double decision. We argue that the West must find some other way of trying to eliminate the SS20's — we suggest economic means above all. Indeed, we would have been less against the NATO decision if Herf were right in interpreting the plans concerning cruise/Pershing as attempts only to redress a balance, or better still, to find a suitable negotiating play. But whatever the Europeans' early ideas (which Herf reconstructs rather well against the misleading claims of many pacifists according to whom the intention behind cruise/Pershing was the actual fighting of a limited nuclear war in Europe) the decision in fact has now been torn asunder into its two halves: in the form of the attempt of the Soviet Union to manipulate the peace movement to wipe out the element of threat behind the decision and the attempt of the U.S. to manipulate European governments to reduce the element of negotiation to mere show. The only meaning of the double decision therefore is to have *both* SS20's and cruise/Pershing. The only meaning of the peace movement's strategy having only the SS20's. We, however, want to eliminate the SS20's which Herf's recipe will not touch and which cruise/Pershing cannot militarily counteract. We further believe (f.n. p. 167) 1. that there is today a rough world balance on the nuclear level, including Europe, in spite of the very real destabilizing nature of the SS20's; 2. that insistence on the cruise/Pershing such as Herf's will in fact weaken the Western alliance far more than an attempt to find other alternatives (e.g., sea based missiles *or* better still redressing the conventional balance) and 3. that pressuring the Soviet Union by means of the arms race will certainly stabilize the worst possible alternative of Soviet, and therefore East European development — that of full authoritarian militarization and therefore, other means of pressure and influence must be found. If this is "moralism" to him, he does not know the meaning of the words he uses. In fact we are a bit concerned that we have been sucked into purely strategic discussions because of the astonishing attitudes to the Soviet Union of so many of our friends in spite of five years of educational activity by *Telos* among others.

A last point needs to be stressed in this context. Despite the pathos of Herf's final paragraph (p. 128), we would argue that he has gone to the opposite extreme of "moralism", by offering a purely strategic and deeply apolitical analysis of the peace movement and the *effects* of the NATO decision. Instead of focusing only on the negative aspects of the peace movement and the dangerous implication of some of its objectives (unilateralism in particular) he might have addressed the issues that the movement is, albeit often inadequately, raising. It is striking that the peace movement is most active in countries that have already lost a significant dimension of their sovereignty by virtue of their integration into the NATO command structure in which they have no control over nuclear armament. While charges of American imperialism are not helpful, the absence of independent national defense systems is a serious mat-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ter, and one that is surely at the heart of the resentment and vociferousness of the peace movements *vis à vis* the relevant countries despite the greater military threat posed by the Soviet Union. The problem with Herf's solution, namely, more of the same, is that it has an elective affinity with the worst version of the peace movement (unilateralism and defenseless neutralism) i.e., the continued denial and renunciation of a part of the sovereignty of West European states. It is difficult to see how the civic spirit or sense of political responsibility might be revived in those countries through the perpetuation of the very form of dependency that has gone a long way in destroying that very spirit. Only some form of the restoration of West European sovereignty, based on meaningful national defense systems (surely costly) would be a viable solution to the dual problem of dependency and nuclear threat.

3. Finally, supposedly that most hideous charge of all: "recycling liberalism" (Piccone) or speaking in "straightforward liberal tones" (Lee). The charge has its history. Not without its ambiguities in his introduction to *Telos* No. 51 (p. 3), Piccone himself spoke, directly in our footsteps, of the "all important lingering pluralism, heterogeneity and vitality of American Civil Society". Well said, we could not have said it better. Apparently between Spring and Summer 1982 things have gone badly in America (they have, but not this badly). In his introduction to the next issue where Cohen is accused of having gone into the recycling business the editor writes of "a civil society ...already penetrated by the state or...bled to death by the culture industry, consumerism and collective narcissism." We could call this the recycling of the same orthodox critical theory that he seemed to have abandoned years ago but even that would hardly explain what he means by "liberalism" since Adorno and Horkheimer used the term exclusively for ideologies relevant to classical, free market capitalism. To unavoidably echo a topic usually dealt with on the sophomore level, is it liberalism in the classical sense or liberalism in the current American sense that is meant? Relative to the first, there is indeed a current cynical renewal of the liberal concept of civil society around the classical issues of unregulated freedom of market and property. Our continuous stress on social movements *and* social reform puts us in diametrical opposition to this revival which, in his attacks on reformists (cf. Gonzalez on Walzer, *Dissent* et. al. in *Telos* No. 48) Paul Piccone himself comes a good deal closer to. Relative to the second, i.e., reform liberalism, which seems to be the content of Lee's charge, this tendency in all its varieties is a statist, technocratic, corporatist one. While reform liberalism assigns reform (for them: incremental) exclusively to the activities of the state from above, we seek institutional and structural reform as a combination of the pressure of movements and citizen initiatives from below and the rationalizing activities of the state by elites (possible only when in the hands of "reformists"). The former are essential to prod and control the latter. While liberals in fact recognize only corporatist forms of interest aggregation we defend the very real possibility of pluralist and syndicalist forms. Liberals seek to further remove areas from popular and public participation in the name of technocratic criteria, by shifting the coordination of action from one steering mechanism (the market) to another (the state) — hence the continuity between 19th and 20th century forms of liberalism. We seek the reconstitution of publicity and the increasing discussion of all issues and norms in the alternative public spheres of independent movements who, by the way, need their own experts precisely to counteract the claims of the monopolization of expertise on the side of the state.[1] While reform liberals seek to administer more and more of society, we point to the possibility (certainly more real here than in the East) of extending and defending social spaces as long as some of the legal-institutional guarantees of the West survive.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While they restrict democracy to the formal (which therefore, but only therefore, becomes manipulated) we seek the plurality of democracies, the preservation of the fruits of past democratic struggles (parliaments, civil liberties, formal law), the introduction of elements of direct democracy into all social spheres and the mutual control of forms of democracy. Perhaps our conception is utopian, it is certainly not "liberal" in the two above senses. The only sense in which it is "liberal" is in the principled requirement of an institutionalized distinction between society and state. Moreover, in fact we do not think our position is entirely utopian because of the logic of some Western institutions (we focus on legality and constitutionality as against the cultural institutions that Piccone continually refers back to) permits challenges to the existing corporate liberal system on the basis of independent plurality, legality and publicity. This is what we have meant by "using the best institutional possibilities of (liberal-democratic) society against its worse (tendencies)". We hate to have to explain these things again on such a purely programmatic and unavoidably simple level. The conception, of course, needs to be greatly elaborated and justified as well as criticized. But criticized on the basis of what has been called immanent critique by the whole tradition of Critical Theory and not crude misreading, misinterpretation and misidentification in the form of potshots.[2]

There are important theoretical and political issues at stake here: let's hope a serious discussion can now begin.

1. Here the neo-Frankfurt purism of Lee plays directly into the hand of technocrats. Indeed, what could be the alternative to the rejection of reform as mere liberalism other than the phantasm of revolution that itself focuses on the state?

2. Despite the silly *ad hominem* attacks in Bookchin's article, at least it clarifies his position: Bookchin still thinks in terms of "reforms vs. revolution", "society *against* the state (that is to be abolished)" that connects him both to anarchist traditions and council communist forms of Marxism. Our concern is to get beyond what we now regard as this *sterile* opposition — reform from above, on its own can only be crisis management, revolution from below in the name of anti-statism always addresses and ends up reinforcing the state over and against society. For this reason we seek to shift the homework to that of the relation between social movements and reform.

"FACING THE WAR" AND "THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC ROOTS OF RE-ARMAMENT": A REJOINDER

by Cornelius Castoriadis

In *Telos* 50 Piccone and Zaslavsky have published an article, "The Socio-economic Roots of Re-armament," the essence of which is vulgar Marxo-American economism at its worst. The intellectual regression the article represents is quite symptomatic of the recent turn in the world situation. However, I will only be concerned here with the appalling distortion and mis-representation of my views.

"*Re-Stalinization*"

Piccone and Zaslavasky impute to me the view that "Re-Stalinization . . . is a viable option" for Russia (p.8). It is very sad, indeed, that the authors quote books which they have not read,[1] and that the Editor of *Telos* does not read articles published in his own

1. My book, *Devant la guerre*, (Fayard: Paris, 1981).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

journal.[2] In the 289 pages of *Devant la guerre* there is not a single sentence which, by any stretch of the imagination, could be construed as hinting at the remotest possibility of a "re-Stalinization" of the Russian regime. On the contrary: my whole analysis is explicity based on the twin impossibility of a return to a Stalinist type of regime and of any effective bureaucratic "self-reform."[3]

Why do Piccone and Zaslavsky invent this figment? First, because they cannot think beyond the platitudes of current sovietology: *either* Russian bureaucracy will reform itself (and "peaceful co-existence," "détente" etc. will continue); *or* it will revert to some form of "Stalinism" (accompanied by agressive external policies). Therefore, since Castoriadis both refuses the possibility of bureaucratic self-reform and insists on the expansionist character of Russian policies, he *must* "believe" in re-Stalinization — and never mind what he writes. Caught in this trivial preconception, they cannot even understand that, in my analysis, stratocracy and external expansion are *substantially linked to the impossiblity* to revert to "Stalinism," "classical" totalitarianism, etc.

Second, and more serious, this trick allows them to talk away the international situation and the Russian-American confrontation. Thus, one does not have to worry about Russian heavy industry and the military because (believe it or not) they "are already much stronger than would be normally necessary" (p.9) neither about American re-armament, because in the U.S. "militarism is the functional equivalent of an effective economic rationalization" (p.18) and aims essentially at imposing " . . . a new international division of labor whereby (the U.S.) would dominate the monopoly sector" and at "a more effective trade relation (with Russia)"!!!

Having put up this straw-man of "re-Stalinization," Piccone and Zaslavsky proceed, with tedious prolixity, to prove that "terror on a mass scale is unlikely to be reintroduced" (p.9-12). Who said it was? I, at any rate, have said explicitly the contrary.[4]

Military and Non-military Sub-societies in Russia

My central thesis, concerning present-day Russia is that: "classical" totalitarianism finished with Stalin; the (feeble and partial) attempts at self-reform of the bureaucracy (Malenkov and Khrushev) failed for no accidental reasons; the Party is bankrupt and its "ideology" is dead; there are no prospects for effective self-reform of the bureaucracy; in this context, the military sub-society (the military establishment proper and the armament industries) have emerged as the only live and effective sector of Russian society; the quantitative and qualitative expansion of this military sub-society has ceased, long ago, to be a reversible "policy option" of the regime; it has become its structural characteristic and possesses its own, virtually uncontrollable, momentum (save for the possibilities of internal explosion); in this sense, the military sub-society has become the *de facto* dominant (not "governing," not even "ruling" part of Russian society: this is what I call *stratocracy*); the only "dynamics" open to the regime are those of external expansion. And on this, in as far as it is translated into conscious policies, there is no conflict between the military sub-society and the Party summit.

Of course, this is an extremely schematic summing up of the results of a discussion taking up several hundred pages. It is given here only to facilitate understanding of this note — not as a substitute for *Devant la guerre*.

The starting point of my discussion is the extraordinary *qualitative* difference bet-

2. "Facing The War", a bad translation of the first chapter of *Devant la guerre*, in *Telos*, n. 46, (Winter 1980-81), pp. 43-61.

3. See, e.g., pp. 25-29, 151-162, and the whole of Chapter IV, pp. 212-282).

4. Cf. *Telos* n. 46, pp. 50-52.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ween the outputs of the military and the non-military economies in Russia — and the argument that this qualitative difference cannot be explained by a difference in the *quantity* of the respective inputs. Therefore, I conclude that the military sub-society is relatively separated, or distinct, from the "grand Russian society," in the sense that it represents a different "sociological model" (from the point of view of organization, motivations, behavior, etc.).

What do Piccone and Zaslavsky have to say on this? "This fundamental split is universally recognized as a key feature of the system" (p.8). This is, of course, wrong. The main stream of sovietology, both "right" and "left," has earned its life for decades now by concealing this split, its presuppositions, and its implications. Such was, and still is, the substance of all "convergence" theories, but not only of those. Sovietologists of all categories have earned themselves imperishable distinction by *not* asking the (admittedly obvious) questions: how is it possible for a country to be capable of successfully landing rockets on Venus, and incapable of producing blue jeans? And what are both the pre-conditions and the implications of a country spending, in peace time and for decades, 15% of its G.N.P. on military production? Neither do Piccone and Zaslavsky address themselves to these questions; except for an aside to which I will revert later on.

But *if* this split is "fundamental," and *if* it is a "key feature of the system" — then why all the fuss? If such is the case, my basic premises are granted, and the rest follows.

Dimly aware of that, Piccone and Zaslavsky try to water down the logic of the situation by introducing some nebulous qualifications. "The two sectors are not so mutually impenetrable as they are normally (?!) depicted" (p.80. Depicted by whom? And what does "impenetrable" mean? did I ever say that they are separated by deadly laser radiations or by a sequence of black holes? "The relations between the two (is) not as asymmetrical as a simplistic model of military-industrial domination may imply but much more interdependent." (p.8). What is an "interdependent relation"? Whose, and which, is the "simplistic" model talked about, and in what does it consist? Why do the authors not try to exhibit some instances of "symmetry" between the two sectors? Do they know of cases, for instance, where military production has been stopped or delayed because non-military production had been granted priorities over materials, machines or whatever?

"There are . . . no grounds to compartmentalize Soviet industry, as Castoriadis has done, into two completely separated sectors — highly efficient closed enterprises and backward, inefficient open ones." (p.8, Fn.12). This is projected nonsense. I took pains to explain the very important differences between the two sectors, as well as between "closed" and "open" enterprises (pp.108-121, 139-151) and I quoted, approvingly (p.144), Agursky's phrase: "Though it is true to say that the Soviet military-industrial complex is organizationally and administratively separated, it is not and could not be economically separated." I could go on adding that it is not, and could not be, spatially, meteorologically, genetically, sexually, linguistically, culturally, etc., separated.

"Compartmentalization" in the sense Piccone and Zaslavsky have in their mind (and impute to me) can of course hardly ever exist in any society. When one says, e.g., that in most Third World countries the "modern" and the "traditional" sectors are separated, one does not mean that there is an iron wall between them, not that there is no "interdependence" nor, finally, that there are no intermediate phenomena. What one means is that typical, stylized situations and "mean densities," so to speak, are substantially and significantly different between the two. And this is also, *mutatis mutandis*, what I mean concerning the two sub-societies in Russia — and, if true, this is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sufficient to establish my thesis.

And what is the purpose of introducing this meaningles banality, i.e., that there is no "compartmentalization"? Plainly, to escape a series of crucial questions: how can one explain the huge qualitative difference between the outputs of the military and the non-military sub-sectors? Does this indicate a difference in the *modus operandi* of the two? Does not all this point to a difference of their *dynamics*?

Despite the repeated and lengthy explanations in my book — and in a way typical of their inability to understand the crucial point — Piccone and Zaslavsky present me as opposing "highly *efficient* closed enterprises and backward, inefficient open ones" (ibid, italics mine). I reckon output per man per year in Russian military production as one quarter of the American one (*Devant la guerre*, pp.133-138, 163-180). By no stretch of imagination could this be called "highly efficient." Piccone and Zaslavsky seem unable to understand the difference between *effective* and *efficient* (in French, *efficace* and *efficient*). I explain repeatedly that Russian military production, though not *efficient*, is *effective*: things are more or less properly done, and they *work* (function); whereas, in the non-military sector, things are, so to speak, just not done — do not work, do not function. Effectiveness has to do with the appropriateness, satisfactory "quality," of the output — whatever the costs. Efficiency relates the output to the inputs (costs).

But in fact, all this is a rhetorical smokescreen. For Piccone and Zaslavsky go farther than I do: "This split into two societies . . . extends even into a geographical stratification of the country into qualitatively different zones describable as closed cities, open cities and the countryside" (p. 8). So: reality is even more as I say than I do say. How is it, then, that they arrive at different conclusions? It is very simple: they declare reality redundant — or meaningless. So-called "closed enterprises" are increasingly losing their critical rationale — their real or imaginary connection with military secrets . . . " "both heavy industry as well as the military are already much stronger than would be *normally* necessary" (p.8, Fn.12; p.9. Italics mine). From this follows that the corresponding traits of the system "cannot be retained unaltered much longer" (ibid.).

As somebody said long ago: do not confuse me with facts. If you want to know what is likely to happen, do not ask about what is there in reality. Ask rather, what is Piccone's and Zaslavasky's idea about normal necessity or necessary normality. Russia goes on piling up military hardware whilst non-military production is in a dismal state: this is irrelevant, because it is not "normally necessary."

Here we have rationalistic-liberal platitude at its best. Twenty million people in the Gulag — was that more or less what would be normally necessary? Six million Jews gassed out — I suppose this was normally necessary? Would it not be more in keeping with *Denkökonomie* to keep reality, and dismiss the Piccone-Zaslavsky nonsense as neither normal nor necessary?

A Self-reform of the Bureaucracy?

Continuing with their *écriture automatique* (or free-associative writing) Piccone and Zaslavsky assert: "For these reasons and others (?!), Castoriadis' scenario turns out to be unrealistic." (p. 10). Which "scenario"? There is no scenario in my book. There is, however, a lengthy discussion of the reasons why I think a self-reform of the regime is impossible (pp. 153-162, in particular). This, Piccone and Zaslavsky ignore, adding instead: "In this respect, Brus' argument for a slow re-Stalinization predicated on the impossibility of reforming the system is more tenable"! What follows is a genuine pearl: "It remains unclear why, in the face of grave threats, the political apparatus will not consider the less costly of the two equally unappealing alternatives and yield some of its power rather than risk much higher costs." Thus, we learn that social-historical

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

developments are the result of rational cost-minimizing choices by political apparatuses. To be sure, contemporary history offers ample illustration for this thesis. Then, the authors go on quoting Amalrik: "In order to remain in power, the regime must change and evolve, but in order to preserve itself, everything must remain unchanged"!

Had Piccone and Zaslavsky understood the sentence of Amalrik they are quoting, they would not have written their article. For the sentence asserts this obvious fact: that it is *equally impossible* for the regime not to reform *and* to reform itself. In no way can it be adduced to support Piccone's and Zaslavsky's wishful thinking, that the regime *will* reform itself. Amalrik's assertion is of course right, and the starting point of my analysis. It is what I call the "internal impasse" of the regime. Once this is understood, the *facts* of the growth of the military sub-society and of external expansion can be seen clearly for what they are: the "way out" of this impasse (which, in turn, make the internal situation even more "impossible," so to speak).

But Piccone and Zaslavsky *do* have a scenario. The trouble is that it is either empty or incoherent, and in fact both. "reforms of some kind (!) will in all likelihood have to be introduced" and (but?) "it is fairly clear that they will not be allowed to threaten the existing power relations" (p.13). I promise herewith to pay Piccone and Zaslavsky one ruble each (at current prices and exchange rates) if they can supply even a rough outline of the "kind" of reforms having any degree of effectiveness which could be introduced *without* threatening the existing power relations.

It is a sign of political irresponsibility and theoretical ineptitude, in discussions about Russia, to go on talking vaguely about "reforms", without giving the slightest hint as to what these reforms would consist in, who would invent and introduce them, who would implement them, how could they be compatible with existing power structures, or how could they impair these structures without provoking a collapse or an explosion, etc. This is infantile day-dreaming, motivated by wishful thinking. Now, what the wishes of Kissinger, Samuel Pisar, Jerry Hough, Giscard d'Estaing, Willy Brandt or Mitterrand in this respect can be is easy to guess. But why should Piccone and Zaslavsky day-dream about unspecified and unspecifiable "reforms" in Russia? To this there is only one answer: because the actual facts are too disagreeable to look upon straight. They are, so to speak, psychically and morally disagreeable. They destroy existing "theoretical" schemata and preconceptions (that is why some other people just go on repeating the "totalitarian" theme, as if nothing of substance had changed in Russia between Stalin's period and to-day). And they raise hard political questions, with no ready-made answers. How much more comfortable to convince oneself that "the United States and the Soviet Union tend to develop *complementary* economic systems, that spell rapprochement rather than confrontation for the years to come"! (p. 13, italics in the text).

I am not a scenario-builder. But *there is*, certainly, a central perspective to which the facts and my analysis of them point very clearly, and I may as well outline it here, to minimize misunderstandings. Short of an internal explosion in Russia (a revolution, if you prefer), the regime will continue on its present course, Brezhnev or no Brezhnev: military build-up; utilisation of whatever opportunities present themselves (and there are quite a number) for riskless penetration of this or that Third World area; continued attemps at Hong-Kong-isation of Western Europe through combination of political and economic pressures and sweateners (that, in the present context, increased trade and credit lead to increased dependence of the suppliers and creditors, not of the customers and debtors this any intelligent child could see, though a Marxist cannot). This

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is a long term perspective. The Russian tempo is not the Nazi one. And, accidents apart, no "1984", rather, disgusted Americans will (rightly) expel Reagan from the Presidency, and the new Administration will resume or accelerate START negotiations, sign possibly new co-operation agreements with Russia, etc., till 199... when, in the wake of the establishment of a communist-controlled Government in Thailand, or Iran, or Turkey, or South Africa, or some Latin American country, and the discovery that the Russians have in the meantime deployed 425 SS-30s or 630 SS-40s, the US Government will embargo the export of peanut butter to countries of the Russian bloc.

What Is Russia?

I cannot end this note without pointing to two quite remarkable features of the Piccone-Zaslavsky paper.

First, here we have an article pretending to talk about Russia, and to forecast future developments, on the basis of *no theoretical conception* whatsoever. A patchy description of a "model of development" and an enumeration of its "difficulties" just will not do. What *is* Russian society? If one follows Piccone and Zaslavsky, it is a society where a "developmental model" characterized by extensive, as opposed to intensive, growth, has "practically exhausted" its possibilities. This is McNamara (IBRD) sociology.

Second, and much worse: power relations, social division and social conflict, the ruthless exploitation and repression are papered over the means of a "consensus" theory. The "stability" of the system is presented as the result of a "social compromise" (p. 6). The "many annoying features (!) of Soviet everyday life have been considered acceptable costs" (p. 5). Various "social achievements" "have been seen worth the political price required by the regime" (p. 6). Have been seen and considered: by whom, when, where?

Any reactionary sociology professor, in any U.S. University, would gladly produce such an "explanation" of the stability of any society, including a slave society. Here again, economistic-liberal platitude is imposed on history. The population of the Russian Empire is presented as calmly weighing the various trade-offs between a marginal decrease in freedom and a marginal increase in consumption and freely opting for the second. And this is offered in a "journal for radical thought"!

To be sure, there is a huge, dramatic, agonizing question: what is there behind the absence of *open* opposition and struggle against the regime, how deep does the passive acceptance of the existing situation go, what are the possibilities of future changes in this respect? Though we do not and cannot know the answer to this question — unless and until *something happens* — we cannot help being obsessed by it.

But we do, definitely, know a lot about how this passive acceptance, rather: obedience and submission, is engineered by the system. Repression properly speaking, certainly: concentration camps are still there, and "psychiatric hospitals" have been added to the means of production of obedience. Economic pressure, to the point of life and death: if you "think otherwise", and say so, you just loose your livelihood. Economic corruption down to the bottom of the social scale (Zinoviev and Bukovsky have rightly insisted on this), and the ensuing demoralization, systematic cretinization and disinformation, cynicism, helplessness, apathy and despair. Beyond all that — and the innumerable consequences thereof — the much more important questions: what is the nature and the strength of the *compulsory internalization* of the regime's "norms" and rules of behavior? To what extent, in the face of the stinking decomposition of official "ideology", the re-emergence of imperial chauvinistic nationalism, can supply an imaginary cement to this society?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

All this is a very far cry from consensus and social compromise. If there were *some* degree of consensus and compromise in Russia, the Russian workers would work. Despite all the sticks, and a few rotten carrots, they do not.

REPLY TO CASTORIADIS

by Victor Zaslavsky

It is unfortunate that, in discussing his position together with Brus' (who does consider re-Stalinization a viable option), Castoriadis was made to appear as if he also held such a position. It should have been said, instead, that Castoriadis believes that the continuation of neo-Stalinism is the only viable option for the future Soviet leadership.[1] Nevertheless, and in spite of this annoying mistake, differences remain and need to be spelled out. I will attempt to do it very briefly: we both have, after all, just published books on Soviet society in which our respective views are discussed at length.

Let me initially make quite clear that I greatly respect Castoriadis' work on Soviet society. His *Devant la Guerre* is an important book, which should be translated into English. While I do not share certain views held by Castoriadis on Soviet society and its future, I think that even those parts of his book which, in my opinion, are one-sided or simply wrong are nevertheless useful in rethinking some major issues. But the book's weaknesses, as is so often the case, are inseparable from its merits. Castoriadis presents his ideas very forcefully, often by driving his points to an extreme. This is a legitimate method: science frequently advances through such one-sidedness. But Castoriadis tends to be carried away by his visions and passions; sometimes his vision of Soviet society leads him away from the actual reality and leads to sweeping statements and indefensible hasty conclusions.

Take the concluding sentences of Castoriadis' letter. By what standards can it be said that Soviet workers do not work? Since, according to all available evidence, the Soviet economy continues to grow at a rate of 3% to 4% per year while many Western economies experience zero growth or even decline, should we infer that American or French workers do not work? If Castoriadis, however, merely intends to say that Soviet workers would work better under different social conditions, I will fully agree. We should heed Nove's warning that "exclusive emphasis upon chaos and waste, the image of production of unsaleable rubbish, is misleading, especially if contrasted with the past, when the Soviet system was *more* wasteful, *more* inefficient, *less* productive."[2]

And then there is Castoriadis' description of the situation in the USSR today: "Economic corruption down to the bottom of the social scale — and the ensuing demoralization, systematic cretinization and disinformation, cynicism, helplessness, apathy and despair." Having until recently lived in the USSR for some 37 years, I can-

1. I discuss the concept of the neo-Stalinist state in my book *The Neo-Stalinist State. Class, Ethnicity and Consensus in Soviet Society.* (Sharpe: Armonk, N.Y., 1982) The Brezhnev regime opted for neo-Stalinism and, as Castoriadis puts it, is unable either to return to a Stalinist-type of regime or to introduce any large-scale and effective bureaucratic "self-reform".

2. A. Nove, "The Soviet Economy: Problem and Prospects" *New Left Review*, 119, 1980, p. 17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not recognize my own experience in this description. There surely are people who perceive their own societies this way, but I doubt that such an attitude can be encountered in Moscow more often than in Paris. Such a presentation of Soviet social reality says perhaps more about the author's state of mind than about Soviet society. Many Soviet and Western literary critics, as well as readers within the USSR and emigres, agree that Yuri Trifonov is a Soviet author who portrays Soviet reality everyday life with utmost realism. I therefore suggest a reading of his books, [3] and a comparison of his depiction with Castoriadis' portrayal of Soviet life.

Castoriadis justly complains for a failure to develop a general theoretical conception of Soviet society. The today's situation in Sovietology can, following Pirandello, be presented as a dozen Grand Theories in search of a society. Soviet society, in its mature phase, has been in existence only for the past two decades or so, and both our knowledge of the basic facts and our understanding of the central social mechanisms and the internal contradictions of Soviet society remain inadequate. The construction of yet another grand theory, be it called "stratocracy" or "corporativism", aim at a comprehensive analysis of this new social formation, is therefore at best premature.

One of our major disagreements results from our different assessments of the size and role of the military-industrial-scientific complex in the USSR. While I would like to emphasize here the importance of Castoriadis' work for the analysis of Soviet "political imperialism" as a type of foreign policy fully compatible with the nature of the Soviet ruling "political class", I must disagree, however, with his interpretation of the role of "closed" enterprises and with his general conclusion that military expansion is the only way of keeping the Soviet regime intact. As to the closed enterprises, let me say this: they tend to belong to the very vaguely defined sphere of the military or state secret. What such a secret is, depends on the definitions of the moment. I would like to illustrate this by drawing on my personal experience. While working as a worker, an engineer and a middle-level manager in the Soviet geological industry, I encountered two types of closed enterprises. The first type is well represented by a geological enterprise located close enough to the border of the USSR to permit raising it to the rank of closed enterprises. Those of the second type deal with "strategic" resources. What a strategic resource is, or how far away from the border an enterprise has to be before it qualifies for this special status, depends exclusively on an often quite arbitrary decision by appropriate authorities. My own observations and those of other Soviet scientists lead me to conclude that closed enterprises are increasingly turning into *political* tools which control labor turnover, divide the working class, create new privileged groups within it and open new channels for upward social mobility. To discuss the closed enterprises as invariably connected with the military industry means to fall into the trap of Soviet propaganda which, rephrasing an old definition, is that branch of the art of lying which consists in deceiving itself together with its enemies.

The gloomiest part of Castoriadis' vision is, of course, his "scenario" of the irresistible march of the Soviet empire to world domination. Brezhnev or no Brezhnev, the Soviets, he argues, will continue their military build-up, their penetration of the Third world, the Hongkong-ization of Western Europe; Reagan or no Reagan, the Western world will counteract only with embargoing "the export of peanut butter to countries of the Russian bloc." It is possible but probably fruitless to point here to the curious company in which Castoriadis finds himself or to ask into whose hands he is playing.

3. See, for example, his *The Long Good-bye* (Harper-Row: New York, 1978).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Incidentally, I think that all this *Proletkult* language — all this talk about "reactionary professors", "trivial preconceptions", "liberal platitudes", "intellectual regression", "bloody leaches of imperialism" and "warmongers" — is not exactly conducive to serious discussion. Castoriadis wants to force the Left to rethink the Soviet case, to recognize the irreformable and inherently expansionist character of the Soviet Union and thereby to contribute to a modification of the traditional leftist approach to the issues of demilitarisation and disarmament. If I thought that Castoriadis was basically right I would not hesitate to support his conclusions, even if the Reagans, Weinbergers, Bechtels and Grummonds would temporarily benefit from the proposed policy. However, I am convinced that the perspective presented by Castoriadis is exceedingly unlikely. I do not underestimate the Soviet threat or fail to acknowledge the nature of the *nomenklatura* based upon "collective ownership" of political power and means of destruction. The policy of expansion, however, can be pursued only as long as it continues to pay off. The new Soviet leadership is unlikely to proceed with its expansionist drive in the face of the blows delivered by the Afghan resistance and especially by the Polish events while facing at the same time demographic, agricultural, financial and other crises at home.

Much more likely is the introduction of certain technocratic reforms, similar to those tried in the mid-60's. In the short run, these reforms can be achieved without threatening existing power relations. In the long run, the impact of such reforms may turn out to be less destabilizing than continuing the rigid policy of status quo maintenance. I would like to stress that Soviet society is not like a lump of clay which always yields to the pressure of its leadership. Therefore, it is not surprising, as Brus has pointed out, "in many respects the expansion of the state has stopped and signs of some roll-back have appeared."[4] There is even now a quite evident shift away from the principle of direct distribution, resulting in a greater economic independence of the population from the state. No less impressive has been a noticeable decline in all kinds of compulsory methods of allocating manpower. The labor market is thriving, in spite of many attempts to curb it through the passport system, residence registrations, etc. There has also been a tremendous improvement in the population's educational level. For the first time in history over 75% of workers in the age-cohort under 30 have ten or more years of formal schooling.

The present radical change in the offical attitude towards individual ("private") plots is most characteristic of the coming reforms. Major journals now openly acknowledge the importance of markets and their growth in Soviet society: "Throughout the country there are more than 5,700 collective farm markets with almost 1,5 million market stalls. In addition to them there are also many small markets that are not officially registered and irregular markets, such as intra-village markets, at which a small share of the output is sold (in a number of republics the sale of some products on this market reaches and sometimes even exceeds the volume of sales in urban markets)."[5] The food crisis has forced officials to adopt a "positive attitude" towards individual plots while Soviet theoreticians are finally permitted to declare the individual plot "a necessary partner of the social sector because the social sector is unable to expand the production of all types of agricultural products — to the scale capable of satisfying the population's needs."[6] Quite clearly, present reforms concerning individual plots are

4. W. Brus, "The Economic Role of the State: West and East", *Survey*, 25:4, 1980, p. 73.

5. G. Shmelev, "Social Production and Personal Household Plots," *Problems of Economics. A Journal of Translations*, 25:2, 1982, p. 47.

6. G. Shmelev, *op. cit.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inconsistent and badly conceived. But the main trend must nevertheless not be ignored: the all-powerful and all-embracing neo-Stalinist state is trying to each an accommodation with the population; it is forced to support a prime source of market relations in the economy and, therefore, to curtail itself.

Castoriadis' perspective on the future foresees the persistence of overall stagnation, interrupted from time to time by splashes of external expansion. While fully sharing his deep mistrust of the Soviet regime and its leadership, I see a more complex, dialectical interplay between state and society which is likely to trigger important social changes. In the next decade we may witness greater changes inside Soviet society than in any industrial society of the West.

ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, NON-LIBERALS AND CASTORIADIS

by Paul Piccone

Througout its history — now going on its 15th year — *Telos* has always encouraged debates in the hope of developing a genuine "Left public sphere" where significant theoretical and political questions could be tackled independently of Marxist-Leninist claptrap or social-democratic banalities. With the journal gradually turning towards more political issues — without, however, compromising its main commitment to theory — there was always the possibility that civil debate could heat beyond reasonable limits and deteriorate into a kind of *bellum omnia contra omnes*. This seems to have happened with the discussion concerning new social movements — especially the peace movement. Similarly, the previously manageable amount of dirty laundry quietly handled in private has grown so large and so theoretical that now it is advisable to process — at least some of it — at a public laundromat. This is not necessarily a bad sign for, on closer analysis, what appear as idiosyncratic differences — as Breines, Arato and Cohen indicate — really betray serious political and theoretical divergences in need of systematic articulation and development. What results, therefore, is not a series of sterile polemics but serious theoretical discourse. Furthermore, when all is said and done, these divergences are far from irreconcilable and the laundry not really all that soiled.

All three major replies, Breines', and Arato/Cohen's and Castoriadis', point to so many "strange" editorial practices (or poor translations), that the uninformed reader would immediately suspect the St. Louis headquarters of editorial Stalinism. But, in view of the proportions of the alleged editorial crimes, the complaints are exceptionally mild — which should immediately lead one to suspect the victims' complicity in the questionable deeds. Why was part of the Breines' title cut without his consent? Why was Arato/Cohen's text "conveniently" butchered so that Lee could misunderstand it as a technocratic ploy? And what about Castoriadis' "poor translation"?

What Breines and Arato/Cohen fail to mention is that both their pieces came to the office only a *few hours* before the journal was to go the printer — Breines', in fact, was picked up at the TWA terminal in St. Louis at 2 a.m. on a flight from Boston, just in time to meet a 9 a.m. deadline. But, at least, Breines does not occasionally forget verbs in sentences and he never leaves phrases unfinished — something that cannot always be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

said for Arato/Cohen.[1] Of course, some of the more serious issues are usually ironed out on the phone, but never to everyone's satisfaction. And the resulting differences of opinion about the final results usually tend to be rooted in philosophical disagreement.

Social Movements and Artificial Negativity

Consider the zapping of "*Telos*" from Breines' title. This was obviously done for the reasons that he himself provides, i.e., because he was really attacking a particular *faction* within the journal rather than the journal as a whole. It is well-known that the so-called "artificial negativity" faction consists primarily of Berman, Luke, Reed, Lee, and myself and one could identify several other equally loosely-knit factions unified by various theoretical predilections. Similarily, there has never been any attempt to force this type of analysis on anyone other than in the normal way of argument, persuasion and discussion that, however, does not always work, in which case either the original positions change or differences remain.

It so happens that, a situation characterized by what some of us see as the rapid decline of individuality, the systematic penetration of civil society by the state, and the lack of a meaningful Left perspective on present problems, leads to a certain skepticism about the possibilities and prospects of genuinely emancipatory new social movements. Thus, anyone sympathetic to the artificial negativity position is naturally inclined to immediately look for alienated individuals becoming sucked in manipulated causes for dubious political reasons, rather than expecting conscientious, well-informed citizens forming autonomous and democratic organizations seeking "truth, justice and the American way." Is this because of inherent pessimism and negativism? No: it is merely a function, entirely understandable, of posing questions within one's theoretical framework more or less systematically worked out (yet constantly under re-consideration) before any particular analysis. Given, furthermore, our collective experience with the Jerry Rubins and Abbie Hoffmans during the 1960's, it is not unreasonable to assume guilt unless innocence is already proven. Why should the standards used by the U.S. juridical system be universalized. What is a good procedure for protecting otherwise helpless citizens from a highly suspect state apparatus need not necessarily apply to political theory. If, on the basis of everything else one knows already, it follows that, given today's conditions, spontaneous social movements either tend to be right-wing, as Denitch shows, or to fall prey to instrumentalization by extraneous forces and feed into an institutional logic quite different from the personal intentions of individual participants, then it makes *extremely good sense* to look for the *rotten* eggs even before establishing the soundness of the other ones. A peace movement infested by Marxist-Leninists has to be assumed to be starting out with two strikes against it.

In a nutshell this is all that separates Lee, Berman, and myself from Breines, Benhabib and what could be called the "sunshine gang" whose hopes and enthusiasm for emancipation we share, but whose cheerful attitude we temporarily suspend. Needless to say, we wish nothing better than to be proven wrong but so far, aside from

1. This practice, of course, is nothing new. Thus, Arato's first article on Lukács, way back in *Telos* 7 (Spring 1971), came with no concluding sentence. For reasons too lengthy to go into, this discrepency was discovered only in the very final proof-readings, about an hour before shipment to the printer. A final one-line sentence with a kind of cowboy-movie flavor (to the effect that Lukács and Marxism lived happily thereafter) was hastily added. Sure enough, a couple of months later, in a *Telos* conference in Buffalo, N.Y., Arato was publicly attacked by David Kettler for such a scatterbrained ending!

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

abstract demands for Will Rogers or Dale Carnegie types of attitudinal changes, no substantive arguments have been provided to have us lift our reservations. As for the charge of suppressing material, it is clearly based on a misunderstanding: in *Telos* articles are ridiculed, attacked, rejected, etc., but never "suppressed."[2]

The issue of "Metacritic" —as Breines labels Orville Lee III (he had nothing to do with choosing this name: he was stuck with it at birth!) — is slightly different. It reflects almost a generational difference. In his attempt to encourage a more open attitude to new social movements, Breines and Benhabib do give the impression of wanting to exempt their movements from the ruthless criticism we usually unleash against everything and the kitchen sinks — at least at the beginning, while they are still in the process of defining themselves (the movements and not the sinks!). Yet, it is precisely at this stage that criticism is most forcefully needed, especially where there is a suspicion of complicity with nationalism, hidden agendas, theoretical naiveté, and therefore political irresponsibility. It is not surprising, consequently, that relatively younger readers immediately reach for their guns at the suggestion that *Telos* should lower its critical standards for anything. The title of Lee's reply, by the way, was suggested by myself — and that by now has become almost predictable: it seems that every time there are problems, the buck can be readily traced straight to the editor's desk!

The more substantive issue lurking behind Breines' complaints, however, has to do with our relation to the New Left heritage and the fear that we are in the process of repudiating it. But, for good or bad, as Breines himself again points out, our attitude has not changed all that much: we reject features of the New Left we rejected in the 1960's and uphold those which we defended then. I have always argued against Lotus-eating, mindless activism and irresponsibility, and for participatory democracy, non-hierarchical organization, a new type of politics focusing on subjectivist rather than formal dimensions, and intellectual rigor.[3] Why should I change this judgement now, especially since it has turned out to be almost prophetic? The New Left has many things and we were only *one* part of it. In retrospect, what has survived as its most lasting heritage seems to be those very ideals that we upheld and still uphold. The mistake then, if anything, was to have not been critical enough (although, it is unclear that more criticism would have done all that much good) on the assumption that the movement was still defining itself and thus should have been given a chance to develop. A more uncompromising critical attitude might have de-legitimized much of the superficial nonsense of opportunistic clowns such as Rubin and Hoffman and some of the criminal intentions of the more scatterbrained Weathermen. Our mild criticism and often partial silence did not do much to prevent the eventual disintegration of that movement. We are older now and we should not repeat those mistakes.

---

2. What happened in the case that Berman mentions and Breines balks at, is the following. When the initial batch of articles for the "peace movements issue" came and Berman evaluated it, he suggested that we should also publish, as a corrective to some of the more tenuous claims in some of the articles, a small piece published by an SPD right-wing German journal whose name I forgot, indicating that the NATO policies were originally suggested by the Europeans themselves. When Benhabib read the article in question, she *strongly* objected and suggested, instead, that we publish the Suss article (being from *Prokla*, this other article had more solid Left credentials). Not only did we publish the Suss article — even though most of us objected to its evaluation of the USSR — but, of all people, it was Berman himself who ended up translating most of it. Berman had also agreed, reluctantly, to junk his original suggestion and go with the Suss alternative.

3. See my "From Youth Culture to Political Praxis," in *Radical America*, vol. 3, no. 6 (Nov. 1969), pp. 15-21.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Neo-Kantianism, Technocracy and Liberalism

Where Breines seems to want to hang on to the spirit of an idealized glorious past by reliving it through new social movements — at the risk of repeating the same mistakes of a decade and a half ago — Arato and Cohen have learned their lessons all too well. Contrary to what Lenin would have called the "*Kinderkrankheit*" of the "sunshine gang," Arato and Cohen seem to have followed the path of those Western Marxists who, in the face of the hard realities of the 1930s, traded in their eschatology and messianism for "constitutionality and legalism." But whereas the Lukács and the Togliattis of two generations ago felt compelled by the rise of Nazism and Fascism (and, although neither of the two said so, of Stalinism), to retreat to a *de facto* liberal politics, Enlightenment philosophy and "bourgeois" formalism, Arato and Cohen have no such justification. Of course, no one is against legality and constitutionality, but that is not the point. What is at stake is whether the outlook is anything more than warmed-over liberalism (or even worse: no true blood conservatives would object to legality and constitutionality!), and whether it holds any emancipatory promises. But first things first.

Arato/Cohen blame me for their having been charged with technocratism. It is very convenient to send in manuscripts in an unfinished form for the editors to put in final shape: any subsequent problem can be easily blamed on "constitutive" editing. Luckily enough, they quote both the original as well as the edited version of the infamous passage in question. Now, any careful comparison of both passages will reveal that, far from making them appear technocratic, the edited version actually tries to compress their claim to *defuse* precisely such a charge. In the original version they suggested *two* possible "technocratic" functions: as "social scientific experts" and as "social and political theorists." In the edited version both functions are collapsed into one. At any rate, given all the problems with the "new class" and "technocracy," it would have helped to clarify that, as *advisors*, intellectuals would only help educate those less enlightened members of these movements (as in the case of Solidarity) and avoid claiming positions of power, *à la* Lenin, on the basis of higher knowledge or by pretending to represent "collective consciousness." But even that may not have worked. After all, in *State and Revolution* Lenin also spoke of "we, workers, *ourselves*" when suggesting ways to re-organize society along the lines of the Post Office. Yet, a relatively irrelevant semantic distinction between "intellectuals participating in movements as experts" and "members of movements with expertise" may have saved the day.

The question of liberalism is more complicated, and elicits less agreement. Without indulging in any unnecessary ancestral worship of Horkheimer or Adorno, or "sophomoric" distinctions between classical and contemporary liberalism, it is clear that, from Gonzales' discussion in *Telos* 48, what was meant was simply the ideology of a political system based on monadic individuality and mechanistic metaphysics, which began as capitalist ideology and turned into the statist travesty we have today. Now, Arato/Cohen seek the reconstitution of civil society and the creation of an alternative public sphere as leverage against statist encroachment. As they themselves point out, the only difference between their position and the contemporary liberal one is that one wants to steer society *from above*, while the other sees this steering carried out by pluralist forms of interest aggregation *from below*. Presumably, the "good guys" *below* will then straighten out the mess made by "bad guys" *above*. This, however, is postulated on the basis of a serious misunderstanding.

Here Arato/Cohen are confusing Eastern Soviet-type societies with their Western capitalist counterpart. Whereas, in the first, State and society are radically split, in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

second the State is continuous with civil society. So either any alternative public sphere smoothly feeds into the logic of the given (in fact, the artificial negativity argument is precisely that the State tends to reconstitute the institutions of civil society *from above* in order to provide itself with badly needed internal control mechanisms), or it will fade away on its own as an independent entity. Arato/Cohen tend to forget that civil society is not constituted just by peace movements, radical groups, church organizations, Boy Scouts, the Salvation Army, Pro-Life groups, the KKK, but also by Bechtel and IBM, ITT and McDonnell-Douglas — and the latter parts of civil society are by far the most powerful. When one takes a good look *below*, it turns out to be not a hell of a lot more encouraging than what one finds *above*. The old saying that a society normally gets the State that it deserves is as true today as ever. Now, even if this "alternative public sphere" can ever get off the ground, it is hard to see how, in a society which is not totalitarian, it can avoid becoming integrated into the existing pseudo-public sphere and actually revitalize it without, however, effectively changing its conformist role — at least as long as the democratic Left remains a small minority. Thus, the distinction between Arato/Cohen and reform liberalism — the emphasis on "from below" rather than "from above" — evaporates when one suddenly realizes that what is at stake is the U.S. and not Transylvania and, consequently, what one finds "below" is not qualitatively different from what is "above."

But this criticism is fraught with problems since, among other things, the project of re-constituting civil society (understood as an aggregation of *autonomous* institutions generating "meaning" and constituting individuality) is the *only* viable project today. What is ultimately liberal about the Arato/Cohen proposal is the proceduralism, formalism and otherwise *abstract* emphasis on "constitutionalism and legality." The old Marxist critique of all this that showed how, in substance, all of these niceties are thwarted by the primacy of the cash-nexus, is suddenly forgotten. To the extent that in capitalist society legality also takes the typical form of everything with that society — the commodity-form (in this case as "services") — it becomes primarily an economic entity, succumbing to the *de facto* rules of the game. While indispensable, these guarantees, by themselves, are usually inadequate since they give way all too easily to other economic priorities and particularistic interests.

My emphasis on cultural rather than legal and constitutional institutions that Arato/Cohen point out is meant precisely to avoid this formal pitfall and, without at the same time falling into Marxian economism, emphasize a more *substantial* institutional domain. Again, this is an old philosophical difference rooted in their neo-Kantian and my phenomenological (Husserlian) neo-Hegelian perspective,[4] which need not be rehashed here. The main point is that, in order to avoid the charge of liberalism, Arato/Cohen must move beyond constitutionalism and legalism and give *substantial* life to their institutions of civil society. The procedural guarantees make sense only if a pluralist aggregation of interests from below is not, e.g., a primarily fascist one (racism, anti-semitism, etc., could, after all, be institutionalized in a constitution!).

In the present situation where these cultural institutions of civil society are either in a state of progressive disintegration (primarily because of state intervention) or are completely overshadowed by their right-wing or capitalist counterpart, the emphasis on

4. Talking about "constitutive editing," in a gambit far surpassing anything I ever imagined, Arato once managed to edit in a neo-Kantian definition of critical theory in one of my texts in the only instance in which our usual editor-author relation was reversed. See my Aratosized "General Introduction" to Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, editors. *The Esssential Frankfurt School Reader* (Continuum: New York, 1982), pp.ix-x.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

legality and constitutionality remains an abstract transposition of an *appropriate* Eastern European political project into an *inappropriate* Western context where they are necessary, but far from sufficient, conditions for a viable civil society.

This explains why Arato/Cohen cannot see the continuity between my two statements to the effect that there is an "all important lingering pluralism, heterogeneity and vitality of American Civil Society," but which is also "already penetrated by the state or . . . bled to death by the culture industry, consumerism and collective narcissism." Why something "lingering" cannot, at the same time, be both *important* and in a stage of general *agony?* A dying civil society is still very important, but dying nonetheless. What is emancipatory about revitalizing it is not its existence as such, but the fact that it will provide various groups the space within it to effectively develop and propose viable emancipatory alternatives. Thus, a thriving civil society is merely a necessary *pre*-condition for the development of *positive* projects of social emancipation based on an ecologically sound relation to nature and an intersubjectivity free of exploitation.

Devant Castoriadis

Whereas disagreeing with Breines and Arato/Cohen may, at worse, generate a hoarse throat and/or a few friendly stray insults, doing so with Commissar Castoriadis leaves one with the distinct impression that, if he was in power, and one were to mistake "efficient" for "effective,"[5] the result could be a long vacation in Siberia! Furthermore, "economistic Marxo-Americans"[6] may instinctively reply by addressing "scatterbrained Franco-anarchists" rather than "friends and colleagues" . . . but this type of exchange is better suited for Lenin's tirades against Kautsky. So, it is probably more appropriate to apologize for a honest mistake resulting from forcibly bunching Castoriadis with Brus and thus wrongly collapsing their positions. Having said that, however, the real disagreements should be brought to the fore. And Castoriadis does this pretty well by forcibly outlining his major arguments about the nature and direction of the USSR.

Yet, our original article was not primarily about the nature of the USSR, but merely an attempt to draw attention to the logic of military Keynesianism as an explanatory key to much recent international political turmoil. The main objective was to show that the starting-point for such an analysis should be the major socio-economic rationalization in progress — and one need not be "Marxo-American" to emphasize the importance of the socio-economic dimension. The USSR came in only in order to show that, contrary to new Cold Warriors such as Norman Podhoretz or Castoriadis (and the two are absolutely not to be equated), the Russian military threat is not as serious as it is made out to be, to justify immense Western re-armament expenditures. Clearly, Castoriadis disagrees with this evaluation, but in that case he should really have rebutted

5. This nit-picking is, of course, on the mark, but, in terms of the broader argument, it remains nit-picking nonetheless. And this is not the first time that this has happened — which explains, among other things, the charge of having made a "bad translation" of Castoriadis' article. I still recall an interminable correspondance between St. Louis, Petersborough (Ontario), and Paris on the occasion of the publication of the special issue on the 20th anniversary of the Hungarian revolution in *Telos*, n.29, (Fall 1976), trying to clarify the distinction between Castoriadis' "social-historical" and our rendition of it as "socio-historical." Despite Castoriadis' best efforts, I must confess that, unlike in the case of "effective" and "efficient," I have yet to figure out that difference.

6. It is interesting that Zaslavsky and I end up branded as Marxo-Americans: Zaslavsky is a Russian-Canadian and I am an Italo-American — and neither of us is a Marxist! Furthermore, the article itself was written while we were both in exile in Newfoundland.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rittersporn who has done a far superior job than Zaslavsky and I in this area.[7] What Rittersporn convincingly shows is not only that Russian arms are pretty-well "Brand X" (something confirmed in the recent Lebanonese war) but that Russian society is totally unable to sustain any type of prolonged war effort. In a nuclear war, of course, "prolonged" may not mean much more than a few hours, yet Rittersporn's point is still valid.

Although Castoriadis is right that the whole policy of détente was predicated on the assumption that reforms in the USSR and Eastern Europe could be profitably financed by Western capital, and that the Soviet Union is stuck with attempting to continue on the present course, it does not follow that *absolutely* no reforms are possible — especially since some reforms need not upset existing power relations (e.g., those in agriculture described by Zaslavsky). This is especially so since the Soviet regime simply cannot continue on its present course. Castoriadis generously offers rewards in rubles for whatever reforms can be listed. But that is an unfair request. Rather, what he should have done is to prove the impossibility of *all* reforms. This is also an unfair request. Given Zaslavsky's analyses of Soviet society in his *The Neo-Stalinist State*, however, it is not immediately obvious that there is no room whatsoever for maneuver in Soviet society. Thus, to attempt to foreclose any such possibility is, at best, premature. What Castoriadis calls "the internal impasse" is now being matched by an equally problematic "external impasse" in Poland, Afghanistan and much of the The Third World where the Marxist-Leninist model is being rapidly de-legitimated. Our modest suggestion was that, given this unenviable predicament, it would be easier to attempt to gradually and slowly modified "the internal impasse" rather than face greater risks by pursuing what Castoriadis calls the "way out."

Two more major points in Castoriadis's rejoinder cry out for comment: the question of an "internal explosion" and the possibility of a theory of Russian society. Apparently Castoriadis seriously entertains the possibility of an "internal explosion" in the USSR. And then he attacks Zaslavsky and I for "wishful thinking"! Again, the major merit of Zaslavsky's *The Neo-Stalinist State* is precisely to point out the solidity of the consensus that the Brezhnev regime has managed to manufacture by skillfully manipulating various things such as social mobility, nationalism, alcoholism and even anti-semitism.[8] A major "internal explosion" in the USSR is as likely as a Marxist-Leninist revolution in the U.S. today. Castoriadis hits the roof at the mere suggestion that the Russian population is actually accepting the present situation. That, however, is not a *conclusion*, but the *premise* of any analysis of the USSR. To postulate internal turmoil in the face of all the successful means of coercion and repression deployed by the regime is primarily the product of what "reactionary sociology professors" cannot help labelling a vivid imagination that has not entirely come to terms with its Trotskyist past.

The issue of the "theoretical conception" is even worse. What would a "theory" of Soviet society look like? Does it mean an account of *how* that society works? Well, Zaslavsky has independently provided as good an account of that as we can expect in the immediate future. Or would it be a deductive model out of which one can predict precisely when and how an "internal explosion" will take place? Clearly, no such thing is possible. All one can do is to identify what one considers significant features, articulate possible interrelations, and speculate about potential outcomes. Short of a deter-

7. Gabor Rittersporn, "Facing the War Psychosis" in *Telos*, no.51 (Spring 1982), pp. 22-31.

8. This particular argument about the instrumentalization of anti-semitism for legitimating reasons is fully developed in Zaslavsky's and Brym's forthcoming work on *Soviet-Jewish Emigration in the 1970s*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ministic theory of history, this is all we can have. The future is made by human beings which, no matter what constraints they may face, still have a modicum of *choice* and *freedom* that can readily upset any scenario so carefully developed either by "reactionary sociology professors" or "reconstructed Trotskyists." To speak Castoriadese, it is possible to invent new imaginary significations which generate new and unforeseen (as well as unforeseeable) scenarios. The apocalyptic "waiting for Godot" or for an "internal explosion" is not all that different from the same expectations for a collapse of the capitalist system by the Marxists of a generation or two ago.

The present international situation is indeed bleak and "the Russian Question" remains unanswered. In carefully dealing with these matters, however, it is absolutely essential to defend whatever free space remains in the West and prevent further State and military encroachments on civil society under overblown claims about the Soviet threat. All Zaslavsky and I attempted to show is that the present balance of terror has not given way to any Soviet superiority, that the present military Keynesianism has, as its objective, the restoration of U.S. world economic hegemony (primarily in relation to Western Europe and Japan), and that social movements — especially West German and English peace movements — are extremely vulnerable to instrumentalization in the interest of hidden agendas. Nothwithstanding disagreements concerning specific details, this is not all that far from Castoriadis' own intentions.

REVIEWS AS POLITICS: A REPLY TO BOOKCHIN
by Daniel Neal Graham

Murray Bookchin's review of *Ecology as Politics* (*Telos* 46) is very critical of Gorz's attempt to fuse ecological concerns with democratic socialist politics. In the reviewer's words, Gorz is "advancing a politics that is environmentally oriented, not an ecological sensibility that is meant to yield a political orientation." Gorz does clearly state that the ecology movement is part of a larger struggle, and even though Bookchin's review manages to critically explore the book's major theme — the relationship between capitalism and ecological constraints — his heavy polemical concerns reduce what could have been truly thought-provoking critique into a rehash of old anarchist versus Marxist debates. While *Ecology as Politics* can certainly leave thoughtful readers undecided on the question of whether ecological destruction is caused primarily by capitalist policies or whether capitalist contradictions are merely aggravated by ecological constraints, *or* whether an ecological sensibility produces its own politics, Bookchin's review makes it quite clear that *he* is more concerned with the politics of reviews than with ecology as politics.

Not without its faults, *Ecology as Politics* is much less disappointing than Bookchin's review of it. It may be true that many of the ecological concerns that Gorz incorporates are not exactly new. His attempt to relate them to democratic socialist politics, however, should be of great interest to those who see both capitalist contradictions and ecological destruction as major barriers to a better future.

Gorz's major concern is how ecology relates to capitalism. In his view, ecological constraints reinforce the structural contradictions of capitalism -- specifically, the rise in the organic composition of capital and the tendency for the rate of profit to decline.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The expense of installing pollution control raises the cost of fixed capital (machinery) relative to that of variable capital (labor). Though Bookchin jumps on this point in order to prove that Gorz's environmentalism is economistically reductionist, he does not really attempt to deal with the validity of such a link or the implications of it. Whether there has been a real rise in the organic composition of capital and a subsequent decline in the rate of profit due to ecological constraints is an interesting and provocative question. The fact that capitalists are finally having to include costs of "externalities" (such as pollution controls and finite resource constraints) is in itself an important point. Capitalism does operate in a closed system when it becomes a world system. Marx's closed-system based predictions do seem to retain some merit. "Grow or die" may yet be the title of capitalism's epitaph.

In Gorz's view, the ecological perspective is incompatible with the growth-fetish rationality of both capitalism and existing state socialism. Though it should not be confused, or equated with it, the ecological perspective is not seen by Gorz to be incompatible with a democratic socialism. Contemporary concepts of a democratic socialist alternative incorporate the ecological perspective's insistence on the need to transform technology and its relation to people. In a manner that echoes Langston Winner's *Autonomous Technology*, Gorz argues that a new approach to technology ("tool inversion") will be a necessary component of socialist politics. Tool inversion would require more control of technology at the local level, increased economic autonomy for local units, techniques that do not inflict environmental harm, and more joint control of existing and new technologies by producers and consumers. Without such changes in the technological realm, socialist transformation of society will remain merely formal. This sensitivity is how ecology becomes politics.

Some of Gorz's other major themes are reviewed in a similar manner by Bookchin. Gorz's point that all production is also destruction gets to the duality of Marx's view on capitalist technology. As a thinker heavily influenced by the technological discoveries of the 19th century, Marx did have an admiration for capitalism's ability to manipulate nature. His discovery that capitalism must continually grow in order to produce and survive helped to reveal the system's internal irrationality. Though not himself overly sensitive to ecological constraints, the irrationality of a system that will have to destroy in order to produce fits comfortably within Marx's general framework. As Barry Commoner (a "closet Eurocommunist," in Bookchin's words) has told us, in order to survive we must learn how to restore to nature the wealth we have borrowed from it. Only a system that takes into account considerations other than simply short-term exchange values can provide the framework necessary to consider ecological lessons. That capitalism and state socialism seem unable to provide such a framework is clear enough. Whether a democratic, decentralized-oriented socialism can provide one needs to be seriously considered, not polemically side-stepped.

Gorz makes some other points that are important for those who are interested in an ecologically sound and socially democratic future. He successfully challenges the growth-dependent orthodoxy that argues that social equality depends on equality of consumption. In direct opposition he argues that equality of consumption is dependent on social equality. Maybe Susan George and others demonstrated it first, but Gorz's incorporation of this view into socialist politics is important. He also shows a sensitivity to the problem of statism — one that Bookchin should have been sympathetic to. Like other contemporary critical thinkers, Gorz articulates the need to return power to civil society. His discussion of how the traditional economic demands of the labor movement need to be linked with the quality of life concerns of the "avant-garde" should also be high on the Left's agenda.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Unfortunately for anyone who has read only Bookchin's review, these very important themes either appear as the mechanical adoption of ecology by Marxism, or not at all. Bookchin's use of *Ecology as Politics* to rehash anarchist versus Marxist debates is all too apparent in his overconcern with the "primary source of exploitation" question. According to Bookchin, Marx and (of course) Gorz take the position that the domination of man by man stems from the need to dominate nature. For Bookchin, the causality is completely reversed — the domination of nature derives from the domination of man by man. Putting aside the theoretical implications of this historic debate, the practical concerns should focus on the mutual reinforcement of human and environmental exploitation. Both have to be eliminated together. Bookchin may be literally correct to quote Gorz's statement that "it is impossible to derive an ethic from ecology." He is very misleading to suggest that Gorz does not see ecology independently contributing anything important to contemporary politics. Ecologically sensitized politics can be ecology as politics without having to become political ecology. The former acknowledges the operation of human politics within the natural environment — which has its own "laws of motion." The latter perspective (Bookchin's political ecology) ignores the conscious self-activity of humankind. Ecological determinism is no less reductionist than economic determinism. Without a perspective that incorporates their interplay, we are left with politics as ecology. *Ecology as Politics* may be a convenient title for those who wish to attach a reductionist label, in spite of its content. More reasonable, it conveys the point that ecology must be given its rightful place in the polis so that politics can play a harmonious role within the environment from which it emerged.

There *are* some important questions that Gorz leaves unanswered in this book. His view that a non-competitive, no-growth capitalism might be able to incorporate environmental concerns leaves open the whole question of whether such a system would still be capitalist. The compatibility of democratic socialist politics with the ecology movement needs elaboration, although some practical approaches come readily to mind (job-creating alternative energy forms, decentralization of political and technological power, etc.).

These inconsistencies and gaps notwithstanding, *Ecology as Politics* does make a pretty successful attempt to theoretically link two of the three major components of contemporary left politics — democratic socialism and ecology. The third major component — feminism — is left out of this work. Exploring the links between patriarchy, capitalism, and ecological destruction has yet to be adequately attempted. That Gorz has only hit on two out of three should not warrant Bookchin's negative dismissal. Such a batting average should be highly appreciated.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reviews:

Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, *The Ethiopian Revolution.* London: New Left Books and Verso Editions, 1981.

Ethiopia became one of the flashpoints of the new Cold War in 1977-78 during the military clash with Somalia over the Ogaden. The conflict in the Horn of Africa also focused attention on the fierce secessionist war in Eritrea and the on-going social revolution in Ethiopia which began with the 1974 overthrow of Emperor Haille Selassie by a group of junior military officers. On November 26, 1977, in response to Somali military successes in the Ogaden, the Soviets began a massive airlift of arms and Cuban troops into Ethiopia, which became the largest Soviet operation of its kind in the Third World (246).

The revolution and the wars of secession became the subject of intense debate on the international left when some of the brutal characteristics of the new regime were publicized. Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux have entered this controversy with a scholarly and thought-provoking study of the complex Ethiopian revolution, which raises a number of disquieting questions about the future of revolution in the Third World.

Ethiopia's role in the culture and politics of Africa is unique. It is the only country which successfully resisted Western encroachments and preserved its archaic social structure, "evocative of the European Middle Ages" (54), well past the era of decolonization. Following the introduction of Christianity by Coptic missionaries in the fourth century, the region developed its own traditions in splendid isolation from other influences, particularly Islam.

The Italians seized the Ethiopian Red Sea port of Assab in 1869, gaining a coastal foothold which by 1890 they had consolidated into a region they called Eritrea (56). But when they attempted to move against Ethiopia proper in 1896, they lost 12,000 troops in the Battle of Adowa. After the defeat of the second Italian invasion of 1935, Allied support gave a new lease on life to the primitive social structure headed by the Emperor. Even in the 1970s, "pre-capitalist relations of production were dominant and even commercial contacts with the world market were limited" (60). On the eve of the revolution in 1974, Ethiopia was the poorest country in Africa.

Although the archaic state continued to demonstrate a remarkable durability, by the 1960s signs of serious decay were becoming evident. The society's feudal structures were very slowly beginning to give way to capitalist production relations. The state, embodied in the all-powerful, sacred, and now elderly Emperor, was also undergoing slow changes that included the development of a weak capitalist infrastructure. The growth of the civil service, the military, and the educational system proved to be destabilizing influences on the decrepit state.

The first signs of real trouble for the regime came in 1960 when members of the Imperial Guard attempted a coup while Selassie was visiting Brazil. The announced aims of the rebels were very mild and included retention of the monarchy. Before it was swiftly crushed the coup did gain some student support (79). The other small spark that gradually became a firestorm was the founding of the Eritrean Liberation Front in the same year. By 1973, the regime's grave difficulties became apparent. Full-scale war had been raging for over a decade in Eritrea and a horrifying famine in the Welo district exposed the government's inhumanity and powerlessness. Even the United States recognized the debility of the Emperor and his ministers and began to dilute its support for the government (219).

Selassie faced serious threats from three sectors: the military, students, and the labor movement in Addis Ababa. The gravest incident was the mutiny by the soldiers

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the Neghelle garrison in January 1974. The mutiny was touched off when officers of the garrison refused to allow the soldiers to drink from the wells consigned to the brass during a drought. The rebel soldiers imprisoned the Emperor's envoy who was sent to investigate the situation. In early February, another military revolt took place at an air base near Addis Ababa. This time the issue was pay. The air base rebellion touched off demonstrations by students and teachers. Taxi drivers, the hub of transportation in the capital, joined the demonstrations to protest a rise in fuel prices which had resulted from OPEC price increases. In response to these events the Emperor reorganized his government and gave in to military demands for better pay and labor demands for the right to organize: "No opposition party or organization had lain behind, or emerged from, the February upheaval. Yet a very real transition had occurred. For the first time in Ethiopian history, popular pressure had forced the Emperor to make substantial political and economic concessions and prevented him from exacting his traditional punishments. Moreover, in an intangible but universally recognized sense, the spell had been broken; it was impossible for the regime to reimpose political control" (85).

After winning the right to organize, the labor movement grew rapidly. The politically moderate Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions (CELU) was founded in 1963 and had its base among white-collar workers. The government permitted the union to form in response to pressures from the United States to modernize the country.

The students were the most radical element in the capital. They had been influenced by the ideologies of the New Left while studying abroad. The student movement developed a serious split in 1971 over the nationalities question, with an older generation arguing that a solution to the question would arise from the general anti-feudal and anti-imperialist struggle, and a younger faction, influenced by the Eritrean struggle, calling for national self-determination and the right of secession. Students had kept up some form of opposition to the government throughout the 1960s and in 1973 suffered casualties while organizing protests against the famine. In April 1974 a student-led protest movement overthrew the local government in the town of Jimma southwest of the capital and set up a popular committee. The students became the center of the civilian revolutionary movement following the overthrow of the Emperor.

The "disparate and spontaneous" (90) student and labor protests were eclipsed by the renewal in June 1974 of rebellions among junior officers in the military who moved to form a Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, or Derg, to use the Amharinya word by which it is popularly known. It consisted of 126 members, all below the rank of lieutenant colonel. Once organized, the Derg began to slowly move against the government, making political demands and arresting aristocrats. At first their slogan was 'Ethiopia First,' and their main demand was for a new constitution. On September 12, 1974, after weeks of leveling charges against the Emperor, Derg officers went to the palace, "read a proclamation of deposition and, after arresting him, drove the Lion of Judah away in the back seat of a Volkswagen car" (87).

Except for the popular student-led uprising in Jimma, it was the military that moved to oust local officials throughout the country. Halliday and Molyneux stress that the labor movement and the students lacked the power to overthrow the regime and that there was no underground civilian group coordinating opposition to the Emperor. Once the Derg seized power, the union and the students called on the military to turn power over to a civilian government. The Derg responded by arresting the union leadership and prohibiting all strikes and demonstrations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

According to the authors, there was initially some support in the Derg for a civilian government. However, moderate members of the military began to perish one by one. The Derg's first spokesman, a popular general, Aman Andom, who had opposed the Emperor, was killed "while resisting arrest" after he opposed the execution of jailed aristocrats and called for a conciliatory policy in Eritrea. Two of his supporters in the Derg were executed secretly without trial in November along with 57 officials of the old regime. By December, the Derg, which jealously protected the identity of its members and acted in secret, called for a socialist Ethiopia and began to enact far-reaching reforms that destroyed the foundations of the old order in the countryside, including the powers of the Coptic Church. Halliday and Molyneux point to popular pressures for radical reform as the strongest factor in the Derg's decision to institute a revolutionary program. There is no evidence that any left-wing group existed in the ranks of the junior officers. Political pressure from the student left was also a contributing factor. The two student groups had coalesced into rival political blocks, the older generation forming the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (ME'ISON), which initially supported the Derg, and younger students who formed the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), which became involved in a bloody struggle with the military government. Whatever its motives, the military leadership did carry out a genuinely radical land reform, including the formation of peasant associations, which won it a broad base of support among the peasantry.

Urban reforms were far less radical and became bogged down in bureaucracy. The urban mass organizations, the Kebeles, were not particularly successful in promoting reform and in 1977-78 became a battleground between the Derg and the EPRP.

After 1975, the Derg and its policies became the center of growing international attention and controversy. The Provisional Military Action Committee, which had formed through a more or less democratic process in June 1974, had become a fixed political command structure which admitted no new members and often settled its own internal disagreements with gunfire. Most of the Derg's leadership appears to have come from the Holeta military training school for junior officers. Many of the Derg's first victims seem to have come from the senior Harar military academy. (At this point the reader should not jump to the preposterous, cynical conclusion that the Ethiopian revolution has largely been a struggle between junior and senior officers from two rural military academies.) On February 3, 1977, Mengistu Haile-Mariam emerged as the undisputed leader of the military regime after a shoot-out at the Derg headquarters in the royal palace, which resulted in the death of seven Derg leaders. In November, the second vice-chairman of the Derg, Atnafu Abate, was executed after he questioned Mengistu's alliance with the Soviets and his belief that Ethiopia could make a rapid transition to socialism (114).

Regrettably, the now famous exploits of the Derg's chairman have a tendency to undermine the attention of serious students, even when the book before them is as sober and balanced as the one by Halliday and Molyneux. The reader finds himself inadvertently slipping into a mood more receptive to hysterical laughter and, if he doesn't contain himself, may head to the bookshelves for Evelyn Waugh's *Scoop*. Halliday and Molyneux have made a concerted effort to keep everything under control by following a structural methodology of Third World revolution based on Ellen Kay Trimberger's *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru* and Theda Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions*. Their commitment to an approach emphasizing objective factors which have constrained the Ethiopian revolution does not prevent them from severely criticizing the Derg or ultimately reaching a pessimistic assessment of the revolution's future.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At the same time, however, this methodology prevents them from developing a generalized political critique of the Derg. Their tendency to focus on objective political factors leads them to compromise with the Derg's politics. For example, the authors denounce the military's officially labeled "Red Terror" campaign, which resulted in thousands of deaths, but end by concluding that the policy was not inherently irrational since it ceased once it had achieved its objectives: "The executions of November 1974 were, it seems, designed to instil fear in the minds of those associated with the *ancien régime* or inclined to believe that it could in some measure be restored. The later use of terror against the EPRP was not the product of irrational individuals or of an irrational process: it was used deliberately, as a means of demobilizing an enemy and consolidating obedience to the regime, and Mengistu's statement and practice bear this out. By the same token, the terror had its limits: the process was not one of an ever increasing spiral of violence, and by the late 1970s it had apparently been decided to pursue less brutal tactics" (153).

Since little is known about Mengistu's politics prior to 1974, other than the fact that he received some military training in the United States and claims to have been radicalized by the black liberation and anti-war movements, the authors are left to generalize from their structuralist model, noting, reasonably enough, that changing social conditions alter individual outlooks. Somewhat vaguely, they claim that Mengistu was the one Derg leader who knew what he wanted from the beginning. They also cite reports which refer to his "cool realism that has enabled him to overcome the many problems he has been faced with" (117). No actual personality cult surrounds Mengistu but someone has spread the rumor throughout the countryside that he is the grandson of an illegitimate child of Emperor Menelik and is thus "held in some awe" by the peasantry (154). Coincidentally, Mengistu uses Haile Selasse's ornate chair for public appearances and lives in the Imperial Palace, "where, as late as 1980, the emperor's lions were still maintained" (153-154).

While Halliday and Molyneux fail to provide the lurid details of Mengistu's shoot-out, they do mention that during one speech the Derg's leader threw bottles of a "blood-colored liquid" into the audience to emphasize a point (153). Apparently without any humourous intent the authors state that, "If his words and actions are anything to go by, Mengistu Haile-Mariam intends to make sure that the mistakes of the Paris Commune are not repeated in the highlands of the Horn of Africa" (117). In this highly volatile situation Halliday and Molyneux could have departed somewhat from the confines of their methodology to provide more of their own impressions of events based on their two visits to Ethiopia.

Perhaps the most enlightening account of all may well be the one provided by Raul Valdes Vivo of the Central Committee of Cuba's Communist Party. Revolutionary readers seeking comic relife from Halliday and Molyneux's dense volume but afraid to be seen reading Waugh's *Scoop*, Updike's *The Coup*, or worse yet, Naipaul's *A Bend in the River*, may find an acceptable substitute in Vivo's apology, *Ethiopia's Revolution* (New York, 1968). Unintentionally, Vivo's book reads like a grim satire of actual events. After excusing the execution of General Andom, Vivo has to go on to explain the demise of his successor: "The case of Teferi Bente, his successor as President of the PMAC, who was also executed for treason, was somewhat different in form but not in essence. Bente even went so far as to espouse the socialist transformation of the Revolution but he...came to work with the CIA... (there are documents to prove this).... The true revolutionaries, headed by Mengistu, were one step ahead of them, effecting a countercoup" (62).

Vivo provides a chilling description of instant Marxist-Leninist Revolution,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ethiopian style: "The high point came when, in a downpour, the peasant militias, including some all-women units, began to march past in their camouflage uniforms, followed by the recently formed worker's militias, dressed in gray tweed. The bad weather in no way dampened their martial gait, mastered in just three weeks. More bothersome were the boots worn by those accustomed to walking barefoot, sometimes even preferring to go into battle that way. The wind beat furiously against the huge pictures of Marx, Engels and Lenin but failed to dislodge them from their posts of honor, while the militia members turned their faces toward them and saluted the head of the Revolution as he stood in the dais.... A high-ranking PMAC official told me why everybody applauded so loudly and continuously: from Revolution Square they would march directly to the battlefront" (113).

Mengistu's poorly trained peasant units were sent into battle against the Eritrean guerrillas in 1976 and suffered heavy losses. The tragic dimensions of this disaster are multiplied by Joseph Kraft's report that, of a dozen peasants he questioned in an agricultural training institute 35 miles from the capital, not one said he had ever heard of the Eritrea or the Ogaden (see his "Letter from Addis Ababa," in *The New Yorker,* July 31, 1978). Despite the violent excesses of the Derg, Halliday and Molyneux reject the violence-prone EPRP's designation of the military government as fascist: "No fascist regime ever carried out a land reform" (125). While there has been little sympathy in the West for the Derg, support for its opponents seems equally misplaced. The authors make a convincing case that the left-wing opposition, including the rival rebel groups in Eritrea, are as politically backward and violent as the Derg itself.

According to Halliday and Molyneux, the most far-reaching result of the 1974 revolution has been the emergence of a more centralized state committed to radical reforms. But as they also point out, the state is not omnipotent and its socialist orientation does not guarantee the future direction of the country. The persistence of pre-capitalist, petty commodity and capitalist social relations does guarantee a continuing class struggle. The authors believe that the new state sector in industry, finance and agriculture may be "a basis for development towards socialism" (271). On the other hand, Ethiopia needs foreign aid in amounts that can only be supplied by the capitalist countries.

The authors wisely consider whether or not the Marxist-Leninist vocabulary prevalent in Ethiopia today is authentic. They are encouraged by the formation of large numbers of political cadres and the regime's unqualified endorsement of socialism. Halliday and Molyneux qualify this, however, by warning that local cultural traditions may end up being completely ignored, "as has happened in Afghanistan" (139).

The regime's adoption of a pre-packaged Marxist-Leninist vocabulary hardly seems encouraging. The authors would do well to take a look at the Marxist-Leninist People's Republic of the Congo, which also purchased the total Soviet-Cuban model, creating a Marxist-Leninist Congo Labor Party, decorating all its intersections with portraits of Marx, Engels and Lenin, building mass organizations and promoting slogans such as "A Communist must be a man of high morals and crystalline purity." The Congo also went through a chaotic period of revolutionary violence, which saw the "mysterious" assassination of President Marien Ngouabi in 1977 (he is now a national hero) and the "savage, unsolved" murder of the Catholic archbishop of Brazzaville. The country has mellowed under its new president, Denis Sassou-Nguesso. Pope John Paul II visited Brazzaville in 1980 and, according to *Le Monde,* local "communist" officials of the Congo Labor Party now voice their complaints about the Soviets: "They've sold us outmoded weapons for high prices. They built a maternity

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clinic in Brazzaville which doesn't work, and the Hotel Cosmos, which is so bad that everybody started going to the Hotel Meridien."

The last chapter of *The Ethiopian Revolution* contains a critique of Soviet policies toward "states of socialist orientation," the latest Kremlin theory of non-capitalist development in the Third World. The new theory emphasizes "the disconnection of state and society, and the retarding potential of the latter on any group within the state committed to a socialist transition" (275). The theory is designed to accommodate the emergence of progressive military regimes and downgrade the role of the masses. Halliday and Molyneux stress that in the Third World state control and the expropriation of foreign capital has led more often than not to the development of capitalist social relations. They conclude their discussion of the possibilities of socialist revolution in the Third World with the pessimistic observation that only "the small and ethnically homogeneous" countries of Mongolia and Cuba have successfully followed the Soviet non-capitalist road to socialism (283). Needless to say, Ethiopia is wracked by ethnic and regional conflicts which the Derg seeks to resolve militarily. Cuban attempts to moderate Mengistu's line on Eritrea have been met with intransigence. The Soviets have reportedly given Mengistu over $1.8 billion in arms for use against the Eritreans who, in the spring of 1982, were facing the possibility of military defeat at the hands of the Derg's "Red Star" offensive, described as "an all-out effort" to win the war.

Despite their severe criticism of the Soviet role in the Eritrean conflict, Halliday and Molyneux's general assessment seems to be that the Soviets and Cubans have acted in a prudent manner in the Horn of Africa: "Much of the criticism made in the West of Soviet policy in the Horn was unfounded. The Soviet action was not in any sense illegal: the Ethiopian government was an internationally recognized authority, entitled to ask for assistance against external aggression of the Somali variety. Soviet support of the territorial integrity of Ethiopia was merely continuing a policy upon which successive Western governments and in particular the USA had insisted under the imperial regime. There is no evidence that the Soviet intervention was motivated by calculations of economic gain; rather, the relationship with Ethiopia promised to be deficitory for many years to come. The charge that the Soviet Union now controlled Ethiopian government policy, or that Ethiopia was now in some sense a Soviet 'surrogate' was contradicted by the evidence. The Soviet assertion that a profound revolution was occurring was quite justified" (249-250).

It seems incredible that the authors can find no significance in the largest Soviet airlift of its kind to the Third World other than the motive to defend Ethiopia's territorial integrity. Such a view fails to take into account Soviet strategic aims in its superpower rivalry with the United States.

Outside of the reasonable logic of Halliday and Molyneux's structural methodology, the Ethiopian military regime appears as an irrational and blood-thirsty dictatorship led by a ruthless junior officer. The Derg's allies appear to be integrating the regime into their global military apparatus. The Soviet airlift, far from being merely an action in support of Ethiopian independence, was the first demonstration of a new Soviet capacity to respond swiftly to U.S. military moves in the Third World. A similar airlift in support of Egypt during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, aborted for unknown reasons, touched off a U.S. military alert. All this has more to do with global military strategy than socialist revolution.

The Ethiopian revolution is one more sign of the militarization of the Third World. As nuclear weapons spread throughout the planet, conflicts similar to the Ethiopian-Somali clash and the Iran-Iraq war will have catastrophic global

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consequences. The revolutions of the future will not be fought by guerrilla armies alone; now they can be supported by elite Marxist-Leninist commandos who can be airlifted to battlefields almost anywhere in the world. Castro's internationalist battalions, elite units of the Cuban armed forces directly under the control of the ministry of interior, bear a superficial resemblance to their British and Israeli counterparts. Perhaps the resemblance ends with their berets and *esprit de corps*. Cuban troops, teachers, and doctors in Angola and Ethiopia may be motivated by socialist values and internationalist solidarity. But Cuban-Soviet military intervention in the Ogaden conflict demonstrates a new willingness to take dramatic and dangerous steps in support of "revolutionary" regimes that are bogged down in internecine regional and ethnic strife. The Derg and its powerful allies who boast of their battlefield prowess have ushered in a new era of military "socialism" and mobile revolutionary warfare on a global scale. Can humanity survive such a strategy?

Tom Good

Peter Fuller, *Seeing Berger: A Revaluation of Ways of Seeing*. London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1980.
Peter Fuller, *Beyond the Crisis in Art*. London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1980.

Critical theory clings to an interpretation of Modernist art that is in drastic need of revision. Years after the Modernist revolt against genteel standards in art and literature has ossified into a new formalism, after avant-gardism has given way to a vulgar celebration of novelty, and after the rebellious artist of Bohemian folklore has been integrated into the "art world" as a colorful functionary, independent radicals uncritically endorse Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse's theory of Modernism as an aesthetic refuge in an administered world. That theory found its most succinct expression in Marcuse's last book, *The Aesthetic Dimension*, in which he argued that the "inner logic" of modern art "terminates in the emergence of another reason, another sensibility, which defy the rationality and sensibility incorporated in the dominant social institutions."[1] Even Jürgen Habermas, who in other respects shows no hesitancy in revising crucial concepts of critical theory, repeats the obsolete notion of avant-garde art as "the refuge for a satisfaction, even if only virtual, of those needs that have become . . . illegal in the life-processes of bourgeois society."[2] Trapped in the polemics against Socialist Realism of fifty years ago, theorists in the Frankfurt tradition refuse to acknowledge that the left needs to re-examine the very ideology of cultural vanguardism that it has nurtured in the past.

In retrospect, Adorno and Marcuse's defense of abstract art, Surrealism, and Dada appears to have been part of a larger debate between roughly two groups of Western Modernists in this century. Just as Marxism has its "warm" and "cold" currents (as Bloch put it), so too were the advocates of Modernism divided between those who proposed a technocratic assimilation of art to science, technology, and industry and those who revolted against this same assimilation in the name of art that would express and defend the unconscious realm of emotional life. Both groups of artists and theorists spoke for the abolition of the industrial division of labor, which separated degraded work from meaningless culture, and for a new reintegration of art and "real life"; yet

1. Herbert Marcuse, *The Aesthetic Dimension* (Boston, 1978), p. 7.
2. Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston, 1975), p. 78.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they clearly differed as to what should constitute such a reconciliation of these separate spheres. Adorno and Marcuse, like other theorists of the "warm" stream of Modernism, rightly recognized the convergence of art and technics in mass culture, state propaganda, and industrial aesthetics as the final victory of a repressive society over the "aesthetic dimension."

Nonetheless, those who praised the avant-garde for its defense of subjectivity shared critical assumptions with technocratic Modernists who pioneered Futurist industrial design, International Style architecture, and what critic Clement Greenberg called an aesthetics "as exactly scientific as physics."[3] For while this latter group of Modernists reduced artists to the elaboration of scientifically-derived laws of industrial progress, and their art to the material expression of Modernist physics, subjectivist Modernists saw artists' activity as simply the expression of pure emotion. For André Breton, painting was only a "lamentable expedient,"[4] an unfortunate obstacle to the reunion of "the too dissociated worlds of waking and sleeping, objective and subjective reality, reason and madness, the calm of knowledge and love, life for life's sake and the revolution, etc."[5] Franklin Rosemont, Surrealism's official historian, adds that Breton and his followers only value "those manifestations of 'culture' which most resonantly embody the unrestrained imagination, the most extreme demands of desire. "All the rest," he adds contemptuously, "is 'literature.' "[6] Such sentiments find support, suprisingly enough, in the work of the young Van Wyck Brooks, who, while still an enthusiast of Modernist literature, extolled "perfect self-realization" and the expression of "personality" as artistic ideals.[7] For Brooks, literary criticism involved the search for "obstructions that exist in the world closer to "personality."[8] Both the American "Young Intellectuals" around Brooks and Breton's French Surrealists agreed that art remained only as an "obstruction" to be erased in the final joining of culture and the unconscious.

The debate between these two currents of Modernist theory emerged most clearly in the United States after WW II, when Greenberg and Harold Rosenberg offered differing interpretations of the early New York School painters. Greenberg's celebration of the autonomy of Abstract Expressionism — wrongly derided by his radical critics as simply formalist or apolitical — was bound up with his social and aesthetic theory, which found crude Marxist and positivist rationalizations for a "matter-of-fact" art that would mirror the self-propelled development of industrialism.[9] In response, Rosenberg praised Abstract Expressionists for insisting that "what was to go on the canvas was not a picture but an event." For these "action painters," he explained, "the big moment came when it was decided to paint. . . just to PAINT. The gesture on the canvas was a gesture of liberation, from value — political, esthetic, moral."[10]

Rosenberg's alternative to Greenberg's Modernist physics illustrates the flaws inherent in the subjectivitst current of Modernist theory. Where Greenberg would

3. Greenberg cited in Donald B. Kuspit, *Clement Greenberg, Art Critic* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1979), p. 14.

4. Breton cited in Franklin Rosemont, "Introduction: Andre Breton and the First Principles of Surrealism," in Breton, *What is Surrealism?*, ed., Franklin Rosemont (New York, 1978), p. 27.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

7. Brooks cited in James Hoopes, *Van Wyck Brooks: In Search of American Culture* (Amherst, Massachusetts, 1977), p. 103.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

9. See Casey Blake, "Aesthetic Engineering," *Democracy* 1, 4 (October 1981), pp. 37-50.

10. Harold Rosenberg, "The American Action Painters," in Rosenberg, *The Tradition of the New* (New York, 1960). pp. 23-39.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

subject the artist to the execution of the "matter-of-fact" in accordance with the laws of industrial progress, Rosenberg would "liberate" him by having him forget about political, aesthetic, and moral values. Rosenberg's re-integration of art and society shares with Greenberg's a dismissal of artistic practice, craft skill, and conscious creation, as well as an obliviousness to the work of art itself — which survives only as an illustration of aesthetic theory or as a souvenir of the artist's widely-publicized "liberation" from values.

Critical theory recognizes that mass culture has resolved the nineteenth-century industrial division of art and "real life" in an authoritarian fashion, bending culture and play to the dictates of production. Yet the early Frankfurt theorists neglected to add that Modernism, even in its subjectivist current, might terminate in a similarly regressive amalgam of cultural and productive life, with art and artistic practice assimilated either to pseudo-scientific theory or mindless gossip.

"Works of art are thought-things," Hannah Arendt wrote, "but this does not prevent their being things" — material creations that help define the human world.[11] The left's reassessment of Modernism has to begin with the recognition that both avant-garde traditions share a disdain for such "thought-things" as backward, particularistic obstructions to more important matters. Repressive desublimation not only characterizes the present state of Eros; it also describes a reconciliation of culture and society that empties the "aesthetic dimension" of actual works of art.

Peter Fuller's art criticims deserves the greatest possible attention because it transcends the sterile debates between theorists of "warm" and "cold" Modernism. Fuller's skepticism about the cant of vanguardism and cultural progress is in itself a necessary corrective to most of the thinking about Modernist art on the left. At the same time, Fuller's focus on postwar American art highlights the crucial moment when liberal proponents of the "triumph of American painting" and American cosmopolitanism appropriated the subjectivist Modernist tradition and purged it of its critical content. Fuller thus situates the present "crisis in art" — and the exhaustion of Modernism — in the context of the Cold War, the popularization of avant-garde in the mass media, and the emergence of the Modernist artist as a pop star in the 1960s. Hoping to rescue artistic practice from what he calls the "Mega-Visual" tradition of advertising and mass culture, and from its substitution by mere ideology, Fuller defends art as an expressive form of material creation rooted in individuals' biological activity.

Fuller's emphasis on art as a material practice that does not simply reflect historical conditions, but instead echoes the unchanging aspects of human existence, has led him to re-examine the work of his former mentor, John Berger. In *Seeing Berger*, Fuller accuses Berger's book and television series, *Ways of Seeing*, "of a kind of left idealism, a dissolution of painting into a chimerical world where images have no existence apart from an ideological existence."(p. 14). For Fuller, Berger's interpretation of European oil painting since the Renaissance, as an art form predicated upon the development of bourgeois property relations, obscures the extent to which the finest work in that tradition has always transcended its historical origins, providing viewers with rich aesthetic experiences that have little to do with the market values of particular paintings. It is not that Berger's criticism is overly "materialistic" and unconcerned with formalist considerations, as his conservative detractors claim; rather, Fuller believes that Berger has reduced the expressive activity of artists to purely ideological questions. As Fuller notes, "it is only if one's materialism extends down to the biological level (and not just to the socio-economic) that one can hope to approach an adequate account of the

11. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago, 1958), p. 169.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

relatively 'ahistorical' aspects of the spiritual (i.e., aesthetic, religious, musical, and imaginative) life of man" (p. 24). In direct opposition to the main current of Marxist art criticism (including Berger's), Fuller's main concern is to examine the interplay between aesthetic experience and this "spiritual life of man" as an expression of his biological existence.

Berger's hostility to any serious analysis of art's "spiritual" aspects stems in part, according to Fuller, from his reliance on Walter Benjamin's famous thesis in "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" that modern technology would dissolve the religious "aura" that had historically prevented the politicization of culture. As Fuller points out, the very organization and lay-out of *Ways of Seeing* (both in its televised and published versions) borrow from the techniques of the modern "Mega-Visual" tradition that Benjamin praised. Fuller argues that mechanical reproduction, far from emancipating art from its religious and class-specific origins, has eliminated the imprint of the artist's personal expression from visual images. Thus when Berger juxtaposes a Gainsborough portrait with an advertisement for *Glamour*, he himself contributes to a "way of seeing" that drains art of the artist's creative practice. By the time Berger is through with the Western oil painting tradition, its works are little more than picture postcards or ideological statements. Like that of so many other twentieth-century Marxists, Berger and Benjamin's enthusiasm for modern technology mirrors the cultural program of advanced capitalism, which Fuller sees epitomized in the "static visual imagery" of advertising (p. 21) but which might also be described as the triumph of the museum gift shop (with its expensive reproductions and easy-to-read critical explanations) over the exhibition hall. "The occlusion of painting and sculpture," Fuller explains, "involves the eclipse of significant values. I am interested in *conserving* those traditional media and those values" (p. 20).

The essays and interviews that make up *Beyond the Crisis in Art* develop these themes in greater detail, arguing that *"kenosis"* — or "self-emptying" — is the underlying characteristic of a late Modernism that divests art of its traditional concern with expression and value (p. 13). Drawing on the work of Raymond Williams and Sebastiano Timpanaro, Fuller explains in his Introduction that his disillusionment with Berger's socio-economic criticism led him to an aesthetics "which stresses the imaginative role of the artist, and the transforming work which he carries out on materials, not just stuff — but also those conventions which are given to him by tradition in that specific art form in which he is working" (p. 13). In the process, Fuller contrasts his aesthetics with those theories, whether Marxist, formalist, or otherwise, that have contributed to Modernist *kenosis* in the postwar period.

Beyond the Crisis consists of roughly three types of pieces: critical essays on late Modernism in the United States and Britain; theoretical essays that point toward Fuller's later *Art and Psychoanalysis*; and interviews with contemporary American and British artists. The critical essays — especially "Where was the Art of the Seventies?", "Fine Art after Modernism," "American Painting since the Last War," and "Jackson Pollock" — show Fuller at his best, exploring the conjuncture of factors internal and external to avant-garde art that have contributed to its current crisis.

According to Fuller, late Modernist art has been posited upon a lie, "that the crisis which the Abstract Expressionists had faced had been solved in the development of the movement itself and through the subsequent trajectory of American painting" (pp. 87-88). Unlike formalist critics who praise the early New York School for jettisoning everything from painting but the two-dimensionality of the canvas, and those on the left who dismiss the Abstract Expressionists as bald apologists for the Cold War, Fuller sympathetically describes the plight of those painters in the America of the 1940s and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1950s. Pollock, Rothko, Newman, and other early Abstract Expressionists were not solely or even primarily concerned with formal questions of painterly technique. As Rothko put it in a statement that might stand for the early New York School as a whole, "I'm not an abstractionist . . . I'm not interested in the relationship of color or form or anything else. I'm interested only in expressing basic human emotions — tragedy, ecstasy, doom, and so on . . . And if you . . . are moved only by [my paintings'] color relationships then you miss the point" (p. 88). Yet these artists understood full well that social realism — whether in its Nazi, Stalinist, or New Deal nationalist manifestations — was irrevocably compromised as a mode of expression by the late forties. Their turn to expressionism did not imply a rejection of painting's traditional concern with materials, values, or even subject matter; rather, Fuller insists that the early New York School painters "were looking for a route back to reality, much as an analysand does, through exploration of their own subjectivity." In the process, they hoped to "*force* the materials and surviving conventions of their respective traditions in such a way that — despite their historic crisis — they could vividly and meaningfully refer to experience beyond the experience of painting again" (pp. 74-75).

In spite of their efforts, Fuller argues, the Abstract Expressionists' artistic project was a failure. Radicals' disillusionment with Stalinism found few cultural or political conventions to which they could appeal in Cold War America. As abstract painters concerned above all with the preservation of human subjective experience, they found it impossible to move their work beyond an expression of their personal predicaments to make contact with a larger audience that might share their concern. Pollock found it difficult to paint anything at all in the last years of his life, complaining to Lee Krasner, "I can't give that much anymore, I'm too miserable, and they never get the point anyway, they always change things around" (p. 102). In his moving short essay on Pollock, Fuller uses Pollock's despair and his fatal car crash of 1956 to symbolize the tragedy of the entire early New York School, a tragedy underscored by the violent or suicidal deaths of many of its other leading members.

The crisis that these artists faced was not resolved by their formal innovations in painting; nor was it resolved by the widely-acclaimed succession of "hard-edged," "post-painterly abstractionist," Pop, Minimalist, or Conceptual movements that followed the Abstract Expressionists in the 1960s and 1970s. As Fuller puts it, "the truth is that *no* painter after Pollock succeeded where he had so manifestly failed: but 'mainstream' artists in America abandoned even the attempt to realize a world view through their painting and became, mostly, talented decorators" (p. 103). This transition from Abstract Expressionism to "talented decoration" paralleled the rise of an apparatus of critics, cultural administrators, and foreign policy-makers who Fuller depicts as rewriting the tragic history of the early New York School into a mythic trajectory of Modernist progress that culminated in the post-war "triumph of American painting."

In Fuller's discussion of these developments in late Modernist art and criticism, Clement Greenberg emerges as the crucial figure in the rehabilitation of the Abstract Expressionists — not as artists painfully struggling with their cultural and political isolation, but as the necessary stepping-stones to the cultural supremacy of the post-war United States. Greenberg announced that the "symbolical or metaphysical content" of Abstract Expressionism was "half-baked," emphasizing instead its precise place in Modernism's meta-historical quest for flatness in painting (p. 82). As his aesthetic theory developed in a series of influential essays after 1940, Greenberg asserted the authority of this historical quest over the acutal work of any particular artist. Greenberg told artists in 1962 that "the only direction for high pictorial art in the near

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

future" lay in the "repudiation of virtuousity in execution or handling" and the artist's embrace of the "self-critical process that . . . provides the infralogic of Modernist art" (p. 84).

Fuller describes the process by which this Modernist "infra-logic," shorn of any concern for old-fashioned notions of "virtuousity," became the predominant concern of Western artist and critics in the 1960s and 1970s. In an interview with Fuller published in this collection, Anthony Caro explains how Greenberg's criticism virtually transformed his sculpture in the late fifties and early sixties, directing it away from Henry Moore's naturalistic imagery toward the geometric steel pieces that have made Caro's reputation. According to Caro, "Greenberg was totally involved" in his stylistic conversion. "He more or less told me that my art wasn't up to mark. He came to see me in my London studio . . . I had come to the end of a certain way of working; I didn't know where to go. He offerred some sort of pointer" (p. 197). For artists like Caro, uncertain of "where to go," Greenberg provided a way out by suggesting that they find their proper place in the Modernist march of progress.

Such facile notions of artistic progress, autonomy, and Modernist "infra-logic" crop up again and again in Fuller's depiction of the heady atmosphere of the Atlantic art world of the sixties and seventies. Artist Frank Stella, ever on the lookout for the most progressive trend in vanguard art, ridiculed "people who want to retain 'old value' in painting, the 'humanistic' values that they always find on the canvas" (p. 24). Willaim Rubin, curator of the Museum of Modern Art, gushed that Pollock's paintings were "'world-historical' in the Hegelian sense" because Pollock "articulated his canvases with 'all-over' webs of poured paint" (p. 83). As recently as 1979, MOMA's Berenice Rose reiterated this optimistic account of Pollock's work, claiming that "what is ultimately important" about it is that it "opened art to a new set of possibilities for everyone; it was largely responsible for creating the confidence that became the basis for the sudden strength of American art in the quarter century following the Second World War" (p. 99). The tragic experience of the early New York School was completely lost in the subsequent celebrations of American artistic "strength" and "confidence." All that remained of their work was the Modernist "infra-logic" of perpetual progress, an ideology guaranteed to appeal to artists, dealers, and critics eager to spot the latest trend.[12]

The popularization of Modernism's "infra-logic," at the expense of any real interest in its actual works or artists, helps explain one of the most depressing moments in the history of Abstact Expressionism — its appropriation by the Rockefeller family, MOMA, and the State Department as a "weapon of the Cold War" against the Soviet Union. Fuller largely repeats the story told by Eva Cockcroft and others about how liberal internationalists in the United States advertised the "artistic freedom" prevalent in the "free world" by exhibiting American abstract paintings around the world.[13] Fuller's discussion of this issue is more sophisticated than that of earlier writers because he situates it within the context of late Modernist *kenosis* and the critical redefinition of Abstract Expressionism. It was only after that art had been sufficiently

12. In this regard, see William Barrett's insightful observations about the "art world" in Manhattan in the early 1960s that make the only interesting reading in his otherwise plodding neo-conservative tract, *The Truants: Adventures Among Intellectuals* (Garden City, New York, 1982), esp. pp. 154-55. Barrett recalls one art dealer of the time remarking that "I never ask myself whether a work is good or not, but only if it has historical importance."

13. See Eva Cockcroft, "Abstract Expressionism, Weapon of the Cold War," *Artforum* 12 (June 1974), pp. 39-41; Max Kozloff, "American Painting during the Cold War," *Artforum* 11 (May 1973), pp. 43-54; and Jane De Hart Mathews, "Art and Politics in Cold War America," *American Historical Review* 81 (October 1976), pp. 762-87.

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

neutralized by critics like Greenberg and institutions like MOMA, that such an "ill-suited emblem for Imperial America" could be inducted into the cultural Cold War. (p. 81).

This neutralization of Abstract Expressionism accelerated the very process of Modernist *kenosis* that Pollock and his contemporaries had hoped to arrest through their explorations of their own alienation and despair. Once an artistic "infra-logic" of progress had been abstracted from those artists' experience, Fuller writes, "late modernist art thenceforth became either nothing at all . . . or ideology, *tout court*, divorced from even the semblance of material practice" (p. 27). With the exception of such exiles from the American and British avant-garde as Edward Hopper, Leon Golub, David Bomberg, and John Hoyland (Fuller might have added Joseph Cornell), all of whom receive sympathetic treatment here, few recent artists have attempted to halt the self-emptying trajectory of late Modernism. Late Modernist art has come to reflect on itself (Fuller quotes one critic breathlessly advocating "an artists' art," an art "for experienced viewers"), usually in the form of endless series of monochrome canvases or camp re-hashes of early Modernist classics (p. 59). Or such art has given way to purely conceptual pieces, thereby eliminating the unsightly art object altogether. The exploration of self-referential nothingness and pure ideology, all dressed up with spicy pictoricals and gossip columns in Warhol's *Interview*, is the end result of a Modernist "infra-logic" stripped bare of its materials, practices, and artists even.

Fuller's short theoretical essays, and in particular "Defence of Art," attempt to rethink the relationship of artistic activity to ideology and criticism. Fuller holds that any creative work in the visual arts after Modernism must reverse the primacy of technique over practice that has characterized the recent avant-garde, culminating in the eradication of the artist and his work as "old-fashioned" appendages to the "infra-logic" of cultural progress. Turning to the British "object-relations" school of psychoanalysis, Fuller finds in the early relationship of mother and child the biological basis for the aesthetic experiences that are usually described as "spiritual" or even "religious" by viewers who have been touched intimately by a particular work of art. Fuller defends the Fine Art tradition because its material practices — painting, drawing, sculpture — resonate with a relatively stable human experience that is neglected by the "Mega-Visual" tradition and its late Modernist imitators. *Beyond the Crisis* leaves the further elaboration of this biologically-rooted aesthetics to Fuller's Art and Psychoanalysis, but the last essay "In Defence of Art" leads beyond the pointless Modernist feuds between subjectivist and technocratic avant-gardism to a renewed appreciation for the physical work of the artist and the material expressiveness of the art object.

Leftist proponents of cultural vanguardism and artistic progress will undoubtedly find Fuller's defense of aesthetic practice and traditional materials completely "reactionary" and "backward-looking." Yet it might well be argued that cultural criticism inspired by early Modernism — and here one should include critical theory — needs to take stock of the extent to which that movement has (at best) ended in self-parody: a cultural revolution that abolishes art objects and their creators and enthrones art critics and administrators as the engineers of avant-garde progress. Fuller's criticism will hardly appeal to those seeking to refurbish the Modernist vanguard by rummaging through the fashions of structuralism, punk rock, or "Post Modernism" for new ideas. His work should prove essential, however, to those on the left who regard actual works of art and artists' expressive faculties as the starting points for any serious hope of cultural renewal.

Casey Blake

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nikolaj-Klaus von Kreitor, *Kansankodin Kuokkavieras. Omaelämäkerrallinen routsalaisen yhteiskunnan korporativismin kritiikki.* Jyvöskylä, Finland: Gummerus Publishing House, 1980. 165 pages.

An idyllic picture of *Folkhemmet* (the people's home) is often presented in the Swedish mass media — a picture of the best country in an otherwise evil world. Nicely wrapped packages of myths and clichés about Sweden as the model of democracy are routinely marketed. About 10 years ago, when I read a critical work about Sweden — *The New Totalitarian State*, by Roland Huntford, the former correspondent for the English newspaper *The Observer* — it was as if I suddenly found myself in the previously invisible backyard of the Swedish People's Home. It had been invisible because of the half truths and lies that are called the Swedish public sector. It was like seeing the idyllic picture again, but this time with the innocent eyes of the child in Hans Christian Anderson's tale, "The Emperor's New Clothes." One experiences the same feeling after reading von Kreitor's book, which will soon be published in German, although not in Swedish. It has not even been mentioned in the Swedish mass media. It belongs to the category of officially non-existent books. In other words, the book exemplifies the problem with censorship as well as self-censorship in Sweden. It raises questions about not only official silence but also the ever narrowing limitations of freedom of speech in Sweden. *Monologues in Exile* is an example of books that are not supposed to be written in Sweden, much less read.

Monologues in Exile can be called an odyssey of consciousness or identity in the People's Home. The voyage begins with his first confrontation with Sweden, with the sudden void in which he found himself, the everyday experience of feeling invisible and the negative identity forced upon foreigners. The voyage proceeds via powerlessness and anomie — when that which has been ingrained falls apart — through the confrontation of an inexplicable illusory world of myths about democracy and the stage scenery of the state on the one hand and empirical reality on the other. Dogmas, prejudices and illusions are smashed to pieces and left behind. What follows is a progressive comprehension process which, of necessity, implies going beyond the myths of the People's Home and its facade. The path is lined with alienation and oppression. However, the final result is a critical consciousness that formulates and calls into doubt not only established social myths but also the immigrant's accumulated negative experiences. The book is part of the so far unwritten history of immigrants in Sweden. At the same time, the marvelous People's Home is thoroughly demythologized and shown to be what it really is — a realized version of Aldous Huxley's anti-utopia, *Brave New World*.

Von Kreitor calls his first meeting with Sweden traumatic — a country with no communication, no emotions and no room for spontaneity and sensibility. He writes: "I was met by a silence that I couldn't understand, which became unbearable. The first and most immediate thing I noticed was the emotional poverty in the environment — the emotional neutrality and the lack of subjectivity. I noticed certain behavioral patterns — it seemed as if the Swedes had absolutely no spontaneity or any ability to really experience anything fully. They were unable to express their feelings and were not used to thinking in terms of fellow human beings. It seemed as if it was bothersome for them to be together with other human beings." The experience of a shrunken, limited subjectivity is strengthened by the confrontation with the Swedish environment's negative evaluation of immigrants. The word immigrant is itself negatively charged and is often used as an insult. To be regarded as an immigrant is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

like having a negative identity. The characteristic of immigrant becomes the foreigner's only characteristic. Thus, immigrants are people without characteristics. Von Kreitor observes that there seems to be a fear in Sweden of anything foreign or different. The immigrant drowns in a sea of negative prejudices of the narrow, nationalistic outlook of the People's Home.

Von Kreitor devotes two chapters to analyzing the social background of repression of sensibility and spontaneity in Sweden. His theme is the continuous extension of technological rationality in society. Weber, Lukacs, and Goffman provide the theoretical framework. The more technology becomes predominant in society, the more technological rationality penetrates and dominates the various sectors of society, and the more human subjectivity and individuality is repressed. Eventually, subjectivity becomes a fixed image. The result is a breakdown of society's humanistic dimension. The repression of subjectivity not only makes the human being more streamlined, more one-dimensional and more easily manipulated, but also makes it more difficult to be meaningful in the experiences of others. Human beings remain intangible to each other.

If society has been modeled by separating the function of human beings in production from the personality and eventually formed the personality to fit the production model so that this isolated part is turned into a maimed totality, then the immigrants are in an even worse situation. The majority society has succeeded both in separating their true identity from the negative identity forced upon them by society and in institutionalizing their identity into the only image of the immigrant acceptable to the majority of society — a negative image, which lacks the general characteristics the majority of society has of itself. Following the Frankfurt School, von Kreitor points out that the majority society belongs to two different spheres: the private sphere of family and one's closest associates, and public sphere of culture, politics, mass media and social institutions. Immigrants, however, only belong to their private sphere. They are closed out of the public sphere. Immigrants, especially intellectuals, are non-existing persons in the public sphere. In addition, the immigrant's private sphere is problematic since the majority's bestowal of a negative identity usurps this sphere. The immigrant cannot find room for his subjectivity and becomes a marginal being, necessary only as a tool in the production process. The immigrant's struggle to enter the public sphere is a struggle to become visible.

The book contains an interesting analysis of Swedish society, with its elements of Prussian authoritarianism, traditional cultural isolation, bureaucracy and alienation. According to von Kreitor, in the choice between personal freedom and technical perfection, the Swedes have chosen the latter. The 40-year-rule of the Social Democrats, with their compromises and agreements, their myths of the Welfare State, neutralized social conflcits, and with technology as the only ideology, has generated a personality structure tied to the production system. There is no room for sensibility and spontaneous communication. The mass human being is predominant in the People's Home — a personality that conforms to the State, organizations and the mass media. The growth of bureaucracy after World War II has created today's Sweden: a country where organizations are everything and human beings nothing. The Renaissance never reached Sweden. Liberalism came very late and never became a prevailing social ideology. Therefore, liberal conceptions of the individual were never established and the authoritarian tradition of the Middle Ages, via the Swedish State Church, has been perfected by the present bureaucratic society.

The myth of the People's Home without conflicts is an important part of Swedish

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

society's ideological facade. The concept of a People's Home was not originated by the Social Democrats. The myth was created in Bismarck's Prussian Socialism, which was institutionalized in Sweden. In *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*, Thomas Mann wrote about the People's Home as a political idea. As an antithesis to the concept of political democracy and parliamentarianism alien to the Germans, he writes about the true Prussian *Folksstaat* — the People's Home — populated not by degenerate citizens but by apolitical conservative burghers inseparable from the State.

According to von Kreitor, the liberal distinction between State and society is unknown in Sweden, the country of Prussian socialism. He finds weak parliamentarianism and strong bureaucracy in the traditional cult of the State, which extends even to the Swedish legal tradition of legal positivism. Formulated in the 1930s in the jurisprudence of Hägerström and Lundstedt, legal positivism rejects the Natural Law conceptions of human rights as unscientific delusions: The Swedish State cult carried to extremes leads to an undemocratic civil servant state, where all power comes from the civil servant class while parliament tends to be reduced to a non-entity. Thus, it is not surprising that, in an article that appeared August 21, 1981, in the Swedish newspaper *Sydsvenska Dagbladet*, the well-known Swedish jurist Jacob Sundberg wrote that the bureaucratic tradition in Sweden as well as the absolutist civil servant state is "derived from one of the most fully developed legislative systems for the creation of spiritual conformity within a cultural group."

On the whole, von Kreitor sees the connection between the State's will and positivism in the enormous expansion of official investigations and reports made by the State during the last few years. In the same way that legal positivism equates power with law, the investigational positivism and the State-financed research commissions equate power with truth. Truth is reduced from an empirical experience to something useful to the State. This is not least noticeable in the various State immigrant reports, where usefulness to the State has coincided with the systematic repression of all real knowledge of the immigrant's situation in Sweden.

Von Kreitor also provides an interesting analysis of the old Swedish theocracy by examining the 19th-century philosopher, Christopher Jacob Boström — the Swedish corporative State's leading ideologist whose teachings concerning the State were taken over by the Social Democrats and still are the foundation of the bureaucracy's conception of the State. Boström believed that reality was composed of eternal, spiritual ideas completely independent of the empirical dimension. The State was seen not only as a living organism but also as a divine idea or a superior moral personality. "According to Boström, the State is, so to speak, ordained in heaven. The conception of the State ranks higher than that of the individual — the individual is only an organ of the State. Human beings exist for the sake of law, not law for the sake of human beings. Sovereignty does not originate from the people, but from above, from the conception of the State and, finally, from God." Hägerström's legal philosophy is derived directly from Boström's philosophy. Hägerström identifies the State with the bureaucracy, which takes over as the bearer of sovereignty: God's position in Boström's philosophy.

Von Kreitor describes his experiences after he came to Sweden: "When I came to Sweden, I had just graduated from the Academy of Art in Warsaw. My identity was that of an artist. Philosophical systems and ideologies were alien to me. On the other hand, I had developed my ability to feel, to experience and to communicate. My first confrontation with Sweden was traumatic. To me, Sweden seemed to be a country with no communication, no room for spontaneity or human relations — in short, there

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was no medium where I could find roots for my identity. It was then that I felt the need to understand and explain my experiences — in other words, a need to reflect. I based my identity on reflection.

"Reflection leads to insight and, I think, each insight seeks to realize itself in social praxis — in political activity — in my case, working as a publicist. Several years ago I read Peter Weiss' novel *The Esthetics of Resistance*. The book dealt with, among other things, resistance as life content and identity. I believe I have rooted my identity in resistance. I try to give a demythologizing picture of Sweden in the foreign mass media — a picture of what is behind the myth of the People's Home and its Potemkin-like theatrical props, its false front. And when I write about this subject, my writings are identical with the necessity to realize my insight in social praxis."

Monologues in Exile shows that the author's identity being rooted in resistance is an unavoidable condition for all creative criticism independent of the state. On the whole, von Kreitor is one of the most important publicists of the 1970s. He has rasied questions about, given a theme to and articulated two buried problems: the oppression of minorities and the decline of law in Sweden. His work has in many ways influenced the view of international opinion of Sweden and contributed to destroying the remains of the myth of the People's Home. One of von Kreitor's models is Kurt Tucholsky. The impact of Tucholsky's activities on the Germany of the 1920s and 1930s is comparable to the impact of von Kreitor's activities on Sweden in the 1970s and '80s.

For some time now, von Kreitor has set the tone for challenging authorities. Cultural bureaucrats and authorities have had an eye on him for years. The only possibility to read his book in Sweden was effectively stopped by the *Kulturradet* (Council for Culture), which, contrary to regulations concerning support for literature in minority and immigrant languages, refused to endorse its publication in Sweden. However, the publishing house Gummerus has made an important cultural and political contribution by translating and publishing *Monologues in Exile* in Finland.

Martha Flogell

Katrin Lederer, ed., *Human Needs: A Contribution to the Current Debate.* Boston: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain; Königstein: Verlag Anton Hain Meisenheim GmbH., 1980.

The slogan "to each according to his needs" was widely proclaimed by 19th-century socialists and can be found as a formula for social justice as early as St. Augustine's *City of God*. The Stoic ideal of "the man of few needs" and Rousseau's critique of civilization in terms of the distinction between natural and artificial needs have much in common.[1] These, however, are subordinate traditions in Western European culture that did not succeed until recently in entering "needs" in mainstream discussions. It is only in the mid-20th century that attempts to define the limits of the concept have been undertaken — a project to which this volume is a contribution.

Why is "needs" a concept of such wide currency? Mostly, it is due to the influence of Marxist thought. As Agnes Heller has shown, in Marx the concept of needs plays a

1. See Patricia Springborg, *The Problem of Human Needs and the Critique of Civilization* (London, 1981), Chapter 3, "Rousseau on Natural and Artifical Needs."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

significant if hidden role, both in the attempt to define characteristic exigencies of the human condition in general and in defining the specific complex of social requirements peculiar to a culture at a given stage of development.[2] The first usage is Marx's contribution to theories of human nature. The second is a legacy of Hegel. To use "needs" in both roles, however, gives rise to irresolvable contradictions.

But it is to the Frankfurt school and the attempt to marry Marx and Freud undertaken by Reich, Fromm, Marcuse and others that the concept of needs owes its current centrality. It was Reich, preoccupied with the problem of ideology and how to psychologically articulate the concept, who saw the theoretical possibilities of needs to explain late capitalism. Thus, Reich managed to solve two problems at once: the concept explained how a perfect fit could be achieved between what an economic system produced and what was demanded of it. Marx had explained this in terms of ideology, which suggested that the fit was due to an internalization of *categories* produced by the economic formation. But as Reich saw, this account smacked of idealism.[3] By seeing the fit between system and individuals in terms of needs, these charges were obviated. Basic needs and drives, infinitely inventive in the outlet they seek, are determined as to their specific form by the possibilities that an economic system admits. More generally, as Fromm and Marcuse were to see, the concept of needs helped explain the success of late capitalism: it survives by inculcating "false needs." But this revisionist theory of needs runs into the same problem that Marx ran into in describing human nature in terms of authentic needs and at the same time arguing that needs were constituted by the economic system.[4] The Freudian Marxists introduced the "unconscious" as the repository of false needs. Thus, they lay beyond the reach of critical capabilities and rendered less likely the cultural revolution waged in the name of "radical needs." Their various attempts to investigate the problem of needs generated different accounts. With Fromm, there is a tension between his vision of a "productive character," which spells out the existential requirements of human authenticity in terms of needs, and his theory that character types are socially determined as a complex of needs favored by an economic system. Marcuse's dilemma, on the other hand, is how to produce liberation in a situation in which false needs have become embedded in the instinctual structure.

Recent literature has not resolved these dilemmas. Agnes Heller subscribes to the

2. See especially Agnes Heller, *The Theory of Need in Marx* (London, 1976) and contributions to Ross Fitzgerald, ed., *Human Needs and Politics* (Sydney, 1977).

3. Wilhelm Reich, *The Mass Pcyhology of Fascism* (Harmondsworth, 1975), Chapter 1, "Ideology as a Material Force."

4. In *The Germany Ideology*, in Marx-Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5 (London, 1975), pp. 255-256, Marx distinguishes between "fixed" and "variable" needs or desires. This is the closest he comes to a distinction between true and false needs. Throughout the *1844 Manuscripts*, however, he distinguishes "human needs" from alienated needs such as the need for money, propagated by private property (*Collected Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 270-282, 293-316, 306-309, 322-326); while in *The German Ideology* he introduces for the first time "needs" as a descriptive concept. In the initial formulation of the notion of a mode of production, needs have an important role to play as the first premise on which productive activity is based. The development of a mode of production is predicated on a corresponding expansion of needs and Marx details three phases in this process which ultimately brings forth the whole array of forces and relations of production: (1) basic subsistence needs, whose satisfaction leads to (2) the production of new needs which a primitive division of labor to satisfy subsistence needs generates, leading in turn to (3) new social relations. Cf. *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, *op.cit.*, pp. 41-44. In the *Grundrisse* the concept of needs, like the concept of "interest," is an important category (*op.cit.*, pp. 92-93, 156-158, 242-245, 325, 408-410, 488, 540-542), but in *Capital*, perhaps due to the unresolved conflict between needs as a value *vis-à-vis* a descriptive category, the concept more or less drops out.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

essentially incompatible theories of "radical needs" and of a "system of needs." In *The Limits to Satisfaction*, Leiss still sees need formation as a mysterious process undertaken at a psychic level that puts it out of rational reach and, therefore, responsibility. This conception conflicts with his injunction to control and minimize needs to insure survival and the integrity of the ecosystem. Illich subscribes to a Rousseauean theory of moral corruption and loss of autonomy due to the inculcation of artificial needs which runs counter to his own counsels against a false rationality. To some extent, Illich and Leiss share this problem: both are critical of modern culture for its destruction of the physical environment and other cultures in the name of technical reason. Leiss even charges that classical Marxism was guilty of this instrumental rationality by subscribing to the doctrine of progress and encouraging economic and technological development as preconditions for socialism. What both Leiss and Illich fail to see, however, is that to subscribe to "needs" as a criterion, and programs governed by "needs" as duty-worthy, is to subscribe to the same false rationality in another guise. "Need" and "utility" are closely related and it is no accident that they stalk about as social imperatives. But on closer examination, these concepts are not clear. They have a subjective dimension such that, to invoke them as standards by which to judge other cultures necessarily involves submitting such cultures to our own imperious rationality.

Ironically, linguistic analysts, theorists of "development," and other conformist academics have now accepted "need" as a concept worthy of further investigation. Lederer's volume is representative of this trend. Produced out of papers presented at a workshop held in Berlin in May 1978, it is jointly sponsored by the International Institute for Environment and Society of the Science Center in Berlin, subsidized by the Berlin city government, and a project on "Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development," funded by the United Nations University. Of the 15 contributors to the volume, three are university professors; three are employed by the Science Center in Berlin; five are employed by the U.N.; and four are researchers in private research institutes for Third World development.

The United Nations project attempts to operationalize the concept of needs as a criterion for evaluating development goals. The conference was entitled "Goals, Desirability and Chances for Implementation of Need-Oriented Environmental Planning — Towards a Concept for Human Growth." In other words, the project seeks to "Humanize" the concept of development." The "basic needs approach," best summed up by Johan Galtung in his essay by that title, is an alternative to standard development approaches and tries to take better account of the welfare of candidates for development than previous approaches. Such optimism is doomed to failure. "Development" is a political rather than a philosophical phenomenon. Development projects are heterogeneous but nonetheless linked to political power. They are typically initiated by the dominant industrial states which succeed in integrating the less powerful states into a system tending to serve the goals of powerful states. One does not have to subscribe to dependency theory or, incidentally, deny that "underdeveloped" countries go along with these projects, to see development contributing to a post-colonial political hegemony.

The range of opinion represented in this collection, however, is much broader than what is indicated. Of the 15 chapters, only the four in Part IV and Galtung's essay focus directly on needs and development. Katrin Lederer's thoughtful introduction and the opening essays by Otto Klineberg and Carlos Mallmann explore the notion of a hierarchy of needs and raise perennial questions concerning the relation between

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

biological and cultural aspects of needs, problems of true and false needs, etc.

In the second section, Yona Friedman and Oscar Nudler attempt to operationalize "needs" and relate them to "satisfiers" from the perspective of social psychology. This section also includes an attempt by Carlos Mallmann and Solomon Marcus to clarify the "basic needs approach" by "the introduction of some new mathematical and semiotic tools such as modal logic in the study of relations between needs, desires, rights, and human values; decision theory in the study of strategic aspects concerning relations between social groups in obtaining the corresponding satisfiers; and automata theory in the study of generative processes that explain the regularities. . . . appearing in the dialectics of desires and satisfiers on one hand and desires and needs on the other" (p. 164). This obfuscating language indicates the desire to operationalize the concept of needs, which amounts to resolving metaphysical problems by their stipulative and arbitrary definition. Earlier attempts by Nielsen, Taylor, MacIntyre and others to use the concept of needs to bridge the fact-value gap renders the problem a semantic one. To use needs as a touchstone for metaphysical theories burdens them beyond their capabilities while illegitimately reducing genuine metaphysical problems. More often than not, linguistic analysis poses rather than resolves philosophical problems.[5]

In her essay on "Can 'True' and 'False' Needs Be Posited?" Agnes Heller rejects the true-false needs distinction as an attempt to impose one's views on others. She concludes: "All needs felt by humans to be real must be considered as real. These include needs of which they are aware, they are formulated by them, that they seek to satisfy. As there is thus no difference between the needs with regard to their reality, it ensues from this that every need must be acknowledged" (p. 215). Acknowledging the reality of both good and evil needs does not, however, involve recognizing a right to their satisfaction. Here Heller quite appropriately appeals to the Kantian categorial imperative and the principle that people should be treated as ends and not means to distinguish between those needs worthy of satisfaction and those which are not (p. 218). She shows convincingly that a case can be made for the distinction between good and evil needs, but that this distinction is not captured by the true-false distinction, which implies that some needs are real and others are not.

Finally, Gilbert Rist's "Basic Questions about Basic Needs" draws on Jean Baudrillard's work to argue that the focus on needs as such involves positivistic and rationalistic assumptions. Rist tackles some of the thorniest problems associated with the concept of needs: the question of just what imputing a need involves and the problems of ethnocentric bias in imputing needs to people of other cultures. As long as it is realized that historical needs represent the specific form in which a social formation admits entry to people's general needs for survival and subsistence at whatever level, their very specificity rules out these needs as a standard for all cultures in all ages. That there are transcending needs, we need not doubt. But they exist in the realm of yet unrealized values, and they do not yield unequivocal concepts and programs for practical implementation in the way that this U.N. project and others seem to assume.

Patricia Springborg

5. Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," in Peter Laslett and W.G. Runciman, eds., *Philosophy, Politics and Society*, 3rd series (Oxford, 1969), pp. 25-57; Kai Nielsen, "On Human Needs and Moral Appraisals," *Inquiry*, Vol. 6 (1963), pp. 170-183; Alasdair MacIntyre, "Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought,' " in his *Against the Self-Images of the Age* (London, 1971), pp. 109-124.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Short Journal Reviews:*

ANTIPODE 13:1 (1981)

P.O. Box 339 West Side Station, Worchester, MA 01602. $8 for 3 issues. DAVID HARVEY, "The Spatial Fix — Hegel, Von Thunen and Marx." Marx's chapter on colonization in *Capital* represents a superficial treatment of imperialism — a shortcoming which later Marxists sought to correct in order to more fully understand the internal and external nature of capitalism. RICHARD PEET, "Historical Forms of the Property Relation: A Reconstruction of Marx's Theory." The author re-arranges quotes by Marx on primitive communism, feudalism, etc. in an attempt to understand the historical process by which labor becomes alienated. MICHEL BRUNEAU, "Landscapes, Social Relations of Production and Eco-Geography." Satellited images, yielding more precise images of Northern Thailand's geographical contours, are corresponded with the various indigenous agricultural zones to analyze vicissitudes in Thai land-use. The result is two cryptic maps. MORRIS ZEITLIN, "Urbanization and Settlement in Soviet Scholarship." An abominably naive overview of Soviet 'urbanology'. Bourgeois urbanologists foster anti-city, ahistorical attitudes out of fear of revolutionary activity while, according to Soviet urbanologists, "the modern socialist village lives much like the city." MW

ANTIPODE: A RADICAL JOURNAL OF GEOGRAPHY, 13:2 (1981)

P.O. Box 339, West Side Station, Worchester, MA 01602. $12 per year (1 issue). BARBARA STUCKEY and MARGARET A. FAY, "Rural Subsistence, Migration, and Urbanization: The Production, Destruction, and Reproduction of Cheap Labor in the World Market Economy." An informative historical account of the colonial and post-colonial economic development of the Third World since the 16th century as the "story of the tapping of a seemingly undepletable reservoir of cheap labor for use in the production and transport of commodities for the world market economy." PAUL H. SUSMAN, "Regional Restructuring and Transnational Corporations." SUSMAN examines how the international division of labor and transnational corporations affect regional economic problems. The northern region of England is used as an illustration. RUTH FINCHER, "Analysis of the Local Level Capitalist." Government agencies, especially those directly concerned with economic growth, become less accountable to the electorate. However, with the transition into global capitalism with its consequent peripheralization of the labor force, "the legitimation problems of the state may increase at the local level to which the working class has most direct access." STEPHEN WYN WILLIAMS, "Realism, Marxism and Human Geography." The author argues that human geography has been characterized by essentially idealist ontological and epistemological presuppositions and that the discipline demands a realist approach instead. However, WILLIAMS' "realist Marxism" is nothing but a pre-Kantian, vulgar empiricism. JOHN EYLES, "Ideology, Contradiction and Struggle: An Exploratory Discussion." EYLES argues that most struggles occur at the level of social movements which take place within civil society. Consequently, we need to understand the "nature of civil society, the configuration of positional ideologies, their relationships with hegemonic forms, the differentiation of the working class and the infiltration of capital, and its relationship with economy and state." RL

CRITIQUE, 15

31 Cleveden Road, Glasgow G12 OPH, Scotland UK. $8 for two issues. PADDY O'DONNELL, "Lucien Sève, Althusser and the Contradictions of PCF." Explores the contradictions of the PCF. O'DONNELL argues that the PCF is both a Soviet and a social democratic party. BOB ARNOT, "Soviet Labour Productivity and the Failure of the Shchekino Experiment." Demonstrates how the Shchekino experiment to control workers through, e.g., incentives and unemployment, failed because the system essentially re-asserted itself against this particular instance at control. L. FRANCES MILLARD, "The Health of the Polish Health Service." The author points out that only a democratic structure can plan and maintain a viable health service which otherwise requires a phenomenal amount of time to construct. KOR, "The State of the Hospital System." The shortcomings of the Polish hospital system are primarily a result of the Polish economy's failure to invest in higher wages, better personnel, more nursing homes, etc. DENNIS O'HEARN, "The Second Economy in Consumer Goods and Services." Arguing that the "second economy" in Soviet society is essentially a systematic out-growth of "Soviet-style" planning, O'Hearn claims that it cannot be eliminated by minor reforms. Instead, increased workers control over the planning process is required. Plus a brief discussion on the universal class, feminism and reviews HH

*This section was organized by the Carbondale Telos Group: Russell Berman, Raymond Lau, Nan-Nan Lee, David Johnson, Harry Hoffman and Mark Wichlin.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GEGENSTIMMEN Issue No. 7 (March 1982)

Ed. Sozialistisches Osteuropakomitee, P.O. 41, 1033 Vienna, Austria. Foreign Subscriptions, ÖS 120 per year. This issue is concerned largely with Poland, the December putsch, the subsequent forms of resistance and the significance of the military's response to Solidarity as representative of a tendential militarization of Eastern Europe societies. After an initial chronicle of the events, the issue presents an interview with Zbiginiew Kowalewski (formerly active in Solidarity in Lódz and now in the Paris exile committee) describing the forms of self-management which had developed in Poland: 1) explicit seizure of the food distribution and rationing systems, 2) "active strikes" during which production was redirected toward needs set by the workers and 3) the factory based workers councils since January 1981. The latter in particular called the bureaucratic Nomenklatura system into question by insisting on the workers' right to appoint qualified managers. The radical wing of the union movement envisioned an extension of these councils on a nation-wide basis as a second house of the Polish parliament, but according to Kowalewski, at the crucial moment the (too) moderate Solidarity leadership backed off from this demand. This potential institutionalization of workers control is placed in the perspective of Polish history in his subsequent article which reviews the erosion of the councils established during the uprising of 1956.

After some excerpts from the Solidarity underground press, Winfried Wolf presents a political analysis of the coup which essentially corresponds to the left Trotskyite critique of the Soviet world: a political revolution, led by the working class, against the Stalinist bureaucracy is necessary but failed in Poland because the compromising leadership was taken in by the illusion of integrationist solutions. Instead, according to Wolf, only a revolutionary solution is possible, and therefore allegations that the union went too far and consequently brought on the catastrophe are the opposite of the truth. The righteousness and rhetorical power of Wolf's position are attractive, but it suffers from abstraction: why could such allegedly harmful moderation hold sway over the purportedly so revolutionary class? How did other sectors of society and competing ideologies add to the equation? What would a revolutionary solution imply? — since even left critics of the leadership (Kowalewski) envisioned institutionalized reforms rather than an unequivocal seizure of power. Wolf is best in his description of the mechanisms of domination, in particular the interplay of Western investment, "social-liberal" Ostpolitik and the state bureaucracy. The massive Western indebtedness of all Eastern bloc countries suggests an objective collaboration between the forces represented by Jaruzelski and the capitalist interests (especially in Western Europe) engaged in trade with the East.

Among several other analyses, the issue includes an interview with Wolf Biermann who lambasts Western critics of Solidarity, especially those who, however tacitly, approved of the putsch due to fears that a threat to Soviet security interests might endanger European peace. Biermann is apparently embittered by the liliputian size of the West German protests against the Warsaw junta, reminiscent of a similar non-response against the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia; he diagnoses a pacifist malaise which, due to a reified apotheosis of peace, is prepared to foresake social change, in order not to provoke conflict. Biermann comments: "But even if they are right, unless mankind soon finds a way out of the social orders that have been established in the East and the West, it is going to come to an end even without a war. There may be something worse than the atomic war that we envision in our nightmares. The plentitude of possibilities of demise is much greater. Even if this wrong equation were right — the balance of atomic terror preserves the peace — the problem of survival would not be solved. For the contemporary social orders are not capable of saving mankind from the coming catastrophe, even if no war breaks out." And on those leftists who openly side with the bureaucrats: "If the leftists are on the side of counterrevolution, then they are simply counterrevolutionary. They are no longer leftists." The issue concludes with the first of a three part series by Jaroslav Suk on the radical left in Czechoslovakia and Michelle Lee's analysis of the unrest in Kosovo where the ethnic Albanian population is waging a regionalist struggle against the Yugoslav central regime. Economic underdevelopment and nationalist currents get complicated within the framework of ideological and political conflict between the two Balkan eccentrics of the Eastern world. RB

GEGENSTIMMEN No. 8 (June 1982)

More on Poland after the martial law. Miroslaw Chojecki, a co-founder of KOR, describes forms of resistance after December 13; Jacek Kuron's open letter to the underground is reprinted; and an interview taken from Solidarity's underground press in Warsaw with Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, a leader of the union movement in Lower Silesia, gives a first hand account of the reconstruction of

LICENSED TO URZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the workers' organizations after the mass arrests of the union cadre in December.

A report on the small peace movements in the GDR and Hungary follows. While any such news automatically leads credence to the legitimacy of their Western counterparts, it seems as if the western peace movements are directed primarily against superpower presence, while in the East the critique is aimed more at domestic militarism (and not the local superpower). A case in point is presented, an excerpt from the East German military schooling text, *Marxist-Leninist Aesthetics in Military Training* (Berlin, 1979): "A war in defense of the fatherland is a thing of beauty. It is a work of art — the sight of a missile ready to be launched fills the soldier with aesthetic sense and growing moral strength."

Miklos Haraszti, a Hungarian dissident, discusses Samizdat literature, censorship and publishing conditions in an illuminating interview. The vagaries of opposition in Kadarism become clearer. On the lack of ties to the working class among Hungarian dissidents, he comments: "A real contact between Polish intellectuals and workers developed in 1976 only on the basis of the previously established, independent activity of the workers. In Hungary the intelligentsia is afraid of repeating the error of 'Bolshevism', in which the intellectuals dictate to the workers what their real interests are." Included also: an interview with Heinrich Böll as a consistent supporter of civil rights in West and East, more on Hungary and a report on opposition in the Ukraine. RB

MONTHLY REVIEW, 34:3 (July-August 1982)

Monthly Review Foundation, Inc., 62 West 14th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011. $18 per year (11 issues). CARL MARZANI, "The Vatican as a Left Ally?" An interesting "Eurocommunist" interpretation of the Vatican which situates it within the Italian Marxist tradition. MARZANI argues that the church has undergone revolutionary changes over the past two decades and is now striving for the reunification of Europe as a "third way" beyond the existing socialist and capitalist systems. Despite MARZANI'S enthusiasm, the question remains as to whether "Eurocommunism" rests on democratic values or European economic self-interest. "Church and Revolution in Nicaragua: An Interview with PETER MARCHETTI." MARCHETTI, a U.S. Jesuit priest working with the revolutionary government of Nicaragua, talks about the role of the Church in revolutions, the Nicaraguan mixed economy, political pluralism, the future of Nicaragua, etc. MAXINE MOLYNEUX, "Socialist Societies Old and New: Progress Towards Women's Emancipation?" MOLYNEUX claims that even though socialist societies have "permanent deficiencies" that have to be overcome before a comprehensive program for women's emancipation can be realized, they already did better than their capitalist counterparts. However, even this seems too optimistic because the improvements women have made were results of the coincidence of developmental and feminist goals. Once rapid development stops, so will feminist progress. RUTH GLASS, "Divided and Degraded: The Downtrodden Peoples of India." GLASS argues that "affirmative action" in India has helped to maintain rather than to discard oppression of the "backward classes." Furthermore, this oppression will continue as a result of the fragmentation of the masses. RL

MONTHLY REVIEW, 34:4 (September 1982)

PAUL SWEEZY and HARRY MAGDOFF, "Nuclear Chicken." The authors argue that Washington's recent military buildup is an attempt to recapture the U.S. world hegemony lost in the 70s by re-establishing the credibility of the threat to use nuclear weapons. Consequently, the immediate demand of the peace movement must be a unilateral declaration of no first-use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. CHERYL PAYER, "Is There a Better Way? Development and the World Bank." The same old critique of the capitalist nature of foreign aid. Other than abstract slogans such as socialist revolutions and "self-reliant" paths of development, PAYER has nothing else to offer. The suspicion that "radicals" don't have a "better way" of third-world development is confirmed again. GEORGE KATSIAFICAS, "The Extraparliamentary Left in Europe." A sketchy but interesting account of the development of the cultural/political youth movement from which emerged today's anti-Americanism in Europe. KATSIAFICAS traces the development of this movement in Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Zurich, and West Germany, and relates it to the current economic crisis. Furthermore, KATSIAFICAS argues that the movement's fragmented, destructive, and atheoretical nature makes it vulnerable to co-optation by the state. Plus poems and book-reviews. RL

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE, 24-25 (Fall-Spring 1981-82)

Special issue on New German Cinema. German Department, Box 413, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI 53201. $11 for three issues. ERIC RENTSCHLER, "American Friends and New German Cinema: Patterns of Reception." Overly-enthusiastic about Hollywood's acceptance of the New German Cinema, RENTSCHLER assumes that it has become the new-found ambassador of the Federal Republic. What RENTSCHLER has forgotten is that Hollywood's acceptance reflects as much appreciation of the New German Cinema as the English subtitles reflect the original dialogues. MIRIAM HANSEN, "Cooperative Auteur Cinema and Oppositional Public Sphere: Alexander Kluge's Contribution to 'Germany in Autumn'." Using "Germany in Autumn" as an example of the collective politics of production, HANSEN views the consequences of the split between commercial and Auteur cinema in German film culture. He concludes that both neglect the creation of a public sphere in terms of the participation of the spectator. SHEILA JOHNSTON, "A Star is Born: Fassbinder and the New German Cinema." An attempt to locate Fassbinder's position within the New German Cinema. Indicating that public aid for German cinema met with side resistance, JOHNSTON finds, contrary to popular belief, that FASSBINDER conforms to the "free-enterprise ethic" so prevalent in Germany. KAJA SILVERMAN, "Kasper Hauser's 'Terrible Fall' into Narrative." Utilizing the "interpretative intertextuality" mode and HERZOG'S "Everyman for Himself and God Against All," the problem of subjectivity and narrative is posed. It is suggested that subjectivity is in effect the dominant cultural narrative. TIMOTHY CORRIGAN, "Wender's 'Kings of the Road': The Voyage from Desire to Language." CORRIGAN argues that "Kings of the Road" is an explicit confrontation of a psychoanalytic formula for film-making with the spectatorial relation it implies. That is, it becomes an attempt to assimilate, defract and/or readjust this formula. As such, it indicates a new possibility for the relation between the spectator and the screen. THOMAS ELSAESSER, "Myth as a Phantasmagoria of History: H. J. Syberberg, Cinema and Representation." ELSAESSER explores SYBERBERG'S intention to locate and rescue the "tradition of irrationalism" for an aesthetics of political enlightenment. In the process, the historical links between fascism and cinema are delineated. JUDITH MAYNE, "Female Narration, Women's Cinema"; and an interview with CLAUDIA LENSSEN, HELEN FEHERVARY, JUDITH MAYNE, "From Hitler to Hepburn: A Discussion of Women's Film Production and Reception." Both the article and the interview attempts to demonstrate the overall importance of methodological strategies and critical activity for the establishment of women's counter-cinema and counter-viewing. In order words, they attempt to layout the basic premises by which films can be viewed and reviewed. MIRIAM HANSEN, "Introduction to Adorno's 'Transparencies on Film (1966)." Viewing ADORNO'S article as essentially "Adorno revising Adorno," HANSEN suggests that a more imaginative and pragmatic re-reading of ADORNO is required. This seems especially relevant when ADORNO has traditionally been read as an "academic Marxist" or as a film-critic. THEODOR ADORNO, "Transparencies on Film" and ALEXANDER KLUGE, "On Film and the Public Sphere." Both question the notion of "reception" in terms of the epistemological and socio-historical concerns for a theory of a cinematic public sphere. As such, both examine the process by which images of the mind succumb and, to some extent, unfold, in relation to celluloid. The primary purpose is to establish a critical cultural practice relating to film reception. ANDREAS HUYSSEN, "The Vamp and the Machine: Technology and Sexuality in Fritz Lang's 'Metropolis'." HUYSSEN claims that EGGEBRECHT'S and KRACAUER'S critique of "Metropolis" are simplistic and inadequate. HUYSSEN'S own re-interpretation argues that the use of religious symbolism, the embodiment of technology in the woman-robot and Freders relation to woman and machine, etc., are the keys to understanding the film's social and ideological imaginary. KARSTEN WITTE, "Visual Pleasure Inhibited: Aspects of the German Review Film." A historical reading of the German review film from its origin in operetta to its final depravation: the television ballet. HH

NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 133 (May-June 1982)

7 Carlisle Street, London W1V 6NL. $22 per year. ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE. In order to historically capture the persistence of the double exploitation of women, the author explains history in terms of a gender system in which a bourgeois ideology of separate male and female spheres pervades the discourse on female nature. CHARLES POST, "The American Road to Capitalism." The anti-capitalist slave labor system stalled the expansion of the agro-industrial complex into Western farmlands. The Civil War removed this obstacle and bolstered capital accumulation through the commodification of western territories. GEOFF HODGSON, "On the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Economy of Socialist Transformation." In this reply to previous statements by Coates, the author sees concrete piecemeal reforms as heading up England's socialist transition. The Labour Party's Alternative Economic Strategy, in conjunction with increases in worker participation represents an opening up of reformist possibilities which lie somewhere between Social Democracy and Coates' Leninism. WALTER BENJAMIN, "Goethe: The Reluctant Bourgeois." "The son of bourgeois parents rises in the world, outstrips everyone, becomes the heir to a revolution whose power in his hands is such that it makes everyone tremble (French Revolution; *Sturm und Drang*); and at the very moment when dealt the most grievous blow to the power of superannuated forces, he established his own dominion within the self-same archaic, feudal framework (Empire; Weimar)." FRED HALLIDAY, "A Persian Tale — Mr. Rezai's Family." A weepy tale of the tortures and deaths of a Mojahidin guerilla family at the hands of the Shah and the Ayatollah. MW

NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE, No. 8 (Spring 1982)

Caucus for a New Political Science, Columbia University, W 118th St. Room 733, New York, NY 10027. $17 per year (4 issues). TIMOTHY W. LUKE, "Rationalization Redux: From the New Deal to the New Beginning." Based on the artificial negativity thesis, LUKE argues that Reaganism is an attempt to "re-rationalize" an "over-rationalized" New Deal state by "a comprehensive contraction of federal authority to transfer its rationalizing role back to the states and the private sector." However, concrete proposals rather than abstract calls for "repoliticization," "renewed education," and "new political spaces" are needed if a historically viable project of emancipation is to be constructed. TERESA AMOTT and JOEL KRIEGER, "Thatcher and Reagan: State Theory and the 'Hyper-Capitalist' Regime." The authors argue that Marxist and corporatist theories of the state are incapable of explaining Thatcher's and Reagan's "hyper-capitalist" regimes characterized by "contradictions between political practice and political self-representation." By focusing exclusively on the differences between corporatist-welfare states and "hyper-capitalist" states, the authors neglect their continuities. BEAU GROSSCUP, "The Neoconservative State and the Politics of Terrorism." The Reagan regime's "ideology of terrorism" attempts to enable the liberal democratic state to overcome its current crisis of democracy by legalizing "'authoritarian democracy' by establishing the prerogatives of internal order, discipline, and national security over those of individual liberties." NANCY L. SCHWARTZ, "The Time of Our Being Together: An Inquiry Into The Meaning of Marx's Labor Theory of Value." Using the distinction between "necessary" and "surplus labor time," SCHWARTZ reinterprets the labor theory of value as an analysis of capitalism's control of the "rhythm of people's public and private lives." What SCHWARTZ does not realize is that the development of an adequate program entails the rethinking of the fundamental Marxist premises rather than the mere invention of new distinctions. Plus organizing news, notes and reviews. RL

PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM, 8:2 (Summer 1981)

Department of Philosophy, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167. $15 per year (4 issues). RAYMOND S. PFEIFFER, "The Concept of Interpersonal Manipulation in Social Critique and Psychological Research." Pfeiffer argues that the standard view of interpersonal manipulation in terms of intentions is inadequate. He presents a detailed analysis of a non-intentional manipulation and shows this non-intentional construal to be more adequate and has more potential for social critique. THOMAS E. WARTENBERG, "Poverty and Class Structure in Hegel's Theory of Civil Society." Hegel's discussion of poverty reveals a different class structure which includes the poor and the workers from the one he acknowledged. The main flaw of Hegel's theory is his failure to grant theoretical legitimacy to this implicit alternative class structure which forms the basis of the actual operation of civil society. JAMES RURAK, "The Imaginary Power of Utopias: A Hermeneutic for its Recovery." Based on an analysis of More's *Utopia* and Bacon's *New Atlantis*, Rurak contends that a utopia is not a proposal for an ideal society; instead, it is an imaginary society held together by the very ideal it projects and the set of conditions for the realization of this ideal. It provides us with a vantage-point to inquire into the nature, purpose and the possibilities of the status quo as well as its limits. MICHEL FOUCAULT, "Foucault at the College de France I: A Course Summary." Foucault summarizes the courses he offered during 1971-76 dealing with the formation and functioning of norms in a disciplinary society, and the one in 1978 studying the foundation of bio-politics. SEYLA BENHABIB, "The 'Logic' of Civil Society: A Reconsideration of Hegel and Marx." Benhabib reconsiders the relationship between Marx and Hegel in light of Hegel's analysis of political economy. Though Marx and Hegel share the same methodological

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

premise that exposition proceeds from the abstract to the concrete, from thought to the real, Marx maintains a radical distinction between thought and reality, whereas Hegel reduces the latter to the former. The difference between Hegel's and Marx's "logic" is that for Marx, thought must account for a concrete, dynamic and self-producing totality; but for Hegel, it is defined by one conceptual principle under which all determinations of the real are subsumed. Though philosophically redundant, this article provides an interesting account of Hegel's political economy. GYORGY MÁRKUS, "Ideology and its Ideologies: Lukacs and Goldmann on Kant." Márkus compares Lukacs' and Goldmann's theory of ideology in their early writings. Whereas Lukacs posited the objective situations and interests of the proletariat as the immanent historical standard to judge the status of the empirical consciousness of a class and culture works, Goldmann rejected such a standard and claimed that the truth-content of any ideology is relative. However, to save himself from historicism, Goldmann postulated an "anthropological unity of humanity" as the ultimate criterion for judging the validity of cultural creations. Consequently, both Lukacs and Goldmann make the mistake of attempting to establish *the* "real" meaning of cultural creations. NNL

POLITICS & SOCIETY, 11:2

Geron-X, Inc., Publishers, Box 1108, Los Altos, CA 94022. $19 per year (4 issues). MICHAEL BURAWOY, "The Hidden Abode of Underdevelopment: Labor Process and the State in Zambia." In this informative case-study, Burawoy criticizes underdevelopment theories (Wallerstein excepted) for focusing exclusively on market rather than production relations. Like Braverman and Noble, he argues that labor control is tied to production techniques. Thus, lacking changes in production techniques, formal political independence only entails a changing of the "managers". In this context, nationalization of industries is nothing but the "growing coincidence of interests" between multinationals and the post-colonial state. MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, "The Decline of Organized Labor: NLRB Union Certificaiton Results." Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Goldfield argues that the decline in union activities during the 70s has been exaggerated. Furthermore, rather than explaining this decline in terms of the capitalist offensive, resistance to unions in the Sun Belt, changing work-force composition, etc., the explanation must be sought in the compromising nature of the labor movement itself from the mid-30s to the mid-50s. PAUL CAMMACK, "The Workers' Movement and the Bolivian Revolution Reconsidered," and BERT USEEM, "Reply." A debate on the extent to which the international economy was responsible for the Bolivian workers' movement's collapse between 1952 and 56. As usual, debates on the relative importance of the "internal" versus the "external" are not particularly fruitful. PAUL PERETZ, "There Was No Tax Revolt." Based on a comprehensive analysis of public opinion changes, political activities and tax payments, Peretz concludes that the passage of Proposition 13 reflects a temporary, local rather than a national tax-revolt, thus demystifying the conservatives' attempt to manipulate "antitax sentiment to limit government size and make the tax system more regressive." RL

RADICAL AMERICA, 16:3 (May-June 1982)

The Alternative Education Project, Inc., 38 Union Square, Somerville, MA 02143. $15 per year (6 issues). A special issue marking RA's fifteenth anniversary consisting of over 80 excerpts from previous issues. This anthology not only documents the evolution of the theoretical and political orientation of RA itself but also provides a panoramic view of the "efforts of the American Left to grapple with the decline, after the tumultuous events of the 1960s, of its immediate political strength." The excerpts are organized under 7 headings: 1) Radical and Radicalism; 2) Women's Liberation; 3) Black Liberation; 4) Their Culture and Ours; 5) The Labor Movement; 6) The New Left and Beyond; and, 7) To the Breaking Point. RL

SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, 7:4 (Summer 1982)

University of Chicago Press, 11030 S. Langley Avenue, Chicago, IL 60628. $22.50 per year. SUSAN GROG BELL, "Medieval Women Book Owners: Arbiters of Lay Piety and Ambassadors of Culture." Medieval women book owners contributed to the transmission of cultural, especially lay religious culture, by influencing iconographical developments and vernacularizing religious writings. Furthermore, they often acted as "international ambassadors of culture change through their distribution of books over a broad geographical area." This is a pointless article. STEPHANIE A. SHIELDS, "The Variability Hypothesis: The History of a Biological Model of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sex Difference in Intelligence." A detailed description of the origin and development of the variability hypothesis which affirms men's superiority in intelligence on the basis of their higher variability both physically and mentally. Shields argues that the hypothesis is "a concept introduced without supporting evidence" and lacks rigid definition. Thus, its acceptance or rejection is an ideological rather than scientific matter. Review Essay: JUDITH A. MCGAW, "Women and the History of American Technology." The recent literature on the relation of technology to women focuses on two categories: technology and women's public work, and technology and domestic work. In addition, much of this literature focuses on the technical, rather, than social, aspects of technology. JOAN C. HOFFMAN, "Biorhythms in Human Reproduction: The Not-So-Steady State." New Techniques of measuring blood hormone levels show that patterns of hormone secretion are not steady, but episodic in both women and men. This dismisses the view that men's greater emotional strength and stability has a biological basis in a "steady state" of hormone balance. ROGER SANJEK, "The American Anthropological Association Resolution on the Employment of Women: Genesis, Implementation, Disavowal, and Resurrection." A historical account of AAA's 1972 resolution according to which all anthropology departments should practice fair hiring and promotion of women in the profession, and at the end of five years departments which fail to comply will be censured by the AAA. But in 1979, the AAA executive board refused to censure incompliant departments. After a membership revolt in 1980, the resolution was implemented. NAOMI QUINN and CAROL A. SMITH, "A New Resolution of Fair Employment Practices for Women Anthropologists: Fresh Troops Arrive." On Dec. 4, 1981, AAA passed a new resolution "calling for a second five-year period during which the efforts of anthropology departments to hire women would be again assessed and again followed by the censure of any department that did not comply." Plus book reviews. NNL

SOCIALIST REVIEW, 12:3-4 (May-August 1982)

The Center for Social Research and Education, 4228 Telegraph Avenue, Oakland, CA 94609. $18 per year (6 issues). Special double issue on "New Forms of Organizing-Breaking Barriers." RHODA LINTON and MICHELLE WHITHEM, "With Mourning, Rage, Empowerment, and Defiance." The uniqueness of the 1981 Women's Pentagon Action lies in the maintenance of the individuality of every participant and the personalization of politics. However, the significance of this action seems more symbolic than political. In fact, this action shows that feminists lack a consistent political strategy other than crying, screaming, and soliciting arrest. "Mobilizing Emotion: Organizing the Women's Pentagon Action." An interview with Donna Warnock, one of the organizers of Women's Pentagon Action. Warnock claims that this action is "a totally participatory event" which deals with each woman's emotion in a political context and thereby empowers them. The success of this action is manifested in the increasing recognition of feminists' leadership role in the left. GARY DELGADO, "Taking It to the Street: Community Organizing and National Politics." Delgado describes the development of the strategy of the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now to expand itself into "a national organization by waging a protracted confrontation with the Democratic Party" and participating in electoral politics, He also discusses the problems and possibilities of this strategy. JIM JACOBS, "DARE to Struggle: Organizing in Urban America." Jacobs, a leader of the Detroit Alliance for a Rational Economy, argues that DARE's strength was in concrete, limited projects, while the lack of political consolidation around an ideology was its weakness. Its dissolution in 1981 was mainly a result of its inability to form ties with municipal unions, and identify with community interests. ROXANNE DUNBER ORITZ, "Land and Nationhood: The American Indian Struggle for Self-Determination and Survival." A historical account of the native American movement as a movement fighting for self-determination and a land for survival. "Occupational Stress and Labor Organizing: The Work of the Institute for Labor and Mental Health." Interview with Michael Lerner and Lee Schore. Contrary to the conformism of most therapeutic programs, the Institute's program encourages workers to externalize their feelings and emphasizes that the ultimate remedy of stress is the removal of its cause by mobilizing people to improve their working conditions through democratic control over not only their workplace but the social order as a whole. BARBARA EPSTEIN, "Family Politics and the New Left: Learning from Our Own Experience." Epstein rejects the new left's analysis of family breakdown in terms of work stress under capitalism and argues that the real causes of family collapse are women's entry into the labor force, availability of birth control, and the feminist movement. Furthermore, instead of trying to salvage the heterosexual nuclear family, the new left should explore other lifestyles. DAN LURIA and JACK RUSSELL, "Rebuilding Detroit: A Rational Reindustrialization Strategy."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Luria and Russell, both members of DARE provide a socialist program to reindustrialize Detroit: 1) utilization of existing resources; 2) socially oriented investment and disinvestment decisions; 3) establishment of decision making body representing the interests of labor, capital, and local government. As to how this program can be implemented, the authors have nothing to offer except optimism. MIKE MILLER, "Community Organization Vision and the Electoral Tactics." Using Solidarity as the model, Miller pictures the establishment of a broad-based, multi-issue, and democratic community organization in America. Even though this organization should be independent of party bureaucracies, it should strengthen itself through electoral politics by pressuring politicians into addressing relevant issues. Is this glorification of a public sphere which has already declined the new politics that the Left has been searching for? NNL

THEORY AND SOCIETY, 11:3(May 1982)

Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., 52 Vanderbilt Ave., New York, NY 10017. $26.40 (6 issues). THEDA SKOCPOL, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution." Because of the importance of Shi'a Islamic ideology, Skocpol modifies her structural theory of revolution to show that the Iranian revolution was as much *made* as it was the product of structural forces. Nonetheless, she focuses on two crucial structural forces: 1) the vulnerabilities of the "rentier state;" 2) the presence of traditional groups potentially in opposition to the government. NIKKI KEDDIE; EQBAL AHMAD; WALTER GOLDFRANK; three "Comments on Skocpol." Whereas Keddie likes Skocpol's rejection of exclusively structural analysis, Goldfrank praises the structural aspects of the analysis while rebuking her for not maintaining a purely structural account. Ahmad praises her comparative approach but criticizes her failure to recognize the similiarity between the classical revolutions, notably France's with Iran's. Seemingly, political sociologists work in a Tower of Babel. E. W. Connell, "Class, Patriarchy, and Sartre's Theory of Practice." Connell rejects Althusserian structuralism, focusing instead on the concrete social practices which constitute *social structure. Using Sartre's "series," "fused group," and "institution" as levels of social reality,* Connell provides a basic set of concepts for the analysis of class/gender practices and structure. His momentous conclusion: the separation of class from patriarchy is analytic rather than substantive. For this we need social science? KAREN FIELDS, "Charismatic Religion as Popular Protest: The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Social Movements." A brilliant case study of a religious movement in the north of what is now Zambia, 1917-1919. This Watchtower (Jehovah's Witnesses) revival is seen as a political threat to the traditional/colonial rule. Fields calls for the rejection of evolutionary secularizing models and doctrines of religion as epiphenomenal, in order to restore the significance of religion in the totality. ROBERT GOLDMAN, "Hegemony and Managed Critique in Prime-Time Television: A Critical Reading of Mork and Mindy." Utilizing "critical-Marxist" theories of mass culture (which presumably includes theorists as diverse as Adorno, Ricoeur, and Goffman), Goldman analyzes the American television series "Mork and Mindy." His thesis: potential elements of negativity in "Mork and Mindy" e.g., criticism of the cult of personality and commodity fetishism, are incorporated into the hegemonic cultural forms of corporate liberalism. JONATHAN WIENER, "Max Weber's Marxism: Theory and Method of Ancient Civilizations." An analysis of Weber's "The Social Causes of the Decline of Ancient Civilizations," and *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations*. Wiener argues that they represent a departure from the rest of Weber's writings in their emphasis on material factors in the explanation of social and economic change. He poses but does not solve the problem (if there is one) of why Weber never attempted to reconcile the various factors in the rise of capitalism into a unified account. Consequently, we have two Webers — one Marxist, one not. Plus reviews. DJ

THEORY AND SOCIETY, 11:4 (July 1982)

Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017. $26.40 per year (6 issues). SHARON ZUKIN, "Art in the Arms of Power: Market Relations and Collective Patronage in the Capitalist State." A narrative account of the recent valorization of urban neighborhoods as cultural centers, e.g., Quartier Beauborg in Paris and Soho in New York. Zukin links the rise of these artsy neighborhoods to the rise of art from marginality to the center of commodified late capitalist society. JON ELSTER, "Marxism, Functionalism, and Game Theory: The Case for Methodological Individualism." Marxists have relied consistently on the worst bourgeois method — functionalism — where end-states are taken as explanatory of prior states. Elster calls for the use by Marxists of rational choice theory in general and game theory in particular. G.A. COHEN, "Reply to Elster." Cohen argues that Elster's game-theoretical applications are only peripherally related to the central aims of Marxism and that functionalism cannot be ruled out a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

priori. Consequently, Marxism needs to be beefed up to meet even minimal demands of adequacy in functionalism. PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, "Functionalist Marxism Rehabilitated." Contemporary Marxist theories are improperly functionalist, but they can be rehabilitated by incorporating Skinnerian reinforcement principles and the mathematics of "absorbing Markov processes." JOHN ROEMER, "Methodological Individualism and Deductive Marxism." A defense of Elster's call for the specification of micro-foundations for Marxism, emphasizing the priority of class struggles. JOHANNES BERGER and CLAUS OFFE, "Functionalism versus Rational Choice?" Methodological individualism and functionalism are seen as complementary methods. ANTHONY GIDDENS, "Commentary on the Debate." In this only sensible article in the entire debate, Giddens rejects the need for functionalism; the utility of game theory to Marxist or non-Marxist theories; the dogmatic defense of methodological individualism; and the historical materialist cha-cha theory of history. Following Giddens, the whole debate is a crock. RON EYERMAN, "Review Essay: Some Recent Studies in Class Consciousness." Review of Paul Willis' *Learning to Labor*, J. Clarke, Critcher, and R. Johnson's *Working Class Culture*, J. Goldthorpe etc., *The Affluent Worker*, and Walter Korpi's *The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism*. Eyerman favors the class culture school with its blend of culturalism (*à la* R. Williams) and structuralism (*à la* Althusser). Especially attractive is Willis' account of a potential culture-based resistence among working class youth to middle class values and behaviors. Plus reviews. DJ

NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE

Number 26 Spring/Summer 1982

CRITICAL THEORY AND MODERNITY

Andreas Huyssen: *Critical Theory and Modernity*
Jürgen Habermas: *The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment*
Axel Honneth: *Work and Instrumental Action*
Stefan Breuer: *The Illusion of Politics*
Trent Schroyer: *Cultural Surplus in America*
Theodor W. Adorno: *Trying to Understand Endgame*
Jack Zipes: *Beckett in Germany*
Jan Bruck: *Beckett, Benjamin and the Modern Crisis in Communication*
Robert D'Amico: Feenberg, *Lukács, Marx and the Sources of Political Theory*
Douglas Kellner: Schoolman, *The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse*

SUBSCRIPTIONS

	Individual	Institution
1 yr.	$11.00	$22.00
2 yrs.	$20.00	$44.00
3 yrs.	$30.00	$66.00

back issues 4.00
3 Issues per Year
Add $1.00 for all foreign subscriptions

New German Critique
German Department
Box 413
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books from:



Telos Press

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL

Socialism and Philosophy
by Antonio Labriola

Originally written between 1897 and 1899 as a series of long letters to Sorel, this book provides an account of socialism that was studiously ignored by both the Second and Third Internationals.

$4.50 paper; $12 cloth

For Socialism
by Gustav Landauer

Originally published in 1911, For Socialism is a critique of an official Marxism that had become an obstacle to emancipation.

$3.95 paper; $12 cloth

History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci
Pedro Cavalcanti and Paul Piccone, eds.

This selection of Gramsci's early writings is required reading for everyone interested in twentieth-century Marxism. $9.50 cloth only

Pannekoek and the Workers' Councils
Serge Bricianer, ed.



Widely regarded as one of the most important founders of the school of council communism, Pannekoek has only recently begun to receive the attention he deserves. This collection of some of his most important essays provides a clear idea of his philosophical and political perspective. 304 pages.

$5.50 paper; $14.50 cloth

Send with check or money order (U.S. currency only) to TELOS PRESS, Box 3111, St. Louis, Mo. 63130 USA. *Foreign order add 10%.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BACK ISSUES STILL AVAILABLE

Also available but not listed here are issues 13 and 17-35. They contain articles by Adorno, Arato, Aronson, Bloch, Bobbio, Breines, Buck-Morss, Carlo, Castoriadis, Colletti, Dahmer, D'Amico, Elshtain, Feher, Fekete, Ferrarotti, George, Goldmann, Gorz, Gouldner, Gross, Habermas, Hegedüs, Jacoby, Jay, Korsch, Kosik, Krahl, Landmann, Lefort, Lenhardt, Liehm, Lyotard, Marcuse, Markus, Mattick, Meszaros, Negt, Patocka, Poster, Offe, Radnoti, Schroyer, Tronti and Ulmen. A full list of back issues in print is available on request. Out-of-print issues may be ordered through University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA.

36 **BOOKCHIN:** Beyond Neo-Marxism; **LEFORT:** Then and Now; **BOBBIO:** Why Democracy? **GEORGE:** On Contradiction; **CARLO:** Capitalism and Crisis in Yugoslavia; **DAHMER:** Sexual Economy Today; **GROSS:** Culture and Negativity; **MONGIN:** Questioning Politics; **HOWARD:** 'Esprit'

38 **CARLO:** Unemployment; **CASTORIADIS:** The Social Regime in Russia; **KONRAD, SZELENYI:** Intelligentsia and the Social Structure; **LEVI:** Sources of Wittgenstein's Ethics; **ADORNO:** Metacritique of Epistemology; **VAJDA:** Lukacs' and Husserl's Critique of Science; **SALVADORI:** Eurocommunism; **MARCUSE ET AL.:** Theory and Politics; **HELLER:** Marxist Ethics and Eastern Europe

40 **ZASLAVSKY:** Rebirth of the Stalin Cult in the USSR; **FEHER:** Kadarism as the Model State of Khrushchevism; **NERI:** The Czech Crisis; **WHITEBOOK:** Nature in Habermas; **COHEN:** Why More Political Theory? **ADLER:** Thalheimer, Bonapartism and Fascism; **THALHEIMER:** On Fascism; **KLARE:** Law-Making as Praxis; **TERTULIAN:** On the Later Lukacs

42 **ZASLAVSKY:** The USSR and the Working Class; **MLYNAR:** From Prague to Moscow; **FEHER:** Toward a Post-Machiavellian Politics; **CARLO:** The Italian Crisis and the Left; **CLARK:** Marx, Bakunin and Social Transformation; **RAULET:** Remarks on Horkheimer's Pessimism; **COLLETTI:** The Three Faces of Italian Communism; **BERMAN:** German Notes; **LOHMANN:** Society versus the State; **SARTRE ET AL.:** Discussion

37 **KOVEL:** Rationalization and the Family; **MILLER:** Nietzsche and Marx; **EWEN:** American Consumption; **TSCHIRHART:** Chinese Asexuality; **RADNOTI:** Benjamin's Politics; **TRAUB:** Lenin and Taylor; **ADORNO:** Culture and Administration; **BOELLA:** Radicalism and Needs in Heller

39 **HABERMAS:** History and Evolution; **HONNETH:** Adorno and Habermas; **SCHMIDT:** Offensive Critical Theory? **REED:** Black Particularity Reconsidered; **ROELOFS:** The Warren Court and Corporate Capitalism; **FEHER:** Lukacs in Weimar; **BEILHARZ:** Trotsky's Marxism — Permanent Involution? **BIRO:** The Plan to Film 'Capital'; **HABERMAS:** Capitalism and Democracy: An Interview

41 **BOOKCHIN:** Self-Management and Technology; **FINOCCHIARO:** Gramsci's Crocean Marxism; **WILDT:** Totalitarian State Capitalism; **BOELLA:** Eastern European Societies; **STOJANOVIC:** Democratization in Yugoslavia; **RITTERSPORN:** Conflict in the USSR 1936-38; **WOLIN:** On Adorno's Aesthetische Theorie; **HEYDORN:** Gustav Landauer

43 **CARLO:** The Crisis of Bureaucratic Collectivism; **COBLER:** The Determinate Assertion of Normalcy; **WOLIN:** An Aesthetic of Redemption; **CASTORIADIS:** Socialism and Autonomous Society; **McNALL:** Greece and the Common Market; **MAHAIRA-ODONI:** Reply to McNall; **ADORNO:** Music and the New Music; **ZASLAVSKY:** Why Afghanistan? **GREFFRATH ET AL.:** Conversations with Wittfogel; **MELOTTI:** Socialism and Bureaucratic Collectivism

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BACK ISSUES STILL AVAILABLE

SPECIAL ISSUES:

26: *On Korsch*
28: *Symposium on Class*
29: *The Hungarian Revolution*
31: *On Gramsci*
39: *On Habermas*
40: *More Habermas*
42: *Germany and the Holocaust*
44: *Narcissism*
45: *On Lowenthal*
46: *The Crisis of the Left*
47: *On Poland*
50: *Symposium on Intellectuals*
51: *Western European Peace Movements and the Polish Crisis*

44 **LASCH, ARONOWITZ, EWEN, ALT, PICCONE, HEARN, JACOBY, KOVEL, ELSHTAIN:** Symposium on Narcissism; **LEVY ET AL.:** Tributes to Sartre; **ZUKIN:** Beyond Titoism; **LOWY:** Marcuse and Benjamin; **PACHTER:** Brecht's Politics; **JANIK:** Wittgenstein's Ethics; **HABERMAS:** On the German-Jewish Heritage

45 **JAY, HABERMAS, HELLER, GROSS, FEHER, LUDKE, SAYRE:** Tribute to Lowenthal; **FEHER:** Eastern Europe in the 1980s; **JACOBY:** Conformist Marxism; **ZASLAVSKY:** Ethnicity in the USSR; **MOUZELIS:** Reductionism in Marxist Theory; **LAYTON, PAPKE:** Towards a Non-Sexist Society

46 **RITTERSPORN:** Stalin in 1938; **CASTORIADIS:** Facing the War; **CARLO:** The Crisis of the State in the 1930s; **SCHMIDT:** Recent Hegel Literature; **KOGAWA:** Adorno's Strategy of Hibernation; **HOFENER:** Sparks, Insanity, Fireworks; **WOODS:** Black Politics in the '80s; **D'AMICO, KIM, PICCONE:** Marvin Farber: 1901-1980; **BRONNER:** Tribute to Henry Pachter: 1907-1980

47 **ARATO:** Civil Society vs. the State; **BAUMAN:** The Maturation of Socialism; **CARLO:** Afghanistan, Poland, Detente; **MICHNIK:** Hopes and Realities; **POMIAN:** Miracle in Poland; **MAZOWIECKI:** Solidarity's Task; **WOJCICKI:** The Reconstruction of Society; **DAMUS:** Strike Cycles in Poland; **SVITAK:** Comparisons; **SWIDLICKI:** Struggle for the Media; **MINK:** Public Opinion and Power in Poland

48 **FEKETE:** On Interpretation; **RADNOTI:** Mass Culture; **SILARD:** History of the Workers' Councils; **WELLMER:** Terrorism and Social Criticism; **HIRSCH:** The New Leviathan; **GORZ:** Nine Theses for a Future Left; **REED:** Narcissistic Politics in Atlanta; **GONZALES:** Rethinking Radical Politics; **SCHMIDT:** Recent Hegel Literature: Part II; **NAIR:** Goldmann's Legacy; **BAPTISTA:** 7 Models of Agrarian Reform

49 **HABERMAS:** Dialectics of Rationalization: An Interview; **HABERMAS:** New Social Movements; **BENHABIB:** Modernity and the Aporias of Critical Theory; **LOWY:** Marxism and Revolutionary Romanticism; **ZERZAN:** Origins and Meaning of World War I; **LANDES:** Feminism and the Internationals; **BUHLE:** E.P. Thompson and his Critics; **KOGAWA,** Japan as a Manipulated Society

50 **PICCONE, ZASLAVSKY:** Roots of Re-Armament; **ARATO:** Empire vs. Civil Society: Poland 1981-82; **MINSKY:** The Breakdown of the 1960s Policy Synthesis; **GROSS:** Time, Space, and Modern Culture; **WHITEBOOK:** Saving the Subject; **PUETZ:** Nietzsche and Critical Theory; **FEKETE:** Telos at 50; **SOELLNER:** Franz Neumann; **PAPKE, MANION, VISOR:** Women Respond to Racism; **ZERZAN:** Anti-Work and the Struggle for Control; **LUKE:** Anti-Work?

51 **TIMOFEEV:** Black Market Technology in the USSR; **RITTERSPORN:** Facing the War Psychosis; **AMMON, BRANDT:** The German Question; **BAHRO, VESTER:** 7 Taboos; **SUSS:** 'Armament Insanity' vs. 'Calculated Power'; **KALDOR:** Interview; **VIVERET:** Peace and Liberty; **HASSNER:** Defense, Rights, and Detente; Dialogue with Viveret; **GORZ:** Interview; **BAHRO:** Rapallo — Why Not? **GORZ:** Reply to Bahro; **DINER:** Notes on the Gorz-Bahro Controversy;

Cost to individuals: $4.50 per copy for issues prior to No. 40; $5.00 each for No. 40 onward. Institutions pay $10.00 each for all back issues. Foreign orders must add 10 percent. Address all orders to *Telos*, Box 3111, St. Louis, MO 63130 USA.

$5.50

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED